Russian Notes: Restoring Russia's Empire

If there is a single idea which today unites all those very different people, who so love to call themselves the "Russian political elite," it is the idea of "dominating the post-Soviet space," of finding a way to restore the Russo-Soviet empire.

Post-imperial messianic complexes have always been a characteristic of Russia's political class. If, however, in the first post-Soviet decade our diplomats fought phantom battles against the expansion of NATO into Central Europe or for "Russia's traditional interests in the Balkans," with extraordinary pomp and ceremony, today their operational area has been reduced to the post-Soviet territories, where they are preparing to make their last stand.

Russia lost her empire back in 1917. She emerged from three years of civil war weakened and devastated. In the Caucasus and Central Asia her opponent was Britain, ruler of the waves and victor of the First World War. London had long been taking an interest in those regions. In the course of a few months, almost without any apparent effort, the Bolsheviks restored the Russian empire as if Britain were not even there. What made this miracle happen? And why is it not going to happen again today?

Well, because on their bayonets the ragged Red Army carried to the peoples of the former Russian empire inspiring communist ideals of social justice and liberation for the masses of the East. No matter that the ideals proved false, and that their implementation was criminal. That became evident only later. At the time, they inspired millions of people, irrespective of their nationality. It was no quasi-religious ideal; it was a fully fledged new religion. Just as the adoption of Christianity prolonged the existence of the Roman Empire for 300 years, so the adoption of communism extended the existence of the Russian empire for several decades.

What has today's Russian elite to offer its former neighbors in the Soviet communal apartment? Nothing except pompous talk about Russia's greatness, its historical mission and the messianic imperial predestination of the Russian ethnos. All of this megalomaniacal stuff can't appeal to anybody beyond Russia's borders. We are trying to force our neighbors to choose: Russia or the West. This is a completely unconstructive and silly choice to put before them. Russia has demonstrated more than once to the countries of the former Soviet Union that she is unable and, worse, unwilling to help them resolve the problems they face. Is it any wonder they are all trying to maximize contact with the West?

It is this post-empire complex that is driving the Kremlin's senseless and hysterical campaign against Georgia. Moscow's campaign has included a trade and transportation blockade, ethnic cleansing and deportations of Georgians living in Russia, and support for separatist regimes in the enclaves of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

The aim of the campaign is to weaken the position of Georgia's pro-Western President Mikhail Saakashvili. But even observers who are loyal to the Kremlin in Moscow have admitted that the result has only been to consolidate Georgian public opinion to back their leader.

The main problem with Russian policy toward Georgia is that Moscow does not know itself what it expects to achieve by such politics of total pressure on Tbilisi. When Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was asked this question, he answered after a long pause: "Georgia knows what we want from her."

Moscow's closest ally, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, probably gave the best description of the inevitable consequences of such behavior. Lukashenko was talking mainly about the pressure being exerted by the Kremlin to push Belarus into joining a union with Russia. But Lukashenko's words serve as a warning about the unintended consequences of Russian policies not just in his