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Why the U.S. is Silent
October 11, 2006
by
Herbert
I.
London
According to Noah Feldman, professor of law at NYU, writing in the New York Times October 1, there is a rational case, to be made for the United States to negotiate with its enemies (“Why Not Talk?”). After all, he notes, our allies are already engaged in negotiations, despite the absence of the United States. “What’s the point of not talking, especially when others are talking for us?” he asks. It is instructive that Professor Feldman answers this question quite effectively even though he doesn’t adjust his conclusion for his own logic. He writes, “some enemies – a Hitler or a Pol Pot – may be so repugnant that the mere prospect of reaching a compromise with them would violate our deepest moral principles. The only time it would be right to hear them out is when they are proposing to surrender.”
Alas, that is precisely why negotiations with the present assemblage of enemies isn’t possible. Given their intractable position and hatred of the United States, compromise is impossible, as is rational discourse. Sheik Nasrallah stated the enemy’s stance blatantly when he said, “Death to America is not a slogan. Death to America is a policy, a strategy and a vision.” If this is the starting point, on what basis is negotiation possible?
And yet, says Feldman, “even intractable interlocutors may be worth engaging.” Here is the diplomat’s calling card – better to jaw, jaw than war, war. While diplomacy has its place, it is also true that negotiations offer legitimacy to tyrants; formal talk provides a basis for the status-quo.
In Iran, for example, it is probably true that most people resent Ahmadinejad and the mullahs. Pro-democracy movements are at a delicate stage of development. What they need is assurance that the United States stands behind their effort at regime change.
Feldman contends that diplomacy led incrementally to the integration of Western Europe, a dubious contention, but one that reinforces the validity of diplomacy. The analogy of Western Europe and Iran, however, is absurd since the mullahs are driven by a religious impulse to imperialize the region, destroy Israel (“wipe it off the map”) and then consider war against the infidels. As Ahmadinejad has noted, Israel is the appetizer; the U.S. is the main course.
Our refusal to speak to the enemy may have its negative side but, on balance, silence in the face of a morally repugnant tyranny is much to be preferred, in my judgment. The problem the U.S. has at the moment is that many Americans either do not recognize the moral repugnance of the enemy or they believe – having been brainwashed by Hollywood inspired anti-Americanism – that the U.S. is the immoral actor on the world stage.
Feldman contends we need a diplomatic “breakthrough,” a point with which I agree. But in the case of Iran, the Europeans have offered every “carrot” the mind can conjure from Airbus planes and money to nuclear energy plants if only the Iranian government will cease its enrichment of uranium as a first step for nuclear weapons development. Is there more we could offer?
Moreover, this scenario is beginning to resemble the Munich Accord of 1936 with European diplomats sounding eerily like Neville Chamberlain. Will Israel serve as the Sudetenland of 2006? The West bends over backwards to avoid conflict – an understandable stance – but in the end respect and flexibility will emerge in Iran when the things the government values are put at risk.
Diplomacy does involve a carrot and a stick. So far European diplomacy is all carrots and no sticks. Perhaps that is a good reason for American silence. We should, as T.R. once said, “speak softly, but carry a big stick.” I would argue silence on our part is justified until the European diplomatic initiative runs its course and stalemate is the result, which I’m confident will be the case.
Feldman ends his piece by noting, “In an ideological age, diplomacy may seem weak and prosaic. But sometimes it is all we have.” I suspect Churchill, among others, would strongly disagree.
Alas, that is precisely why negotiations with the present assemblage of enemies isn’t possible. Given their intractable position and hatred of the United States, compromise is impossible, as is rational discourse. Sheik Nasrallah stated the enemy’s stance blatantly when he said, “Death to America is not a slogan. Death to America is a policy, a strategy and a vision.” If this is the starting point, on what basis is negotiation possible?
And yet, says Feldman, “even intractable interlocutors may be worth engaging.” Here is the diplomat’s calling card – better to jaw, jaw than war, war. While diplomacy has its place, it is also true that negotiations offer legitimacy to tyrants; formal talk provides a basis for the status-quo.
In Iran, for example, it is probably true that most people resent Ahmadinejad and the mullahs. Pro-democracy movements are at a delicate stage of development. What they need is assurance that the United States stands behind their effort at regime change.
Feldman contends that diplomacy led incrementally to the integration of Western Europe, a dubious contention, but one that reinforces the validity of diplomacy. The analogy of Western Europe and Iran, however, is absurd since the mullahs are driven by a religious impulse to imperialize the region, destroy Israel (“wipe it off the map”) and then consider war against the infidels. As Ahmadinejad has noted, Israel is the appetizer; the U.S. is the main course.
Our refusal to speak to the enemy may have its negative side but, on balance, silence in the face of a morally repugnant tyranny is much to be preferred, in my judgment. The problem the U.S. has at the moment is that many Americans either do not recognize the moral repugnance of the enemy or they believe – having been brainwashed by Hollywood inspired anti-Americanism – that the U.S. is the immoral actor on the world stage.
Feldman contends we need a diplomatic “breakthrough,” a point with which I agree. But in the case of Iran, the Europeans have offered every “carrot” the mind can conjure from Airbus planes and money to nuclear energy plants if only the Iranian government will cease its enrichment of uranium as a first step for nuclear weapons development. Is there more we could offer?
Moreover, this scenario is beginning to resemble the Munich Accord of 1936 with European diplomats sounding eerily like Neville Chamberlain. Will Israel serve as the Sudetenland of 2006? The West bends over backwards to avoid conflict – an understandable stance – but in the end respect and flexibility will emerge in Iran when the things the government values are put at risk.
Diplomacy does involve a carrot and a stick. So far European diplomacy is all carrots and no sticks. Perhaps that is a good reason for American silence. We should, as T.R. once said, “speak softly, but carry a big stick.” I would argue silence on our part is justified until the European diplomatic initiative runs its course and stalemate is the result, which I’m confident will be the case.
Feldman ends his piece by noting, “In an ideological age, diplomacy may seem weak and prosaic. But sometimes it is all we have.” I suspect Churchill, among others, would strongly disagree.
Herbert London is president of Hudson Institute and professor emeritus of New York University. He is the author of Decade of Denial (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2001) and America's Secular Challenge: The Rise of a New National Religion (Encounter Books, 2008). London maintains a website, www.herblondon.org.
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