

Hudson Institute's Bradley Center for Philanthropy and Civic Renewal
and
Encounter Books
present

ENCOUNTER AT 10: The Power of Ideas

The 2008 Bradley Symposium



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Encounter at 10: The Power of Ideas
The 2008 Bradley Symposium
June 4, 2008

I. Edited Transcript

PROGRAM AND PANELS

9:00 a.m.

Continental Breakfast (Magnolia Room)

9:15

Introductory Remarks, **WILLIAM SCHAMBRA**
Introductory Remarks, **ROGER KIMBALL**
“Publishing and the Importance of Ideas”

9:30

PANEL 1

VICTOR DAVIS HANSON, Presenter
“Memory and Civic Education: The Perils of
Cultural Amnesia”
JAMES PIERESON, Discussant
Q&A

10:25

COFFEE BREAK (Magnolia Room)

10:45

PANEL 2

JOHN FONTE, Presenter
“Global Governance vs. the Liberal Democratic
Nation-State: What Is the Best Regime?”
JOHN O’SULLIVAN, Discussant
Q&A

11:35

PANEL 3

ANDREW MCCARTHY, Presenter
“The Jihad in Plain Sight”
ROBERT BORK, Discussant
Q&A

12:30

ADJOURNMENT

THIS TRANSCRIPT was prepared from an audio recording and edited by Krista Shaffer. To request further information on this event or the Bradley Center, or to read or download the commissioned essays upon which the June 4 discussion drew, please visit our web site, contact Hudson Institute at (202) 974-2424, or send an e-mail to Krista Shaffer at Krista@hudson.org.

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Visit <http://pcr.hudson.org> (under “Bradley Center Past Events”) for further information, audio and video recordings, and links to other online material.

Introductory Remarks by William Schambra

WILLIAM SCHAMBRA: My name is Bill Schambra, and I'm director of the Bradley Center for Philanthropy and Civic Renewal at Hudson Institute here in Washington. It's my privilege to welcome you to the 4th annual Bradley Symposium, "Encounter at 10: The Power of Ideas." As are many of the groups represented here today, the Bradley Center is a proud grantee of the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation located in Milwaukee. We're honored to have with us today so many of the foundation's board members and spouses, as well as staff members. We're particularly grateful to foundation vice president Dan Schmidt for his advice and assistance over the past several months. As ever, of course, the real work for this symposium was done by Hudson research fellow Krista Shaffer. Thank you so much, Krista, for all the work you've done. We join in celebrating the winners of the 2008 Bradley Prize, Gary Becker; Victor Davis Hanson, who will be on our first panel this morning; Alan Kors; and Robert Woodson, who has long been a friend of the Bradley Center.

At the end of last year's Bradley Symposium, we took note of the formation of the Bradley Project on America's National Identity under the wing of Anne Neal's American Council of Trustees and Alumni (ACTA). The project aimed to examine some of the questions we raised at that symposium—questions about who we are as a nation and a people, confronting ideas and forces that seem to be pulling us apart. Since then, that question has if anything increased in salience as our presidential candidates begin to discuss in earnest what draws us toward and what drives us away from each other as American citizens. This week, the Bradley Project issued its report entitled, *E Pluribus Unum*. I hope you all will consider carefully its a diagnosis and its recommendations.¹

For this year's Bradley Symposium, it's a particular honor to have as co-host Encounter Books, a publishing house that has also been a beneficiary of generous support from the Bradley Foundation—and that is now celebrating ten years of operation. Roger Kimball, who directs Encounter today, is a one-man illustration of the power of ideas and the various ways they can be placed into the public debate. He's not only a publisher, but also a prolific writer. He blogs almost daily at "Roger's Rules" on the web site Pajamasmedia.com (<http://pajamasmedia.com/rogerkimball/>). His books include *The Rape of the Masters: How Political Correctness Sabotages Art*, *The Long March: How the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s Changed America*, and *Tenured Radicals: How Politics Has Corrupted Our Higher Education*. How does he do it all? He will also be our master of ceremonies for the day, and it's now my honor to turn matters over to Roger Kimball.

(Applause.)

Introductory Remarks by Roger Kimball "Publishing and the Importance of Ideas"

ROGER KIMBALL: Thank you so much, Bill. It's a great pleasure to be here. My gratitude also goes to the Bradley Center for Philanthropy and Civic Renewal for organizing this. I must say that

¹ For more information on the Bradley Project, or to view a copy of the report online, please visit the project's web site at <http://www.bradleyproject.org/>, or visit the Bradley Foundation's web site at <http://www.bradleyfdn.org>.

Krista Shaffer has done a fantastic job, and I know from doleful experience how difficult it can be to get these conferences put together. So I'm very grateful.

Bill just mentioned the famous phrase *e pluribus unum*, and just as a kind of indication of what we're up against, I think of Al Gore's translation of that phrase, "out of one, many." (Laughter.) I think he wasn't paying attention in Latin class.

I just want to make a few remarks before I don my role as *immoderator* of today's festivities. The work of the Spanish-born, American philosopher George Santayana is not as well known today as it should be, in my opinion. But nearly everybody knows Santayana's observation that those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it. As the publisher of Encounter Books, a press concern with ideas and public policy, I often think of Santayana's admonition. It always inspires a certain fear and trembling, especially when I remember it in conjunction with that old Chinese curse, "May you live in interesting times."

We certainly do live in interesting times. It is an age in which faster is synonymous with better. When yesterday seems like ancient history and when empty hortatory words like change, audacity, and innovation are widely regarded as beneficent talisman of universal happiness—a happiness that never actually arrives, of course, but—so we are told anyway—is always just around the corner. At such a time simply remembering where we have been as a culture is of paramount importance. And it is worth pausing to note that a crucial part of remembering is facing up to reality—which means, among other things, having the courage to call things by their real names. One of the most corrosive legacies of political correctness is the culture of intellectual and moral euphemism that results from it. And it is part of Encounter's mission to resuscitate those essential cultural memory markers and speak frankly about the constellation of ideas that lead and mislead contemporary public life.

I'm deeply pleased, on the occasion Encounter's tenth anniversary year, to have this opportunity to reflect briefly on these perennial tasks, and introduce this distinguished panel of present and forthcoming Encounter authors. Let me start with a few questions.: Who are we—we Americans of the twenty-first century? How did we arrive at our present prosperity? What sacrifices were made by our forbearers to bequeath us the richest, freest, physically most secure society in history? What good ideas did the founders of this republic promulgate to our eventual benefit? And equally important, what bad ideas did they shackle, tame, and inoculate us against?

It is worth stressing the bad ideas. Santayana's observation about the dangers of forgetting the past is fearsome not only because of the good things we might miss should forgetting progress and metastasize. It is fearsome also because of the many bad things we thought we had vanquished only to see them striding buoyantly over the horizon once more. More than two decades ago, Daniel Patrick Moynihan ruefully noted that Republicans had become "The Party of Ideas." And all though it is not universally acknowledged, especially perhaps in this city, he was right about that, as recent American political history amply attests on issues from welfare and taxes to free markets and national security. And this fact tempts me to indulge in an extended parenthesis. Last week *The New Yorker* magazine ran a long piece by George Packer about the alleged bankruptcy of conservative ideas.² The cover of the newsstand edition even featured a headline wondering whether the GOP were, brain-dead—a question which prompted me to ask, compared to whom? (Laughter.)

² "The Fall of Conservatism," *The New Yorker*, May 26, 2008.

Now you might wonder why Mr. Packer identifies the GOP with conservatives. It seems pretty obvious that they are distinct creatures. But distinctions are not high on Mr. Packer's list of accomplishments in this article, which I found notably unsatisfactory in ways large and small. On the large side of the ledger, he seemed to mistake the triumph of intellectual sobriety with intellectual weakness. Compared with a situation of just a few decades ago, conservative ideas enjoy an enormous influence in our society nearly everywhere that doesn't begin with the words "The University of." On economic matters, for example, it is widely understood that low taxes and free-markets conduce to the production of wealth, and then what Friedrich Hayek called the "Extended Order of Cooperation"—that is capitalism—was enormously more successful at ensuring prosperity and underwriting liberty than any of the more sentimental, socialistic alternatives on offer.

It is part of the responsible exercise of intelligence to recognize the difference between ideas that work and those which merely produce a species of moral intoxication. Mr. Packer points to no left-wing liberal ideas that compete with the conservative ideas that he disparages. He merely assumes that because conservatives are not beating the gong called "change," they've run out of ideas. The truth is, conservative ideas are regnant, and those who support them understand the wisdom of Lord Falkland's observation that when it is not necessary to change, it is necessary not to change.

There is much more that I might say about Mr. Packer's article but I'll confine myself here to noting his description of *The New Criterion* as a "dour" publication—a characterization which suggests either that Mr. Packer doesn't know what the word "dour" means, that he's never read *The New Criterion*, or that he was engaged in this article primarily in a species of ideological combat masquerading his journalism. And these options, I should note, are not mutually exclusive. (Laughter.)

Let me return to Senator Moynihan. I wonder what he would say, were he with us today, about conservative ideas. It was the philosopher Samuel Goldwyn, I believe, who spoke of feeling as if it were "déjà vu all over again." I know what he means. Ideas that have been tried and found wanting, tried and found to be disastrous—the totalitarian temptation in all of its many guises, the multifarious utopian schemes for universal beatitude, efforts to curtail freedom in the name of an abstract republican virtue—all of these ideas were thoroughly discredited only yesterday. But, like some strange villain out of the science-fiction movie, they have suddenly changed shaped and are poised to attack again. We have yet to learn, even now, even at this late date, that promises of liberation often turn out to conceal new enchantments and novel forms of bondage.

Consider, to take just one issue that Encounter has weighed in on and that we will be discussing more this morning, the various efforts to deconstruct American identity and replace it with a multicultural rainbow or supranational bureaucracy. Such efforts have made astonishing inroads in the last few decades, and especially in the last few years. As the political philosopher Samuel Huntington has noted, the attack on American identity has counterparts elsewhere in the West, wherever the doctrine of multiculturalism has trumped the cause of national identity. The European Union, whose unelected leaders are as dedicated to multicultural shibboleth as they are to rule by top-down, anti-democratic bureaucracy is a case in point. But the United States, the most powerful nation-state, is also the most attractive target for deconstruction.

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It is a curious, not to say alarming, development. It corroborates James Burnham's observation that liberalism permits Western civilization to be reconciled to dissolution. For what we have witnessed with the triumph of multiculturalism is a kind of hypertrophy, or perversion, of liberalism as its core doctrines are pursued to the point of caricature. As the Australian philosopher David Stove pointed out, we in the West set ourselves to achieve a society which will be maximally tolerant. But that resolve not only gives maximum scope to the activities of those who have set themselves to achieve the maximally *intolerant* society. It also, and more importantly, paralyzes our own powers of resistance to them. Freedom, diversity, equality, tolerance, even democracy—how many definitive liberal virtues have been redacted into their opposites by the imperatives of political correctness? If a commitment to diversity mandates bilingual education, then we must institute bilingual education even if it results in the cultural disenfranchisement of those it was meant to benefit. The passion for equality demands affirmative action even though the process of affirmative action depends upon treating people very unequally.

Since September 11, 2001 these issues have taken on, I think, a new urgency. The murderous fanatics who destroyed the World Trade Center, smashed into the Pentagon and killed thousands of innocent civilians took the issue of multiculturalism out of the fetid atmosphere of the graduate seminar and into the streets. Or rather, they dramatized the fact that multiculturalism was never merely an academic matter. In a sense, the actions of those terrorists were less an attack on the United States than part of what Benjamin Netanyahu called "a war to reverse the triumph of the West."

We are still very far from being in a position to assess the full significance of September 11th for the simple reason that those detonations that began that day continue to reverberate. A battle of wills, a contest of values, indeed a war of ideas was initiated, or at least openly acknowledged, on September 11th. It is much too early to predict the course of that conflict. Indeed, September 11th precipitated a crisis, the end of which we cannot see.

Part of the task that faces us now is to acknowledge the depth of barbarism that challenges the survival of culture. And part of that acknowledgement lies in reaffirming the core values that are under attack. That reaffirmation is another part of Encounter's mission. Ultimately, victory in the conflict that besieges us will be determined not by smart weapons, but by smart heads. That is to say, the conflict is not so much—or not only—a military conflict as a conflict of world views, a conflict of ideas. And that is where institutions like Encounter Books can play an important role. My point is that when we speak of publishing and the power of ideas, we need to give at least as much attention to criticizing seductive bad ideas as we do to promulgating the good ones. Indeed, because vital good ideas that impinge upon politics and social life tend to be elaborations of relatively simple home-truths, the critical project of exposing bad ideas is often tantamount to revealing the good ideas that the bad ones had obscured or perverted.

We have, as I say, assembled a distinguished panel of present and forthcoming Encounter authors to discuss some of these issues—the issues that face Western society, and that will determine the course of our civilization. I'd like to begin our program by turning to the classicist and military historian Victor Davis Hanson, who will deliver the first paper. Thank you very much.

(Applause.)

PANEL 1

“Memory and Civic Education: The Perils of Cultural Amnesia”

VICTOR DAVIS HANSON, Presenter “Memory and Civic Education: The Perils of Cultural Amnesia”

JAMES PIERESON, Discussant

VICTOR DAVIS HANSON: Thank you very much. I am very happy to be here and honored to be a part of this panel.

I was asked to speak about cultural amnesia and the wages of not knowing who we are and who our ancestors were. We should remember that in the very beginning of the Western liberal experience—that is, the ancient Greek city state and the Roman republic—there was a sense that if free citizens did not know who the people in their immediate and distant past were, then they could not really go forward themselves or pass on that legacy to their children. One thinks in this regard of the famous opening remarks of Pericles in the second book of Thucydides’ history; he said, “I shall start with my ancestors.” Or one thinks of the AD second-century biographer Plutarch, who wrote *Illustrious Lives*—that’s how it translates in English—of notable Greeks and Romans. The book’s point was to provide young Roman citizens with pillars of emulation.

What was behind this idea, whether it manifested itself in literature or in art or in collective monuments and memories, graphic, artistic, in stone, or on papyrus? What was the point of this? I would sum it up briefly as, the Greeks and Romans believe that all of us are a part of a great chain of culture and civilization; that our link in the here and now is not predicated on what we have done, but what our ancestors have done; we have a responsibility to them to pass on something better than what we inherited to our children; and if we were to not do that, if we were to indulge in our appetites, then this fragile chain—I use “chain,” but it is the wrong metaphor, because it is very fragile—would break and all of what people, if I could use a modern illustration, who were in crosses at Normandy Beach had done would be squandered by us, and we would *not* be able to transmit the affluence and prosperity that we were bequeathed.

And I think, as we all know, we are worried about our cultural amnesia. We’re worried that our youth today are not aware not only of the dates and facts and people of the past, but of how dependent we are upon their sacrifices. We could talk for quite a long time about the wages of multiculturalism, or utopian pacifism, or moral equivalence in our schools and universities, but I would like just to point out four or five trends in the writing of history, in the looking back at the past, that seem to me have done a lot of damage and impair our appreciation for our ancestors.

The first is what I would call the drudgery of the past. The enemy of liberalism at any time is drudgery, so today when we write history as melodrama—that is, we go back and pick and choose heroes and villains, often based on their race or class or gender, with the idea that by doing so we win applause or praise in the present for our apparent liberality—what we are forgetting is the physical conditions of the past. If somebody is on the frontier and they are less sensitive to Native Americans, we forget that to cook a meal or to clean a home might take four or five hours. We forget that if you were not entirely “equal”—“you” being a man or a woman—in a frontier hut, it might be predicated on the fact that to have two children or three children survive you and then perpetuate your culture, you might—as was true of civilizations until the

nineteenth century—have to be have to be pregnant ten or twelve or thirteen or fifteen or twenty times. I am thinking in this regard of my grandmother, who was one of twelve children; to have twelve children her mother was pregnant nineteen times, and out of those nineteen pregnancies twelve came to full term, and out of those twelve, four died. For me to suggest that I would hear my grandmother use the word “Indian” rather than “Native American” is absolutely absurd. In their way of thinking—“their” meaning almost everybody up until the present generation—it was simply a matter of survival one more day. When we go back and we apply these standards of the utopian future or indeed the prosperous present, and we condemn them for being illiberal, it’s the worst sort of hypocrisy.

There is a recent book out by Nicholson Baker about how we committed something tantamount to a war crime by bombing Hamburg. Forget the decision, whether it was tactically, strategically or morally sound. Does anybody in this room realize what it was like to get into a rickety B-17, fly nine hours, deal with somebody like the Wehrmacht in the sky with a Focke-Wulf 190, fly back, and do that twenty-five to thirty hours a week? Part of our inability to appreciate the past is, we have no idea of the physical conditions—the diseases, the problems with food, the dangers from security—that our ancestors not only overcame, but overcame in such a way to pass on this culture to ourselves.

There is another problem with the present generation’s inappreciation of past, or “cultural amnesia,” as many of us have termed it, and that is the absence of any notion of magnitude. We look back in the past and almost all the events were of equal merit. I think all of us appreciate the work of Sojourner Truth or Harriet Tubman in helping slaves escape the Confederacy, but by any notion of what destroyed the notion of slavery, it was the work of two men, largely, as well as Lincoln; the two men were William Tecumseh Sherman and Ulysses S. Grant. Those names are almost unknown to today’s youth. Why? Because they don’t resonate in the present in terms of a class or a gender or a racial connotation. And yet by any fair measure there is a reason why today there is a General Sherman tree and General Grant tree. Our ancestors understood that had those two men not did what they had done, we wouldn’t have inherited a unified United States today.

I have been very lucky to have three children who were all history majors. They have all now graduated from college. One of the games I used to play with them was to say, before they took a class in World War II history or Civil War history, that when the class was over I was going to ask them a simple question. For the Civil War, the question was, what is the Battle of Shiloh? And when the course was over and I asked the question, they could tell me everything about women’s roles in the pre-plantation South but almost *nothing* about the Battle of Shiloh. In the case of World War II, I reserved the question, what was Okinawa and the 50,000 Americans who were killed, wounded or lost there? or what was it like to go into Iwo Jima? In almost every case they could not tell me, but they volunteered very rapidly information about three topics: the Japanese internment, the amazing career of Rosie the Riveter, and the war crime of dropping the bomb on Hiroshima. It’s not that those are not profound incidents in the nature of World War II, but they have no notion of magnitude—of the twenty million Russians civilians who died on the Eastern Front; of the complete destruction of the German Army Group “B” at the Falaise Gap; or what the Americans suffered—80,000 dead or wounded—in the hedge rows after the successful D-Day landing.

So part of our problem is that when we don’t examine the past, we lose all sense of what was important, and you can see the ramifications for the present. We ourselves do not think and do

not know what is important in the present and what is not. So we can say something like, “Iraq is the worst blunder in our history” because we lost 4,000—in, I think, a noble sacrifice—because we have nothing to calibrate that with. Nobody knows what the Meuse-Argonne (World War I) was. Nobody knows what Belleau Wood (World War I) was. Nobody knows what Chancellorsville (Civil War) was. That is the second problem with the inappreciation of the past, the notion that we can’t calibrate what is important and what is less so.

There is another, third train that’s very disturbing, and it is an element of our cultural amnesia—and that’s the notion of what I guess I would call utopianism, the notion that in the past there were always good and bad choices, and we can fault our ancestors for making a wrong choice. But in fact if you were an American and you were trying to stop the Wehrmacht in 1941, and most of Europe was overrun and on every level of technology you were at a disadvantage, whether we are talking about German Mausers, 88mm artillery, or fighter planes, or tanks, especially. What would you do if you didn’t have the resources and you had to stop that? You might find that an alliance with Soviet Russia, which after all had killed twenty million people, was of some advantage to you—and the Soviet Union did kill two out of every three soldiers of the German Army.

But the point is, you would not go back and say, the Soviet Union at that point was not perfect, and therefore it didn’t do good for us. These are terrible choices that are involved in history. We will have an inability to grasp the dilemma that our ancestors were faced with if we often hear that the people who came west were exploiters of the wild, and we never hear that there were two to three Native Americans per hundred square miles in the West, while there was the opposite situation in Ireland or in Russia at the time—there may have been a hundred or two hundred individuals per square mile. Any time history gives you that dilemma—where people have the ability to come to a place that is quite empty and leave a place where they were quite crowded and sick—history doesn’t say, don’t do that—it’s not moral. That’s a choice that happens. People in Ireland did not want to come here and kill people; they found that they were either going to starve, or they were going to have a chance at a different life.

We can really see, again, the wages of that when we look at this present war. For example, we are told that, gosh, we empowered Iran or we empowered Iraq in the Iran-Iraqi war. Well, what choice is there? In Iran you had a country that took hostages and sponsored international terrorism, and in Iraq you had a country that had attacked four of its neighbors. We are told that we shouldn’t have helped the tribal sheikhs that were Sunni and may or may not have been actively involved in Al-Qaeda. What choice do you have between Al-Qaeda and tribal Sunni sheikhs that want to get rid of Al-Qaeda? But this inability to distinguish a bad and a worse choice is one of the great legacies that comes from not knowing the past.

Finally there is a fourth that I think is very important, and this is sort of a modern example of hypocrisy: We in the twenty-first century are the most affluent, leisured and comfortable generation in history, and there is something very strange about all of us who get behind our desks in our library carrels and start to pass judgment about a prior generation that had the ability to do what we simply cannot do.

I can remember this very clearly: When I was a high school student and I was taking a class in world history, the teacher made us read John Hersey’s *Hiroshima*. I finally made the vague correlation that my father had flown forty missions in a B-29, so I came home very arrogantly

and said, “Well, we were just told you dropped a bomb on Nagasaki and Hiroshima. How dare you do that! Aren’t you afraid?” My father said, “Well that was small potatoes compared to the fire raids that I participated in, so why don’t you get mad at me for that as well?” So I went back to class and told the teacher, and she got mad at him. And I went back home and I said, “You are even worse than I thought!” And I remember my father, rather than trying to defend the strategy, the tactics, the politics involved—which were all defensible, said something I will never forget. He said, “When you get to be twenty-one, son, I want you to get up in the morning at three, take your (inaudible) tablet, and fly the distance from here to Salt Lake City—only you will be over the ocean in the black of the night. Then sit on top of twenty tons of napalm and don’t wear a parachute, because if you bail out they are going to behead you anyway—so what’s the point? And then turn around and fly back. And when you have done that for six months and you have had sixteen planes with eleven men in each crew, and there are only two left, I want you to welcome the next eight crews and know that out of those eight, seven are going to be dead. And when all that’s done I want you to grow up, and then have your sixteen year old son tell you what you have just told me.” (Laughter.)

I just returned from Europe leading a group of people to examine sites like Agincourt, Waterloo, Bastogne. There is a Meuse-Argonne cemetery not far from Luxembourg City. 18,000 Americans are buried there. Last year 30,000 Americans went there. It doesn’t get the attention that Normandy Beach does after *Saving Private Ryan*. We have simply lost the collective notion of what is important and who lies under the crosses and what they did.

So, what are the wages, then, of our cultural amnesia and this arrogance of the present?

The first, of course, is that it creates a certain arrogance on our part; we feel that all of the infrastructure we inherited—all of the roads, the universities, the freedom, the abstract and the material—are somehow our creations. We are a generation of dead souls who float around our buildings, float around our universities and our roads, and we have no idea that almost everything that is there came from somebody else.

The second thing is, it encourages this sense of self-importance. My generation—I’ve said and it’s true that we have been the worst generation in a hundred years—we have this idea that we solved the Civil Rights problem; we solved the environmental crisis; we solved the question of gender equity. But all of those issues had precursors, and we wouldn’t have been able to do anything had we not discussed this in a manner and in a way that led to the eventual evolution. And the truth is that we are the generation that gave us Botox, and we are going to bankrupt the Social Security system, and we will not under any circumstance raise the retirement age for Social Security or lower the benefits. And yet we claim that we are far more liberal than the people who created the Social Security system.

Finally, there is a fragility about constitutional government. The notion of America is not some notion that was written in stone and as such is going to exist in perpetuity. The very idea that you could create a constitution; and it would be a nation of ideas; and it would evolve; and the natural evolution of it would be what we see today, many races, many religions; and they would all be united by not just a common language, but a common, shared culture, that is a very radical idea. The people in the United States do not understand how exceptional, but also how fragile this country is, and that the work of 225 years or more can be lost in a single generation, then we are in big trouble. We should keep remembering what history, which is very cruel, tells any culture,

any people, any civilizations, *you get no pass*. The first time you think that you are no better than the alternative, or you do not know who you are and how to defend yourself, then there is no reason for you to continue. And as we know from classical Athens, eighteenth-century France, or the France of 1940, they *don't* continue.

Thank you very much!

ROGER KIMBALL: Thank you, Victor. It is my pleasure now to introduce James Piereson, who will respond to Victor Hanson's talk. I won't burden you with a long description of everyone's biographies since you can find that information in your packet, but I will mention that one of Jim Piereson's more recent accomplishments is to have written a very good book for Encounter called *Camelot and the Culture Revolution: How the Assassination of John F. Kennedy Shattered American Liberalism* (2007).

JAMES PIERESON: Let me add my congratulations to Victor and the other recipients of the Bradley Prizes, all richly earned and deserved.

I find that I have very little to add to Victor Davis Hanson's fine essay on the collapse of civic education into a corrosive mixture of ignorance and political correctness. The great strength of his essay is that it documents the real price the American people are paying now and will pay in the future for the distorted view of the American past that is now taught in our schools and colleges. Churchill warned that those that would start an argument between the past and the present will soon find that they have lost the future. Mr. Hanson shows us that in losing our past, we may also lose our future. Since I cannot add anything to Mr. Hanson's essay, please permit me to make some remarks on the questions that he raises with an eye to arriving at the same destination by a somewhat different route.

He notes in his essay that the classical definition of a civic education is linked to an ideal of collective memory—that is, how a people views its past, what duties it prescribes to the living, and how it aims to shape the future. The Greeks and Romans took civic education most seriously, looking to great figures of the past as exemplars of virtuous conduct and relying on statesmen to infuse both catastrophe and victory with historical meaning. The ancients—the Athenians, the Spartans, and Romans alike—understood that their lofty position in the world was due to the sacrifices of their ancestors. The funeral oration of Pericles, the classic statement of civic memory, begins with a dedication to Athenian ancestors.

Yet America, as a new nation and as a nation of immigrants, finds itself in a somewhat novel situation, in some of these respects. For many Americans today as in the past, their ancestors were not in Philadelphia in 1776 or 1787, or at Gettysburg in 1863, but in Silesia, Sicily, Scandinavia, and other such far off places. When Americans cite the achievements or sacrifices of their ancestors, they do so more in a metaphorical than in a literal sense.

This gives rise to the thought that America is not an ancestral nation, but rather a propositional nation—that is, to be an American one need not be descended from the Founders, but only must endorse a set of ideals found in the Declaration or the Constitution. Many view that this is America's great strength, and perhaps it is. On the other hand there is, as Mr. Hanson notes, a certain fragility to it as well, for if the ideals somehow lose their power, the nation disintegrates with them. This is the troubling proposition that he introduces in his fine essay.

Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg Address is usually understood as America's answer to the funeral oration of Pericles. In that speech, given to dedicate a cemetery for the soldiers killed in the battle four months earlier, Lincoln did not dwell on the sacrifices of ancestors but on their creation. They had brought forth a new nation dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal. Lincoln's vision of America as set forth here and later in the Second Inaugural Address was biblical. The American story was a modern retelling of the biblical story of the ancient Israelites. Americans, he said, were "the almost chosen people." This was in some ways a Protestant telling of the American settlement, but now applied to politics and civic education. This was Lincoln's version of a civil religion.

Lincoln was joined on the platform at Gettysburg by Edward Everett, a renowned orator and then the leading American scholar of ancient Greece. As a young man Everett ventured to Germany to earn a Ph.D. in Ancient Greek, the first American to earn a doctorate and the first of many to travel to Germany for advanced education. Everett was later a professor of Greek at Harvard, president of the college, and later secretary of state. Everett was part of the Greek revival of the nineteenth century. The founders, on the other hand, had focused more on Rome than Greece. In his address, Everett pointed to the honors that the Athenians bestowed upon those who fell in battle. He went on to compare the Battle of Gettysburg to the Battle of Marathon. The victory at Marathon had saved Athens, just as the victory at Gettysburg had saved the Union. Those who fell at Marathon were given special honors comparable to the obsequies at Gettysburg.

In these speeches Lincoln and Everett set forth the two great civic metaphors that propelled the growth of the United States through the nineteenth and into the twentieth century. American was Israel; America was Athens, or perhaps Rome. These two ideals had enormous power through this entire period. Ancient studies and biblical theology were the two great civic and religious themes taught in the nation's schools and colleges. In tandem they addressed one of the great intellectual questions of the millennium now past, how to square pagan learning with biblical revelation. Together they provided both a moral and a historical perspective on the American experiment.

Madison and Hamilton, as we know, looked to the ancient world for historical lessons to guide the construction of the Constitution. Federalism, the senate, the unitary executive—all were argued for in the Federalist Papers drawing on examples from Ancient Greece and Rome. That generation believed that the lessons of the ancients were timeless, that certain principles of human conduct applied at all times, and that history therefore moved in cycles of growth and eventual decay. The Constitution was designed to slow down or arrest the decay.

These two civic metaphors no longer have the power that they once did, and have largely been swept aside in elite educational circles. The secular and anti-religious drift of our age has swept away the biblical metaphor. The rise of historicism has elongated the intellectual distance between ourselves and the ancients, which has thereby shattered Madison's assumption that there are genuine lessons for our time to be found in Greece and Rome, or indeed in the past. Mr. Hanson has himself written an outstanding book on the decay of classical studies: *Who Killed Homer? The Demise of Classical Education and the Recovery of Greek Wisdom*, published by Encounter Books. I recommend that volume highly.

These powerful civic metaphors have been replaced by conceptions that are either weak—secular liberalism, or destructive—multiculturalism and political correctness. A great value of the biblical and the ancient traditions was that they provide an external perspective on American life and the American experience, a standpoint from which we could assess our progress, evaluate our institutions, and understand disappointment and tragedy. The liberal doctrine of rights and equality, which has taken over our educational institutions and in many cases even our churches, provides no such perspective that might introduce limits to its own claims or point to more realistic ways of assessing the past. Liberalism as a doctrine is too abstract to supply that perspective; we must rely on other traditions of thought to supply it. The older civic metaphors provided a map and a compass for the American journey into the future, cultural tools that today we find lacking. One wonders where we might find them again.

Perhaps, on the other hand, this is precisely the kind of crisis or failure that Madison anticipated when he designed that magnificent political machine, the US Constitution. The multiculturalists and deconstructionists still have to reckon with that obstacle to their aims. One hopes that Madison will have outsmarted the post-modernists after all. Still, one cannot be too confident about that, in view of constitutional developments over the past many decades. This is why we still need authors like Mr. Hanson and publishers like Encounter Books to develop auxiliary safeguards against the intemperate passions of our time.

Thank you.

ROGER KIMBALL: Thank you, Jim. Before we open it up to questions, I wonder, Victor, if you have anything you'd like to say in response to Jim's comments?

VICTOR DAVIS HANSON: I think what Jim talked about was the definition of what a classically liberal education is, and we forget that what the ancients thought education was. We have all these different terms for it today. It's not making one aware, and it's not necessarily just making one sensitive or knowledgeable about what the right or wrong thing to do is—moral education.

Basically, in the classical sense all education was, was two things: It taught the student to look at the world inductively—so, it taught a method. You were to look empirically at examples, and you were to come to a general thesis that would apply as sort of a wisdom of the ages; it would transcend your situation in the present. The second that was critical to that classical education is, you had to have what the Romans called *exempla*: names, dates, people. If you didn't have the examples and you didn't have the methodology, you weren't educated. If you had the methodology without the examples you weren't educated. If you had the examples without the methodology you weren't educated.

And what was the purpose for education besides being a good citizen and having some *technae*, or the ability of science and reason, to be a good citizen? There was also something that I think is very critical that we've forgotten, and I thought of it when Jim was reading that excellent essay. An education makes us immune from the charge of "presentism"—that is, if we have a bad day at the office, or if we're a woman who sees that a man is being promoted by his gender, or we see that the nicer we are to somebody, the worse they treat us—we have these *exempla*. We look to Sophocles' Ajax, or Oedipus, or Euripides' *Bacchae*. We have all of these friends out there that

we've accumulated as part of our education that remind us that we're not unique, and it's all happened before. I think that's really the great value of civic education.

ROGER KIMBALL: Thank you, Victor. We have about fifteen minutes for questions. Yes—right over there?

QUESTION: I'd like to turn the question of bad to worse back on the speaker, Mr. Hanson. That is, maybe our education today is bad, but is it worse than it was? You mentioned what your teacher taught back when you were growing up, and to throw out a random cultural example—I could throw out a lot more—I'm much happier that my children are watching Stephen Colbert than Walter Cronkite.

VICTOR DAVIS HANSON: I'm not. I know that we can easily find examples of bias in Walter Cronkite's efforts, and what he said during the Tet Offensive, I think, not only was reprehensible but had very deleterious effects for a generation. But there was, in the evening news, some facts and data. I'll be candid—what I don't like about Stephen Colbert or any of that genre is the sarcasm, the cynicism, and almost the nihilism, where nothing is at it seems. It's the David Letterman take on the world: There's always a double entendre. When you see Stephen Colbert, you don't know whether he's serious. It's funny, but it sends the wrong message to our young people, the message that nothing is as is or it should be, and there is always somebody a little bit smarter and a little bit more clever. And for the young person, the net effect of that is, when he wants to talk about civic education or memory it seems corny or straightforward or too one-dimensional. We live in an age, I think, of nihilism and skepticism, and it sends the wrong message.

As far as education in general, the reason why I think that education is not as valuable today, and is not as competitive today as it was when I grew up in public schools in the '60s and '70s, is because we and the people immediately prior to us destroyed classical education in the United States—classically liberal education—but we were still the beneficiaries. We got that great gift, and then we turned around and destroyed it. I know that as a graduate student we complained about having to write in Greek and Latin and take Greek and Latin composition. But then we destroyed that requirement at most graduate schools, and the next generation never got to have that benefit.

And when I look at the education that my children got, and I look at the eight-hour day or six-hour day they had, how in the world were they going to be educated in a zero-sum game when they had to take AIDS education, drug education, gender sensitivity, citizenship—citizenship in the very narrow sense of environmentalism—and things like that? There are so many therapeutic dimensions to the present education that there's simply no time for all of what the ancients said education was—and it was very simple; it was just history, science, rhetoric, language, and philosophy. So we've created the worst of both worlds. We've created people who are enormously ignorant and at the same time sort of arrogant. I think it has been a classic tragedy of American public education in the last twenty years.

ROGER KIMBALL: I'd like to add that this starts very early. My wife and I took our five-year-old son a few years ago to a possible school where he would go to kindergarten. We were greeted at the door by big posters proclaiming the institution's commitment to diversity and so on, and shepherded into an auditorium where we were introduced seriatim to the school

psychologist, the school social worker, and the school “literacy expert”—who when I was growing up was called the reading teacher. The literacy expert, a woman in late middle-age, proceeded to act out the story of *Goldilocks and the Three Bears*—sort of vamping it up that Goldilocks was a “babe.” This went on for a while, and afterwards it took me some time to kind of calm down—we left—but I remember that as I was driving home I asked James, our son, what he had thought of it because he knew the story of *Goldilocks and the Three Bears*. And his one response—maybe he’s a budding literary critic or something—his one response was, “She left out the porridge”—which was true. So, in her effort to tart up the story, she had totally destroyed it. So it starts very early.

Are there other questions or comments—yes, sir?

QUESTION: This is for Professor Hanson. I see a conflict or potential conflict between your first two principles. It seems to me that your point about a life of drudgery being the enemy of liberalism would point to teaching a certain kind of social history, while your second principle, that we need to understand magnitude better, would point to political history. You did say that Lincoln is more important than Harriet Tubman. Don’t you see a conflict there, and how would you resolve it?

VICTOR DAVIS HANSON: I don’t see a conflict. I was suggesting that if people in the past don’t conform to our present definition of “liberal” or “illiberal,” it’s not just because they were selfish or they were unaware, (but) that simply because to survive, they didn’t have enough time, enough attention, enough hours to read, enough access to communication capable of changing their awareness. They were worried pretty much from one minute to the next. That was more at home to me when I first read Hesiod’s *Works and Days*. He has a great description of a wagon, and when I came home from university that weekend I looked at my grandfather’s wrecks of wagons around the hills, and I realized that there was no difference. In other words, we were the first generation that had done something different in 2,500 years—in his case, even longer.

My point was that it’s easy to be more sensitive when you have the leisure and the affluence and the capital that our generation does. But if all of us right now were out in a wheat field, and many of us were sick today without antibiotics, we wouldn’t have this access. I’m not suggesting that that excuses illiberality or insensitivity or prejudice; it’s just something that we have to take into account. That was my only point.

I don’t know quite the parallel you were making with magnitude, but I think that’s one that’s very important. We don’t have the classical criteria any longer, a grasp of how many lives were changed, or how many borders were changed, or how many people died or were saved. I know that Harriet Tubman in the long term did a lot of good, and that the Underground Railroad was important, but for that moment of saving the Union, there (were) only four or five people in the United States in the summer of 1864 who could do that.

It’s sort of like saying today (that) it’s very important that we understand and we study the role of women in Iraq. I think it’s essential that we do so. Or that we look at the question of race and class on promotions in Iraq. But at this moment, at this time, if we did not have this Matthew Ridgway/William Tecumseh Sherman figure like David Petraeus, an entire theatre, and with that theatre an entire region, and with that region an entire moment in American history would be lost. One individual has done something that’s quite extraordinary.

That was my only point. Maybe Jim wants to—

JAMES PIERESON: I would just add that the people who live today—well, let's put it this way: people who lived in 1900 or 1850 probably lived lives more similar to those living five-hundred years before, or maybe even a thousand years before, than they (did) to the people living today. People from the mid- to late twentieth century lived in a kind of world that no one had ever imagined before. So it was easy for people in the past to understand that life really was difficult and tragic; they needed no reminders of that. We seem to require some reminders about how difficult was the passage to the point that we've arrived at today. We do live in a kind of unprecedented civilization and we seem to lack the appreciation of what was required to arrive here.

VICTOR DAVIS HANSON: I would just add one last point—that conservatism really is in some ways easy to fathom in the past. You tried to do what exactly your father did, because if you made one mistake you could be dead. Today you can experiment with all sorts of different protocols, lifestyles, and there's no worry that you're not going to have enough to eat. But in the past, if you didn't plant wheat at a particular date based on your reading of the stars and the constellations, and you didn't do it after a particular rain—and instead you decided that you wanted to do something a little different and you wanted to gamble—you weren't gambling with yourself or your lifestyle. You were predicating the very survival of your wife, your children (and) your community. And that tends to be reinforced in everything you do, and it promotes a certain conservative view of the world that I think today's liberal critics don't appreciate at all.

ROGER KIMBALL: I would like to add that we have kind of a terminological difficulty here, too, because in many ways the kind of conservatism that Victor (Hanson) is talking about is not opposed to liberalism in the old sense of "liberal," the sense in which, for example, Edmund Burke was a liberal or I am a liberal or Victor, I think, is probably a liberal.

I remember Russell Kirk saying that he was a conservative *because* he was a liberal—that is to say, he was conservative wanting to conserve that which was handed down to us, the best from the past, precisely because he wanted to provide the most secure guarantees possible for freedom, and I think that's been lost sight of in the, sort of, illiberal liberalism that has gained so much traction in our culture.

Some other questions? Yes, sir?

AL MILLIKAN, Washington Independent Writers: What have you both been hearing from the intellectuals, the academics, and the cultural elites you know in response to the topics Jeremiah Wright has brought to the forefront of American consciousness?

VICTOR DAVIS HANSON: I would just make a brief remark. I was born in 1953, and I did not think in my lifetime that the national scene, the collective public, would ever see something that Reverend Wright did; I never thought that an African American or any member of the clergy would go to a regional meeting of the NAACP, as he did—I think it was in Detroit, and in front of the entire audience make the case that we humans have genetic differences in learning ability and those genetic differences are predicated by race, and then be greeted by a standing ovation and silence from the candidates. No censure. What was something that was just absolutely

stunning—that nobody challenged that. I think that was a great setback in the public attitude towards race. That was something right out of the nineteenth century, and yet nobody said a word.

Barack Obama promised us an honest dialogue about race and, in fact, you only get one chance, when you give a landmark speech about race. If you don't speak honestly and candidly—you can only do that one time, and now we're in this dilemma. We are seeing that people are making this argument, and Roger (Kimball) knows it better than I do because he has written about the "wages of the university." The esoteric theories of post-modernism *do* filter down, and this idea that one can't be racist or one can't be sensitive or one should not be subject to abstract censure because of one's race or gender has finally filtered down and we can see in the flesh in what happened.

JAMES PIERESON: I'd only add that I think there is a sense of embarrassment and the wish that (Wright) would disappear. Of course, many of the kinds of things that he said are the kinds of things that are taught on the college campus about America and the sins of the past. To many people it's somewhat indelicate to raise it publicly the middle of an election campaign.

VICTOR DAVIS HANSON: I would just make one last point. His comments about Hiroshima were very interesting because he said, essentially—if I can remember right, that we were pathological when we had done something like drop the bomb on Hiroshima. If he were to go back and read the literature in the newspaper, accounts of that time, there was a great deal of censure about Hiroshima, but there was also censure, I guess, from veterans themselves who felt that we should have used the bomb earlier on Okinawa, which we invaded in April 1945 and lost fifty thousand dead, wounded, and missing.

So it's just the opposite of what he thinks. There were no good choices, and we don't want to get into that historical crux, but it does seem that from what we know now about Japan, Reverend Wright was absolutely clueless that we were going to have to invade all the way until 1946 and hundreds of thousands of people were going to be killed. Curtis LeMay had a nightmarish idea to bring six or seven thousand bombers from Okinawa and do what he had done in March of 1945 almost monthly.

Again, it's an example of someone who doesn't know much, but knows "one great thing" to paraphrase Archilochus:³ that if you evoke Hiroshima it has a sort of shock value; it's a *fides* or a pledge of how liberal you are, and the discussion stops. Nobody can dare challenge you. That's what's so scary—how we are self-censoring ourselves.

JAMES PIERESON: I would just add that it turns out that Reverend Wright's church received many millions of dollars in federal grants over this period in which he was preaching for housing and that sort of thing. So one wonders why one wins government grants by damning the country and the government that provides it. But that's been a kind of tactic that we've seen, really, from the 1960's and 1970's. You win grants from the government by denouncing it. If we had a somewhat different policy we might have a different kind of rhetoric from people like Reverend Wright.

³ "The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one great thing," or word for word, "Fox knows many, / Hedgehog one / Solid trick." (The latter is from Guy Davenport's *Carmina Archilochi: The Fragments of Archilochus*: University of California Press, 1964.)

ROGER KIMBALL: It's also interesting to note that Reverend Wright was to be the commencement speaker at Northwestern University, but it was only because of his recent travails that they, at the last moment, withdrew the invitation. I find it absolutely shocking that a major university would consider such a character to be a commencement speaker. What sort of wisdom would he be imparting to the next generation?

On the subject of Hiroshima, my father was a Marine in World War II, and I know that he was very grateful indeed that he did not have to invade the islands of Japan. That would have meant absolute carnage for hundreds of thousands of Americans and millions of Japanese.

I think we have time for one more question.

QUESTION: This is for both of you, Dr. Hanson and Dr. Piereson. I'm on a school board in California and Dr. Hanson, you wrote a book called *Mexifornia*. We're dealing with educating a lot of Title I children who don't speak English. In trying to defend the classical education, what are the best defenses that this is helpful preparation that they need to enter our society? I'd appreciate your comments.

VICTOR DAVIS HANSON: One of the reasons I wrote the book is, my children went to public school, and I knew something was wrong—I was a professor of Latin and Greek who can read Spanish, and I would have parents come to me and ask me to translate Spanish documents to them because they didn't speak Spanish. They didn't read Spanish. They either had left school in seventh or eighth grade and did not read Spanish very well, or they were *mestizos* and Spanish was not their first language. So the federal government was spending money to teach people desperately in need of the tools to compete with those who had advantages of foreign language. That wasn't true of all, of course, or even the majority, but it was true of some.

One of the things that we tried to do at California State University, Fresno, was have a pilot program—it sounds absurd, but we offered Latin to sixth and seventh graders who were predominantly Hispanic-Mexican-American. And we found that if somebody speaking Spanish wanted to transition to English, not only would Latin be something, as a romance language, that would have commonality—in vocabulary, in philology, in syntax, and in grammar—if they were successful it would give them a boost over other groups that had advantages. Again, it seems to me and I tried to point that out in that book, but as Roger says, the classically liberal position was always integration, inter-marriage, assimilation and trying to offer classical education to people who had just arrived here so that they could compete in the way that they speak. But that's a tragic lesson lost.

I'll just finish with this: I can remember that when I was a third grader, I was in a predominantly Mexican-American and Mexican-national class. And our teacher—in a very illiberal sense—would ask us to stand up and say, "I have a stick-shift Chevy." And anybody who garbled it was remonstrated—not because the teacher was being cruel but because she wanted us to realize that we were going to be judged on the quality of our speech and our diction, and people were going to make unfair inferences about our inability to speak perfect English. "When I get done with you you're all going to speak perfect English," she told us.

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When I think of my English compared to some of that generation—I don't speak as well as they do today, and there are very successful Mexican-American students. So we were about as illiberal as you could be to immigrants. We ask nothing of the immigrant. We didn't want anything of him, didn't require any sacrifice of him, and I think in many cases he was willing to give that.

ROGER KIMBALL: Professor Higgins said, "The rain in Spain falls mainly on the plain." We need to take a lesson from his book. Thank you all very much for coming to this first panel. We are going to adjourn for a brief break now, but I've been told to run this symposium with Prussian efficiency, so we will begin again at quarter to eleven sharp.

Thank you very much.

PANEL 2

“Global Governance vs. the Liberal Democratic Nation-State: What Is the Best Regime?”

JOHN FONTE, Presenter

JOHN O’SULLIVAN, Discussant

ROGER KIMBALL: We’ll proceed now with our second panel. John Fonte from Hudson Institute will speak first, and then responding to him will be John O’Sullivan. John (Fonte)?

EDITOR’S NOTE: John Fonte referred during his remarks to a PowerPoint presentation, the slides of which have been incorporated below.

JOHN FONTE: Thank you, Roger.

The primary question of politics is, who shall govern and in what regime? The traditional American answer has been, the people govern themselves within the liberal democratic nation-state.



Recently, an ad from a major American university asks the question, “As a global citizen, to whom do I pledge allegiance?” The ad suggests that the issues of American identity, sovereignty, and our constitutional democracy are, as academics put it, “contested.” For many of the world’s elites, the big project of the twenty-first century is how to achieve global governance.

The argument goes something like this: There are global problems beyond the capacity of nation-states to “solve.” These global problems include: terrorism; war; climate change; world hunger; inequalities of wealth; diseases; human rights violations; racism; xenophobia; increasingly

Islamophobia; and global migration from poor countries to rich countries. Therefore, some form of “global governance” is required to address these problems.

Now, unlike the international system of sovereign nation-states, this new transnational system of global governance seeks to establish supra-national regulations and institutions whose authority extends beyond and within nation-states. Nation-states continue to exist, but they are subordinate to transnational authority. This authority is exercised by “evolving norms” of international law, which is in effect transnational law. Major American foundations have endorsed the view that US constitutional law should be subordinate to “evolving norms” of international (“transnational”) law; a publication of the Ford Foundation on human rights in the United States stated “all people need ultimate recourse to an alternative legal authority.” The Ford document also talked about the need to “to break the chokehold of domestic law.” It declared: “US human rights activists are trying to reshape US society according to a framework of rights that most people either have not heard of or have been taught to think of as foreign.”

I call this viewpoint “transnational progressivism” and argue that it is “post-democratic.”


The European Union (EU) represents a conscious model of supra-national governance. Most of the authority is exercised by the European Commission (EC), the bureaucracy in Brussels. Even legislation is initiated by the bureaucracy. One of Europe’s most prominent sociologists, Ralf Dahrendorf, declared that, “It is not just a joke to say that if the EU itself applied for accession to the EU, it could not be admitted because it is insufficiently democratic.”

The global progressive response to radical Islam has been twofold: First, externally, the response has been mostly denial that terrorism is in any way connected to Islam. As Princeton University Dean Anne Marie Slaughter put it “our enemy is not *Islamic* anything.” However, internally throughout the West, Muslims have been granted special privileges that contradict the liberal principle of equality of citizenship. While the Archbishop of Canterbury was roundly criticized for endorsing the partial application of Shariah law for British Muslims, the British government has admitted that it has already recognized polygamous marriages and provided benefits to the same.

This is essentially “post-liberal” practice.

The activist American left supported by Ford and other foundations embrace a view remote from the American mainstream. But what of the governing American center-left?—and by that I mean the views of policy makers who serve as political appointees in administrations, as opposed to the academic left.

The mainstream left is prepared to deal with transnational governance both conceptually and rhetorically, for the most part. But the governing left has, for the most part, internalized the global governance project as America’s “leadership” mission. Strobe Talbott clarifies this mindset best. He has a recent book subtitled “The Quest for a Global Nation.” In a memo to Bill Clinton shortly before the 1992 election he wrote: (See slide below.)



This concept of “pooled” or “shared national sovereignty” is central to the thinking of transnational elites who are promoting global governance. It’s an idea that we will be hearing about over and again in the decades to come.

Harold Koh, the dean of Yale University Law School, served as an assistant secretary of state during the Clinton administration. Koh articulates the viewpoint of much of the governing left. He proposes in a *Stanford Law Review* article that “American lawyers and activists.... trigger a transnational legal process,” that will “generate legal interpretations that can in turn be internalized into the domestic law of even resistant nation-states.” He also suggests that, “human rights advocates” should litigate “not just in domestic courts, but simultaneously before foreign and international arenas.” Moreover, they should encourage foreign governments (such as Mexico) to challenge the US on the death penalty and other human rights issues.

Harold Koh et al: “transnational legal process”

Human rights advocates should litigate “not just in domestic courts, but simultaneously before foreign and international arenas.” Moreover, they should encourage foreign governments (such as Mexico) to challenge the US on the death penalty and other human rights issues.

I just want to point out a cartoon that appeared in the *Washington Post* just recently—May 27—on the right side of the slide (above); it's a suggested "flag" lapel pin, with the implication that a globe might be a more appropriate symbol for candidates to wear during campaign discussions.

Of course, the "transnational legal process" advocated by Koh and others—essentially, the mainstream left—is outside of American constitutional democracy. Transnational "interactions" (such as appealing to foreign courts) are not part of the authority and accountability inherent in the meaning of the phrase: "We the people of the United States." They are something "outside" of the "people of the United States" and "beyond" the Constitution and our democratic process. They reopen the primary question of politics: "Who shall govern and in what regime?"

On global migration, Western progressives argue that immigrant integration into the host country should be based on two concepts: dual citizenship and diaspora connectedness. The mainstream American left has pretty much internalized these concepts. Three weeks ago at the Women's National Democratic club I heard an editor at the *Washington Post* declare that the US is not really a nation of immigrants, but a nation of dual citizens—and that the ampersand has replaced the hyphen. The editor said that a citizen is not an Iraqi-American, but an Iraqi & an American—so, dual citizenship, dual loyalties, and so on. "Transnational citizenship" is the word used for what these people think is coming.



Sometimes this view reaches the center-right; about ten years ago the *Wall Street Journal* published an op-ed favorable to the notion of the ampersand replacing the hyphen.

Let us examine how the integration of immigrants works “on the ground.” Under the mainstream-left Governor of Illinois, the state’s Office of New Americans is administered by a political appointee, Jose Luis Gutierrez. His concept of assimilation is different than that of, say, Theodore Roosevelt. He told the *Chicago Tribune*: “The nation-state concept is changing. You don’t have say, I am Mexican or I am American. You can be a good Mexican citizen and a good American citizen and not have that be a conflict of interest. Sovereignty is flexible.” And if you examine the Illinois government website, it is clear that the emphasis is on transnational or dual citizenship and diaspora connectedness, not on traditional American notions of assimilation. Or you could say, it’s on the ampersand, not the hyphen.

While the governing center-left has for the most part internalized global governance and is prepared to promote it, in some form at least, the governing center-right has for the most part failed to engage on the issue—with some exceptions that will be discussed later.

Now, in writing the commissioned essay for this symposium and for my book for Encounter (to be published in 2009), *Sovereignty or Submission*, I developed this chart (see slide below or Chart A in the commissioned essay), a world ideological chart. I was thinking of Frank Fukuyama’s point that in the future only ideologies with universal appeal will challenge liberal democracy—that is, ideologies that would also appeal to Western intellectuals in places like Berkeley, Berlin, Cambridge, Oxford, and so on. The key distinction, though, is the Fukuyama distinction between ideologies that have universal appeal and those that don’t.

IDEOLOGIES with UNIVERSAL APPEAL	IDEOLOGIES that LACK UNIVERSAL APPEAL
Liberal Democracy (liberal and democratic)	Radical Islam (anti-liberal, anti-democratic)
Global Governance (post-liberal, post-democratic) Transnational Progressivism	Chinese Nationalism Russian Authoritarianism
IDEOLOGIES that used to have UNIVERSAL APPEAL	Asian Values
Communism	Chavez-Bolivarism
Fascism	Ethnic Chauvinism

(Fonte reads the slide.)

A number of obstacles stand in the way of clear thinking on the challenge of global governance. In the paper, I describe how Fukuyama’s narrative has been widely internalized by the center-right, so global governance is not seen as a distinct ideological challenge. Likewise, Bob

Kagan's new thesis—that the main ideological event of the twenty-first century will be the perennial conflict between democracy and autocracy—also sidesteps the transnational issue. It sidesteps questions of the Enlightenment, too, which I talk about in the paper.

Now, it would also be a mistake to view radical Islam as the only “transcendent” threat facing American constitutional democracy. I get into that in the paper; due to time constraints I won't say more about it here.

But I will say that all of these frameworks have something in common. They are all bi-polar, pitting democrats against anti-democrats. But it's my point that the ideological conflict in the twenty-first century will be *tri-polar*, with an overlapping struggle among democrats, anti-democrats, and global post-democrats over the great question of politics, who shall govern and in what regime?

It's important to realize *now* that these transnational progressives constitute a major obstacle in the conflict with radical Islam. The center-right and liberal anti-Islamists will have to fight on two ideological fronts. As Andrew McCarthy and others have pointed out, there will be “lawfare” battles with both the radical Islamists and a significant contingent of Western anti-anti-radical Islamists—the John Espositos, the Juan Coles, the ACLUs, and the Amnesty Internationals who are attempting to use “evolving norms” of international law to thwart the war against Islamic terror. This parallels the situation during the Cold War, when anti-communists within the West had to fight against anti-anti-communists as well as against the communists themselves. Thus, the conflict with radical Islam is intertwined with and cannot be separated from the challenge of transnational progressivism.


Another obstacle to clear thinking on global governance comes from some libertarian and corporate elements of the broader center-right coalition. Some American business leaders have internalized the global governance arguments. A vice-president of Coca Cola emphatically declared: “We are not an American company.” These corporate officials are not ideologues, obviously, but could be described as “transnational pragmatists” as opposed to progressives.

For some (clearly not all) libertarians, opposition to the “state”—even a constitutional democratic one—leads to an affinity to transnational politics. The late editor of *Wall Street Journal*, Robert Bartley, is reported to have told a *Forbes* journalist, Peter Brimelow: “The nation-state is finished.” If so, that raises the question of *who shall govern and in what regime?*

In *Who Are We*, Samuel Huntington argues that issues such as transnationalism, dual citizenship, multiculturalism, immigration, assimilation, national history standards, and so on, are “all battles in a single war over the nature of American national identity.” They are all what Jim Ceaser called “regime issues.” Huntington's core point is that “de-nationalized elites” are promoting the “transnational” and the subnational, the “multicultural,” in order to “deconstruct” this regime. Unfortunately, Huntington's core argument got lost in series of sub-controversies, but it is possible to disagree with Huntington—which, to an extent, I do—on the creed vs. culture aspects of American nationhood; the degree to which American culture is still formed by the “dissenting Anglo-Protestant” tradition; and on the “Clash of Civilizations” thesis, and still, at the same time, recognize the accuracy of his description of the comprehensive assault on our national identity by “de-nationalized” elites.

As a consequence of the center-right’s failure to embrace the core of the Huntington critique, conservatives have continued to see—on the one hand—either a series of unconnected “cultural” issues such as racial preferences, history standards, immigration without assimilation, the UN Durban conference, and so on, or—on the other hand—simply the rantings of post-modern academics instead of a comprehensive ideological offensive directed at the traditional American regime.

But there is good news. (1) The American people remain strongly attached to our national identity and nation-state, and (2) there are signs that some are starting to take the global governance challenge seriously. Let me share with you some of the poll results announced yesterday by the Bradley Project on American National Identity (www.bradleyproject.org). The Bradley project commissioned Harris interactive polling to conduct a random sample of American citizens in December. Let’s take a look.



83 percent of Americans think of themselves primarily as American citizens, not “global citizens” (12 percent).


89 percent favored the “Americanization” of immigrants defined as “learning English and embracing American culture and values.” It’s a rather thick interpretation of “Americanization,” and still 89 percent approve.

(For the remaining slides, see next page.)


An overwhelming 86 percent believe that potential immigrants who favor replacing the US Constitution with Islamic law should not be allowed to immigrate to the United States. This is a question of belief—not of whether the potential immigrant is a member of a terrorist organization. So that’s pretty clear.

Two-thirds (66 percent) believe the Constitution should be the “highest legal authority” for Americans if there is a dispute with international law. (Sixteen percent chose international law.)

Naturalized citizens take an oath promising to absolutely and entirely reject all allegiance to their former state—or in other words, they reject the ampersand. We asked whether this should continue to be a requirement, and 73 percent said yes, naturalized citizens should give up all loyalty to their former homelands. Among registered voters, the number was 75 percent.



In the oath that immigrants take when they become American citizens, should individuals be required to give up loyalty to their former country?



The second bit of good news, in April of 2008 the Federalist Society and the American Enterprise Institute launched a new website, Global Governance Watch (<http://www.globalgovernancewatch.org/>), with former UN Ambassador John Bolton giving the keynote address at a kick-off luncheon.

Besides John Bolton, other analysts are taking this seriously as well, many of them in this room: Robert Bork, Jeremy Rabkin, David Rivkin, Lee Casey, Curtis Bradley, Andrew McCarthy, Herbert London, John O’Sullivan, Kenneth Anderson and others.

Another piece of good news is the role of Encounter Books, which has helped shape the debate and therefore will help shape the future. Many publishers on both the left and right are seeking an oversimplified—you might say a “red meat”—approach. Encounter permits a comprehensive approach to serious subjects as the books of Andy McCarthy, Victor Davis Hanson, Jim Piereson, Jim Bowman, and others testify, and I’m grateful to them.

In conclusion, the 21st century will witness a renewed argument over the primary question of politics, who shall govern and in what regime? Make no mistake about it, global governance is a *direct challenge to American constitutionalism*. The American center right must be prepared to do theoretical and conceptual work necessary to defend the American regime and the liberal democratic nation-state generally on universal grounds against this new threat. This challenge is “existential” because it challenges the existence of the American constitutional democratic regime and liberal democracy. It is formidable because it comes from *within* Western civilization. It will be a great challenge of the twenty-first century.

Thank you.

ROGER KIMBALL: Thank you, John. Next we'll hear John O'Sullivan. John?

JOHN O'SULLIVAN: Well, first of all, Roger, thank you for your introduction. It is a great privilege to be on this platform on behalf of Encounter Books, Hudson and the Bradley Foundation. I had a little to do with the original *Encounter* Magazine when it was run by Melvin Lasky in London, and of course, the distinguished first editor of *Encounter*—Irving Kristol—is in the room here today.

I think that that magazine played a very crucial role in English and European intellectual political life in the '50s, the '60s, and later. First of all, it was a strong encouragement and an inspiration to pro-American social democrats in its first phase. And then secondly, in the '70s and later, it shifted from support for social democrats like Tony Crosland, who of course is no longer around, and moved toward support for more conservative opinions like Thatcherism. And I think it was extremely important in giving arguments to conservatives at that time, and making them less provincial.

Secondly, and I will just say, too, that a new magazine has just been launched in London—*Standpoint*, edited by Daniel Johnson. It attempts to provide a kind of *Encounter* for the present day, and I think its arrival on the scene—it was launched last week—is a very good omen.

But here today, Encounter Books, Hudson, and the Bradley Foundation are examining and ventilating some of the ideas that, I think, will determine the politics of tomorrow. John Fonte's work is extremely important here—and not simply his paper commissioned for this symposium, which I think is a very fine paper. The fact is that John has been the single-most important voice on his side of the argument in questions of post-democracy, post-nationalism—I would say post-sovereignty, and all of the related issues—multiculturalism, immigration, and so on. And while John is kind enough to mention me in his work, the fact is that almost all of us who work on these questions are dependent on the work he has already done.

There is a slight risk today that this is going to be a debate between Tweedledum and Tweedledee, because I don't differ very much with John, if at all. But I would just like to add a couple of points in immediate response to what he has said.

I think the ampersand argument can be very quickly demolished by asking whether or not the ampersand idea should be applied to marriage: "The fact, my dear, that I am married to her in no way conflicts or reduces my commitment to *our* marriage." (Laughter.) I think most women would not feel that to be a particularly persuasive statement. Of course, the whole notion of pooling things like sovereignty is absurd. Sovereignty to a group is what liberty is to an individual—the ability to make decisions. If you have a group of five nations and the voters of one nation rebel against a joint decision, either they are able to carry through their decision—the government that they have elected is able to do what they wanted it to do, in which case the pool's sovereignty is dissolved and they regain full sovereignty—or they are not allowed to do so because in pooling their sovereignty they have *lost* their sovereignty. In other words, the notion of pooled sovereignty, when examined seriously, is seen as an oxymoron.

My one difference—and it is not really a difference, it's a gloss—with John is when he classes radical Islam as one of the ideologies that can't have universal appeal. Now, it is probably true that it can't have absolutely universal appeal, but it is interesting that radical Islam does seem to be the

choice ideology of the lower depths of society, different groups who want some meaning in their lives. Quite a lot of people in prison who are not themselves Islamic get converted to it. Robert Reed, the would-be shoe bomber, was converted to radical Islam in prison. I've read a number of newspaper accounts of various different groups being recruited although they had no connection with Islam until they encountered it in places like prison.

And then finally, if the world were a rational place it would be very surprising to find that some left-wingers in Europe and some feminists managed to forge alliances or at least form a kind of an informal alliance with radical Islamists whom by any normal test of opinion they should shun.

Now, I am not going to repeat what John said in his paper. He gave you a very good account of his own views. I am just going to make a few points about it. As I said, I believe his facts are accurate, his reasoning is valid, and his conclusions are correct. But I would just add a few marginal notes.

First of all, what is the essence of what is happening, in my view? Where does it begin? Well, I think it begins actually some time back. I would put the beginning in the interwar years—because it is the transfer of power from elected bodies such as Congress or Parliament to unelected bodies such as the courts, bureaucratic agencies, the UN and other international bodies, treaty-based global groups which place obligations on us, and so on and so forth. These bodies—bodies such as Kyoto, International Criminal Court, the “alphabet agencies” in this country, the courts here, the courts in Europe, the courts today in Britain under the Human Rights Act—now have considerable political power which they wield. But they are either not accountable at all to us, or they are accountable at so many degrees that voters exercise no real authority over them.

With regard to the former, in what sense, for example, is the International Criminal Court accountable to the voters of the Western Europe? The British judges, as I say, have emancipated themselves largely from political control under the Human Rights Act. And, to put it mildly, the US Supreme Court's accountability to the American people is extremely remote. With regard to the latter, the decisions, for example, of European bodies are very difficult for the citizen of any single European state to significantly influence through voting, organizing, and doing all of the democratic things we take for granted. And in the case of the alphabet agencies, well, as early as 1929 the famous book by the Lord Chief Justice of England (The Rt. Hon. Lord Hewart of Bury), *The New Despotism*, raised alarms about this, but was these alarms were largely dismissed as well: “He was being nostalgic for the world that is lost.”

So, this has been going on a long time, but it has been accelerating lately—since the end of the Cold War. Why? Why is it happening?

Well, one argument we hear all the time is that we need these bodies. We need these powerful bureaucratic bodies, these unelected authorities. They are “uncontaminated” or uncontrolled by democratic gridlocks to deal with matters that are either too big for a single state or matters on which the legislative authorities have failed to act—that is, generally speaking they have failed to carry out the policy favored by the person who is talking.

But first of all, states can, do, and for a long time have acted on big international problems through *international* bodies and treaties. And there I agree with John; there is a distinction between an *international* body and a *transnational* body. An *international* body is one which operates under rules that make it subordinate to the governments that establish it. It acts as their agent to perform certain

common tasks. A *transnational* body is the body to which governments cede powers and sovereignty and authority, and to the decisions of which they are subsequently bound whether or not they particularly like them. We have had international bodies since the International Telegraph Union (which dates back to 1865), I think—and probably before that, the experts will tell me. These were essentially forms of international cooperation.

To give one example, people used to sneer at the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as the “General Agreement to Talk and Talk.” (Laughter.) But in fact, GATT was an extremely effective mechanism of spreading and establishing free trade by the principle of voluntary adoption. You signed up to it, you made concessions, and you receive fair treatment in return. No one was forced to do so, but because there were benefits in doing so people generally signed up.

The second argument is that legislatures—Congress—have failed to act. I think the latest argument where this is used is immigration, but it has been used on many other issues. But the objection here is false, because, of course, it is not that Congress has failed to act. Very often it has deliberated long and hard. It has simply reached the conclusion either to do something that these people do not like, or to do nothing at all.

So, if the arguments for what is happening are not valid—because I think they are not—what is really happening? Well, I think one argument is that significant elites in societies find that the electorate has not favored their policies, and they are looking for some other electorate. I think—because I am a conservative, so I would say this—that the left in general has been disappointed with the people in the last thirty or forty years, and consequently it is looking for ways of getting its political will through international pressure and international organizations.

Secondly, I think we might rediscover here the old Marxist concept of class interest. There are a lot of people in today’s world, such as international lawyers, the officials of international agencies, the heads of NGOs—and the NGO revolution is one of the major new developments of our time—and people who work in these organizations, for whom post-democracy and post-sovereignty means an increase of power at the same time as they enjoy being exempt from some of the controls that exist in their democratic politics. It’s very agreeable, really. And not all of these people are on the left, as John rightly points out. He calls these people “transnational progressives” because they act transnationally, but they hold progressive views. A London lawyer named David Carr shortened this to “tranzis.” (See http://www.samizdata.net/blog/glossary_archives/2002/09/tranzi.html for Carr’s definition.) I like his term because it has a faint hint of sexual ambiguity. (Laughter.) That joke always gets a laugh, and I think it is a good example of the joke being true. (Laughter.)

Anyway, the thing is, there are quite a lot of careers, if you are a tranzis, which are very lucrative and pleasant and agreeable. Some of them may join an NGO and get sent out by the UN to some trouble spot, where they drive around in a Jeep, have a local girlfriend, eat cheap local food, live on a tax-free income with lots of dollars, and generally after that move on to a position, let us say, in the office of the assistant secretary for global humanitarianism at the UN, or whatever. But there are even grander things. Take a failed politician like Neil Kinnock, the former leader of the Labor Party, twice rejected by the British people—very sensibly—and known locally as the Welsh Windbag. (Laughter.) Once he was safely expelled from British politics, he was sent to Brussels—in the way that in the old days we used to send the failed politicians to the colonies, you know:

“. . . But as it is! . . . My language fails!
Go out and govern New South Wales!”

(Hilaire Belloc, “Lord Lundy,” *Cautionary Tales for Children*, 1920)

Well, these days we send them to Brussels. It’s nearer, but also it’s much more lucrative. The salaries are tax free. And you get to “lord it”; you get to take decisions. I mean, people differ about the extent, but some people would argue that as much as, say, 70 percent of political decisions now are essentially taken in Brussels. So, you get to exercise political power without annoying difficulty of being elected.

My third point here would be to say that it’s perfectly true that the tranzis themselves occasionally have a guilty conscience about this, and so—since they don’t have an electorate—they have decided to invent their own global electorate. They call it “global civil society,” and it consists of all those NGOs to whom they give the seal of good housekeeping approval, and they admit them to all of these side conferences that always occur, whether it is the UN or other conferences taking place of governments. So on the one side of the road you have the governments and the official UN bodies, and on the other side of the road you have the NGO conference, which sort of gives press conferences day and night, exerting pressure on the official conference. Kofi Annan used to like to refer to the second conference as “the global electorate.”

The problem is that the UN and governments select which NGOs are going to be at this conference. This is a good example of politicians at selecting their own electorate. And sometimes when they can’t find NGOs of a suitably compliant character, they set up their own, known as GONGOs—Government Organized NGOs. (Laughter.) And what you then have is a complete façade of democratic debate and argument in which the real decisions are taken by bureaucrats.

So, therefore, I reach the conclusion that post-democracy and post-sovereignists are really empty democratic. Yes, it is as simple as that. Do you want to amend or appeal the decision of an international court or the decision of a bureaucratic agency in Brussels, or change the mind of a body set up under the Law of the Sea? For practical purposes, you *can’t*.

A good example of this is the EU’s democratic deficit. You see, the EU does admit it has a democratic deficit. It could hardly do otherwise. The most interesting example of it is that legislation in the EU has to come from the Commission, which is unelected and not subject to recall. It is a bureaucratic organization appointed by the different member governments. If they don’t propose the law, the law never gets discussed, debated and passed. So, they have what *The Economist* rightly described as an “advance veto” on legislation. This advance veto has survived all reforms—we had the Single European Act in 1986, the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, and the Lisbon Treaty, which is coming up before the Irish this weekend. None of these have reduced or removed that provision.

Now, how do they deal with it? Well, it is a brilliant way that they deal with the democratic deficit. They say, “Yes, we do—we have a democratic deficit. It’s *terrible*.” But this admission is then treated as a solution to the problem: “You see, we are aware of it! We don’t like it! If only something could be done about it! But it can’t.”

Why can’t something be done about it? Something cannot be done about it because if you were to do something about it in general, that would mean it would be possible for voters and private bodies and so on to successfully challenge the direction of European politics on the key issue of further

integration. And that is something which the European elites *simply will not tolerate*. The degree of their unwillingness to tolerate it is demonstrated by the fact that after failing to get the Lisbon Treaty through—in other words, a European constitution, which is itself a monstrosity and legally should have been finished, having been rejected by the voters—they have brought it forward again in almost unchanged form, and this time the politicians all agreed they would not put it to the test of a referendum in case it “went wrong” again. The Irish, for constitutional reasons of their own, had to put it to the referendum test. But everybody knows that if the Irish are to vote against it, they will be asked to vote again—as they were in the past—until they get the answer “right.” So, the EU is itself, therefore, an undemocratic body, as John (Fonte) said, and one that is fundamentally *not* going to become something else.

Now, that leads to my final point—namely, that there is going to be a series of clashes from now on into the future in world politics. There will be other clashes, of course, clashes to do with the War on Terror, the rise of China, and so on; but this clash is going to inform a lot of those other ones. And it is this: The mere existence of the US constitution as a binding liberal democratic document—and one, furthermore, which, as John’s poll showed, has great prestige with American people and, I would say, by the way, outside of the America as well—means that decisions taken by international bodies and organizations have to be accepted by the American people through their institutions or they won’t bind this country.

Now, there are other countries which are grateful for this. I think that they will in future days include, for example, India and China, because as they are rising powers, feeling their oats, so to speak. They will not want to be bound by decisions that are taken by the Lilliputians, which is another phrase for the tranzies. And consequently we are going to see a clash between, on the one hand, the United States as the head of the coalition of traditional nation-states—not all of them democratic—which support the Westphalian international order, and on the other side, the transnational progressives and the states that sympathize with those ideas, headed by the European Union. The European Union—and the Americans don’t seem to realize this, including American policy makers—sees itself ideologically as *the champion of this new order*.

Now, I have one final point—my *final*, final point. (Laughter.) All of the ideas dissected by John (Fonte) have been almost an international consensus, and an Establishment near-consensus in America, without ever having been properly debated or without being tested in an election. I don’t think they will be tested this November. Senator Obama is the very paladin of post-democracy, and John McCain is himself implicated in some of these ideas. He is, for instance, a strong admirer of the EU and proponent of Kyoto. And republican strategists, if that is not an oxymoron, are not likely to launch attacks that they have to explain at length in advance.

So, the battle, if it is not to be lost, will have to be fought initially at the high intellectual level of *Encounter*, Encounter Books, Hudson Institute, the Bradley Foundation, and, as I mentioned at the outset, the new British magazine *Standpoint*—which, by the way, bases itself explicitly on recovering and reviving the concept of the West. They are the reasons for optimism, as much as the polls of the American people to which John pointed.

Thank you.

(Applause.)

ROGER KIMBALL: Thank you, John O’Sullivan and John Fonte. I believe that John O’Sullivan has a couple of the jobs in Brussels; if anyone wants to see him after this, he can dispense them. (Laughter.)

We have a little time for questions. Yes, sir?

ROBERT CHANDLER, Strategic Planning International, Inc.: My question is in terms of a kind of a sweeping, waving hand about the American left being complicit in progressive transnationalism. That is certainly true, through my own research, in what the Institute for Policy Studies is doing through their gigantic network, and also in the UN through the Hague Appeal of Peace, which is run by Cora Weiss. They are moving forward on this. Marcus Raskin has written a book called *Liberalism*, which lays out the changes to liberalism (inaudible). So I am wondering who, specifically, are those on the left about whom you are speaking, besides some of those who are quite evident?

JOHN FONTE: Well, in the paper I mention three people: Strobe Talbott, who was deputy secretary of state—so he is in the mainstream; Anne-Marie Slaughter, the dean at Princeton who undoubtedly get a top job if Obama is elected; and Harold Koh, who served in the Clinton administration. These are just examples. I was concern not so much with Cora Weiss and the hard left, but rather the mainstream left. I don’t think that this is a done deal, however. I think its still evolving, so to speak, within the left, and there are certainly people who have not accepted transnational progressivism. I can think of people in the Senate—Senator Dorgan (D–ND) and Senator Webb (D–VA) and so on—who would not necessarily have a transnational progressive view. So I think this is in flux, but I think the majority of the mainstream has internalized it and they have accepted it—as Talbott said—as America’s leadership. This is the argument that is going to be used. This is what Madeleine Albright said: It’s not that we’re giving up power; it is in America’s interest to transfer authority to the International Criminal Court. That is the argument that is going to be made. That is the argument that Joe Biden makes. It is in America’s interest to sign the CEDAW treaty, the Convention against Women. Of course we are against discrimination but what the treaty promotes is gender proportionalism. It is illiberal, its post-liberal, and it promotes corporatism. Representation by group. But that’s complicated to explain and oppose.

So I think this is an evolving fight. They seem to have internalized the argument, and the argument is, well, we are leaders and this is what we do. As James Schlesinger said, they want to lead by following—by following European elites.

QUESTION: In the previous panel and also in this Bradley project publication *E Pluribus Unum: A Study of Americans’ Views of National Identity*, it was said that America is not founded on shared ethnicity but rather on ideas, and I wonder what your thoughts are on this proposition theory of American nation. Is it true and does it furnish us with a place from which we can defend America against multiculturalism and transnationalism?

JOHN FONTE: I’ll take it first. If you read further in the Bradley report, it says that there is a culture, too. In fact it says—and Jim Ceaser spoke yesterday, saying—that the two are essentially *both* very important. Both the creed and the culture are more or less equal, as he presented it. I would go back to Victor Davis Hanson and say that we are a “proposition plus” nation. That is my own personal label. The “plus” is the culture which is part of the civic narrative, if I could be forgiven for using that word in this company. It’s the narrative that the Victor Davis Hanson talked about this morning. The

story of America. Jim Piereson said that his ancestors—and my ancestors—weren't in Gettysburg; they were in Sicily. But they *adopted* the story of America. So they are *our* ancestors, George Washington and the founders and the boys in blue *and* gray. They are our ancestors because we adopted them. So we are a proposition plus this story of America that is adopted by immigrants, the civic narrative which is a big part of the culture. It is not simply an abstract proposition but is based on a particular nation, a civic nation that has a national story to it.

JOHN O'SULLIVAN: Yes, I rather agree with John's reply. I think obviously that the "proposition" part of the American nationhood is there because after all the Americans had to explain to the world why they were rebelling, and secondly they had to explain to people who were coming to this country what the essence of Americanism was. But it's a distillation of the full American cultural sense of identity. And I think that it's a mistake to confine America to the proposition side, and I am always therefore wary of the idea that America is a proposition nation.

I will say that I once had the embarrassing task of ringing up Professor Melvin Bradford to explain that the first sentence of his article, a review, contained a misprint—it now read, "It is often said that America is a nation founded upon a preposition." When he finished laughing, he said that he hoped that it was "but" he rather was afraid that it was "for."

ROGER KIMBALL: We've only (time) for one more question. Judge Bork?

JUDGE ROBERT BORK: It's not my object to stamp out the last vestige of opposition here. (Laughter.) But when you talk about the US Constitution as being a brake on this transnationalism, isn't it true that the majority of our (Supreme) Court is now looking to foreign law and international law—some of which they make up—so that you're getting *from within* a change in our Constitution to correspond to international or transnational norms.

JOHN O'SULLIVAN: Yes, absolutely. And of course, the more you multiply the cases from which you can extract precedents and so on, the greater freedom of action you give the courts and the judges. And one of the problem we face is that judges now essentially feel free to write their personal policy preferences into law, and this will simply make that matter worst. So yes, I agree with that.

Having said that, because the American people actually believe in their Constitution, because it's almost more than the flag, the symbol of America—you don't have a sovereign in the personal sense but you do have the Constitution—I do think that alarm over the maltreatment, the assault on the Constitution can be raised. And of course no one has done more to raise it than you have, Bob (Bork). But it requires probably a grievous, bad decision by the courts to give people the interest to make them pay attention to the principal. And they have made such bad decisions, and sometimes there has been a rebellion—but, well, not enough, so we need more bad judicial decisions to arouse the people.

ROGER KIMBALL: I'd like to thank our panelists, John O'Sullivan and John Fonte. We are going to proceed without delay to the final panel. There would be an opportunity for questions—those of you who were not able to ask your questions now, please save them and we'll have some time shortly. Thank you.

PANEL 3

“The Jihad in Plain Sight”

ANDREW McCARTHY, Presenter

ROBERT BORK, Discussant

ROGER KIMBALL: We will proceed now with our third and final panel. I’m delighted to welcome Andrew McCarthy to give the paper. He will be followed by Judge Robert Bork. Andy?

ANDREW McCARTHY: I’m going to try to comply with Roger’s Prussian efficiency, but I do want to begin by thanking the Bradley Foundation and Hudson Institute for the honor of addressing this gathering this morning, and it’s a special treat to speak at an event that’s framed by the invaluable contributions of Encounter Books. I’m especially grateful to my friend Roger Kimball for giving me an opportunity to share in that.

It’s nearing lunchtime, of course, and more’s the pity for all of you. You may have had a nourishing breakfast. You may have splurged on the Danish. You may even have gone all out and put a splash of half-and-half rather than the two percent milk in your first or second cup of coffee. But let’s be serious—you did it in abject ignorance. You have no idea how many calories you’ve consumed. You may have thought yourself an adult; you may have thought that you pretty much understood the relative risks and rewards of opting for the waffle rather than the fruit cup. But alas, you’re frightfully wrong—at least according to today’s left.

Progressives admit: Our nation is at war against a deadly, incorrigible foe. Iraqi insurgents? The Afghan Taliban? The looming threat of Iranian nukes? Don’t be ridiculous. I speak, of course, of the war on obesity. (Laughter.)

You see, when it comes to their pieties, progressives stridently insist that you must be informed. The peril must be exposed, examined, and explained for you right down to the very last Cheerio. We need knowledge; we need wisdom; and in the progressive worldview we have neither until they have been certified by the central government and emblazoned on our consciousness by its alphabet soup of bureaucracies. So it is that ecstasy has gripped my hometown, the once rough-and-tumble New York City. There, the nanny-in-chief, Mayor Michael Bloomberg, has decreed through the city’s health department that restaurants must henceforth post the calorie count of each menu offering. What could possibly be more critical in a war than providing accurate information about the enemy?

That’s what Mayor Bloomberg’s minions argued to a federal judge when the restaurateurs had the temerity to complain. And you’ll be shocked to learn that the judge enthusiastically agreed with the city. He reasoned that if consumers were properly informed about their fundamental interest in waging this “battle of the bulge,” they would, as he put it, “use the information to select lower-calorie meals.”

“Accurate information would make them safer,” the judge said, “because their informed choices would lead to a lower incidence of obesity.” That’s the way it is, as long as we’re waging a right-minded campaign against trans fats, against secondhand smoke, against drilling for oil in a

barren tundra, against climate change, or against whatever the left's trendy phantom of the week may be.

Things change starkly, though, when we are confronted with a genuine threat: a real war against real enemies whose mass-murder plots against Americans are, as we've seen again and again, only too real. When it comes to the real thing, the jihadists' threat to our lives and our way of life, we'd prefer not to know. That is the clear message from our diplomatic progressives at Foggy Bottom.

The Bush administration has just circulated guidance, long touted by the State Department and other pockets of Islamophilia, language guidance that would purge "jihadism"—the word—from our public lexicon and thus eradicate from our public consciousness the core ideology that animates our enemies. The Surgeon General believes smokers need a neon warning of the pluperfectly obvious. The State Department, however, does not think jihadism is hazardous to your health. To the contrary, our top policymakers have determined that jihad, like Islam itself, is a public good, and therefore—try to follow this—we should just stop talking about it.

We Western non-Muslims, the thinking goes, must school the world's 1.4 billion adherents of Islam in what simply must be the truth about their belief system: The real jihad is an internal struggle for personal betterment, a key tenet of the Religion of Peace, or the Religion of Love and Peace, as Secretary of State Rice prefers to put it. Besides, administration officials tell us, as the Associated Press quotes them, "Referring to terrorists a 'jihadists' or 'Islamofascists' or 'mujahideen' may actually boost support for radicals among Arab and Muslim audiences by giving them a veneer of religious credibility, or by causing offense to moderates."

Of course, if jihad were truly a sublime summons to become a better person, it's not entirely clear how plowing jumbo jets into skyscrapers and mass murdering civilians could achieve beatification in the eyes of the faithful, droves of whom took to the streets in celebration of the 9/11 atrocities. Nor is it clear why calling a terrorist a jihadist would cause angst for moderates—unless they are pretending that jihad is something other than what it is. And they are. And in doing so they enjoy enormous support from special pleaders strategically dotted throughout the government, to say nothing of their academy and media allies.

Yet, for all its energetic earnestness, the campaign to refashion jihad and crush dissenters is persuasive only in the ivory towers of elites desperate to be persuaded. Down here on the planet Earth, it is futile. The Muslim world is not populated by Western intellectuals hardwired to nuanced white-into-black by legalistic arcana and historical massaging. In large swaths of the ummah, there is rampant illiteracy; education consists of myopic focus on the Koran; and intolerance, especially anti-Semitism, is so rudimentary a part of everyday life that any jihad rooted in "good works in society" would never square with Western liberals' understanding of that term.

Progressive moderate Muslims would doubtlessly like the concept of jihad to vanish. They are in a battle for authenticity with fundamentalists. Jihad would be far easier to omit than it is to explain away. Indeed, if anyone should resort to the purge of jihad, better it be Muslim reformers striking the concept than US Pollyannas striking the word. To concede jihad's centrality as an Islamic obligation while distorting its essence can only fatally damage the reformer's credibility and, hence, the entire reform effort.

Jihad, however, is very unlikely to go away. There are too many Muslims who believe in it, and there would be no Muslim world without it. When it comes to jihad, authenticity is simplicity, and simply stated, jihad is and has always been about forcible, military-type conquest. None less than Bernard Lewis has explained, “Conventionally translated ‘holy war,’ jihad has the literal meaning of ‘striving,’ more specifically in the Koranic phrase, ‘striving in the path of God.’” Some Muslim theologians, particularly in more modern times, have interpreted the duty of “striving in the path of God” in a spiritual or moral sense. The overwhelming majority of early authorities, however, citing relevant passages in the Koran and in the tradition, discuss jihad in *military* terms. And as the invaluable scholar Ibn Warraq has noted, guess what you find when you look up “jihad” in the celebrated *Dictionary of Islam*:

jihad. A religious war with those who are unbelievers in the mission of Muhammad. It is an incumbent religious duty established in the Koran and in the traditions as a divine institution enjoined specifically for the purpose of advancing Islam.

It’s no wonder that this should be so. The Koran repeatedly enjoins Muslims to fight and slay non-Muslims. “O ye who believe!” commands a famous verse (123) in chapter nine. “Fight those of the disbelievers who are near you, and let them find harshness in you, and know that Allah is with those who keep their duty unto Him.” It is difficult to spin that as a spiritual quest for self-improvement. And there’s plenty more where that came from.

It is an unrelenting fact that Islamic doctrine is the catalyst for the cataracts of Islamic terror raining down on the globe. This does not mean that all or most Muslims will become terrorists, though some percentage will, and a far larger number will sympathize with fundamentalist goals if not terrorist methods. Nor does it mean that Islamic doctrine is not rife with many virtuous, peaceable elements, though many of these trace to the initial peaceful enticements of the Meccan phase of Muhammad’s ministry. Many Muslims believe they were later superceded by the bellicose scriptures of the Medinan period, when the Warrior Prophet spread Islam by the sword.

What all this does mean, though, is that the mortal threat we face *is* jihadism, which is caused by Islam no less than obesity is caused by high calorie counts, lung cancer by smoking cigarettes, birth defects by imbibing alcohol during pregnancy, and countless lesser risks to our well-being by pathologies our benevolent bureaucrats compel us to confront remorselessly, without any concern that we might be misunderstood as crusading to rid the world of food, or alcohol, or tobacco.

No less do we require accurate information about jihadism to arrive at sound public policy. It is whistling past the graveyard to ignore or minimize the virulent strain of fundamentalist Islam that galvanizes jihadism. And it is positively fatuous to suggest that this ideology hinges on what Americans say about it. Witness, to take just one recent example, the rioting of jihadists in Indonesia who stoned and burned a mosque. Their anger was provoked not by American policy, but by another sect of Muslims, the Ahmadi, because the Ahmadi don’t accept Muhammad as the final prophet or jihad as a divine injunction. It is simply not the case that a mere nineteen terrorists hijacked a peaceful religion, as President Bush hastened to assure Americans while smoke billowed from the Pentagon and lifeless bodies were pulled from the wreckage of the Twin Towers. It is not the case and it was not the case, as the Clinton administration was just as

quick and emphatic to tell the public in 1993 when the World Trade Center was first bombed, that a rag-tag handful of miscreants had perverted the true Islam.

The species of Islam that has spurred these and other attacks has a long and distinguished pedigree. It is fourteen centuries old; it is rooted in the literal commands of the scriptures; it is a project that has engaged high intellects and a belief system that continues to win the allegiance of the educated and the illiterate, the rich and the poor, the young and the old, princes and peons, cutting across even the Sunni and Shiite divide. It may not be the majority construction of the faith, but it is the creed of at least a sizeable minority—and a dynamic one, underwritten by Saudi billions and catapulted by Khomeini's revolution. Even if it were representative of only, say, twenty percent of the Muslim world, an estimate that may even sell it short, that would translate into over a quarter of a billion people.

By mulishly refusing to see this we put ourselves at great risk. We pretend that influential fundamentalist clerics are out of the mainstream. That's what we did in 1990 with a guy I prosecuted, who was known as the Blind Sheik, Omar Abdel Rahman. He was no perverter of Islam. To the contrary, he's better understood as a party-spoiling resister of modernization and anti-literalism.

He was a doctor of Islamic jurisprudence graduated from Al-Azhar University in Egypt, the seat of Sunni learning. His renown as a master of doctrine is exactly what accounted for his influence, and not just his influence among radicals. "Jihad," he instructed his hordes of admirers, "is the peak of the full embrace of Islam. There is no work that equals it." He recounted that for over a millennium jihad had unambiguously and unapologetically called for aggressive application of brute force against oppressors and infidels.

"It means fighting the enemies," he said. Jihad was not about internal betterment, or other efforts at peaceful achievement. It was not to be accomplished by such everyday practices as prayer, mosque attendance, almsgiving, or living a virtuous life. At such suggestions he scoffed, and these words are his: "Jihad is jihad. There is no such thing as commerce, industry, and science in jihad. This is calling things other than by their own name. If God says to do jihad, it means to do jihad with the sword, with the cannon, with the grenades, and with the missile. This is jihad—jihad against God's enemies for God's cause and His word."

The Blink Sheik exhorted followers that it was their duty to wage jihad against any regime that did not govern by Allah's law, the *Shariah*. In the short term, this meant in Islamic countries; in the long term, because Islam aspires to global hegemony, it meant throughout the world. There were blazing signs that Abdel Rahman's acolytes were preparing for just such an offensive in the years before radical Islam declared war by bombing the World Trade Center in 1993. We refused to see them, and I think we still refuse to see them.

Back in 1989 the FBI shut down a surveillance despite witnessing the beginnings of a jihad army conducting paramilitary training on Long Island. The CIA allowed its lavish aid for Afghan mujahideen to flow to the most anti-American elements of the anti-Soviet jihad, elements that promptly turned on the United States once the Russians were defeated. A brazen 1990 killing by Abdel Rahman's henchman, Sayyid Nosair, the murder of the Jewish Defense League's founder, Rabbi Meir Kahane, was treated by the authorities as the work of a lone, crazed gunman despite

a wealth of seized evidence proving that Nosair was a member of a jihadist network with much broader ambitions.

Simply stated, we did not take the enemy and his motivations seriously before he announced himself. We did not react seriously in attempting before 9/11 to prosecute him into submission when he attacked again and again. And we are not serious if we believe now that we can define him out of existence.

Thank you.

ROBERT KIMBALL: Thank you, Andy (McCarthy). We will have a response from Judge Bork.

JUDGE ROBERT BORK: Well, I've been sitting here desperately trying to make some notes fit the topic this morning. What it reminds me of, in a way, when we discuss this desire of the transnational folks to find a new electorate if the old electorate doesn't produce the results they want, is that Bertolt Brecht saw that a long time ago when he said that the people had lost the confidence of the government, and a new people would have to be formed. (Laughter.)

The power of ideas is an intriguing topic because no one is sure what that power might be and how to wage the war. Intellectuals, of whom there are perhaps a sufficient number in this room, love the notion of the power of ideas because it suggests that they are the ultimate arbiters of society, and they control matters. And that I suppose springs from Holmes' famous metaphor that the best test of truth is the power of thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.

Holmes must have known better than that; the test of truth turned out to be the victory of the Union over the Confederacy in a war in which Holmes was wounded four times. And he cannot have supposed that Gettysburg was the marketplace of ideas. Ideas often are crucial but they must be implemented in many cases by force.

And I think that's what we think we're going to face with jihad. Jihad is maybe the latest evil idea. It is quite powerful. Nazism and Communism were very powerful ideas; Nazism lost to force, and Communism came apart when it didn't produce a decent life for its people. I don't know how we're going to persuade—we're clearly not going to persuade the jihadists that they are wrong, as Andrew (McCarthy) just mentioned. The debate about the superiority of Christianity and Judaism is unlikely to decide the issue in the war that's upon us.

But what ideas does the West have that are capable of meeting the threat? As Herb London and others have pointed out, much—arguably all—of the West has adopted secularism as its religious idea. Traditional religion is rapidly declining or being eaten away from within. We talk about America still being the most religious society in the world, and in a way that's true—but you have to examine what the content of that religion is and whether it's just therapeutic or whether it actually imposes duties and obligations. In any event, secularism is unlikely to produce the kind of fighting spirit or morale that you need to face the jihad. As Robert Goldwin said, you don't bring cheering throngs into the streets by marching under a banner that reads, "Be reasonable." (Laughter.)

I once made the entirely unoriginal observation to an eminent social scientist that there is an emptiness at the heart of modern liberal democratic regimes. He said that was not so. I asked, what was at the center? The pursuit of happiness, he said. Thomas Jefferson's somewhat unfortunate phrase. Although the formulation is empty, it has overtones of an individualism that tends to deny a community spirit. That combines with the high state of technology that in our society has produced a desire for convenience above much else. And the combination of that technology, a desire for convenience, and a lack of central purpose results in the rise of the couch potato, if said folks ever rise.

People for whom comfort and convenience are the meaning of life do not want to think about dangers that are growing but rarely impinge upon their personal, daily lives. Though it once seemed impossible, the memory of 9/11 has faded, and with it has faded the brief spurt of anger and patriotism that followed. The unpopularity of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are evidence that we don't want our lives disturbed by thinking about even serious threats. Perhaps this is always true in liberal democracies faced with prolonged struggles that threaten comfort, and it may partially account for what Andy McCarthy so well describes as "willful blindness" to the evidence before us of jihad.

Today there's ample evidence of the power of bad ideas. I think that bad ideas are more clearly formulated than good ideas right now. And among these are the intellectual-class religions of environmentalism, diversity, multiculturalism, and the encouragement throughout our educational system of a grievance mentality.

An acute commentator said that when socialism collapsed as a theory and a practice, liberalism had only anger left. That's not quite true. In the first place, the socialism of the liberal left was always rooted in anger. The apparent demise of the socialist theoretical framework really required that the anger find new outlets, and environmentalism was the perfect candidate because it is socialism under another name. It involves the same desire to control people's lives and to punish business and capitalism.

Global warming now rechristened "climate change" is perfect; it's a crisis in perpetuity. There is no way you'll ever solve it. One can never solve it so long as humans inhabit the planet. Its connection with jihadism is that the warmers refuse to allow technological steps that we must take in order to resist; I need not go into the question of their opposition to drilling for oil, their opposition to nuclear plants, their opposition to all kinds of things that would increase our national power. Instead, continual and intrusive governmental supervision of the way we live is bound to lower social morale and individual energy as well as foster divisions within our society.

Two related secular religions are diversity and multiculturalism.

We're constantly told diversity strengthens society and its subsidiary communities. It is, for example, the driving force behind affirmative action throughout our educational system from primary levels to post-graduate and in our economy from entry-level jobs to the executive suites. It's an obvious falsehood. Anybody who observes university life, for example, will see that racial and ethnic groups tend to segregate themselves rather than to enrich the educational experience. But what common sense tells us about artificially imposed diversity is confirmed by Robert Putnam's study, which shows that as diversity in the community increases, trust between

individuals and groups declines, and voluntary social work diminishes as do all other forms of social cooperation.

I don't know what we can do about it now, but it was obvious long ago that homogeneity had some advantages. John Jay, in his Federalist No 2, wrote, "Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country to one united people—a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs, and who, by their joint counsels, arms, and efforts, fighting side by side throughout a long and bloody war, have nobly established general liberty and independence." He said these people should never be split due to a number of unsocial, jealous, and alien sovereignties.

Well, of course we're well past the time when that kind of homogeneity could be expected in America, and nobody really wishes it to return. But there is something to be said for not speeding up the process of diversity to a point where community feeling becomes impossible, or becomes highly attenuated. I think it's safe to say, for example, that the Constitution that Jay was advocating in Federalist No. 2 could not be written and ratified today. We've become a nation of too many groups—whites, blacks, Hispanics, Asians, Muslims, and not to leave anybody out, Native Americans. The document would be swallowed by a voluminous Bill of Rights assuring everybody of non-discrimination as well as special treatment, as the Canadian Charter does. All that would mean is a nation governed by judges uttering politically correct pieties.

Now, I should digress here. When I asked John Sullivan about whether transnationalism had not already invaded our Constitution, I mean by that—if you look at it, I think six or seven of the nine justices have relied upon foreign law, or UN resolutions, or some other material that would not have been thought to be legal material in making decisions. And to that extent, transnationalism *has* invaded the court. And people who revere the Constitution in substantial measure believe that the Constitution is what the Court says it is. Now there are a few exceptions that are just too raw for everybody to accept—abortion being one. But by and large, the Court is viewed as the guardian of our sacred civic text, and when it begins to import the tenants of transnationalism into our Constitution, something is being weakened that ought not to be.

We're told that we're in a global war with jihadism that will last for generations if not for a century or more. The society we are becoming—with environmental socialism, extreme diversity, competing groups, multiculturalism, and grievance politics—is going to have the utmost difficulty in waging a war without tiring and perhaps losing what we value in the West. And we have groups within this society that are constantly attacking our ability to organize ourselves sufficiently to fight that war. The ACLU is the classical example.

I want to close with a quote from Walter Bagehot. What Bagehot said was, "The characteristic danger of great nations like the Romans or the English, which have a long history of continuous creation that, is, that they may at last fail from not comprehending the great institutions which they have created."⁴ And I think that's our danger today, and it's a danger that is being met at an intellectual level by Encounter Books and by *New Criterion* and also by *National Review*, and *Weekly Standard*, and *American Spectator*. So we do have a number of groups that are fighting back intellectually, the war of ideas. Which is only part of the overall war. There isn't cause for

⁴ from "Lord Althorp and the Reform Act of 1832," published in *Fortnightly Review* in November of 1876.

despair. I am sometimes viewed as a pessimist, but I deny it. There's no hope but I deny it.
(Laughter.)

And with that I subside.

ROGER KIMBALL: Thank you, Bob (Bork). I know Herb London is fond of quoting Kafka, who said, "There is hope, but not for us."

(Laughter.)

I don't know if *pessimism* is in order, but I think a certain measure of realism is, and while there is plenty to criticize about what the historian Arnold Toynbee wrote, he was probably right when he observed that most civilizations do not die from murder—from external attack—but from suicide.

One of the leitmotifs of our discussion today has been about liberalism and what happens when liberalism disintegrates or when it makes a fetish of certain core values—like tolerance, for example—and becomes empty. And if there is a tendency for liberalism to create a sort of vacuum—I think of something James Burnham, whom I quoted earlier today, wrote in his book *Suicide of the West* about the confrontation between the West and communism. He said that we aren't going to be able to prevail in this battle if all we have to put against it are things like higher social security payments, universal health care, and things of that nature. We do need to somehow recapture, reanimate, and resuscitate, certain core values—which I believe that we have, that we share. After all, the republic that this country is is not based merely on abstract values like tolerance but real values like the rule of law. These values, the values that animated James Madison, for example, we really need to recover.

How one does that is a complicated process. Certainly I believe that institutions like Encounter Books and the ones that Judge Bork mentioned have a role to play, but so do we all as citizens—in our families, in our communities, in our churches. We need to be less apathetic. We need to speak up more *for* America, and speak out against anti-Americanism. just by way of response to some of the things that Andy and Judge Bork said.

But we have some time for questions. First, Andy (McCarthy), do you have anything you'd like to say in response to Bob's comments?

ANDREW McCARTHY: Thank you. I just think that where this all unifies is, we are in a war, and how it will proceed from here on, and how it will ultimately turn out, probably is much more about us than it is about the enemy. The enemy really hasn't changed in fourteen centuries other than now it has, as I tried to suggest before, the advantages of a lot of money and some nation-state leadership, which it has had from time to time. The question in the equation is about us, and what we ultimately think of ourselves.

David does occasionally be Goliath. The enemy that we're fighting, aside from many other things that you can say about it, is utterly convinced that they'll win. They understand who they are. They understand what it is that they believe. And they believe that they'll be successful, and they think the trajectory of history is on their side. When they bombed the American embassy and the Marine barracks in Lebanon and the United States picked up stakes and left; when they

did the same thing in Somalia and the United States left again; when they waged a jihad against the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union not only left but faded out of existence; and when they conducted an operation like 9/11 and the mighty Twin Towers became just a gaping hole in the ground, they took it as a sign and as confirmation that history *is* on their side, and if they just hang in long enough, because they are more confident in who they are than we are in who we are, they believe they can win.

JULIANA PILON: First of all, I want to put a plug in for your book, Andy (McCarthy), it should be required reading. The nice thing about it is that it's a page-turner. Nevertheless, if I may take exception to—

ANDREW McCARTHY:—I don't like that “nevertheless”! (Laughter.)

JULIANA PILON: Well, I think it's fair to say that “jihadism” is not necessarily an ideal way to describe our enemy because of the obvious ambiguity at the root. I think what you're really reflecting, and what Roger very succinctly picked up on, is that we do have some problems in defining ourselves in positive terms. When communism was still kicking we could call ourselves anti-communist and make it clear that we are the opposite. Both liberalism and democracy share a certain problem—namely, that they are *process* oriented.

Liberalism allows freedom *for* something, or freedom against—even more negative—freedom against coercion, for example. Why are we reluctant to use, perhaps—because I haven't heard it all morning—a term such as “humanism,” perhaps “spiritual humanism,” in order to dispel the idea that it may be nihilist or even secular. It need not be. Why are we having difficulties? Is it perhaps because the very concept of an “ism,” as such, is what we abhor in a liberal society?

ANDREW McCARTHY: I guess the problem is that what we're trying to define is what we're fighting against. And that kind of objectifies the enemy rather than being a commentary on us, even if we are the variable in the equation. Let me just take one aspect of what you said and agree with it, even though it may not be as you meant it.

I think that it may well be that we focus too much on jihad. That's not to say that jihad is unimportant. I think jihadism *is* the enemy, and I think it's utterly appropriate to call it that. But because—at least in the West—there's a dispute about what “jihad” means, I think that has riveted our attention away from what may be a much bigger problem, which is Shariah. And as we argue out whether jihad is a holy war against us or whether it's a spiritual quest for individual betterment, what goes on under the radar—and I try to get into this in the paper—is this creeping Shariah into our institutions, our government institutions, culturally in the academy, and throughout our society. And while we have our eye on the jihad ball, that may end up being a much bigger challenge to us.

ROGER KIMBALL: I think that what Victor Davis Hanson spoke about this morning, a cultural amnesia, can supply some of the lack that you notice there. I mean, our educational institutions have failed miserably in supplying those exempla that Victor spoke about. And that is certainly one way in which to provide some of the content that—you're right—is missing.

FAITH McDONNELL, Institute on Religion & Democracy: After the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, a friend of mine who had lived in Khartoum was watching television and saw

her former bag boy as one of the perpetrators who was involved in that, and that makes me want to ask you, are you concerned with the fact that the US government's whole approach on Sudan has been a humanitarian one—completely—rather than addressing it as a jihadist state that's not only attempting to “Islamize” and “Arabize” all the Sudanese but is an active participant in global jihad, I believe, and also that the US government seems to believe that the Islamic regime in Khartoum is cooperating with us in the war on terrorism?

ANDREW McCARTHY: Well, I'm concerned that I didn't subpoena your friend! (Laughter.) But I actually think that the approach to Sudan has been all wrong, and that's not anything that's recent. We proved in the 1995 trial of the 1993 plot that two diplomats in the Sudanese embassy at the United Nations were complicit in the plot and were helping the jihadists by providing them with diplomatic plates so that they could bring a bomb-laden van onto the United Nations complex in Manhattan and help blow it up. Not much was publicly made out of that, but they had diplomatic immunity and they couldn't be prosecuted. They were declared *persona non grata* and thrown out of the country.

In 1998, after the embassies were bombed, the Clinton administration retaliated with one day of cruise missiles. One of the targets famously attacked was a pharmaceutical factory in Sudan. The reason that the factory was attacked was because it was thought by our intelligence to be a joint venture among Al Qaeda, the Sudanese government, and the government of Iraq to develop chemical weapons. And when the 9/11 Commission pressed Clinton administration officials on that—including President Clinton, as I understand—during the interview, they continued to hold to the view that that's exactly what it is. So, the problem of Sudanese state sponsorship of terrorism is not anything new, and I think that it is something that should have been addressed in a serious way a long time ago.

MARK KRIKORIAN, Center for Immigration Studies: I agree completely that we need to fight against this elite unwillingness to confront and name the enemy in a variety of ways. But, I would suggest we also need to acknowledge it and incorporate it in planning how we confront jihadists. In other words, we have two options—rollback or containment, to put it in earlier, simple terminology. Against previous enemies where there wasn't this kind of elite disagreement—against the Nazis and the Japanese—we pursued rollback. Against the Soviets, we had, actually, a similar problem; much of the elite was anti-anti-Communist, and I would submit that that's one of the reasons containment ended up having to be our strategy, and it ended up working.

I am actually completely confident that *we* are going to win and they're *not* going to win. My point is: Does this unwillingness to name the enemy have to be one of the things we factor into our strategy on how to confront jihadism? Might containment rather than rollback be a more viable and sustainable strategy precisely because of this elite unwillingness to name the enemy?

JUDGE ROBERT BORK: How do you contain a group that is worldwide and hard to identify? It's not like the Soviets, where you could contain their armies or deter their armies. I don't know how you contain a group like al-Qaeda.

ANDREW McCARTHY: Mark, let me just add to that that just on the legal aspect of it, there are important changes. If I get this wrong, I hope Judge Bork will correct me, but there have been important changes in the law in the last half-century, particularly in the interpretation of the First

Amendment in the 1960s and 1970s, that make a legal response a lot more complicated now than it may have been during the Cold War. For example, the Supreme Court has, at best, confused what the difference is, I think, between advocacy on the one hand, and instruction. It's made it problematic to criminalize, for example, being a member of an organization like the Communist Party.

We had a raging debate in our office during the terrorism prosecutions of 1990s about whether it was a crime to be a member of al-Qaeda. I thought it was, because as I understood the al-Qaeda conspiracy, you couldn't be in it without agreeing, essentially, to be in a conspiracy against the United States that was intended to kill Americans. Other people forcefully argued that under the Supreme Court's precedence of the 1950s, '60s, and '70s, you could no longer criminalize being a member of an entity without doing something more affirmative to carry out its forcible designs. I just think it's more complicated than it used to be.

JUDGE ROBERT BORK: You're both right. It should be a crime, under any sensible approach, and the Supreme Court has prevented it from being a crime.

ROGER KIMBALL: That's why it's so important, as we were saying this morning, to be able to call things by their right names. I know, for example, that Gordon Brown's government has recently re-baptized Islamic terrorism as anti-Islamic activity.

JUDGE ROBERT BORK: John O'Sullivan... (off mike) arouse the public, and I wonder when they're going to get aroused! (Laughter.)

ROGER KIMBALL: Yes, Hillel?

HILLEL FRADKIN, Hudson Institute: I actually want to—not on her behalf, but on my own behalf—withdraw the “nevertheless” from the praise that Juliana (Pilon) first offered.

It seems to me that your remarks today were very correct, Andy (McCarthy), in putting the stress on the fact that we are in a very strange situation now, where people are trying to deal with this problem by essentially saying it doesn't exist, or defining it in such a way that it disappears from our speech. In that regard, what you have to say is really very important, and it's really very important that Encounter helps it reach people—because it won't reach them from the more obvious sources, which would be our academy's experts on Islam, who are now extremely complicit in the attempt to deny that the problem exists or to actually insist that the problem really lies with America, the American public, and especially it's most vicious anti-Muslim instincts. So, it's really terribly, terribly important.

It's also just very curious; I'm not aware of another situation, even looking back to our conflict with the Soviet Union, where people just simply were inclined to deny the problem altogether or to place the onus for it completely and utterly on the United States. There were, of course, certain people who did in Cold War, but everyone kind of admitted that there was *some* issue out there. This is unlike that in its extremity, and I just want to thank you for fighting against it.

ROGER KIMBALL: We have time for one maybe more brief question. Yes?

NESTOR FORSTER: Just a brief question. I have no question that on a civilizational scale,

jihadism is the big enemy of America, but I think we are too quick to dismiss the whole communist threat, you know, just because the Soviet Union ended eighteen years ago.

Anti-American sentiment throughout the world has increased a lot since the defeat of Soviet communism, and we cannot attribute this growth only to radical Islamism. So, I'd like to hear your comments. I think that the Chinese Communist Party thinks that communism is very much alive. So do the faculty of many American universities. And I agree with Judge Bork that environmentalism is the new face of socialism today, but so are all of these agendas on the left—gay rights, radical feminism, and so on. How do we fight this more complex, several-headed enemy?

ROGER KIMBALL: If I could just call to your attention a brilliant essay by a member of the audience, Irving Kristol, called "My Cold War," written shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union. He said that his cold war is not over, because one institution after the next of Western society is being infiltrated by these various bad things. And I think you're probably right, in that sense, that the Cold War is not over. Andrew?

ANDREW McCARTHY: My only reaction to that is to say, I don't mean by focusing my remarks on jihadism to trivialize any other problem. But let me just put it as bluntly as I can: jihadism is the challenge that is on the main stage right now. It's the most obvious one. And if we react to it with weakness; if we put our heads in the sand; if we decline to deal with it even as it becomes more serious, then I think that has an exacerbating effect on all of the other challenges. It really is front and center now, and if we are unwilling to deal with the main, present danger to us, I don't see how that doesn't just make everything else much worse.

ROGER KIMBALL: Well, I'd like to thank all of the panelists, all the discussants today, for participating in what I think has been a marvelous conversation, and all of you for helping to make it possible.

You know, the sage of Ecclesiastes said (in 12:12) that of making many books there is no end. I don't think he's very pleased about the prospect, either, but I like to think that he would smile benignly on some of the efforts that we undertake at Encounter Books. We are deeply, deeply grateful to the Hudson Institute's Bradley Center for Philanthropy and Civic Renewal, and, of course, to the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation for making our work possible. Thank you very much.

(Applause.)

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II. Biographies

Robert H. Bork served as Solicitor General from 1973 to 1977; acting Attorney General from 1973 to 1974; and Circuit Judge of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit from 1982 to 1988. He was nominated by President Ronald Reagan to the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States on July 1, 1987. Confirmation was denied by the Senate on October 23 of that year. In February 1988 he resigned as Circuit Judge and joined the American Enterprise Institute from which he resigned in November 2003. Judge Bork served as the Alexander M. Bickel Professor of Public Law at Yale Law School from 1962 to 1981 with time off to serve as Solicitor General. He is currently a professor at the Ave Maria School of Law in Ann Arbor, Michigan and the Tad and Diane Taube Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution. Judge Bork is the author of two New York Times bestsellers: *Slouching Towards Gomorrah: Modern Liberalism and American Decline* (1996), reissued with an afterword (2003) and *The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law* (1990). He also authored *The Antitrust Paradox* (second edition 1993). His most recent book, *Coercing Virtue: The Worldwide Rule of Judges* (2003), examines judicial activism and the practice of many courts, national and international, that decide matters not committed to their authority. He has written numerous magazine, newspaper, and law review articles.

John Fonte joined the Hudson Institute in March 1999 as a senior fellow and director of the Center for American Common Culture. His forthcoming book, *Sovereignty or Submission: Will Americans Rule Themselves or be Ruled by Others?* will be published by Encounter Books in 2009. Fonte has been a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute where he directed the Committee to Review National Standards under the chairmanship of Lynne V. Cheney. He also served as a senior researcher at the U.S. Department of Education and a program administrator at the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH). He is currently on the board of the American Council for Trustees and Alumni (ACTA). Fonte has testified before Congress on immigration, assimilation, citizenship, citizenship naturalization and on civil rights issues, and has served as a consultant for state departments of education, several private organizations, and the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Lithuania. He was a member of the steering committee for the congressionally-mandated National Assessment for Education Progress (NAEP) which issued the “nation’s report card” on civics and government. Fonte’s articles and essays on citizenship, history, civic education, patriotism, assimilation, civil rights,

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global organizations, American sovereignty, and liberal democracy have appeared in dozens of journals, magazines, and newspapers. He is co-editor of *Education for America's Role in World Affairs* (University Press), a book on civic and world affairs education used in universities and teacher training institutes. His ideas on democratic sovereignty and international law were cited in the annual *New York Times Magazine's* "Year in Ideas" as among the most noteworthy of 2004.

Victor Davis Hanson is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, a professor emeritus at California University, Fresno, and a nationally syndicated columnist for Tribune Media Services. He is also the Wayne & Marcia Buske Distinguished Fellow in History, Hillsdale College, where he teaches each fall courses in military history and classical culture. He was a full-time farmer before joining CSU Fresno, in 1984 to initiate a classics program. In 1991, he was awarded an American Philological Association Excellence in Teaching Award, which is given yearly to the country's top undergraduate teachers of Greek and Latin. Hanson was a National Endowment for the Humanities fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, California (1992-93), a visiting professor of classics at Stanford University (1991-92), a recipient of the Eric Breindel Award for opinion journalism (2002), and an Alexander Onassis Fellow (2001) and was named alumnus of the year of the University of California, Santa Cruz (2002). He was also the visiting Shifrin Chair of Military History at the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland (2002-3). He received the Manhattan Institute's Wriston Lectureship in 2004, and the 2006 Nimitz Lectureship in Military History at UC Berkeley in 2006. Hanson is the author of hundreds of articles, book reviews, scholarly papers, and newspaper editorials on matters ranging from Greek, agrarian and military history to foreign affairs, domestic politics, and contemporary culture. He has written or edited sixteen books, including *Mexifornia: A State of Becoming* (Encounter, 2003), *Ripples of Battle* (Doubleday, 2003), and *Between War and Peace* (Random House, 2004). His newest book, *A War Like No Other: How the Athenians and Spartans Fought the Peloponnesian War*, was published by Random House in October 2005, and was named one of the *New York Times* Notable 100 Books of 2006.

Roger Kimball is co-editor and publisher of *The New Criterion* and president and publisher of Encounter Books. He is also an art critic for the *London Spectator* and *National Review*. He is the author, most recently, of *The Rape of the Masters: How Political Correctness Sabotages Art* (Encounter Books, 2004). Kimball is also the author of *Art's Prospect: The Challenge of Tradition in an Age of Celebrity* (Ivan R. Dee, 2003), *Lives of The Mind: The Use and Abuse of Intelligence from Hegel to Wodehouse* (Ivan R. Dee, 2002), *Experiments Against Reality: The Fate of Culture in the Postmodern Era* (Ivan R. Dee, 2000), *The Long March: How the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s Changed America* (Encounter Books, 2000), and *Tenured Radicals: How Politics Has Corrupted Our Higher Education* (HarperCollins, 1990). A revised edition of *Tenured Radicals* will be published by Ivan R. Dee in the fall of this year. Kimball lectures widely, has appeared on numerous television and radio programs, and has contributed to many publications here and in England, including *The New Criterion*, *The Times Literary Supplement*, *Modern Painters*, *Literary Review*, *The Wall Street Journal*, *The Public Interest*, *Commentary*,

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The Spectator, The New York Times Book Review, The Sunday Telegraph, The American Spectator, The Weekly Standard, First Things, American Outlook, Crisis, National Review, and The National Interest.

Andrew C. McCarthy directs the Center for Law & Counterterrorism at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. He is also a contributing editor at *National Review* and a member of the Committee on the Present Danger. His book *Willful Blindness: A Memoir of the Jihad* was published on April 14 by Encounter Books. For eighteen years, McCarthy was an Assistant United States Attorney in the Southern District of New York. From 1993 through 1995, he led the terrorism prosecution against Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman and eleven others in connection with the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and a plot to bomb New York City landmarks. He served for several years as the Chief Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Southern District's satellite office in White Plains, and, following the 9/11 attacks, supervised the Office's Command Post near Ground Zero in New York City. In 2004, McCarthy served at the Pentagon as a special assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. He has also been an adjunct professor at both Fordham University's School of Law and New York Law School, as well as a Deputy United States Marshal in the federal Witness Protection Program. In addition to being featured regularly in *National Review*, McCarthy's articles have also appeared in the *Wall Street Journal*, *Commentary*, *The New Criterion*, *The Weekly Standard*, *USA Today* and many other publications. He is frequently featured as a commentator on television and nationally syndicated radio broadcasts.

John O'Sullivan is executive editor of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, setting editorial vision and direction for the organization. He has served as a senior editor at the *London Times* and the *Daily Telegraph*, and as a special adviser to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. He helped found the Canadian daily, the *National Post*. O'Sullivan has also been editor-in-chief of United Press International and editor of the magazines *The National Interest* and *National Review*. Most recently, O'Sullivan was a senior fellow at Hudson Institute in Washington, DC. His recent book, *The President, the Pope, and the Prime Minister*, has been translated into Polish, Czech, Spanish and Portuguese. O'Sullivan is also the founder of the bi-partisan, transatlantic New Atlantic Initiative, launched at the Congress of Prague in 1996.

James Piereson is president of the William E. Simon Foundation, a private grantmaking foundation located in New York City. The foundation has broad charitable interests in education, religion, and problems of youth. Piereson is also a senior fellow at The Manhattan Institute in New York where he is director of the Center for the American University. Piereson was executive director and trustee of the John M. Olin Foundation from 1985 until the end of 2005 when, following longstanding plans, the foundation disbursed its remaining assets and closed its doors. Piereson joined the John M. Olin Foundation in 1981 as a program officer, and was appointed executive director in 1985. He was elected to the Board of Trustees in 1987. Prior to joining the Foundation, he served on the Political Science faculties of several prominent universities, including Iowa State University (1974), Indiana University (1975), and the University of Pennsylvania (1976-82), where he taught courses in the fields of United States

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government and political theory. Piereson is the author of *Camelot and the Cultural Revolution: How the Assassination of John F. Kennedy Shattered American Liberalism* (Encounter Books, 2007). He is also the author (with J. Sullivan and G. Marcus) of *Political Tolerance and American Democracy* (University of Chicago Press, 1982). He has also published articles and reviews in numerous journals, including *Commentary*, *The New Criterion*, *The American Political Science Review*, *The Public Interest*, the *Journal of Politics*, *Philanthropy*, *The American Spectator*, *The Wall Street Journal*, and *The Weekly Standard*.

William A. Schambra is the director of the Hudson Institute's Bradley Center for Philanthropy and Civic Renewal. Prior to joining the Hudson Institute in January of 2003, Schambra was director of programs at the Bradley Foundation in Milwaukee. Before joining Bradley in 1992, Schambra served as a senior advisor and chief speechwriter for Attorney General Edwin Meese III, Director of the Office of Personnel Management Constance Horner, and Secretary of Health and Human Services Louis Sullivan. He was also director of Social Policy Programs for the American Enterprise Institute, and co-director of AEI's "A Decade of Study of the Constitution." Schambra was appointed by President Reagan to the National Historical Publications and Records Commission, and by President George W. Bush to the board of directors of the Corporation for National and Community Service. Schambra has written extensively on the Constitution, the theory and practice of civic revitalization, and civil society in *The Public Interest*, *Public Opinion*, *The Wall Street Journal*, *The Washington Times*, *Policy Review*, *Christian Science Monitor*, *Nonprofit Quarterly*, *Philanthropy*, *The Chronicle of Philanthropy*, and *Crisis*, and is the editor of several volumes, including *As Far as Republican Principles Will Admit: Collected Essays of Martin Diamond*.

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