In his first speech after the attacks of September 11, 2001, ‘Usama Bin Laden lists the grievances that compelled and justified the terrorist backlash against the West, among which he alludes to a European role that he alleges was played in ousting the last Ottoman caliph. For ever since March 4, 1924, when Caliph Abdul Mejid II was sent packing by the Turkish nationalists, most Islamists and jihadists have held that the resurrection of the caliphate is an important step towards recapturing the glory, might and purpose of early Islam, and in fending off centuries of Western territorial and cultural encroachment upon their lands and sovereignty—a nadir reached when European powers occupied Istanbul, the seat of the caliphate at the time, after World War I. Given the immense doctrinal and political obstacles posed by Muslim disunity and weakness in the 20th century, the task of re-establishing the caliphate and picking a caliph had been deferred pending a spiritual revival among Muslims. It had been pending, that is, until a new crop of jihadists doing battle in post-2003 Iraq, who initially had not acknowledged Bin Laden’s tutelage of worldwide jihad, decided that such an Islamic revival was indeed taking place in the territories under their control, and that the time for the caliphate’s rebirth had come. The vehicle for this new-born venture of theirs would be called the ‘Islamic State of Iraq.’

The Islamic State of Iraq was to be the first incarnation of the resurrected caliphate, and its leader Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi was to be the caliph in waiting. The Islamic State of Iraq was the third stage of a three phased expansion begun by Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi: his first move was to link his Iraq-based Jama’et Al-Tawhid wel-Jihad (‘Monotheism and Jihad Group’) to Bin Laden’s worldwide Al-Qaeda franchise in October 2004 by adopting the name Al-Qaeda fi Bilad ar-Rafidayn, commonly referred to in Western circles as ‘Al-Qaeda in Iraq’; then al-Zarqawi made a bid to bring all the other Iraqi jihadist organizations under his control by expanding the ‘Al-Qaeda in Iraq Organization’ into the umbrella-like Majlis Shura Al-Mujahidin (‘Shura Council of
the Mujahidin’) in January 2006. The process was completed five months after al-Zarqawi’s death in a U.S. airstrike, when his successors made a bid to supersede the worldwide Al-Qaeda network by forming the Dawlet Al-‘Iraq Al-Islamiyya (‘Islamic State of Iraq’) in October 2006. The Islamic State of Iraq would be the most ambitious jihadist venture to date, for it would take the jihad against the West to its next level of confrontation: rather than have disparate groups of jihadists retaliating against western targets by terrorist means, the Islamic State would confront its foes as would an emerging empire—sovereign throughout, and expanding upon, its territory—in the fashion of the early Islamic conquests. Their act of defeating the United States, the world’s mightiest military and economic power, on the battlefield of Iraq as al-Zarqawi’s successors believed they were doing and as echoed back to them from a despairing American press corps, was to be the harbinger of even greater victories for Islam. In this vein, the jihadists in Iraq could lay claim to the leadership of global jihad, since they had surpassed in scope, purpose and martial triumph the generation of jihadists that preceded them, notable among which was Bin Laden.

The doctrinal premises upon which the jihadists in Iraq justified the formation of their state, as well as the requirements and conditions to be met by candidates seeking the job of head of state, are the same ones that medieval Muslim jurists such as al-Mawardi (d. 1058) and al-Juwaini (d. 1085) had laid down for the caliphate. These updated premises were put forth in a book that was released by the ‘Ministry of Shari’ah Commissions’ of the Islamic State of Iraq in early January 2007 under the title Elam al-anam bi milad dawlet al-islam (Informing the People About the Birth of the State of Islam) —a manifesto of sorts for the ‘Zarqawist’ wing of the global jihad—almost three months after the state was declared.

The ambition and bravado of ‘Zarqawists’ is reflected by the unidentified author of Elam al-anam when quoting President George Bush to say “those radicals want to terrorize the moderates and intellectuals, and they want to overthrow their governments [to] establish the state of the caliphate. [So] leaving Iraq is very dangerous, because it means abandoning a part of the region to the radicals who will glorify [their] victory over the United States, and this region will give them the opportunity to conspire and plan to attack America, and manipulate the resources to enable them to expand the state of the caliphate.” The author reckons that “the liar [Bush] was right about that!”

In this boisterous vein, the jihadists of the Islamic State of Iraq appropriated for themselves Muhammad’s personal standard, the ‘Banner of Al-‘Uqab’—under which the early Muslims fought the enemies of Islam while their prophet was still alive—that, depending on its various and at times varying descriptions, they rendered as such:
The emblem of the Islamic State of Iraq

Taking the prophet’s flag as their own is not the only way in which the jihadists sought to emulate Muhammad; they also adopted his nascent state in Medina as the blueprint upon which the Islamic State of Iraq should be modeled.

This was a revolutionary step which contrasted with earlier generations of Islamists and jihadists such as the Muslim Brotherhood or Bin Laden, who preceded the founders of the Islamic State of Iraq, that had cautiously deferred appointing a caliph not only because of a general sense of Muslim powerlessness in the 20th century, but also to avoid a selection process that is vague and ill-defined, and hence lends itself to speculation and abuse. Jihadist victories in post-2003 Iraq restored to Islamic militancy a new sense of strength, fortifying the victors with the confidence to dismiss doctrinal obstacles that had hindered earlier caliphal ventures, which enabled them to apply what seemed to be practical and convenient by their reckoning.

In as much as there is a Sunni doctrine for the caliphate it is one exclusively based on precedence. The method by which a caliph is chosen, on what criteria, and how a caliph chooses to exercise his prerogatives have all witnessed wide fluctuations in the course of Islamic history, thus finding a stable and undisputed precedent is not without its many controversial pitfalls. However, it appears that modern jihadists may in fact have made use of a ground-breaking tome on the caliphate, which was authored in the early 1980s by Saudi cleric Abdullah ibn ‘Umar ad-Dumaiji under the title Al-imamah al-‘udhmah ‘inda ahl ul-sunnah wel-jama’ah (The Grand Imamate According to Sunnis), to serve as their guide. This work offers a user-friendly manual for choosing a caliph, one that does so by reflecting on the various arguments for and against any given stipulations and authoritatively recommending the most suitable from a doctrinal perspective, thus charting the way out of the most problematic historical issues that had impeded caliphal selection. It was re-published by the Global Islamic Media Front, an important jihadist propaganda outlet, a month after Elam al-anam’s release, seemingly to complement the Islamic State of Iraq’s publication.

This paper will analyze the various arguments made by the author of Elam al-anam, along with the ideological framework laid out in ad-Dumaiji’s study, in order to provide some insights into what motivated the jihadists in Iraq especially in determining the necessary prerequisites to be met by its leader, al-Baghdadi, who is also the candidate caliph. Since historical precedent is of critical value in matters of Islamic leadership, this paper will contextualize these works by reviewing late 19th and early 20th century deliberations that came prior to or following the
abolishment of the caliphate, with focus on the events that unfolded in Turkey and Egypt, which the jihadists are most likely to have taken into consideration in avoiding ensnarement by the same pitfalls. These deliberations revolved around what group or body is tasked with electing a caliph, where such an election must take place and whether possession of the two holy cities of Mecca and Medina is required. The role of the caliph, as it was innovatively reinterpreted under one of the last Ottoman sultans to include a diffuse spiritual component akin to that exercised by the Catholic pope will be explored to show the means by which Turkish nationalists charted their course towards abolishing the caliphate—the very act that Bin Laden found so odious—by stripping the caliph of temporal authority and leaving the office with a hollow and ultimately redundant claim to a spiritual following across the Muslim world. The question of the caliph’s descent from the tribe of Quraysh and whether such a pedigree is mandatory for a caliph shall be scrutinized since the Islamic State of Iraq dramatically and recurrently embellishes al-Baghdadi’s alleged Qurayshite roots in hinting at his role as caliph.

In order to understand the historical progression of jihadist ideology this paper will also address the nebulous attempts in the years preceding the Iraq war by which earlier jihadist ideologues had dealt with the issue of the caliphate, mainly in light of their hostility to Hizb ut-Tahrir, an Islamist organization founded in the 1950s that had cornered the ideological niche on all issues pertaining to the caliphate that includes Hizb ut-Tahrir’s stipulation that jihad can only be waged under the guidance of a ruling caliph, a precondition that jihadists find unnecessary. The farcical consequences of an ad hoc experiment during which some mujahidin veterans of the Afghan jihad elected a caliph in Peshawar—an embarrassment that the jihadists may have been mindful of and one that they would have wanted to avoid—shall also be appraised.

The tendency by which jihadists skip over such precedents and return to the early decades of Islam, under Muhammad and his immediate successors, along which to model their actions, shall be highlighted in order to better frame how al-Baghdadi understands his role as caliph to be both temporal and imperial rather than spiritual, as evidenced by his many pronouncements on the allegiance he is owed by Iraq’s Sunnis and his declarations of war against several regional and Western nations. The paper will conclude by examining the implications of the collapse of the jihad in Iraq and its effects on the attempted caliphate, and how this may weaken overall jihadist morale in the short-term.

**Brief Note on the Interchangeability of the Terms ‘Caliphate’ and ‘Imamate’**

Ad-Dumaiji begins his book by explaining that Islamic authorities have always understood the terms ‘imamate’ and ‘caliphate’ to be interchangeable, and that the titles of ‘imam’ and *emir al-mu’mineen* (‘Commander of the Faithful’) were prerogatives of the caliph. Quoting a medieval scholar, ad-Dumaiji points out that the imamate is the “leadership of all matters private and public in the realms of religion and worldly [affairs],” and that it is sometimes referred to as *al-imamah al-‘udhma* (‘The Grand Imamate’) to distinguish the ruling imam from an imam, or leader, of prayer. The distinguishing feature seems to be that Sunni scholars employed the term
‘imamate’ when writing about doctrinal issues, and ‘caliphate’ when discussing historical events. The title of caliph is applicable to rulers who succeeded the Four Righteous Caliphs, in ad-Dumaiji’s opinion, as long as they could claim descent from the tribe of Quraysh. Sunni jurists may also be more comfortable with the title of imam since there is a long-standing historical controversy over whether the title of caliph means ‘Successor of the Apostle of God,’ ‘Successor to the Successor of the Apostle of God,’ or ‘Vicegerent of God,’ or even ‘Vicegerent over the Muslims.’

The significance behind the interchangeability of these terms becomes apparent in the Islamic State of Iraq’s Elam al-anam since the term ‘imamate’ is employed with greater frequency than ‘caliphate,’ while in other publications released by the Islamic State of Iraq the title of emir al-mu’mineen was awarded to the head of state; such substitutes may also have served as a rhetorical ruse to offset any controversy that may have been engendered by blatantly calling their venture a ‘caliphate’ and their leader a ‘caliph.’

WHO SELECTS THE CALIPH?

Keeping in line with medieval treatises on the subject, ad-Dumaiji argues that selecting an imam or a caliph for the ummah must replicate precedents set by the Four Righteous Caliphs who succeeded Muhammad. However, it is sufficient to adhere to the procedures set by the first two, the caliphs Abu Bakr and ‘Umar. In limiting the procedures for the first two caliphs, ad-Dumaiji may have been motivated by a desire to minimize controversy in the selection process, since even Abu Bakr’s appointment was disputed at the time, and continues to be disputed as reflected by the major schism that separates Sunnis from Shi’as to this day. Furthermore, ‘Umar’s reign as well as that of the two Righteous Caliphs that followed him were all cut short by assassination, not the best precedents to cite when prescribing stable transitions of power from one caliph to another.

Taking Abu Bakr’s election nonetheless as the more preferred precedent, ad-Dumaiji chooses to interpret it as the process by which the influential leaders of the Muslim community, ahl ul-hel wel-‘aqd (literally ‘those who loose and bind’) are empowered, as representatives of the larger community to appoint, or alternatively to sack, the caliph. Citing al-Mawardi’s 11th century treatise on the caliphate, the author recommends choosing the bravest candidate during a time of war, and the most erudite candidate during a time of doctrinal dissonance. After considering numerous arguments for the number of influential delegates that need to be congregated and how many of the congregants must agree upon a single candidate, ad-Dumaiji concludes that a simple majority of ahl ul-hel wel-‘aqd is adequate for a caliph’s selection to stand—as did Abu Bakr’s.

However, the situation discussed by the medieval scholars whereby a ruler seizes the caliphate by force as a method for self-selection is rejected by ad-Dumaiji as a usurpation of the title that does not reflect the authentic traditions of selection. Hence such a ruler is not a “true imam” or a “true caliph.” Ad-Dumaiji’s stringently dismissive tone—he even likens this process to modern
day military coups—is a slight departure from earlier jurists who made allowances for Muslim rulers that came after the Righteous Caliphs and who had seized power over Muslims and awarded themselves the hallowed titles of Islam despite not following acceptable precedent.¹⁰

Similarly, the author of the Islamic State of Iraq’s Elam al-anam attempts to follow the proper precedents as described by ad-Dumaiji but adds a practical caveat:

“…the starting point that the mujahidin employed in their declaration of [the Islamic State of Iraq] was a compounded mixture of religious facts derived from the [Koran] and the sunnah [together] with realistic and political outlooks borne out by experience and practice.”¹¹

The author rehashes the three ways by which an imam can be chosen as established by al-Mawardi in his Al-ahkam al-sultaniya (Ordinances of Government) and al-Juwaini in Ghiath al-umam fi tiyah al-dhulem (Rescuing the Nations Lost in the Darkness):¹² either through a pledge of allegiance to a preeminent man made by ahl ul-hel wel-’aqd, or when one imam picks a successor, or when a commander establishes his rule through the use of force during a time marked by fitna (sedition) and conflict among Muslim factions.¹³

But the revolutionary point of departure in jihadist thinking manifests itself when the author concludes that none of these methods for choosing a caliph is appropriate on its face since a unique situation has arisen whereby the lands of Islam have been temporarily taken over by the ‘infidel’ enemy; whether it be directly as is the case with ‘Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq’ or through surrogate ‘apostates’ as is the case with the rest of the Muslim territories. Thus it is impossible to attempt a resurrection of the caliphate based on these methods, and another avenue must be found. The way out of this quandary, the author argues, is to suppose that the jihadists fighting for the restoration of Islam and its precepts—who view themselves as the ‘victorious faction’ that was prophesied by Muhammad¹⁴—deserve the designation of ahl ul-hel wel-’aqd. The author quotes a point made by al-Juwaini that in the eventuality that “the [electors] held back and delayed putting forward an imam and the period extended and the hardship expanded to the periphery of the realm and the elements of imbalance arose” then the imamate goes to those who take the initiative in correcting the situation by appointing an imam,¹⁵ which is a task that was not seriously attempted ever since the caliphate was abolished in 1924.

As was the case with ad-Dumaiji, the author of Elam al-anam wades into a discussion of the numbers of the ahl ul-hel wel-’aqd that are necessary for the purposes of securing a legitimate quorum and a binding decision, and concludes that a simple majority of those who can be gathered at any given time or place is enough, ascribing such a convenient remedy to Ibn Khaldun, al-Nawawi and Ibn Taymiyyah, among others.¹⁶

The contemporary instance of such a quorum is described as follows:
“Allah has helped the brothers in the Hilf Al-Muttayyebin (Alliance of the Muttayyebin)\textsuperscript{17} succeed for it represents the majority of \textit{ahl ul-hel wel-’aqd}, since it [consists] of the Shura Council of the Mujahidin, which is an organization that comprises seven jihadist groups, with renowned names and emirs and soldiers and not as some people say that they don’t exist…

“The advice of over sixty percent of the Sunni tribal sheikhs in the areas where the mujahidin are present were taken\textsuperscript{18} and we saw enthusiasm and elation over this matter…

“We also sought to seek the counsel of some of the other large jihadist groups and we tried to meet their leaders… but some wouldn’t enable us to do that under the excuse of the security situation, so it was necessary for us to decide with whoever of the \textit{ahl ul-hel wel-’aqd} we could bring together in these difficult times…”\textsuperscript{19}

The author expands upon al-Juwaini’s point about seizing the initiative by arguing that no other body is claiming to represent \textit{ahl ul-hel wel-’aqd} at the present time.\textsuperscript{20}

The Islamic State of Iraq was declared on October 15, 2006, three days after the Alliance of the Muttayebbin was formed. The ‘Official Spokesman’ of the newly-formed ‘Ministry of Information’ announced in a video bearing the logo of the Shura Council of the Mujahidin that the Alliance of the Muttayebbin had decided to establish the so-called ‘Islamic State of Iraq’ and that the new head of state would be someone called ‘Abu ‘Umar Al-Baghdadi’—a name previously unheard of. The spokesman called upon Iraqi Sunnis to pledge their allegiance to Al-Baghdadi. He also called upon Sunni Muslims everywhere to support the nascent state that shall act as the precursor to the state of the caliphate, to be resurrected in Baghdad. The Official Spokesman declared that the territory that the jihadists currently control in Iraq is roughly equal to the territory of the state of Medina founded by the Prophet Muhammad during the early days of the Islamic calling, and that it finds itself under similar internal as well as external threats.

The author of \textit{Elam al-anam} sought to associate the size and writ of the Islamic State of Iraq with the precedent of Muhammad’s nascent state at Medina. This was necessary to show that the Shura Council of the Mujahidin could claim, after over three years of fighting in Iraq and after witnessing the “qualitative and important leaps in jihadist performance in its political, administrative, media and political fronts,”\textsuperscript{21} that it is able to govern over a population in the land of Iraq since the raison d’être for founding an Islamic State is its ability to implement \textit{shari’ah}.\textsuperscript{22}

There isn’t any relevant text in the Koran or the \textit{sunnah} that specifies the amount of territory needed for an Islamic State to exercise \textit{shari’ah}. But by drawing a parallel with Medina under Muhammad the author aimed to show that the Islamic State of Iraq was starting off with better odds: only seventy men from Yathrib (later Medina) pledged allegiance to Muhammad before
his flight from Mecca, and they were unknown youths, certainly not the most influential of Medina’s townspeople. The author argues that Muhammad’s grip over the political affairs of Medina was not solid: there were large groups of Jews with military and economic capabilities who later sparked “disturbances;” there was no sense of security; and Medina was not built with the aid of technocrats or with sufficient funds.

Delving deeper into this parallel, Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi began his first speech, dated December 22, 2006, with three verses from the Isra’ surah of the Koran that pertain to Muhammad’s flight to Medina. Al-Baghdadi also cites a symbolic hadith whereby Muhammad predicts victory for Islam at the time of its darkest hours. Al-Baghdadi presents a leaked Marine intelligence report published in November 2006 as evidence that the jihadists control Anbar Province, which he says is far larger in territory than was Medina and its environs during Muhammad’s time.

As for the timing of the declaration of the Islamic State of Iraq, the author of Elam al-anam states that there was an immediate need to administer shari’ah and to manage the affairs of Muslims, such as providing judicial arbitration and maintaining basic services. Furthermore, the political vacuum was leading some Sunnis to join the political process in Baghdad, so much so that some prominent jihadist factions had openly stated that they would negotiate with the Americans.

Another interesting facet of Elam al-anam and how it ascribes the role of ahl ul-hel wel-‘aqd to the jihadists in Iraq is the sense of superiority that the jihadists attach to themselves vis-à-vis more established Islamic scholars, even though the jihadists tend to be younger and less advanced in scholarly stature. Those more eminent scholars are dismissed as staid and stodgy, usually in the service of tyrants, and are afraid of roughing it out on the battlefields of jihad; engaging in actual battle on behalf of Islam is seen as a higher calling than arbitration over archaic formulas for Muslim ritual. This brash and ambitious style was inherited by the jihadists who established the Islamic State of Iraq from their slain leader, Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi, who in turn was heavily influenced by Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, a scholar deeply affected by the rebellious teachings of Saudi radical Juhayman al-’Utaybi, the leader of the Mecca insurrection during November 1979. The latter was dismissive of the generation of reformist Saudi scholars of the 1960s and 1970s, who molded the early thinking of the likes of ‘Usama Bin Laden, seeing them as not confrontational enough, and unwilling to violently break with the ruling religious establishment.

The sense that jihad elevates the jihadist is noticeably evident in Elam al-anam:

“…The Shura Council is more justified in selecting the imamate and declaring the state and controlling its affairs and sovereignty, for the [opinions] of the scholars specifies the plausibility of one man of high stature from whom emanates the pledge of allegiance to one who is
qualified for the imamate, after which the imamate is affirmed and established on its pillars, [as] it is [with the case] of our council [that is] full of such preeminent Muslims and [represents] their elite in terms of sacrifice, jihad, and good conduct.33

EARLIER ATTEMPTS AT CHOOSING A CALIPH THAT FAILED

Today’s jihadists are probably mindful of the role that dithering Islamic scholars had played when they last congregated to find workable solutions to the problems posed by the caliphate, at the General Caliphate Congress held in Cairo in 1926, in which Ayman al-Zawahiri’s grandfather took center stage. The problems of vague and conflicting precedents were compounded by scholars discreetly pushing the claims to the title by competing Arab sovereigns—Sheikh Muhammad al-Ahmadi al-Zawahiri (d. 1944) being King Fuad’s man.34

In an article penned by the pioneering Salafist thinker Rashid Ridha (d. 1935) ahead of the Caliphate Congress for Al-Manar, his widely influential monthly magazine, Ridha lays out his credentials for speaking out on the issue: he had written a book about the caliphate, ran important deliberations on the nature of the caliphate in his magazine, and had participated in the planning committees for the congress.35 Ridha questioned the benefit of electing yet another caliph with no authority, especially at a time when there were three men alive who had once carried the title: the deposed Ottoman sultan Muhammad Wahid ud-Din (r. 1918-1922, who died in exile three days after the conference commenced),36 the last Ottoman caliph Abdul Mejid II (r. 1922-1924, the 101st Sunni ruler to have carried the title), and King Hussein (d. 1931), formerly of the Hejaz, to whom, Ridha writes, “many of the people of Palestine and Syria had pledged allegiance to willingly, and by the people of Hejaz unwillingly.”37 Ridha advised the would-be congregants at Cairo to first identify the ahl ul-hel wel-’aqd in every Islamic nation and to incorporate them into a functioning body using “known modern methods for initiating parties, associations and unions,” indicating that Ridha did not view the scholars who would be attending the congress as legitimate representatives of ahl ul-hel wel-’aqd. Ridha further advised the congregants to establish a religious school that would prepare candidates for the caliphate as well as graduate those who would serve as suitable members of ahl ul-hel wel-’aqd, emphasizing that this approach is generational in nature and that even if it were to last several decades in resolving itself then that would be a necessary remedy for an institution whose collapse had been centuries in the making. However, Ridha optimistically maintained that all this could be done in a few years time.38

The original intent for the General Caliphate Congress, as it was conceived in 1924 immediately following the dissolution of the Ottoman caliphate, was to declare a new caliph.39 However, in response to widespread resistance to Fuad’s ambitions, both from inside and outside Egypt, the goal of the congress was downgraded by the preparatory committee to one of discussing the question of the caliphate without resolving it by picking a candidate for the job.40
The General Caliphate Congress convened on May 13, 1926 at an Azhar University facility; it lasted barely a week, and held only four sessions. It drew together notables and scholars from the Levant, the Maghreb, Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula, together with representatives from far-flung Muslim communities such as South Africa and Poland. However, the important factions in the Indian Subcontinent that had advocated for a re-invigorated caliphate decided to boycott the proceedings, partly over fears that Egypt’s Fuad would try to steer the delegates towards declaring him caliph. The Congress formed two committees to ponder classical and modern questions pertaining to the caliphate; the first, that studied the doctrinal underpinning of the caliphate, was composed of three scholars representing each of the three dominant Sunni schools (Hanafi, Shafi’i, and Maliki) with a single Hanbali scholar accorded a lesser observer status among them. Al-Zawahiri was chosen as the head of Shafi’i group as well as the speaker for the committee. The second committee was tasked to consider modern concerns impeding the caliphate.

However, the Congress was bogged down from the very beginning over arcane debates concerning its Articles of Association, which were followed by arguments over the transcript, word parsing and distracting calls to denounce French actions in Syria. The undercurrents of dissent seem to have been motivated by factionalism based on origin and how the voting clout of individual Muslim nations would count in respect to the size of their populations. The dissent was led by the representatives of Iraq, who were backed up by the Palestinians, seemingly to thwart Egyptian ambitions of playing host to the institution of the caliphate in Cairo. The second committee concluded—much in line with Ridha’s letter to the congregants—that a proper caliphate, that is one whereby a caliph would exercise authority over Muslims, would be an impossibility at this time of Muslim weakness, suggesting that more conferences of such a nature needed to be held until such a time when it would be possible to have a caliphate in a practicable sense. In his memoirs, al-Zawahiri claimed credit for quickly winding up the congress on the pretext that not all Muslim nations were represented after he realized that there would be no way of having Fuad proclaimed caliph.

WHERE DOES THE CALIPH RULE FROM?

Interestingly, the author of *Elam al-anam* and the congregants at Cairo never made the point that a sitting caliph must have possession of the two holy cities of Mecca and Medina, a notion that seems to have been raised at first by retired British bureaucrats and adventurers. Thus, following the Medina model did not necessarily involve Medina itself.

The idea that possession of Mecca and Medina was central to the caliphate seems closely related to the idea of service to Islam as a legitimizing condition for a caliph. This idea came into vogue as the office of the caliphate lost its luster with the waning of the ‘Abbasids dynastic authority, and as ambitious potentates sought to bolster their populist credentials by ascribing to themselves the ultimate pious deed of maintaining the holy sanctuaries. The caliph as guarantor of the safety of the annual *hajj* (pilgrimage) was a descriptor and function that was enthusiastically
adopted by the Ottomans in the 16th century, even though not a single Ottoman sultan ever performed the pilgrimage throughout their six centuries of rule. The British writers who weighed in on this issue were mostly preoccupied with the fear that the Ottoman sultan would be able to influence India’s Muslims during the pilgrimage season, a fear that set in after the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857. If a pliable caliph could be propped-up in Mecca, under British protection, then that would insure that the office of the caliphate would not be used to agitate against British imperial rule, which lorded over Muslim populations that far exceeded in numbers, the size of Muslim populations under the Ottoman sultan’s direct authority.

Sultan Abdul Hamid II (r. 1876-1909, d. 1918)—who sought to use the theoretical authority of his office as a bargaining chip to fend off further European encroachments on his empire—played-up his role as “Servant of the Two Holy Sanctuaries” and took an active role in appointing sharifs in Mecca who would be loyal to him. He further extended his authority’s physical presence and claim of providing more services to pilgrims by building the Hejaz Railway, an expensive venture that was substantially funded by contributions from Indian Muslims.

The spiritual and political center of Islam has shifted with the ebb and flow of currents of power; the seat of power migrating from Medina to Damascus to Baghdad. This fluid nature is clearly demonstrated during transitional periods of the caliphate, or periods perceived as such, and reveals a discourse informed by malleable rationalizations rather than brittle precepts tethered to landmarks. Consequently, during Abdul Hamid’s reign, when proto-Arab nationalists and his political enemies were agitating for an Arab caliph, Mecca was designated as the spiritual center of the Islamic world where a caliph would sit in residence. Another argument made in favor of Mecca was its geographical remoteness that places it far from colonial expansion, in addition to not having any non-Muslim communities or natural resources that may invite European meddling.

Cairo was touted by King Fuad’s acolytes as a center of learning with Al-Azhar University as its shining beacon, yet others were wary of British influence over political affairs there as voiced by some Azhar scholars. Other dissident sheikhs railed against the spread of vice and secularism. For his part, Ridha was flexible on the location, considering at one time Ankara or Mosul.

OTHER PITFALLS THAT THE JIHADISTS SOUGHT TO AVOID

In the decades that followed the Cairo Congress, especially since the 1950s, radical Muslim ideologues had been vague about suggesting any feasible means towards resurrecting the caliphate. This circumspection is due in part to the controversial nature of the issue, which such ideologues did not want to raise, especially given that the issue of jihad and whether or not it was mandatory was itself controversial—most of their argument that touched upon the caliphate served to argue that it was not necessary to wait for a call for a jihad from a sitting caliph. For
example, ‘Abdul-Mun‘im Mustafa Halima, the Syrian-born jihadist ideologue based in London who is better known by his pseudonym Abu Bassir al-Tartousi, promises plenty in the title of his book *Al-tareek ila isti’naf hayat islamiyyah wa qiyam khilafah rashidah ‘ala dhaw’ al-kitab wel sunnah* (*The Path Towards Resuming an Islamic Life and the Resurrection of the Righteous Caliphate that is Guided by the Koran and the Sunnah* 55) written in 2000, but doesn’t offer much by way of methodology. “The just sultan is Allah’s shadow on earth,” writes al-Tartousi 56 citing an alleged hadith, but instead of presenting his own formula for selecting a caliph, he lashes out in a diatribe against the Hizb ut-Tahrir—the organization that had cornered the ideological market in advocating for a resurrected caliphate since it was founded by radical Palestinian clerics in 1953, and claims to have tens of thousands of members in 40 countries. Al-Tartousi accuses Hizb ut-Tahrir of burdening the process of selection with difficult stipulations that make it impossible to choose a caliph. 57

Al-Tartousi introduces a vague notion that *jihad* will somehow lead to the caliphate by preparing and selecting a “vanguard or elite of monotheist believers,” a new generation that would be eventually qualified to lead the *ummah*. 58 This line of thinking seems to have had an impact on the actions of the jihadists in Iraq, who see themselves as the elite representatives of the jihadist vanguard. However, al-Tartousi was more preoccupied with arguing that, in the meantime until such an elite is gathered, *jihad* does not need an imam, 59 and that groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir that have suspended *jihad* pending the election of a caliph are no better than the “heretical” Qadianis, as the followers of the Ahmadiyya Movement are derogatorily called. Al-Tartousi ridicules Hizb ut-Tahrir’s rationalization of their stance by citing the precedence of Muhammad “seeking aid” in Mecca prior to leaving for Medina; it took Muhammad two years to do so while the Hizb ut-Tahrir are still “seeking aid” fifty years after their launch. 60 Thus, Hizb ut-Tahrir is stuck in a perpetual Meccan mode and has placed barriers in the path of progressing to Muhammad’s Medina model. This is all a waste of time for al-Tartousi, who is in a hurry to enjoy the realization of prophecies that foretell conquering Rome and India for Islam, events that shall be realized through waging *jihad*. 61 Even five years after authoring *Al-tareek ila isti’naf hayat islamiyyah*, al-Tartousi was comfortable writing about issues of government under an Islamic state such as *shura* (consultation), justice, oversight, social liberties and security, but does not touch upon a method for electing a leader. 62

For its part, Hizb ut-Tahrir argues that an election through *ahl ul-hel wel-‘aqd* is only necessary when there is a short leadership transition between caliph to caliph, with the accepted practice that this transition should not last more than three days. However, since many decades have lapsed since the last caliph was deposed, there are two ways a new caliph can be chosen: one is by which a group of Muslims take the initiative upon themselves, but this course must meet four conditions stipulating that the territory on which the election takes place must be under Muslim authority, that Islam has full sovereignty there, that *shari’ah* is implemented, and that the newly appointed caliph must fulfill and meet all the conditions of eligibility and duty. 63 The other and more preferred method is that a provisional emir is selected to manage the affairs of state while a
Council of the ummah shortlists all candidates for the caliphate to two names, and then a general election involving the entirety of the Muslim world decides on one, seemingly requiring Islamic unity as a condition that must be met ahead of electing a caliph.\(^64\)

In considering the issue of territory on which a caliph is to be selected, Hizb ut-Tahrir alludes to the notion that the pledge of allegiance by ahl ul-hel wel-’aqd should take place in the abode of the last ruling caliph, presumably because the influential leaders of the community would be congregated in the capital of Islam, but it is unclear whether this prescription only applies to short periods of power transfer that do not exceed three days.\(^65\) Ad-Dumaiji addresses this issue directly by citing al-Mawardi and argues that holding the pledge of allegiance in the capital of the last caliph was customary but not mandatory, and that the means of modern travel have rendered this custom unnecessary.\(^66\) Depending on where one sees the end of the “proper” imamate, the last capital could be Kufa (the fourth Righteous Caliph Ali moved here from Medina), Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo or Istanbul.

The author of Elam al-anam\(^67\), meanwhile, makes the case for Iraq not by extolling Baghdad’s association with ‘Abbasid grandeur but rather he highlights Iraq’s strategic location at the center of the Middle East, as well as its ample resources that can sustain a nascent and expanding state.

However, there was one precedent in particular that the jihadists would have wanted to avoid, and it occurred when some brash and ambitious Arab mujahidin in Peshawar picked a caliph in 1993, an embarrassing affair which lasted for a year and resulted in infighting and recriminations. The idea originated with “Abu ‘Uthman” (a jihadist of Palestinian origin with US and Pakistani citizenship) at a time of much disorientation and ideological turmoil among the mujahidin in Afghanistan following the Soviet withdrawal. He nominated a Jordanian, Mohammad ‘Eid ar-Rifa’i, also known as “Abu Humam” who carried British citizenship, to be caliph. Ar-Rifa’i was given allegiance by a number of mujahidin and he began calling Muslims to heed his authority; he even resorted to taking punitive actions, including abducting children, against those who refused to pledge allegiance. The caliph conveniently made hashish smoking legal in an initially successful bid to win the patronage and funding of drug cultivators and smugglers that operate in Pakistan’s north-east province, but this endeavor ended with clashes between his disciples and the smugglers leading to the murder of the caliph’s deputy. Ar-Rifa’i eventually escaped to Konar in Afghanistan, and then returned to London. In May 2006 he suffered stroke while in British custody.\(^68\) There is some indication that ‘Usama Bin Laden knew about this episode since ar-Rifa’i had called upon him to pledge allegiance when Bin Laden returned to Afghanistan from Sudan in 1993, and that Abu Musa’ab al-Zarqawi was also aware of it—and hence both were mindful that capriciously choosing a caliph may turn into a farce.\(^69\)

Interestingly, ar-Rifa’i’s chief qualification for the caliphate seems to have been his claim of descent from the tribe of Quraysh.\(^70\)

WHAT’S IN A PEDIGREE?
‘Attiyet-Allah, a prolific jihadist writer, posted a mildly critical essay on several jihadist forums in which he supposes that the mujahidin of the Islamic State of Iraq had exercised *ijtihad* (‘initiative’) by choosing to name their new creation a *dawla* (‘state’) rather than an *imarah* (‘emirate’) and awarding the exalted title of *emir al mu’mineen* (‘Commander of the Faithful’) to its leader Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi; thereby implying that while their intent was well-meaning they had somehow overreached. This critique was circulated in December 2006 ahead of al-Baghdadi’s first speech. ‘Attiyet-Allah is uncomfortable with the allusions these terms entail:

“And what can be said here is as was said regarding the term of ‘State’ or ‘Emirate’: probably our brothers chose this particular term for reasons that they saw fit and that are unseen by us who are far away, even though my initial opinion is that the choice of some other [title] would be better and more proper, and I said as much when giving my opinion on [awarding the title of] the ‘Prince of the Faithful’ [to] Mullah Muhammad ‘Umar, may Allah preserve him.

“It probably would have been better to call him emir without adding ‘of the Faithful’ so that the evident reference would be to ‘Emir’ of this ‘State,’ because the term ‘Commander of the Faithful’ gives the illusion that he is the Grand Imam, and gives the impression that our brothers may consider him so! And it has been accepted as a tradition among Muslims from the time of our master ‘Umar bin al-Khattab, may Allah regard him well, that the title is synonymous with the ‘Grand Imam’ who is also the Caliph.

“And if it were added to that he—may Allah preserve and aid him—is a Qurayshite and a Husaynite, then the illusion is strengthened!

“…I hope our brothers would clarify these issues more as the opportunities arise, Allah willing…”

Interestingly enough, even though al-Baghdadi was identified as the head of the state, his alleged Quraysh pedigree and exalted title went unmentioned in the first communiqué that announced the establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq on October 15, 2006. It was not until a few weeks later on November 10 that Abu Hamza al-Muhajir (al-Zarqawi’s successor as head of Al-Qaeda in Iraq who was later appointed Minister of War in the Islamic State of Iraq) pledges allegiance to “the Qurayshite and Hashemite, descendant of al-Hussein, the *emir al-mu’mineen*, Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi,” that we learn of al-Baghdadi’s alleged pedigree. Al-Muhajir made the pledge in his own name as well as on behalf of the “12,000 fighter [strong] Army of Al-Qaeda.”

Al-Muhajir’s pledge of allegiance as it was worded—especially with regards to Quraysh ancestry—was the first hint that the leaders of Al-Qaeda in Iraq who had succeeded al-Zarqawi
upon his death in June 2006 were attempting to resurrect the caliphate, and had gone as far as choosing a would-be caliph, and it was to these loaded words that ‘Attiyet-Allah was directing his remarks and a plea for further clarification.

The author of *Elam al-anam* does not directly discuss the rule on Quraysh ancestry for a would-be caliph, and in a passing reference to the subject he seems to override it with the necessity of picking any caliph. This omission, if taken together with the omission of al-Baghdadi’s pedigree when his name was first mentioned, could be an indication that there was dissent among the jihadists over the extent to which they would emphasize the Quraysh issue, so as not to reinforce the impression that they were establishing a caliphate. However al-Baghdadi’s pedigree and title were played-up when introducing his inaugural address, which was released two weeks prior to the publication of *Elam al-anam*.

The following February, the Global Islamic Media Front released al-Dumaiji’s thesis that he had presented twenty-four years earlier and in which he discussed the Quraysh issue extensively and concluded that it is a mandatory condition in a candidate when a caliph is to be elected. Ad-Dumaiji begins with a description of the Quraysh tribe and its many clans in order to define the pedigrees that would go back to Quraysh since Arab genealogists have disagreed about who the ancestor called “Quraysh”—a moniker rather than a birth-given name—really was. After affirming the identity of “Quraysh,” the author argues that the “vast majority of Muslim scholars”—including al-Mawardi, Ibn Khaldun, al-Ghazali and Rashid Ridha—had made Quraysh ancestry a prerequisite for an elected caliph, while the dissenters were either negligible or heretical naysayers.

The important point about ad-Dumaiji’s treatment of the subject is that he makes Quraysh ancestry mandatory for any caliph that is picked through a decision by the *ahl ul-hel wel-‘aqd*:

“This condition, like the other conditions [cited] earlier [only applies] when the selection is made by the *ahlul hall wel-‘aqd*, but if the imam assumes the imamate in any other way then the Quraysh condition is not mandatory such as [he who takes it by force] or to he who was chosen [as heir] by a previous imam and sedition was feared if he were deposed; in this case it is mandatory to obey him if he is not faulted and to [conduct] *jihad* with him and so on, and he has the rights of a Qurayshite according to the prior hadiths that stipulate obedience to [he who takes it by force] even if he does not meet all the conditions.”

A short treatise bearing the title “Hel al-Qurashiyyeh shartt fi al-imamah?” (“Is Quraysh [Descent] a Condition for the Imamate?”) and signed by a certain Abu ‘Abdullah al-Dhahabi was also circulating on jihadist forums around the time that the Global Islamic Media Front released ad-Dumaiji’s thesis, and it seems that this treatise was initially posted serially before being compiled into a thirteen page document. But upon closer examination, it turns out that al-
Djahabi’s treatise is a word by word copy of ad-Dumaiji’s chapter on the topic of Quraysh, albeit with minor formatting and sequence changes. This is another indication that ad-Dumaiji’s contribution to the topic of the caliphate has influenced jihadists.

In choosing to emphasize al-Baghdadi’s Qurayshite roots, the jihadists of the Islamic State of Iraq were drawing a distinction between their *emir al-mu’mineen* and another contemporaneous holder of the title: Mullah ‘Umar was named *emir al-mu’mineen* at a ceremony in April 1996 where he symbolically adorned himself with a cloak that had allegedly belonged to Mohammad. A year and a half later, the Taliban regime was renamed The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. When asked whether Mullah ‘Umar was still the *emir al-mu’mineen* after the Taliban collapsed in 2001, Kuwaiti cleric Hamid bin ‘Abdullah al-‘Ali responded by citing the two methods by which an imam is picked: one is by election, but the candidate must be of Quraysh, implying that this method would not apply to Mullah ‘Umar since he was an ethnic Pashtun. The other method is through force. Al-‘Ali suggests that Mullah ‘Umar rose to the imamate by force at the time when he had authority over the people he governed, and he was an imam over them but not over a divided Muslim world. But given that his regime was no more, Mullah ‘Umar should be considered a leader of the jihad but not “an imam of authority and rule.”

In his *Al-imamah al-’udhma*, ad-Dumaiji had considered the issue of having two imams, a situation that he frowns upon as improper and would lead to political strife, even though some jurists—ad-Dumaiji points out that they are in the minority—such as al-Juwaini, had made allowances should two imams, or a multiplicity of imams, appear in two or more widely separate realms of the land of Islam. In order to remedy such a situation, ad-Dumaiji suggests that the imamate would go to the imam who was chosen in the land of the last imam that had been widely acknowledged by Muslims, or otherwise the imamate should be given to he who claimed it first. Ideally, both would concede the title and leave it up to the *ahl ul-hel wel-’aqd* to reconvene and choose from among them, or in the case whereby the second claimant had not heard of the earlier claim to the title, then the imamate would rightfully belong to the claimant who had earned a larger number of votes from *ahl ul-hel wel-’aqd*.

By coupling the title of *emir al-mu’mineen* with Quraysh ancestry, Zarqawi’s heirs were signaling to Bin Laden and Zawahiri, who are still under obligation to follow Mullah ‘Umar while he is alive given their pledge of allegiance to him, that al-Baghdadi was not merely the foremost commander among commanders, but rather he was angling for a position more potent than that of emir. The Islamic State of Iraq was a grander achievement than the Emirate of Afghanistan and the office of its head of state would have wider authority over Islam; the authority of a proper imam elected by the Iraq-based *ahl ul-hel wel-’aqd* that does not necessarily have to include the leaders of the Afghan *jihad* to be legitimate, and which would overrule Mullah ‘Umar’s candidacy.

**EARLIER CONSIDERATIONS OF THE QURAYSH RULE**
Juhayman al-'Utaybi indirectly argued against the House of Saud by citing the stipulation that Muslim rulers must descend from Quraysh, 82 but even though Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi was deeply influenced by al-'Utaybi, as evidenced by the repeated references to the latter in al-Maqdisi’s book denouncing the Saudi royals as “infidels,” he does not elaborate on their lack of Quraysh credentials in arguing against them at any point. 83

As for Hizb ut-Tahrir, the contractual conditions for a caliph do not include the necessity of a particular pedigree. 84 This point is further addressed by a ruling from the current emir of Hizb ut-Tahrir in response to a question about Quraysh ancestry in which he ignores medieval Islamic sources on the topic and instead applies his own historical and rhetorical analyses to the original incident of Abu Bakr’s investiture with the role of caliph where the issue of tribal affiliation was first raised; the emir concludes by reasoning that Quraysh ancestry was “favorable” but not mandatory. 85

Abu Bakr was faced with a unique political problem: Muhammad had left no clear-cut successor and upon his death Medina’s townspeople, who had hosted Muhammad after his flight from Mecca, wanted to re-establish control over their city which had served as the political capital of the nascent religion. This was not the only faction that Abu Bakr had to contend with, for the civil peace between the various Qurayshite clans of Mecca was at stake if one clan would attempt to monopolize power to the detriment of the others. Thus, Abu Bakr thwarted Medina’s pretensions to succession by limiting rule to Quraysh; he cited a saying of the Prophet’s that maintained that “the imams are from Quraysh.” But by securing the office for the whole of Quraysh, rather than Muhammad’s clan of Banu Hashim, Abu Bakr had also won over the Meccans and cemented their interest is seeing the venture of a new religion to success, as they had the most to gain by being automatic members of the ruling class. 86

However, Abu Bakr’s ruse set a problematic precedent: the arbitrary use of Mohammad’s alleged sayings in settling factional disputes. Thus, the prophetic hadiths could be adapted and reinterpreted to suit the aspirations and circumstances of the claimants to the highest office in Islam. Hereafter, there would be no universally accepted doctrine for the caliphate, apart from its duty to impose shar‘iah and defend the faith and the faithful. 87

Following the Quraysh dynasties of the Umayyads and ‘Abbasids, such doctrinal elasticity was applied to the Quraysh rule by the Ottomans who were determined to claim the title of caliph when it suited them to do so; as their rule weakened and as they searched for new sources of legitimization for their authority apart from raw power. The Ottoman case for the caliphate was made as early as the sixteenth century: upon being challenged by the ashraf (descendants of Mohammad through his kinsman ‘Ali) Lutfi Pasha (d. 1562) wrote a treatise arguing that the sultan who empowers Islam in the “important” heartlands of the religion, such as the Middle East, must be considered the imam in his territories, irrespective of pedigree. In Lutfi Pasha’s view, stressing the uniqueness of Quraysh as the ruling class sounded suspiciously Shi’a, and
hence had treacherous undertones especially at a time when the Ottomans had recently defeated a rising Shi’a power in Iran.\textsuperscript{88}

As their power waned, the Ottomans found other loop-holes in the Quraysh rule. One story had it that upon seizing Cairo in 1517, Sultan Selim was invested with the title of caliph by the last of the ‘Abbasids, Muhammad XI al-Mutawakkil ‘Ala Allah, who was the 17\textsuperscript{th} in line of the ‘Abbasid figurehead caliphs who resided in Cairo from 1261 onwards, following the sacking of their traditional seat of power in Baghdad by the Mongols.\textsuperscript{89} Fanciful as this story may be, it was widely accepted.\textsuperscript{90} Yet another approach was authored by Pirizade Mehmed Sahib (d. 1749) who argued that the Quraysh stipulation no longer applied since it was superseded by another alleged saying of Muhammad’s that was rendered “after me the caliphate will endure for thirty years, thereafter will come the rule of kings,” that is, the Quraysh rule was only applicable for thirty years, spanning the era of the Four Righteous Caliphs and the six months of reign by al-Hassan bin ‘Ali prior to his resignation. Later Ottoman writers resorted to questioning the authenticity of the hadiths that specified Quraysh pedigree for the ruler.\textsuperscript{91}

The Ottomans’ stake in the title was heightened significantly during the Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca in 1774 as the dynasty had to contend with the loss of Muslim Crimea to the hegemony of Orthodox Christian Russia, a power that only a few years later out-rightly annexed the territory. The Ottomans were also worried that dissident factions in Istanbul may champion the Crimean khans as nobler substitutes for the house of Osman.\textsuperscript{92} Adopting the title of caliph would add luster—and immunity from sedition by virtue of “divine appointment”—to an otherwise faded regime.

Yet try as they may to strengthen and legitimize their rule by propping up their credentials as caliphs, the Ottomans were doctrinally vulnerable on the Quraysh issue, which was ceaselessly exploited by their enemies and rivals. British detractors of the Ottomans highlighted the Quraysh ancestry of the sharifs of Mecca or Emir Abdulqadir of Algeria, then in exile in Damascus, as suitable successors should the dynasty in Istanbul collapse. Khedive Isma’il of Egypt, deposed as such by order of the Ottoman sultan, funded dissident publications in Europe that exposed his enemy as a non-Qurayshite usurper of the caliphate.\textsuperscript{93} Arab dissidents such as Abdel-Rahman al-Kawakibi and Sharif Hussein used the Quraysh rule as an argument both to undermine the Ottomans and to win back the caliphate for an Arab.\textsuperscript{94}

Quraysh ancestry did not matter for much among India’s Muslims, who were looking for an independent Muslim world power that would adopt their interests in light of them being outnumbered by the non-Muslims of the Indian subcontinent, who they had ruled over for several centuries until the advent of British rule. Some of them even attempted to cover this gap by concocting a genealogical tree linking the Ottomans to Quraysh.\textsuperscript{95} Such loyalty to the Ottomans survived the latter’s collapse after World War I, with an influential group of early Indian enthusiasts for the caliphate denouncing Sharif Hussein as a traitor, continuing to invoke
the name of a deposed Ottoman caliph in the Friday sermon, and issuing a fatwa waiving the Quraysh rule.\footnote{96}

However, the non-Arab royal family of Egypt, that had its roots in the Balkans, also contended for the caliphate, so it was in their interest to fudge the Quraysh stipulation. The earliest contemporary argument made against the Quraysh stipulation by an Egyptian came from Mohammad Mustafa al-Maraghi (d. 1945); it is unclear whether he was acting upon anyone’s behest, but he later aligned himself with the Egyptian royals. Al-Maraghi’s take on the rule was based on the idea that at the time of early Islam, the Arab tribes would only unite under the banner of Quraysh, but since Islam’s expansion and incorporation of non-Arabs then the requirement of Quraysh leadership had lapsed.\footnote{97} A few years later when acting as King Fuad’s troubleshooter at the Caliphate Congress in Cairo in 1926, Zawahiri attempted to question the Qurayshi requirement by citing Ibn Khaldun who in turn had cited 11\textsuperscript{th} century Islamic scholar Ibn Baqillany to argue against the necessity of Qurayshite pedigree. However, Zawahiri grudgingly acknowledged in the report he submitted on behalf of the committee that looked into the legalistic requirements of the caliphate that the majority of the scholars mandated Quraysh ancestry.\footnote{98}

The royal quest for the caliphate continued under Fuad’s son Faruq, who had been mentored by and was closely associated with al-Maraghi. Yet a few years after al-Maraghi’s death and during the last year of his reign, Faruq saw fit to appoint a committee in 1952 that was tasked with identifying a family connection that would link him back to Quraysh.\footnote{99}

The jihadists of the Islamic State of Iraq must have been aware of all the historical deliberations on the Quraysh rule and thus their act of over-emphasizing al-Baghdadi’s ancestry was calibrated to convey the sense that he was indeed their caliph. Such was their enthusiasm that they put pedigree ahead of identity, opting to tell the ummah that their leader is a descendant of Quraysh—they even specify his descent from the Hashemite line through al-Hussein—but at the same time not revealing his name or other qualifications for the job. The author of the \textit{Elam al-anam} defends the decision to keep the leader’s identity anonymous by citing that it is sufficient for the \textit{ahl ul-hel wel-‘aqd} to know the candidate’s identity and qualifications without having to reveal such details to the wider public, a ruling especially pertinent given the precarious security situation of the jihadists in Iraq.\footnote{100}

**WHAT WAS THE NATURE OF THE CALIPH’S AUTHORITY UNDER THE LAST OTTOMAN SULTANS?**

The caliphate underwent its last major historical reinterpretation in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries during the reign of Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II, who used its religious aspect to fortify his autocracy over his Muslim subjects, and to manipulate a common European misconception that the caliphate was an approximation of the catholic papacy. By claiming to have a spiritual authority over the Muslims living under European rule, Abdul Hamid was able to
blackmail European powers such as Britain and Russia, and win over others like Germany, with the notion that a call to *jihad* from him would send millions of Muslims worldwide rallying to his banner, much like the role of the pope during the crusades. This misconception was historically rooted, and it was mirrored on the Ottoman side with an earlier misunderstanding of the role of the papacy.\(^{101}\) However, it was convenient for Abdul Hamid, who was under no illusions as to the real and limited potency of his boast of spiritual authority, to play to these misconceptions.\(^{102}\) The fallacy of such a notion was demonstrated during World War I, when Abdul-Hamid’s successor, with German prodding, announced a *jihad* against the Allies with much fanfare but little effect.\(^{103}\)

Abdul Hamid employed the religious facets of the caliphate in facing very different internal realities within his empire: due to the loss of the Balkan and Caucasian territories, the demographic balance that resulted from the in-flow of refugees and the shrinking of its domains had swung around the population numbers of the Ottoman Empire to put Muslims in the absolute majority.\(^{104}\) Within these numbers, the Arabic-speaking inhabitants of the Levant gained preponderant importance since their loyalty to the Ottoman sultan was critical in facing off the strategic threat posed by further British-influenced encroachment from the direction of Egypt, and the Levant’s newfound economic resurgence was a primary concern for keeping the empire’s finances in order. Abdul Hamid surrounded himself with Arab advisors, many of them Sufi scholars, who convinced him that religiously-mandated obedience and submission due to their caliph would sufficiently inoculate Arab Muslim Syrians against the germinating ideas of ethnic and linguistic nationalism that had been eating away at the Sultan’s European domains and that had been showing their first symptoms among exiled non-Muslim Syrians.\(^{105}\) For some Syrian Sufis, obeying the caliph was not enough of a religious duty: an apologist for Abdel Hamid makes the case, using Sufi sources, that Muslims were obligated to glorify the imam, since he is a manifestation of God’s rule.\(^{106}\)

Abdul Hamid was ultimately successful in using religion to solidify his domestic clout, however his notion of a duality in the nature of the caliphate in temporal and religious fields later enabled his political enemies to strip him and his successors of effective authority, leaving the caliph with an undefined spiritual role within the state’s hierarchy. Abdul Hamid was deposed and his successor served merely as a rubberstamp for the new regime led by the Committee of Union and Progress. A similar role was played by the last Ottoman Sultan Wahid ud-Din, but at time in the service of the victorious Allies subsequent to Istanbul’s occupation in the aftermath of WWI, when he arranged for a *fatwa* to be issued in April 1920 that set the actions of the Turkish nationalists under Mustafa Kemal (later Ataturk) in Ankara as contrary to Islam. Thus began the process by which the Turkish National Assembly decided to annul the sultanate as a redundant vestige of the Ottoman past; in November 1922 the Kemalists abolished the sultanate, retroactively dating their law to March 1920, thus rendering Wahid ud-Din’s earlier *fatwa* invalid. A counter *fatwa* was issued to the effect that Wahid ud-Din had forfeited the office of caliph by fleeing the country. Then, the Turkish National Assembly did something very curious:
they nominated and elected the sultan’s cousin, Abdul Mejid II as caliph. Not only did the Turkish National Assembly appropriate for itself the role of *ahl ul-hel wel-*aqd, but their election seems to be the first since the fourth Righteous Caliph’s death in 661 AD.

A study on the nature of the caliphate had been commissioned to justify the Turkish National Assembly’s actions, which was published under the title *Hilafet ve Hakimiyet-i Milliye* (‘The Caliphate and National Sovereignty’) subsequent to the abolishment of the sultanate. It had been supervised by Seyyid Bey (d. 1925), a parliamentarian with a background in Islamic learning. The study argued that the caliphate was a legal, rather than a theological issue. It was not critically important to the integrity of the Islamic faith since by the time of his death Muhammad had concluded his mission of delivering the new faith yet had left the matter of succession unresolved, hence the temporal issues relating to the management of the new Islamic state were left to the discretion of his successors. These successors, especially during the period of the “real caliphate” when the early caliphs were elected to office, had ensured that it was the caliph’s duty to secure the happiness of the Muslims—a goal that could be met through other forms of government.

The *ahl ul-hel wel-*aqd have the power of attorney on behalf of the people to invest a candidate with the title of caliph. Later, when arguing for the abolishment of the caliphate itself in early March 1924, Seyyid Bey gave a seven hour speech in which he noted that there was no ruling in the Koran or the hadith or in the consensus of Muslim scholars that explicitly prohibits a body of individuals such as a modern parliament from acting as a corollary to *ahl ul-hel wel-*aqd and skipping the election of a caliph in order to govern over Muslims directly. A return to the “real caliphate” would be impossible, since the noble qualities that were exhibited by the early Muslims are lacking in today’s people, Seyyid Bey argued. Other parliamentarians used a parallel argument for annulling the caliphate by citing the hadith that limited the “real caliphate” to thirty years; they added that the rationale behind the hadith was that a single ruling caliph could not possibly rule over an expanding and huge Muslim territory.

After he sent the last caliph packing, Ataturk tried to offset Muslim indignation by offering the “spiritual caliphate” to Ahmad al-Sharif al-Sanussi (d. 1933), a Libyan Sufi leader of Qurayshi descent whose call for jihad had stimulated the Tripolitarians to fight against the Italians in 1911. The offer to become a “Muslim pope” residing in a place other than Turkey was made twice, in 1924 and in 1925, but was turned down.

The prospect of an exiled Ottoman caliph was problematic for King Fuad’s aspirations for the title, however this predicament was neatly resolved by a ruling from pliable Azhar sheikhs who argued that Abdul Mejid II’s title was not legitimate and allegiance to his person was not binding since he had accepted the un-Islamic terms that were laid out for him by the Turkish Government when he took the office. But the liberal opposition to Fuad quickly took up the points made by Seyyid Bey’s study, and repackaged them as a book by Egyptian sheikh Ali Abdel Razik in

Draft, Kazimi, “The Caliphate Attempted”
1925. Abdel Razik further elaborated on these points by arguing that Islam was restricted to theology, ethics and ritual but not government.\footnote{Also in Cairo, Rashid Ridha vacillated on the nature of the caliphate, and seems to have concluded at one point that since a temporal office could not be realized at a time of Muslim weakness, then having a “spiritual caliphate”—albeit with its political independence guaranteed—is better than not having a caliph at all.\footnote{Another approach was taken by Abdel-Razzak al-Sanhouri (d.1971), then an Egyptian student in France, who wrote a doctoral thesis in 1926 that was posthumously published in 1988—with major parts excised—under the title \textit{Fiqh al-khilafeh} (‘The Jurisprudence of the Caliphate’). Al-Sanhouri went on to become a renowned jurist in the Middle East, and his book has been enthusiastically championed by moderate Islamists seeking to resurrect the caliphate. In his thesis, al-Sanhouri sets out to refute Abdel Razik by arguing that instead of adopting a fully secular form of government, early Islamic governing, and hence the office of the caliph, can be updated and made applicable to modern times. Among other notions, al-Sanhouri fancifully imagines joint Muslim and non-Muslim committees that would make \textit{dhimma} rules conform to modern interpretation of citizenship, and that Islamic unity could be achieved through the formation of a commonwealth of sovereign Muslim states.\footnote{In anecdotal terms, the tomb of the ‘Abbasid Caliphs in Cairo is a visual affirmation that a caliphate devoid of authority and relying on its supposed “spiritual” aspect is not all that endearing to Muslims. The ‘Abbasids in Cairo were figureheads, useful only in providing religious cover for succeeding Mamluk strongmen. In building a mausoleum for their earthly remains, the ‘Abbasids seem to have picked a spot near the shrine of Seyyida Nafisa, a great-great-granddaughter of al-Hassan bin ‘Ali who was turned into a living saint by the folks people of Cairo during the heyday of ‘Abbasid power under the Caliph Haroun al-Rashid, then reigning in Baghdad. The throngs of the faithful still supplicate at Seyyida Nafisa’s shrine, a busy and bustling scene. But to get to the ‘Abbasid mausoleum one must walk through a dusty alleyway that opens up to the cemetery at the back of Nafisa’s, where the padlocked and decrepit structure stands, neglected and unvisited. When asked whether the cenotaphs inside the mausoleum legibly reveal the identities of the ‘Abbasids interred there, a cemetery caretaker indicated that it has been the centuries-old habit of the lower-born townspeople of Cairo to bury their own dead within and around the mausoleum thus erasing long ago any trace of the ‘Abbasids.}}
The mausoleum of the ‘Abbasid Caliphs in Cairo, with the shrine of Seyyida Nafisa looming over it.

WHAT ARE THE DUTIES OF THE CALIPH ACCORDING TO THE JIHADISTS?

For their part, the jihadists certainly do not acknowledge a spiritual aspect of the caliphate that can be separated from temporal authority; their concept of it involves a muscular defense of Islam in all fields to be supervised by an active caliph. Ad-Dumaiji and the author of Elam al-anam do not even consider the role or jurisdiction incumbent upon the office of the caliph over significant Muslim populations in formerly Islamic realms being governed by non-Muslims, as Abdul Hamid II had to contend with in the case of Russia and India. It seems that the jihadists view such relapses in Islam’s authority that have been centuries in the making as temporary setbacks, pending the restoration of full sovereignty to all of Dar al-Islam (‘Abode of Islam’).

Ad-Dumaiji summarizes these duties as follows: the caliph is to preserve the faith by proselytizing for Islam through “pen, [spoken] word or sword,” and by safeguarding the faith from erroneous misinterpretations. He is to protect the territorial integrity of the land of Islam by fortifying the borderlands so as to safeguard the lives, wealth, faith and honor of Muslims. Furthermore, he is to enact shari’ah, collect taxes and other forms of payment owned to the treasury by Muslims and non-Muslims, divide and distribute these funds, and equip armies and appoint able deputies and judges. The caliph must maintain unity and justice, and develop the realms and increase their productivity. The caliph is not mandated to take shura (consultation) but would benefit from it, and unless it is a ruling given by the religious scholars, he is not obligated to follow anyone’s advice. In as much as the caliph performs these duties well, then he is owed obedience by Muslims—for life.
According to ad-Dumaiji, the caliphate is not an end in and of itself, but a means to empower the religion of Islam.  

For the author of *Elam al-anam*, the jihadists had succeeded in fulfilling these duties that are assigned to a caliph even before declaring the Islamic State of Iraq, for “Iraq has been transformed…into one of the most monotheistic countries on the face of the earth…No shrines are visited…no magicians are [consulted],” and *shari’ah* was returned to its divinely-mandated place, to be “hegemonic over actions and persons and institutions and customs and other [facets].”  

Moreover, the jihadists are settling tribal disputes, appointing judges, helping fellow *mujahidin* break out of prisons, meting out punishments, pushing back against invaders, collecting alms and taxes, appointing suitable administrators, and taking care of the families of martyrs and soldiers. Yet if Islam was being empowered by the jihadists even before their declaration of the Islamic State then one would question their motivation for going ahead with the venture anyway. In a sense, the jihadists in Iraq had turned things around: the empowerment of Islam was the means to the state. The decades-long quest for the caliphate had turned the idea of the state, rather than its function, into something of a jihadist fetish, one that they were pining for and over-eager to gratify.

The author concludes that it is precisely because the jihadists were succeeding in fulfilling these duties that the West has marshaled its military might in a bid to stop them:

“Without question, the new Islamic State will be fought [since] the Crusader [planner] declared his goals as not allowing any upcoming caliphate to arise…But God is overpowering for he had enabled his [followers], the *mujahidin*, [to win] and they smothered the Crusade’s plans in the dust, and they declared their new project, this newborn state has knocked on the door, and has arisen from lethargy, and it is faced with a long journey that is not easy to bear, and it is the new gate of hope for the ummah, and its forthcoming glory, and its brandished sword upon the necks of [the ummah’s] enemies.

“Oh cavalry of Allah mount [your steeds], and oh Muslims come all of you to defend and protect your religion, and know this that Islam cannot be made to be apparent or victorious unless [Islam’s] state is erected, and its might is made apparent and it confronts and clashes with [wrongness] on the field of battle, for all who think that Islam can be made apparent with a tape or a book or [by] proselytizing or [through] parliaments or election ballots, are ignorant of how this religion had arose [at the beginning]; this religion arose on the skulls and corpses of the [first Muslims] and their sons…”
Thus Islam can only be defended by an Islamic state, and such a state can only come about through *jihad*. The author of *Elam al-anam* is putting the Muslim world on notice that the Islamic State has arisen anew in Iraq, and that is incumbent on Muslims to support it.

**HOW DOES AL-BAGHDADI VIEW HIS ROLE AS HEAD OF THE ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ?**

Al-Baghdadi casts himself in the role of the defender of the faith in facing down internal and external threats to Islam. He began his first speech, that was released on December 22, 2006, by explaining that he was no more than “a soldier among the laypeople; fighting those who turned against Allah,” and that he was “never the emir of any of those [jihadist] groupings but the people reached a consensus upon [me] and refused to let [me] go.” Al-Baghdadi relishes in presenting himself as the reluctant ruler who had “repeatedly refused to take [upon myself] this matter, that is, the Emirate of the Muslims,” but was called upon by destiny to lead. He then explains that he is resolved to take decision only after consulting the other *mujahidin* leaders, and in that respect he has formed a *majlis shura muwwasaa’a* (‘Expanded Consultative Council’) that includes three members from each jihadist group that had joined the Islamic State “regardless of the number of its soldiers and the volume of its operations,” and that a representative from each of the major tribes has also been included, together with religious scholars and notables. The Expanded Consultative Council is complemented by a *majlis shura mudhayeq* (‘Narrower Consultative Council’) that comprises five individuals who would take speedy executive decisions when required.\(^\text{124}\)

In a later speech, al-Baghdadi extols the virtues of the Islamic State of Iraq where *shari’ah* is being actively administered:

“...The people of Iraq are today one of the greatest nations on the face of the earth in maintaining monotheism, for there is no polytheistic Sufism being propagated, or shrines being visited, or innovated festivals being celebrated, or candles being lit or a pilgrimage being made to a pagan totem, for the people of Iraq have destroyed these shrines with their own hands so that Allah will be worshiped alone...

“Go and delve into the country, so that you will see that [there are no longer] places that encourage sordidness or corruption, and no [unveiled women] present to infatuate the young, and to tempt the old, or to be devoured by wolves...Search and you will not find a dance party that angers Allah in His heavens...”\(^\text{125}\)

Such enforcement of morality, it seems, was brought about by some of al-Baghdadi’s measures such as banning satellite dishes and ordering women to cover their faces when in public.\(^\text{126}\)
Alms are being collected, al-Baghdadi claims, even from “the herdsmen of the desert who willingly give what is owed to the mujahidin.” He also adds that “the Iraqi jihad has restored vitality to [other] jihadist locations that had fizzled out,” and that the time of the Islamic State had come; the jihadists did not “seek to pick the fruit before it ripened, but that they had simply caught the fruit, midair, as it fell off the tree,” and in doing so prevented the jihad in Iraq from suffering the same fate which befell the jihadists in Bosnia and Afghanistan, who did not have a clear plan for what comes after the phase of waging jihad.\textsuperscript{127}

In dealing with Iraqi Sunnis who have refused to offer their allegiance to him, al-Baghdadi chooses to accuse mujahidin hold-outs among them with the charge of “recalcitrance,”\textsuperscript{128} while other Sunni Islamists such as the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood-oriented Islamic Party that have participated in the political process are castigated as “apostates”—together with lay Sunnis who join the government’s security or administrative services, yet the charges of “apostasy” and “heresy” for laypersons are to be applied in a case by case basis pending a trial.\textsuperscript{129} Al-Baghdadi’s bickering with fellow Sunnis and his wrath over their lack of enthusiasm for his Islamic State is a running theme throughout all the pronouncements that he has issued. At times he offers amnesty and a negotiated settlement,\textsuperscript{130} but it is often the case that he threatens them with annihilation.

In a curious departure from ritual, al-Baghdadi commiserates with his soldiers that the price of sheep is too high to offer as alms during the ritual slaughter of ‘Eid, but he offers them the alternative of a human sacrifice in its stead: the jihadists can slaughter Sunni “renegades” who had joined the American-backed tribal Awakening Councils. The only caveat he adds is that although it is favorable to offer the sacrifice before the advent of the lunar Islamic month of Muharram, but one Islamic school of jurisprudence allows delaying the sacrifice until such a time as a Muslim is able to. Thus, taking the head of a renegade can be deferred.\textsuperscript{131}

Al-Baghdadi also approaches the subject of non-Muslim Iraqis in a most unusual way, for he assigns to himself the right to renegotiate the Covenant of ‘Umar with the Christians. In as much as the jihadists believe that such a pact between the second caliph and the Christians of the Holy Land was a historical occurrence, al-Baghdadi’s nullification is a significant transgression against what ad-Dumaiji calls the sunnah of the Righteous Caliphs that Muhammad had instructed the faithful to adhere to, especially what is set down by the first two, Abu Bakr and ‘Umar.\textsuperscript{132} Yet al-Baghdadi’s sees things differently and that the actions of the non-Muslim minorities in support of the “invaders” warrant such a drastic break with accepted orthodoxy, and that they must renegotiate their status with the Islamic State if they seek to enjoy those past protections:

“We find that the sects of the people of the book and other from the Sabians and so in the State of Islam today are people of war who qualify for no protection, for they have transgressed against whatever they agreed to in many countless ways, and if they want peace and security then they
must start a new era with the State of Islam according to [the Second Righteous Caliph] ‘Umar's stipulations that they have annulled.”

Al-Baghdadi blames the Arab Christians of the Levant for introducing the ideas of ethnic and linguistic nationalism so as to break Muslim bonds and to replace Islam with Arab nationalism. According to al-Baghdadi, “this was their opportunity to destroy the Ottoman caliphate.” He also takes credit for the gruesome attacks on the Yezidi minority of Iraq which resulted in hundreds of deaths; al-Baghdadi brands them as “devil-worshippers” and accuses them of preventing their own from converting to Islam.

Whereas Abdul Hamid II hinted at the threat of declaring jihad against the foreign powers that were challenging the Ottoman state but never exercised it, al-Baghdadi fervently and repeatedly declares jihad even in retaliation for minor offenses. Given the immediacy of the American threat to the Islamic State of Iraq, al-Baghdadi devotes a portion of his inaugural speech to the terms of surrender he was offering to President George Bush:

“We order you to withdraw your forces immediately. But the withdrawal must be via troop transport trucks and passenger planes whereby each soldier is allowed to carry his own weapon only. They may not withdraw any of the heavy military equipment and the military bases must be handed over to the mujahidin of the Islamic State and the duration of the withdrawal may not exceed a month.”

Al-Baghdadi goes on to warn Bush not to waste this opportunity of safe passage for his troops, as he did when he wasted the opportunity of a ceasefire that was offered to the American by the “sheikh of the mujahidin” ‘Usama Bin Laden. Al-Baghdadi thinks that the Americans are so demoralized by the war that they would jump at his offer. In another instance, he asserts that the jihadists have killed “more than 75,000 [American] soldiers” with “many multitudes more” wounded and disabled.

As for the regional threats facing Islam, al-Baghdadi singles out Iran’s alleged Shi’a expansionism across the Middle East—one of al-Zarqawi’s chief concerns—as well as the supposed menace posed by Israel. In July 2007, al-Baghdadi threatens war against Iran if it does not stop interfering in Iraqi affairs, and sets a deadline of two months for the Iranian leadership to untangle itself from Iraq. He calls upon the Sunnis of Iran to prepare for war, and warns Sunni businessmen in the Arab world and the Persian Gulf that they must sever all business partnerships with Shi’a merchants, using the derogatory words rafidha to refer to the Shi’a and majus when discussing the Iranians. He also declares that all mercantile dealings between Iraq and Iran are to be suspended.

Al-Baghdadi promises the Palestinians that, in the interim, they will be resettled in the towns and villages of Iraq that have been cleansed of Shi’as, but that eventually the Islamic State of Iraq will destroy Israel and liberate Palestine. He chooses the 12th century Zengid sultanate as the
historical precedent upon which the Islamic State of Iraq will be modeled in this cause, as well as the more timely possibility of providing training and aid for Palestinian jihadists:

“As was the state of Noureddin the Martyr the cornerstone for the return of Al-Aqsa [Mosque] back into the [fold] of the ummah, [as a result of which] his disciple Saladin entered [Jerusalem] as a conqueror after the Battle of Hittin; as it had been entered by [the Second Righteous Caliph] ‘Umar al-Faruq, we ask of Allah and hope that the [Islamic State of Iraq] will be the cornerstone for the return of Jerusalem. The Jews and the Americans have realized that, and they have tried to thwart us by any means from [advancing towards] this goal, and the vicious campaign in Anbar [Province] and the excessive pride in [how it calmed down], is [due] to their knowledge that it is easy to fire medium-range missiles against Israel from some parts of [Anbar] as was done by Saddam…And because they know that some of these missiles still exist, and can be manufactured as long as their targeting is not accurate…

“But we are prepared to support you with all that we have of funds, even though it is little, and we are prepared to train your cadres, starting from [the manufacture of Improvised Explosive Devises] and ending with manufacturing missiles…”

Al-Baghdadi’s understanding of geostrategic balances are muddled and delusional, for at one point he sees common ground between the Islamic State of Iraq and the ambitions of the French, the Russians and the Chinese in supplanting the United States. He even addresses the Communist leadership of North Korea demanding some credit for allowing their nuclear program to go through because America was being distracted in Iraq by virtue of the actions of the jihadists there. Al-Baghdadi also seems to view Belgium as a world power to be reckoned with.

Yet al-Baghdadi’s oddest foreign policy pronouncement to date would have to be his declaration of war on Sweden’s economy during September 2007 in retaliation for a cartoon depicting Muhammad as a dog. He seems to be seizing on a new opportunity for Muslim indignation not unlike that which was spurred on by the Danish cartoons lampooning Muhammad two years earlier:

“…Every sniveling scoundrel is daring to insult us, from the worshippers of the cross [Christians] to the worshippers of the devil [Yezidis], even the worshippers of the cow [Hindus], and our honor and our blood have become the cheapest thing in this world, and when we strive to arise from our slumber to retrieve our glory and the dignity of our ancestors, these [renegades] stabs us in the back…

28
“…No, oh worshippers of money, no oh worshippers of the cross, we are a nation that Allah [had chosen] to glorify with Islam, and you will know oh worshippers of the cross how it will feel to kneel down in humiliation, and officially apologize for your crime against our Prophet…And we know how we can force you to retract and apologize, for if you don’t then await the attacks on the economies of your giant corporations such as Ericsson, Scania, Volvo, Ikea and Electrolux…”

Furthermore, al-Baghdadi announced a $100,000 bounty for whoever kills Lars Vilks, the Swedish cartoonist, and an extra $50,000 if Vilks’ neck is slit like a lamb’s. Al-Baghdadi also set aside another $50,000 for the head of the editor of *Nerikes Allehanda*, the paper that ran the cartoon.

Al-Baghdadi foretells the imminent collapse of the West’s decadent civilization, and wonders why is it that precisely now at a time when Islam, as represented by the Islamic State of Iraq which he heads, is poised to reap the fruits of this massive victory that the Sunni “renegades” remain obstinate in refusing to pledge allegiance to him and continue to actively resist his authority:

“…Today, we are embarking on a new era, and a point of transformation for the region and the entire world, we are witnessing the end of that lie called Western civilization, and the rise of the Islamic giant, and this is exactly what Bush warned of in his latest speech in front of the veterans [August 22, 2007] saying: ‘the region is developing in a way that threatens the downfall of civilization’ and by that he means the civilization of unbelief, the civilization of usury and prostitution, the civilization of oppression and humiliation. And he had this to say about the soldiers of the Islamic State of [Iraq]: ‘they seek to restore the caliphate from Spain to Indonesia’ after [the Americans] made clear that [the soldiers of the Islamic State] are only Sunni danger threatening America and its civilization, and this is the truth as testified to by the enemies, doesn’t this conflict with what the renegades have branded us?”

If President Bush himself is aware of the grand ramifications of the Islamic State of Iraq and its portent for a resurrected and belligerent Islamic empire, then why have Iraq’s Sunnis failed to recognize the import of this lofty jihadist venture and instead have turned against it, al-Baghdadi admonishingly asks?

**IMPLICATIONS FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM**

In a recent “Message to the Ummah” that was released on May 19, 2008 addressing the 60th anniversary of the state of Israel, ‘Usama Bin Laden laments that “the Ottoman state, despite its immense flaws, had protected the ummah from the wolves of the crusading West, so Britain
conspired with Arab leaders at the forefront of whom were Sharif Hussein and his sons, and King Abdel Aziz [Ibn] Saud, who colluded with [Britain] to fight and topple the Ottoman state.” Thus for Bin Laden, even a flawed caliphate was a necessary institution to forestall the external and internal threats posed to Islam.145

The Al-Ekhlaas internet forum, one of the most important jihadist propaganda outlets, continuously runs a ticker marking the founding of the Islamic State of Iraq that it prominently displays on all its main pages. On June 6, 2008, this ticker read: “600 days have passed since the declaration of the State of Islam, the imminent hope of the ummah…and it shall remain by the grace of Allah.” Clearly, while Bin Laden grieves over the end of the caliphate decades ago, the jihadists and their sympathizers on Al-Ekhlaas had placed high hopes in the venture for a new caliphal state that had been embarked upon in Iraq. Another fixture on Al-Ekhlaas’ main discussion forum highlights a thread that invites its patrons to pledge allegiance to “the Caliph of the Muslims, the Commander of the Faithful, Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi”; by last count, some 1,200 individuals had done so.146 There could be hundreds more active jihadists in Iraq who still observe their pledge to al-Baghdadi, and possibly thousands of others dispersed around the Middle East.

Yet the Islamic State of Iraq is faltering, according to statements made recently by some of America’s top military, diplomatic and intelligence officials.147 The Sunni Awakening Councils and ‘Sons of Iraq’ militias that had thrown in their lot with the Americans against Al-Qaeda in Iraq have been given too much credit in media and analyst circles for bringing about this auspicious result, without factoring the role of doctrinal dissonance that had set one jihadist group against another as a direct result of the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq.148 It was the spectacle of jihadists turning on jihadists, and their ensuing distraction and discord that initially opened-up the maneuvering space that gave tribal leaders, as well as a few insurgent groups that had been exhausted and depleted by years of fighting, the head start by which they could rally fellow Sunnis against Al-Qaeda in Iraq.

Four months into the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq, an unknown but seemingly authentic Iraqi jihadist leader calling himself ‘Jihad al-Ansari’ published a extraordinary open letter (dated February 26, 2007) that was addressed to al-Baghdadi. In it al-Ansari references an earlier letter that was dated December 4, 2006 that had gone unanswered and in which al-Ansari had sought some clarifications from al-Baghdadi regarding the timing and purpose of the Islamic State of Iraq. However, al-Ansari could not hold back since “matters have deteriorated in this period” that had “damaged the jihadist corps and greatly tarnished the reputation of the jihad and the mujahidin.”

Al-Ansari decried the zeal by which Al-Baghdadi’s soldiers went about advocating for their newfound regime:
“The most prominent of these results and the worse that has come about because of your solitary step, was the commencement of many of your groups and members of your organization, so as to show your authority over Muslims in Iraq, to attack and insult all people, and to agitate against those who refuse to pledge allegiance to you…And in this most recent period, this pattern has been increasing, and many of your groups are capitalizing on the delicate situation, to peddle the idea of the State according to its beliefs, and to do so by attacking the people, and to harass every citizen, whether he was innocent or not…Do you want to drive your organization towards collapse and dissolution, because of the sins of these sinners...

“Is it reasonable for you to squander the fighting effort towards assassinating and killing the mujahidin who refuse to pledge allegiance to you, or those from the general body of the Muslims, at these trying times, when the efforts of the infidels are coalescing against the Muslims in Iraq? A few days ago, one of the sheikhs of the mosques of Baghdad said to me: ‘We have started to fear the fighters of Al-Qaeda more than we fear the Mahdi Army gang’…Since when has the threat of murder been the correct manner by which to extract a pledge of allegiance?!

“Do you think that through this manner we will hurry to pledge allegiance? Don’t you know [as an Iraqi], that the Iraqi will give you [the shirt off his back] if you speak to his pride, but if you begin to threaten him, he will strive to avenge his dignity, not fearing death…”

Al-Ansari goes to declare that he shall be “the first to publicly refuse to pledge allegiance,” but caveats his antagonism by adding that the “Al-Qaeda organization would be honored and respected if it [adopts] justice and wisdom and fighting the infidel occupier and their Safavid agents as its guidance” and stops trying to force people to succumb to its authority—that is if it drops the venture of the Islamic State of Iraq.

There has been a 94 percent drop in the Islamic State of Iraq’s violent operations over the last year according to a study that was prepared by a jihadist sympathizer on Al-Ekhlaas, citing the Islamic State of Iraq’s own numbers, whereas only a year and half ago al-Baghdadi’s organization credited itself with 60 percent of all violent attacks in Iraq, including the majority of the spectacular ones. But nowadays most of the Islamic State of Iraq’s vengeance is directed against recalcitrant “renegades” who broke rank on doctrine.

Whereas the resurrection of a robust and sovereign caliphate has been an oft-stated jihadist goal, jihadists and their detractors have long-understood that such a goal, in its initial stages, would mark the soft and doctrinally vulnerable underbelly of their militant ideology. In their
overconfidence, in their zeal in forcing the hand of history by embarking on the venture of the Islamic State of Iraq as the embryonic caliphate, al-Zarqawi’s successors afforded their critics a golden opportunity to question the viability of their vision for the future, a vision that they were willing to nihilistically wreak havoc and destruction in preparing the ground for its rebirth.

The American public was uncurious as to the identity, nature and goals of its enemy in Iraq, and unfortunately U.S. leaders and commanders, for the most part, accommodated that willful unawareness rather than addressed it—that is, had these leaders and commanders been aware of the facts themselves. The disinterest on the part of the public was partly due to the bitter partisan recriminations over the Bush administration’s policy in waging the Iraq war, and who was to blame, in Washington, for the insurgency that ensued. Consequently, the doctrines of the Bush administration regarding pre-emptive strikes and spreading democracy in the Middle East came under incessant scrutiny from the administration’s political foes in the United States, while the doctrines of the jihadists were overlooked and, in the few cases where they have been considered, were dismissed as weird and kooky, without realizing the significance that as fantastical as they may be, these ideas do indeed motivate and inform the enemy’s actions and strategy.

As such, the Islamic State of Iraq was played down by American officials, analysts and journalists as an “Al-Qaeda in Iraq affiliate” rather than its successor, and al-Baghdadi is trivialized as a “fictional character”—even though this assertion could have originated with jihadist disinformation. Would Al-Qaeda in Iraq invite upon itself such an ideological backlash from fellow jihadist groups by announcing al-Baghdadi’s pedigree simply in a conventional bid to confuse Coalition intelligence services as to the make-up of its top leadership? It seems like a steep and wholly unnecessary price to pay for a security ruse, given that it incurred the wrath of so many of their fellow travelers in the cause of jihad, and exposed them to questioning and criticism as to the implications of their venture.

Irrespective of whether the Iraq war was justified or not, one post-invasion reality cannot be disputed: al-Zarqawi and his fellow jihadists chose to turn Iraq into a new battleground against the United States and its allies. Al-Zarqawi was not a member of Al-Qaeda when he began his terrorist operations, but in the course of garnering plenty of support and succor for the jihad in Iraq under the name of the Monotheism and Jihad Group, he could turn that achievement around to negotiate with Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri on acquiring the Al-Qaeda franchise, principally for fund-raising and recruiting purposes in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf, yet he did so on his own terms without conceding the doctrinal idiosyncrasies—in some ways held more radically than mainstream jihadists—that had prevented him from officially joining the Al-Qaeda movement in Afghanistan years earlier. Even so, the Al-Qaeda affiliation was only useful for al-Zarqawi for a year or so for he moved on to expand his organization and append it to the Iraq-based Shura Council of the Mujahidin on January 15, 2006.
It has been the purpose of this paper to demonstrate that not only did al-Zarqawi (who was killed in June 2006) and his successors choose to turn Iraq into a battleground on their own initiative but that they subsequently chose Iraq as the incubator for their grand vision of a unified Islamic empire under the aegis of a ruling caliph. They did so without instructions from or consultations with the traditional leaders of Al-Qaeda hiding out in the Hindu Kush Mountains. Rather, they presented the jihadist world with a fait accompli: the Islamic State of Iraq, thereby capturing the imagination of a new generation of jihadists who were already enthralled by the alleged victories of the Zarqawists in Iraq.

The Zarqawists believed that they were winning at the time when they declared their state, taking the gloomy forecasts of an American ‘quagmire’ and ‘defeat’ in Iraq, as peddled by the U.S. media, as a sign that they were about to turn a corner in the war. As far as they were concerned, there was no greater service to Islam—not even ‘Servitude of the Two Holy Shrines’ of Mecca and Medina—that would compare with what the jihadists were proffering in Iraq, a distinction that ranked them as the elite and vanguard of a victorious Islamic regeneration. The merit of a successful jihad, waged against the world’s greatest power, earned them the authority and responsibility for resurrecting the caliphate, since they alone were the rightful *ahl ul-hel wel-'aqd* of their time. Mindful of the disarray and confusion that had enfolded the Muslim world before and after the last Ottoman caliph was deposed: the temporal and spiritual duality under Abdul Hamid II; the ceremonial caliphate that the Turkish nationalists experimented with right before annulling the office outright; the dithering at the Cairo Caliphate Congress; the embarrassment at Peshawar, the jihadists skipped over centuries of precedent to go back to Muhammad’s nascent state at Medina and took his actions there, in addition to the deeds done by his immediate successors, as the outline along which they would model their own. Their ‘Commander of the Faithful’ would be of Quraysh stock, not some ethnic Pashtun warlord. Their ‘state’ would be the “real caliphate” once again, set to expand under Muhammad’s own banner from the very heart of the *Dar al-Islam*, from ancient Baghdad and its environs; a venture far more ambitious and daring than a marginal emirate within the remote folds of the Hindu Kush.

The Islamic State of Iraq was to be the shield and spear of Islam, facing down infidel foes from within and without. It was to be the harbinger of glory and redemption, the “ummah’s hope” for an avenger to its many humiliations. And should the jihadists meet some slight setbacks here and there, then that too shall pass, for as al-Baghdadi says when giving his reasons as to why he is confident that the Islamic State of Iraq shall persist: “we are certain that Allah will not break the hearts of the embattled monotheists and turn us into the object of ridicule by the oppressors.”152 Yet, it does not seem as if the Islamic State in Iraq is about to make a comeback, especially since the Iraqi Sunnis that it claimed to be fighting on behalf of, and to whom its laurels shall accrue in victory, seem to have irreversibly turned against it. So could it be, after all the blood, treasure and prayers that went into the Islamic State of Iraq, that Allah too had turned His back on the jihadists?
The corollary to the military defeat now being experienced by the jihadists is the even more agonizing prospect of doctrinal collapse: the heralded caliphate is stillborn; the glorious vision of reinvigorated Islamic State has been smashed. The anguish and demoralization brought about by this byproduct of battlefield victory cannot be overstated, for to smash the dreams of a man who lives for a cause, who endures cruel deserts and damp caves while awaiting martyrdom, is a fate far worse than death. In a battle of wills where a young man is able to summon the necessary willpower to press a button and to detonate himself among innocent bystanders for the cause of jihad and for a deferred utopia of a resurrected and avenging Islamic world power, nothing breaks the will of the individual jihadist than to see, in real time, his ideology bear fruit and to watch that fruit rot away right before his eyes. Such has been the impact of the ‘Zarqawist’ Islamic State of Iraq—the caliphate to be, under the Commander of the Faithful Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi the Qurayshite—and the bitter aftertaste of its ruinous downfall.

---

2 Islamic State of Iraq-Ministry of Shari’ah Commissions, Elam al-anam bi milad dawlet al-islam (Al-Furqan Institute for Media Productions, released on January 7, 2007) available at http://www.tawhed.ws/r/?i=4359. This 101 page tract begins with an introduction from the ‘Ministry of Information’ that is penned by the ‘Official Spokesman’ of the Islamic State of Iraq, posthumously identified as Muharib Abdel-Latif al-Juburi, one of Al-Qaeda in Iraq’s top native-born leaders (confirmed killed on May 1, 2007). In the introduction, the spokesman informs us that this tract was authored by “one of the sons of the shar’iah commission” who was “killed in an ambush with U.S. forces.” The author is not identified, not even by a pseudonym, but the tract is described as one that was “prepared under the supervision of ’Uthman bin Abdel-Rahman al-Tamimi, the head of the shari’ah commission.” On April 19, 2007, Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi named a certain ‘Abu ‘Uthman al-Tamimi’—by all indications an Iraqi—as the Minister of Shar’iah Commissions in the Islamic State of Iraq (see Nibras Kazimi, “Al-Baghdadi Names Pseudonyms—for ministerial portfolios,” Talisman Gate blog (posted April 19, 2007) available at http://talismangate.blogspot.com/2007/04/al-baghdadi-names-pseudonymsfor.html) but it remains unclear whether the supervisor of this tract (’Uthman al-Tamimi) and the minister (Abu ‘Uthman al-Tamimi) are one and the same. It should be noted that the Iraqi cadres of Al-Qaeda in Iraq seem to have been enthusiastic supporters of the establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq, probably reflecting a desire to secure the title of caliph for a fellow Iraqi.  
3 Islamic State of Iraq, Elam al-anam, p. 55. Another variation on Bush’s words came from al-Baghdadi in his first speech “Truth Has Arrived and Falsehood is Perished” that was released on December 22, 2006 where he claims that the establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq “drove that enemy of Allah, Bush, to say after its emergence that the [jihadists] seeks to establish an Islamic state from China to Spain, and thus he was truthful [in this instance] despite being a liar.” See Nibras Kazimi, “Would-Be Caliph’s Inaugural Address to the Islamic Ummah,” Talisman Gate blog (posted December 23, 2006) available at http://talismangate.blogspot.com/2006/12/would-be-caliphs-inaugural-address-to.html.
4 ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Umar ad-Dumaij, Al-imamah al-’udhma ‘inda ahl ul-sunnah wa’t-jama’ah (Global Islamic Media Front, February 2007), available at http://www.aekhlaas.net/forum/showthread.php?t=47906&highlight=%C7%E1%CF%E3%ED%CC%ED. This 403-page book was published in 1987 (not specified by whom and where in the GIMF electronic version), and it was based on a Master’s thesis presented by ad-Dumaij at the Umm Al-Qura University in Mecca during May 1983. ‘Abdullah ‘Umar Suleiman ad-Dumaij, 51, currently teaches as an Associate Professor at the College of Islamic Creed at the King Abdul-Aziz University in Mecca. He was one of 38 signatories who had affixed their names to a controversial letter dated December 7, 2006 that called upon Muslims to confront alleged Shi’a and American designs on the Middle East region, see Nibras Kazimi, “38 Leading Saudi Clerics Incite Iraqi Sunnis Against Shi’as, Americans,” Talisman Gate blog (posted December 11, 2006) available at http://talismangate.blogspot.com/2006/12/38-leading-saudi-clerics-incite-iraqi.html. The Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) is considered one of jihadists’ principle media outlets; it began to put out a video news bulletin called “Sawt al-khilafa” (‘Voice of the Caliphate’) in September 2005. The GIMF also publishes an electronic magazine called Sada Al-Jihad (‘The Echo of Jihad’).

5 Ad-Dumaij, Al-imamah al-’udhma, pp. 16-25. On the controversy behind the title of khalifat Allah (‘Vicegerent of God’), ad-Dumaij cites Ibn Taymiyyah who argues that God is neither dead nor absent to necessitate the appointment of a deputy on His behalf (p. 19 n. 7). Al-Mawardi also ruled against the designation of the caliph as khalifat Allah, see Hamilton A. R. Gibb, “Al-Mawardi’s Theory of the Caliphate,” Studies on the Civilization of Islam, ed. S. J. Shaw (Princeton University Press, 1982 [1962]), p. 158. A compelling case is made by Crane and Hinds that the term caliph carried connotations to mean deputyship on behalf of God from the very beginning of Muhammad’s succession, that is, even before the third Righteous Caliph ‘Uthman officially adopted the title of khalifat Allah, see Patricia Crane and Martin Hinds, God’s Caliph: Religious authority in the first centuries of Islam (Cambridge University Press, 1986 [2003]), p. 12-23. Crane and Hind’s analysis is criticized in Wilfred Madelung, The Succession to Muhammad: A study of the early Caliphate (Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 46 n. 50, for not taking into account the historical circumstances that induced ‘Uthman to change the title. Madelung further clarifies these circumstances: ‘Uthman believed that he was chosen and invested with authority by God, and raised to the supreme position through no effort of his own, p. 80. Nonetheless, Crane and Hinds convincingly argue that khalifat Allah was the title of choice throughout the Umayyad and most of Abbasid dynasties, but this title was challenged by medieval ‘ulema (religious scholars) who saw it as a usurpation of their claim to interpret divine guidance (p. 21); the religious authority of the caliph was whittled down to the point that the scholars began appropriating the title of ‘imam’ to themselves (p. 98).

6 Ad-Dumaij, Al-imamah al-’udhma, p. 70.

7 Ad-Dumaij, Al-imamah al-’udhma, pp. 89-97. Abul-Hasan Ali bin Muhammad al-Mawardi was born in Basra and died in Baghdad in 1058 AD. Al-Mawardi’s works have been studied by western scholars as the definitive classic on Islamic governance. But as Gibb demonstrates, al-Mawardi was writing under unique circumstances during a time when ‘Abbasid rule was humiliated by its subjugation to the Shi’a Buwaحدود dynasty, and there was hope for a restoration of a more muscular caliphathe; these expectations colored al-Mawardi’s outlook. The importance of al-Mawardi’s contribution is that he maps out a doctrine for government based on precedence; the decisions taken by previous generations of the Muslim jama’ah (‘community’) were justified by divine guidance and hence had to be right, and it is these decisions that must inform how a present Muslim community goes about governing itself. Therefore, all precedents for choosing a caliph were correct and applicable where appropriate. Al-Mawardi’s ‘rules’ are summarized in nineteen points, see Gibb, Studies on the Civilization of Islam, p.151-159.

8 Ad-Dumaij, Al-imamah al-’udhma, p. 102.

9 Ad-Dumaij, Al-imamah al-’udhma, pp. 125-126.

10 This is particularly true of the Hanafi school of jurisprudence, which contended that the caliphate had only lasted for thirty years, beyond which Muslims have been ruled by dynasties. This line of thinking influenced the earlier Ottoman sultans, who adopted the Hanafi school of law, see Thomas W. Arnold, The Caliphate (Barnes and Noble, 1966 [1924]), p. 163.

11 Islamic State of Iraq, Elam al-anam, p. 10

12 Abul-Ma’ali Abdul-Melik bin ‘Abdullah al-Juwaini was a native of Khurasan who died there in 1085 AD and rose to prominence as a cleric and a leader of prayer in Mecca and Medina. A summarized version of his book Ghiath al-
umam fi tiyah al-dhulem, with a special emphasis on what the conditions for the election of an imam are to be when the Islamic world is in turmoil, was republished under the title Al-tariq ila al-khilafah (The Path to the Caliphate) by Abu ‘Ammar Muhammad bin Hamid al-Hasani (dated April 1984) and is available at http://www.tawhed.ws/r/?i=3905. Clearly, al-Juwaynī remains an important reference on the caliphate for the jihadists, seemingly more so than al-Mawardi, even though ten centuries have lapsed since his book on the subject was authored. Gibb did not have access to al-Juwaynī’s book, see Gibb, Studies on the Civilization of Islam, p.142.

11 Islamic State of Iraq, Elam al-anam, p. 13
12 The concept of the Al-ta’ifah al-mansourah (‘Victorious Faction’) is an important one for the jihadists, and has been enthusiastically adopted by those waging jihad in Iraq. One’s allegorical membership in this faction entails the belief in forty-one tenets as laid out in a pamphlet by Abu al-Fadhl al-Iraqi, which were described and expanded upon by Abu Islam al-Ansari in Ma‘alim al-ta’ifah al-mansourah fi bilad al-rafidayn (The Features of the Victorious Faction in Iraq) dated December 2004 and available at http://www.tawhed.ws/r/?i=3142. Al-Ansari explains that the land of Islam can revert back to Dar al-kufr (Land of Unbelief) if occupied or subjugated by “infidel” forces. Tenet number thirty five states that jihad is the way back to recommencing the caliphate; see p.47. The notion that one belongs to a faction negates the Sunni doctrine of jama’ah since it is dismissive of majorities and the process of consensus. It could explain the willingness shown by the jihadists in Iraq to commit brutal atrocities since they are more interested in being right than in being popular—such schismatic impulses seemingly bring the jihadists closer to the style of sedition and heresy during the classical Islamic era. Such tendencies deserve further study that is beyond the scope of this paper.

13 Islamic State of Iraq, Elam al-anam, pp. 15-16.
14 Islamic State of Iraq, Elam al-anam, pp. 17-23.
15 ‘The Alliance of the Muttayyebin’ was a new body announced on October 12, 2006 in a 5 minute propaganda video put out by the Shura Council of the Mujahidin; the alliance consisted of several jihadist groups such as Al-Qaeda in Iraq that had allegedly formed a pact with several Sunni Iraqi tribal leaders. ‘Muttayyebin’ refers to the gooey yellowish syrup called ttreeb into which those who pledged allegiance to each other dipped their right hands. The video showed six masked men pledging allegiance to one another to establish shari‘ah. The original ‘alliance of the muttayebin’ refers to a pre-Islamic tribal alliance made by several Meccan clans and tribes to protect the Ka’ba and to aid each other in war. It was attended by Muhammad, who was 20 years old at the time, and it was convened by his grandfather ‘Abdul Muttalib.
16 Al-Baghdadi identified these tribes (he put the number of tribal sheikhs who had pledged allegiance at 70 percent) as “the Duleim, the Jebour, the ‘Ubaid, Zoba’a, Qais, Azzah, Ta’yy, the Janabis, the Hayyalis, the Mushahdeh, the Dayniyeeh, the Bani Zeid, the Mujamma’a, the Shammar, the ‘Anizeh, the Sumayda’a, the Nu’aym, the Khazraj, the Bani Lheib, the Bu Hayyat, the Bani Hamdan, the al-Sa’adoun, the al-Ghanim, the Sa’ideh, the Ma’adheneh, the Karabilee, the al-Salman, and the Kubeisat,” and he had listed the areas in which the jihadists operate as Fallouja, al-Garmeh, ‘Amiriyyah, Ramadi, Al-Ghbariyeh, Al-Tarmiyyeh, Al-Sinniyyeh, Tikrit, Sammara’, Baqouba, Al–‘Udheim, Mosul, Kirkuk, Talafar, and Baghdad, see Nabras Kazimi, “Would-Be Caliph’s Inaugural Address.”

18 Islamic State of Iraq, Elam al-anam, p. 32.
20 Islamic State of Iraq, Elam al-anam, p. 30. The Medina analogy was taken up by others who sought to legitimize the Islamic State of Iraq such as pseudonymous author ‘Attiyet-Allah’ who posted a mildly critical article on several jihadist discussion forums on December 13, 2006 that nevertheless responds to some of the arguments made against the Islamic State of Iraq. In addition to citing the size of Muhammad’s state at Medina, ‘Attiyet-Allah also references Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab’s state in Dir‘iyya. In response to the charge that the Islamic State of Iraq is dividing Iraqi territory, ‘Attiyet-Allah asks “Did [Muhammad] divide the Arabian Peninsula and Arab society by declaring his state in Medina?” see Nibars Kazimi, “Interesting Jihadist Critique of the Islamic State of Iraq,” Talisman Gate blog (posted January 11, 2007), available at http://talismangate.blogspot.com/2007/01/interesting-jihadist-critique-of.html. The same point about Muhammad not dividing the Arabian Peninsula was made earlier in an audio tape by Abu Hamza al-Muhajir in which he declares Al-Qaeda in Iraq’s allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and to Al-Baghdadi, see Nibars Kazimi, “Al-Qaeda in Iraq Supports US Elections Results,” Talisman Gate blog
(posted November 10, 2006) available at http://talismangate.blogspot.com/2006/11/al-qaeda-in-iraq-supports-us-election.html. Another correlation between the Islamic State of Iraq and the Medina city-state was made by ‘Abu Hureira al-Ansari,’ a jihadist allegedly based in Iraq, in a post that he authored on a jihadist discussion forum on August 18, 2007: just like Muhammad in Medina, the Islamic State of Iraq faces internal (tribal Awakening groups) and external enemies (the Americans and the Shi’as); al-Ansari also likens the flocking of the mujahidin to Iraq from all over the Islamic world to the early Muslim hijra (migration) from Mecca to Medina, available at http://www.aekhlaas.net/forum/showthread.php?t=75462.

23 Islamic State of Iraq, Elam al-anam, p. 29.
24 Islamic State of Iraq, Elam al-anam, pp. 30-31 and p. 77. The recalcitrant tribal Sunni ‘Awakening’ groups are likened to these Jewish tribes.
25 Islamic State of Iraq, Elam al-anam, p. 68.
27 The three verses are numbers 80, 81 and 83 from the Isra’ sura. The various interpretations of these verses more or less say the same thing: Muhammad’s mission entered upon a new phase when he embarked on the journey from Mecca to Medina, and it was here that Allah promised to render upon him the glories of the Persian and Roman empires. Muhammad then returned victorious to Mecca, which was a harbinger of more victories to come. The last verse makes the case that the Koran was reveled in stages, and so will victory arrive in stages, see Kazimi, “Would-Be Caliph’s Inaugural Address.”
29 Islamic State of Iraq, Elam al-anam, pp. 40-42.
30 Islamic State of Iraq, Elam al-anam, p. 34. The author specifically refers to the Islamic Army of Iraq as one of the jihadist groups that were willing to negotiate with the Americans.
33 Islamic State of Iraq, Elam al-anam, p. 33.
36 Sultan Wahid ud-Din cabled the Egyptian government from San Remo, Italy where he was living out his exile a few days ahead of the congress insisting that only he had the authority to convoke such a gathering, see “Ex-Sultan Mehmed Khan Opposes Selection of a Caliph,” New York Times (May 5, 1926). Wahid ud-Din had earlier proclaimed that the decisions taken by the Ankara government to depose him and separate the sultanate from the caliphate were contrary to Islamic law, and that in fleeing Istanbul he was following the example of Muhammad in his flight from Mecca to Medina, see “Ex-Sultan Appeals to Moslem World,” New York Times (April 16, 1923); Wahid ud-Din died on May 16, 1926 in Italy, and was buried in Damascus.
37 Sharif Hussein (r. 1908-1917), later King of the Hejaz (r. 1917-1924), claimed the title of caliph in early March 1924, but the general reaction was hostile. He tried to garner wider Muslim recognition for his title a few months later at the Pilgrimage Congress that was held in Mecca during July 1924 but was rebuffed as the congregants agreed not to discuss the caliphate. By October of that year, Hussein abdicated in favor of his son Ali, see Martin Kramer, Islam Assembled: The Advent of the Muslim Congresses (New York, Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 84-85. In addition to the three claimants mentioned by Ridha, there were at least several others: the Sharif of Morocco (whose family claimed the title since the 16th century), five rulers in the Malay Archipelago, and a few more in Sumatra, see Arnold, The Caliphate, pp. 181-182.
38 Rashid Ridha went through many phases before arriving at these points: for example in 1922, following the victories of the Turkish Army, he considered the Turkish National Assembly in Ankara as a body that was representative of ahl ul-hel wel-‘aq and consequently was empowered to depose Wahid ud-Din. Later, Ridha argued that ahl ul-hel wel-‘aq should be selected from among the leaders of the ummah in both religious and secular affairs and he included in their ranks merchants, agriculturalists, managers, distinguished writers and professionals, who together would function as a parliamentary body. For a full reading of Ridha’s many phases see Mahmoud Haddad, “Arab Religious Nationalism in the Colonial Era: Rereading Rashid Rida’s Ideas on the Caliphate,” Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 117, No. 2 (April 1997), pp. 253-277.
42 Kramer, Islam Assembled, pp. 93-94.
44 Devotion to Mecca and Medina had become a way by which a Muslim potentate may distinguish himself among other aspiring princes. ‘Servant of the Holy Sanctuaries’ was never considered a legitimizing attribute for the early caliphs running through the ‘Abbasids, but it became coveted as the title of caliph inversely lost its dignity through over-use by minor rulers who based their authority on force. Control over the holy cities was tied to control over Egypt, which served as the granary of the Hejaz. It is interesting that Ottoman Sultan Selim acquired the title of ‘Servant of the Holy Sanctuaries’ from his slain foe, the Mamluk sultan of Egypt, rather than from the ‘reigning’ ‘Abbasid caliph, see Arnold, The Caliphate, pp. 144-153.
45 Kemal Karpat, The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State (Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 242-244.
49 Kramer, Islam Assembled, pp. 32-33.
54 Emmanuel Sivan, Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics (Yale University Press, 1985), p. 84.
56 Halima, Al-tareek ila isti‘naf hayat islamiyah, p. 5.
57 Halima, Al-tareek ila isti‘naf hayat islamiyah, p. 9.
58 Halima, Al-tareek ila isti‘naf hayat islamiyah, pp. 16-18.
59 Halima, Al-tareek ila isti‘naf hayat islamiyah, p. 29.
60 Halima, Al-tareek ila isti‘naf hayat islamiyah, p. 87.
62 Hizb ut-Tahrir, The Method to Appoint a Khaleefah, pp. 28-29.
64 Ad-Dumaiji, Al-imamah al-’udhma, p. 94.
65 Islamic State of Iraq, Elam al-anam, p. 93.
66 The earliest published account available about this affair is from Muhammad Kheir Awadallah, “Fi al-dhikra al-rabi’al li ahadh sebtember [2-2],” Al-Sahafa Newspaper, Issue no. 4418 (Sudan, September 21, 2005) in which he names Abu ‘Uthman and Mohammad ar-Rifa’i. In an e-mail correspondence with this author during May 2008 Awadallah would not further identify his sources for this information or elaborate on the identity of Abu ‘Uthman. The other account of the episode with more details, although providing no names, came in a book by ‘Abul Walid al-Misri’ which was serialized in Mohammad al-Shafii’i, “Thartharah saqf al-‘alem,” Ashaq al-Awsat Newspaper, Issue no. 10193 (London, October 25, 2006); the source of the book was identified as the HARMONY project. However, it turns out that ‘Abul Walid al-Misri’ is former Aljaeera correspondent in Afghanistan Mustafa Hamid, who had written a series of books on the experiences of the mujahidin from 1979-2001 under the title Adeb al-mattareed. The reference to the caliphate episode was narrated on p. 41 in “Book 6” that bore the title “Salib fi sama’ Qandahar” in which he refers to the Bin Laden encounter, available at http://mafa.maktoobblog.com/?all=1. News of ar-Rifa’i’s arrest and coma were attributed to Yassir al-Sirri in “Khalifat al-muslimeen Muhammad ‘Eid ar-Rifa’i fi ghyaboobah bi mustashfa Brittan,” Middle East Transparent website (May 25, 2006) available at http://www.middleeasttransparent.com/old/texts/caliph_rifai_in_coma.htm. Some previously unreported biographical details were provided in the latter source, such as ar-Rifa’i’s membership in the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood in the early 1990s and his subsequent expulsion from its ranks before leaving Jordan for Afghanistan.
67 Although he was not present in Afghanistan at that time, Al-Zarqawi would have probably heard about the Peshawar caliphal affair in detail from his brother-in-law (married to Zarqawi’s sister) Salih al-Hami, also known as ‘Abu Qudamah’ (real name could be Sati Qasrawi). Al-Hami writes about his antagonistic encounter with ar-Rifa’i, who he calls the “naive caliph” and an “arrogant idiot,” adding that the latter had declared al-Hami an infidel and called for his blood to be spilt. This aside was mentioned in a long tract that al-Hami had authored and that appeared under several titles and at different times online (last dated July 27, 2007, available at http://www.gulfson.com/vb/t68205.html), which was meant as a rebuttal to Fuad Hussein’s biography on Zarqawi, Alzarqawi: aljeel althani li Al-Qa’ida (Dar al-Khalyal, Beirut, 2005).
68 The Rifa’i’s claim descent from Muhammad’s grandson al-Hussein bin ‘Ali, and hence consider themselves members of the Banu Hashim clan of Quraysh.
69 Kazimi, “Interesting Critique,” see n. 22.
70 Kazimi, “Al-Qaeda in Iraq Supports US Election Results,” see n. 22.
71 There had been much speculation as to the real identity of Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi. In July 2007, the U.S. military announced, based on confessions made by a senior Al-Qaeda in Iraq figure held in custody, that al-Baghdadi was a fictional character created as a ruse to confuse U.S.-led Coalition Forces. It would seem bizarre that the Islamic State of Iraq would embark on such a controversial endeavor as anointing the Commander of the Faithful, only to fill the position with a fictional character; the unlikelihood of which is further underlined when considering that Islamic State of Iraq was trying to convince other jihadist groups to follow suit in pledging allegiance, and further when considering the very serious doctrinal implications of the move, and the effect the revelation of the supposed ruse would have on the standing of Islamic State of Iraq. Another speculative account has it that al-Baghdadi is the pseudonym of Khalid Khalil Ibrahim al-Mashhadani (Abu Zaid), see Nibras Kazimi, “More on Abu Omar al-Baghdadi’s Alleged Identity,” Talisman Gate blog (posted March 7, 2007 and updated on April 22, 2008) available at http://talismangate.blogspot.com/2007/03/more-on-abu-omar-al-baghdadis-alleged.html. Another possible suspect is Hamid Dawood Muhammad Khalil al-Zawi, according to a police chief in Anbar Province, see Nibras Kazimi, “Abu Omar al-Baghdadi Revealed?” Talisman Gate blog (posted May 7, 2008) available at

74 It is only referred to once to make an indirect point about how the power to impose one’s will and authority is sufficient for a caliphate or an imamate to stand, see Islamic State of Iraq, Elam al-anam, pp. 74-75. The rules for the head of the state can also be tweaked to take into consideration circumstances, pp. 83-84.

75 Ad-Dumaiji, Al-imamah al-’udhma, pp. 148-149.
76 Ad-Dumaiji, Al-imamah al-’udhma, p. 152. The author does acknowledge that al-Juwaini leaned towards not making it mandatory, and he included him among the minority of Asa’rite scholars who took this stance, see p. 153. Even though ad-Dumaiji agrees with the “majority of scholars” that he cites, he takes issue with the arguments made by Ibn Khaldun, Wali-Allah de Dehlawi and Mirza as to the wisdom behind it, see pp. 161-164. The author also makes the anti-Shi’a case of why this stipulation was not limited to the Banu Hashim clan of Quraysh by claiming that the Hashemites were small in number and hence the pool of qualified caliphs would be limited as a result, and that the elite of the early Muslims was not exclusive to Banu Hashim, see p. 164. Contemporary writers had made arguments that it was not mandatory; ad-Dumaiji cites these views and refutes them, see pp. 154-160.

77 Ad-Dumaiji, Al-imamah al-’udhma, p. 165.
78 Abu ‘Abdullah al-Dhahabi, “Hel al-Qurashiyyeh shartt fi al-imamah?” (undated) available at http://www.tawhed.ws/r/?i=2939. The indication that it was posted or discussed in installments is a reference to “today we continue what we started in the past episode.”

79 Fatwa by Hamid bin ‘Abdullah al-’Ali (undated) available at http://www.tawhed.ws/r/?i=4277. Al-’Ali, 42, is an Islamist professor and preacher based in Kuwait who comments regularly on current events, and whose writings are popular among jihadists. In a later fatwa dated April 4, 2007, al-’Ali delivered a long and scathing critique of the Islamic State of Iraq, concluding that al-Baghdadi’s imamate was not legal since the presumed imam’s identity was unknown, and that he was in hiding and did not enjoy any real authority over a stretch of territory. Al-’Ali further decried al-Baghdadi’s insistence on the pledge of allegiance and his denouncement of those who withheld it with “recalcitrance” as unlawful, available at http://www.h-alali.net/f_open.php?id=1a55240a-3422-102a-9c4c-0010dc91cf69. As a result of this latter fatwa al-’Ali incurred the wrath of the supporters of the Islamic State of Iraq who vehemently accused him of betraying the jihadists in Iraq.

80 Ad-Dumaiji, Al-imamah al-’udhma, pp. 309-310.
81 The rivalry among al-Zarqawi’s successors and the traditional leaders of Al-Qaeda may have been reflected by Ayman al-Zawahiri’s response to a question concerning the legitimacy of the Islamic State of Iraq and its leader al-Baghdadi, for he seems to minimize the significance of the Islamic State as a “step towards the caliphate” rather than the caliphate itself, and that “al-Baghdadi is [one of] the leaders of the Muslims and the mujahidin of this era” rather than a caliph. Al-Zawahiri describes the Islamic State of Iraq as a project that forestalled sedition rather than resulted in it, further implying that he views it as a local Iraqi affair without larger implications for the cause of global jihad. In defending the Islamic State of Iraq against other accusations, al-Zawahiri decries to and quotes statements made earlier by ‘Usama bin Laden rather than mounting a vigorous defense of his own, see Al-Sahab Media, Al-’iqra’ al-maftouh ma’a al-sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri, Episode Two (released April 22, 2008) available at . http://www.aekhlaas.net/forum/showthread.php?t=141671&highlight=%C7%E1%D9%E6%C7%E5%D1%ED

84 Hizb ut-Tahrir, The Method to Appoint a Khaleefah, pp. 16-19.
Draft, Kazimi, “The Caliphate Attempted”


89 This tale originates in a late 18th century account written by a local-born interpreter employed by the Swedish Consulate who provides no historical sources. This account later gained currency among European historians and filtered back into Ottoman accounts. As early as Murad I’s reign in Edirne, the Ottoman sultans had adopted, or were described in their correspondence by, the title of caliph. This merely reflected customary practice at the time, when the title became yet another term of ornate flattery for a potentate, see Arnold, *The Caliphate*, pp. 128-147. Selim would not have been able to acquire so empty a title; his attitude would have been more affected by the distinctly Turkic sense that the Ottomans were descended by blood from world conquerors as a source for legitimacy rather than being elected to eminence by an alleged inheritor of an enfeebled ‘Abbasid legacy that another Turkic race, the Mongols, had put an end to in Baghdad, see Arnold, *The Caliphate*, p. 109.
97 Maraghî’s letter was written during World War I to the British Governor General of the Sudan at a time when Britain was at war with the Ottoman Empire. The letter is reproduced in full in Kedourie, *The Chatham House Version*, pp. 208-212.
100 Islamic State of Iraq, *Elam al-anam*, pp. 86-88. This same argument was made by ‘Usama Bin Laden in his speech about the Islamic State of Iraq in which he responded to criticism that al-Baghdadi was an unknown figure; Bin Laden stated that it was enough that al-Baghdadi was recommended to him by al-Zarqawi and al-Muhajir, and that it was prudent to keep such matters secret during conditions of war, see ‘Usama Bin Laden, *Al-sabeel li iḥbatt al-mu’amerat* (Al-Sahab Media, December 30, 2007) available at www.alekhlass.net/forum/showthread.php?t=110962.
103 For an in-depth presentation of the role played by German intelligence in manipulating the office of the caliph as a religious weapon in agitating against the Allies, see Tilman Ludke, *Jihad Made in Germany: Ottoman and German Propaganda and Intelligence Operations in the First World War* (LIT, 2005).
104 Ozcan, *Pan-Islamism*, p. 44.
Draft, Kazimi, “The Caliphate Attempted”

106 Itzhak Weismann, Taste of Modernity: Sufism, Salafiyya, and Arabism in Late Ottoman Damascus (BRILL, 2001), p. 129.


111 Ludke, Jihad Made in Germany, p. 86.

112 Kedouri, The Chatham House Version, p. 189. A few years later, Ataturk claimed that the Muslims of India and Egypt had beseeched him to take on the title of caliph himself, see Haim, “The Abolition of the Caliphate,” p. 223. Ataturk would have been mindful of the potential for worldwide Muslim indignation even ahead of abolishing the caliphate after receiving a letter from the Aga Khan that implored him not to detract further from the office of caliph following the annulment of the sultanate, the letter is reproduced in full in “Letter of Aga Khan, Criticizing It, Resented by Angora Government,” New York Times (January 6, 1924). See also Andrew Mango, Ataturk: The Biography of the Founder of Modern Turkey (Overlook Press 2002 [1999]), pp.400-405. Ad-Dumaiji, reflecting a common Islamist opinion on the man who ended the caliphate, includes a brief biographical note about Ataturk in which he castigates him as a crypto-Jew, a Mason, pro-British and an alcoholic “who died an infidel,” see ad-Dumaiji, Al-imamah al-’udhma, p. 67 n. 2.

113 Haim, “The Abolition of the Caliphate,” p. 241. Abdul Mejíd’s election was supported by India’s Muslims, who at the time, after Turkey’s war against the invading Greeks, looked upon the nationalists in Ankara as Islamic heroes (p. 240). Upon being deposed, Abdul Mejíd waited until he crossed into Bulgaria to issue a proclamation that his removal was null and void, see Mango, Ataturk, p. 406. Abdul Mejíd’s claims to the title were again brought up by the Indians ahead of the Jerusalem Congress in 1931, see Haim, “The Abolition of the Caliphate,” p. 242, also “Indian Group Seeks to Restore Caliph,” New York Times (October 30, 1931). Reflecting this association with India, Abdul Mejíd gave two of his daughters in marriage to the Nizam rulers of Hyderabad, see “Struggle For Hands of Caliph’s Kin Bared,” New York Times (January 1, 1932); he died in Paris on August 23, 1944, and was buried in Medina.


117 Author’s visit to the Tomb of the ‘Abbasid Caliphs in the Al-Qarafah Al-Kubra district of Cairo on July 17, 2006.

118 Ad-Dumaiji, Al-imamah al-’udhma, pp. 187-188.

119 Ad-Dumaiji, Al-imamah al-’udhma, pp. 209-220, and pp. 251-256. For the caliph’s right to rule for life, see p. 232.

120 Ad-Dumaiji, Al-imamah al-’udhma, p. 311.

121 Islamic State of Iraq, Elam al-anam, p. 46.

122 Islamic State of Iraq, Elam al-anam, pp. 47-54.

123 Islamic State of Iraq, Elam al-anam, p. 91.

124 Al-Baghdadi’s first speech, see n. 3.


Draft, Kazimi, “The Caliphate Attempted”

127 Al-Baghdadi’s fourth speech.

129 Al-Baghdadi’s third speech.

132 Ad-Dumaiji, Al-imamah al-‘udhma, p. 70.
133 Al-Baghdadi’s third speech.
134 Al-Baghdadi’s eighth speech.

136 Al-Baghdadi’s first speech.
137 Al-Baghdadi’s second speech.
139 Al-Baghdadi’s fifth speech “Should You Desist Then That is Better for You,” released on July 9, 2007, see Kazimi, “What is al-Baghdadi Up to These Days?”
140 Al-Baghdadi’s second speech.
141 Al-Baghdadi’s ninth speech “Religion is Advice,” released on February 14, 2008, see Kazimi, “Back to Al-Baghdadi’s Speeches.”
142 Al-Baghdadi’s second speech.
143 Al-Baghdadi’s sixth speech.
144 Al-Baghdadi’s sixth speech.
145 Al-Sahab Media, “A Message from the Lion of Islam Osama bin Muhammad bin Laden to the Islamic Ummah,” (May 19, 2008) available at www.aekhlaas.net/forum/showthread.php?t=148375. Bin Laden’s apparent nostalgia for the Ottoman Empire is deeply frowned upon by the wider body of Wahhabis who consider such romanticized reminiscences about the Sufi-patronizing and westernizing Ottomans, even if such sentiments issue from well-meaning individuals, to be “arrogant” and misguided, see Nassir al-Fahd, Al-dawlah al-Uthmaniyyah wa mawqif da’awet al-sheikh Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab minha (undated) available at www.tawhed.ws.
146 The varying forms of the bay’a‘ah (‘pledge of allegiance’), and what their different wordings signify, deserve further study that is beyond the scope of this paper. Ad-Dumaiji addresses these issues in Al-imamah al-‘udhma, pp. 112-123, also see Abdel Hakim Hassan, Al-baya’a suwaruha wa wujub al-wafa’ biha (undated) available at www.tawhed.ws. The Al-Ekhlaas thread for pledging allegiance to al-Baghdadi begins at http://www.aekhlaas.net/forum/showthread.php?t=47428. The first pledge to the “caliph of the Muslims” was made on February 22, 2007 by the pseudonymous ‘Muhibb al-Irhab’ (‘Lover of Terrorism’) who is tagged as the ‘Deputy General Supervisor’ of Al-Ekhlaas. Muhibb al-Irhab claims to be posting from “the land of the caliphate.” By June 16, 2008, the number of responses to this thread had reached 1,214 posts.

148 For a discussion on the secondary role played by the Sunni tribes and militias in bringing about the improved security situation in their areas, see Nibras Kazimi, “Let Beast Devour Beasts,” New York Sun (June 19, 2007) and Nibras Kazimi, “Of Tribes and Men,” New York Sun (September 23, 2007).


Nibras Kazimi, “Calling All Caliphs,” *New York Sun* (October 12, 2005)

Al-Baghdadi’s fourth speech.