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BEYOND RADICAL ISLAM?

SESSION THREE
ISLAM AND MODERNITY

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MR. MARC PLATTNER: I'm Marc Plattner. I'm what might be called a guest host. I'm not from Michigan State. I'm the editor of the *Journal of Democracy* and normally based in Washington. It's my pleasure to welcome you to this third session of our conference, "Beyond Radical Islam," and the subject of this morning's session is "Islam and Modernity." It's not entirely clear whether the expression, "Islam and Modernity" here is supposed to be an opposition or merely a juxtaposition of two elements.

In the small blurb on our table of contents, it's suggested that Islam—especially in its radical form—may be considered anti-modern, yet we also heard in some of the discussions yesterday several speakers expressing the view that radical Islam, in fact, is very much a modern phenomenon. So, I would say we have a very open question before us, but this is an exceptionally broad-ranging topic, and we're very fortunate to have as our paper-giver today Abdou Filali-Ansary, who in my view—and I think not only my view—is one of the most interesting political thinkers in the Muslim world today.

Abdou Filali-Ansary is currently the director of the Institute for the Study of Muslim Civilizations—and that's not accidentally in the plural—at the Aga Khan University in London. He served from 1984 to 2001 as the founding Director of the King Abdul-Aziz Foundation for Islamic Studies and Human Sciences in Casablanca, Morocco. He's a professor of philosophy by training. He's taught at the Faculty of Letters in Rabat, and he's the co-founder of the bilingual Arabic and French journal *Prologues*, which is truly an outstanding publication. I commend it to any of you who are interested in seeing the state of discussion of these kinds of issues in at least part of the Muslim world.

His work includes a translation into French of Ali Abderraziq's book, *Islam and the Foundations of Political Power*, and he's written an essay entitled "Is Islam Hostile to Secularism?" He serves on several advisory boards, and I'm very pleased to say that he's a member of the editorial board of the *Journal of Democracy* and, as it happens, he's quoted extensively in the latest issue of the *New York Review of Books* in an essay on Islamic thinkers.

As respondents on this panel, we will have one who's expert on Islamic matters and another who's an expert on modernity, we might say. Asma Afsaruddin is Associate Professor of Arabic and Islamic studies at the University of Notre Dame. Her fields of specialization are the religious and political thought of Islam and the intellectual history of Islam. She's the author of *Excellence and Precedence: Medieval Islamic Discourse on Legitimate Leadership.* She recently was a visiting scholar at the Centre of Islamic Studies at the School of Oriental and

African Studies in London, and serves on the Board of Directors of the Washington-based Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy.

Francis Fukuyama is dean of the faculty and the Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy at SAIS, the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, also in Washington. He has previously taught at George Mason University and served long ago on the Policy Planning Staff of the U.S. State Department. He's widely known for his many writings on democratization, international political economy, and numerous other subjects. Among his most well-known books are *The End of History and the Last Man Trust: The Social Virtues* and *The Creation of Prosperity*, and his most recent book, which I think is due out any day if it hasn't already appeared, is *State Building: The New Agenda*, and I'm pleased to say that he, too, like Abdou Filali-Ansary, is a member of the editorial board of the *Journal of Democracy*.

So, with that introduction, let us begin with Abdou Filali-Ansary.

MR. ABDOU FILALI-ANSARY: Thank you very much, Chairman. Well, my first word will be to thank the organizers of this conference, which is offering me a very good opportunity to meet friends who are very dear to me, and also to have direct contacts with other colleagues whom I knew until now from their writings.

I will not read my paper since I am not quite happy with all of its parts, and I would like also to be able to benefit from what will come out in the discussion in order to rewrite it and to bring, if I can, more clarity and more arguments to what may need to have more clarity or more arguments.

I will begin by something which seems to me to be a massive fact about this very subject, Islam and modernity. We already have a huge literature on this subject. If we take together what has been written in English, in French, in Arabic and these languages on this subject, the quantity—the number of titles—is really extremely large, and the publication of such titles has been continuous throughout the 20th century. In one aspect of it, it is may be part of a pattern. We have also many other publications in which Islam is in the title: We have Islam and democracy, Islam and human rights, Islam and—the list is very long, and the number of publications is impressive. Although the categories which are involved are not the same in every language—and to this I hope to be able to come back later—in Arabic, for example, you may find titles such as Islam and genetic engineering, and many, many kinds of titles like this. And in the Western languages, as I said, you find "Islam and democracy," "human rights"—you find also "Islam and Europe," "Islam and …"— well, other parts of the world—and so on.

I am surprised by this phenomenon and by its continuity, by its weight, and by the fact that it has gone on for such a long time. I am surprised also by the fact that the two terms, "Islam" and "modernity," are very broad. Mohammed Arkoun describes them [both] as being concepts [that are] used as suitcases in which travelers put in them whatever items they may need to take with them.

I also—and this may be more serious—find that the use, particularly, of the category Islam, is built in such a way that no distinction is made between what Marshall Hodgson called "Islam" and "Islamdom." It is a fact that, when we are thinking or talking about Christian traditions, the

distinction between “Christianity” and “Christendom” is so clear that no one questions it. [By contrast] the term “Islam” is such that no such distinction can be made or is made, and I wonder if some of the important misunderstandings that we have in our dialogues are not linked to this simple semantic habit.

To take an example, to my knowledge, no one makes a link or sees any link between the massacre of St. Bartholomew in France and the history of France. It was a very important event through which the Catholics—or the King of France, who was Catholic—decided to massacre all Protestants. In one night, many thousands of individuals were killed—and it was in the name of the Christian faith in order to purify the Christian society of France, and so on.

But no one whatsoever, to my knowledge, has made a link between this fact of Christendom, the history of Christians, and the teachings of Jesus. While today in our very dated practice, we all the time invoke Islam whenever someone kills somewhere, or some atrocity is committed here or there. This isunderstanding of this kind—of semantic use—is such that many misunderstandings are built in to discourses, and it seems to me that many of the problems we think of as being part of reality may be just linked to this kind of use of the language.

I will quote a sentence from Wilfred Cantwell Smith, who was a Canadian theologian. He died a few years ago. His main writings are from the ‘50s and ‘60s. He said that the word “Islam, is used in at least three distinct ways, to refer to three related yet different things. I may designate these three as Islam, the active, personal faith; Islam, the religious system as a transcendent ideal; and Islam, the religious system as historical phenomenon. On the whole, there is a tendency here for believing Muslims to use the term in the second sense as an ideal, and for outside of service to use it in the third sense, as an historical, sociological actuality. This is because men generally tend to talk about other people's religions as they are, and about their own as it ought to be. If they had no faith of their own, they usually think of all religion as observably practiced. As a result, insiders and outsiders may use the same words but be talking of different things.”

It seems to me that this kind of misunderstanding goes much further. When I had translated the book by Ali Abderraziq, *Islam And The Foundations Of Political Power*—and just rapidly, I can say that this book, which was published in 1925 in Cairo, is considered to be the book which has stirred the greatest controversy in the history of Islam. Its author was a theologian from al-Azahar, and he simply attempted to look back at the sources, at the Scriptures, in order to be able to decide whether Islam encompasses [simultaneously, both religion and politics.]

In the very year when the book was published, three books were published in order to respond to it, to object to it, and from then on till nowadays, Ali Abderraziq and his book remain the focus of an endless controversy. But I was amazed—I was amazed that no one seemed to have read what [Abderraziq] had written. No one seemed to speak of the same thing, yet the controversy is still continuing.

So, about Islam and modernity, what—how can we handle this in these conditions? I am afraid that some of the attitudes and behaviors of people may be built on the way these words are used. This is what I’m fearing and what I’m calling in the introduction of my paper a kind of “vicious circle” — whether some conceptions which we built by our semantic uses end up determining

our own behaviors, whether in the Muslim context or the non-Muslim context. And I wonder whether we should discuss this theme—this subject of "Islam and modernity"— and its theological determinants, or rather try to look at what happened really in history. I will attempt to go the second way—to look at and to try to understand what can be learned from history. And this will be my second point here in this presentation. The title I'm proposing for it is, "Modernization In the Recent History of Muslims."

If we take the period between the mid-19th century and the end of the 20th century, 150 years—what can we see? What can we objectively see, and what happened in Muslim societies? Well, I propose to group the main changes in the following four parameters. These parameters I understand are arguable, and there may be others. They may not be the best ones, but they seem to me to give us at least a clear idea of some very important things.

One of them is demography. Yesterday, it was mentioned that the worldwide Muslim population is now maybe 1.4 billion. How many of them were on the planet in 1850? I think it may be a lot more than 150 million. So, the numbers of Muslims has been multiplied by 10. And more than that, most of the Muslim populations [in 1850] were living in rural areas. The latest that we know is that now there is nearly a majority—nearly more than 50 percent—of the Muslim population that lives in urban setting. And we know how much this affects the life and the views and attitudes and habits of people.

The second parameter I propose is that of material conditions. And in this [matter], to describe what happened, I would use a couple of words: "inclusion" and "exclusion." Inclusion, this is—well, following a contemporary historian of Muslims, Reinhard Schulze, and his book, entitled *A Modern History of the Islamic World*, published in English in 2000—what may be the greatest change that affected Muslim societies in modern times was the fact that their societies were included in the world market very early in the 20th century. It means that all the material conditions—the way people were living, or the traditional economy—had completely collapsed early in the 20th century, except maybe in some islands or some little places here and there. But for most Muslim societies, the way of living was built on producing some goods for the world market and consuming other goods that came from outside of these societies. So, these societies were included; This is the inclusion in the world economy very early [that I'm referring to].

Why, then, am I using the word "exclusion"? Because I think that, within Muslim society, something began to happen to them and continues to happen, and weighs very heavily on how things are going on in these societies. This is the fact that a majority of Muslims are excluded from the market, or the goods from the modern market, from the modern economy, within Muslim societies. I'll come back to that in a moment.

The third parameter I'm proposing is that of political institutions. It's the birth or the imposition—whatever we want—of the modern state in most, if not all, Muslim societies now. Now the modern state is everywhere. It was not there by 1850, but now the Muslim world is divided into modern nation-states. These divisions have not been devised or designed from inside these societies most of the time. They were decided by the powers of the time, and they do not follow the criteria of cultural continuity in these societies. They do not respect, if I can say, the linguistic facts in these societies.

The Arab world is now I think [comprised of] something like 20 states—20 different states—and the frontiers between them have been and remain, until this day, objects of contention. The latest was the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. We should not forget that, for Iraq, Kuwait cannot be accepted as a country. It cannot be—it could not be anything other than a province of Iraq.

But, the modern state is now—we know that it is there [in the Muslim world], and it is there to stay, and it has become the framework within which everything is happening to these societies. And even where the frontiers [between countries] have been the most arbitary, the dualities that have been created are such that they determine the life of the people in the most intense way.

I would describe this—the buildup of the nation-states within Muslim societies—as being a process of secularization. I would say that secularization now is a fact in the history of Muslims because the modern state brings with it a set of institutions, specific organization, and it also creates some kind of public space. Whether the state is democratic or the furthest that can be from democracy, the public sphere is there, and new institutions are there.

And I would say that, with this comes many other changes, even in the attitudes of the people. I would dare say that even something like a disenchantment of the world has happened within Muslim societies. The behavior—the way people look at themselves, at history, at nature around them, and the presence of the sacred in society—we have been speaking about the idealization of religion—I think [all of this] may also be a symptom or an aspect of secularization.

The fourth parameter that I propose—and it is maybe the most important for me—is the changes in cultural conditions. Secularization is one part of this, but I think that [some of the biggest changes] that happened in Muslim societies came about [as a result] of the policies put into practice by Muslim states. The two elements that I select for this are mass education and the prevailing mass media within Muslim societies.

Mass education is also a fact [that's here to stay], and if one makes the comparison with what was the case before, access to the written heritage of Muslims was limited to a very tiny minority in pre-modern societies. It was a very tiny minority, and all of them were—nearly all of them were living in urban centers. So, all the [the symbolic wealth] of these societies was accumulated within some areas. Now, with mass education, there are hundreds of thousands who have access to the written heritage. It makes it possible for people who have been just through primary school and maybe part of the secondary school to be able to read these texts and to be able to discuss and to react and to object to what's been [thought and said] by this or that scholar.

So, mass education has been a fact. It has had an effect quantitatively. It has opened to masses access to this heritage, but it also has had a very, I think, important impact qualitatively because this mass education was done in ways that cut the relationship or the opening of these new generations to the world culture. The policies that were adopted in most Muslim states were built on the concept of nationalization. In the Arab world, it was called Arabization. In the Maghreb area from where I come from, we used to have education in Arabic and in French or

Spanish, depending on the country. But with the policies of Arabization, it was decided that we didn't need to know French nor Spanish [any more], and we needed only Arabic.

This happened in Iran with Farsi, in Turkey with Turkish, [and in many other places]—well, the [Indian] subcontinent may be an exception because English remains the language, as far as I know, even in education—and so on. But in most areas of the Muslim world, it meant not only access to the written heritage but a particular way of accessing [this heritage], and also of accessing the world culture. Arabization had the very important consequence [of creating] new generations who do not have the slightest idea of the culture that has developed in the world during the last decades or two or three last centuries, which means a very great narrowing of the horizon—the cultural horizon of the people, and also a very, very deep change in the way people interact or accept the views that come through educational systems.

The mass media—I don't need to stress too much on this—the mass media was used by modern states as means to enforce their domination or their authority in their environments. But now things seem to [grown out of] their hands, to escape their control, because now there are mass media which cross frontiers. We all have heard about al-Jazeera and these new channels and their affect, and this is also a big [reason for cultural] change.

So, to summarize what I have been saying about these great changes in the recent history of Muslims, I would say that we are ending by finding ourselves in a situation where secularization is a fact. Modernization is a fact, but attitudes towards secularization and modernization are very mixed—and, very often, very hostile. So, [we have] a society which has undergone these changes but which is very frustrated by the effects of these changes.

As I said, the word [I'm using to describe this condition] is exclusion—I'm taking it from the French. I don't know whether it has the same connotations in English. But, it is a very strong feeling, a very strong fact within these societies—the fact that the majority feels to be not included, not taken as part in the processes in the political life, and in economic activities, in the markets of these countries.

Let me illustrate this by something that I heard just a few days ago. There was a report on the BBC radio about my own country, about Morocco, which was [a very positive fact.] [The BBC] was reporting that the national, state-owned company in the country which manages the electrical network had concluded a few years ago that it could not extend coverage to the whole country, [and that] 50 percent of the population could not have electricity. So, they decided to contract with a French company to offer on the market very cheap—they negotiated very good prices—kits for solar energy, which brought electricity to a few homes, and they decided to subsidize these very cheap kits at up to 60 percent of their price.

What is happening now, following this report, is a boom in the market. Now, everyone in the rural areas are buying one of these kits, and the reporter interviewed a couple of people, and I was very amazed. The reporter was not aware of some of the dimensions of this change. When he asked one man, his answer was that the change was important for him because he would be able—and this is, for me, very important—he would be able to make sure that his children could do their homework [in the evenings] and would not be expelled from school.

From what I remember, there was talk a few years ago about the collapse of primary education in rural areas in Morocco, and the collapse was linked to the problems of these young people to do their homework—in the country, there is still this idea of homework as being an important part of the educational programs. [And so] we can measure, and maybe have an idea of the breadth of the change that this can bring to the life of these individuals. The man felt during the interview [that he was] being empowered. Now he felt that he could do his duty [as a parent].

And the woman: her joy was even more evident. She said that—well, she said she would be able to watch television and then to watch the soap operas that we have there from Mexico, and so on. But, she said that she would also do some additional work in the evenings. She would do embroidering, and then she would be able to have some pocket money, which is extremely important in a society where, even when the woman works, her salary goes to her father or to her husband, and she is supposed to have everything brought to her by one of them, by whoever is in charge. So, the very idea of being able to have some money and to go to the market and to do this basic act of participating in the market—not to be, as the French say, to be excluded—was so important for this woman.

And following this report, they said that now, 50 percent of the population of Morocco [can have access to electricity]. [But] Morocco is not the worst. If we look at the map, Morocco stands somewhere in the middle—there are [countries] where I think those who do not have access to electricity are in much greater proportions. So, the report was saying that, by the end of 2007, it is hoped that up to 50 percent of these [countries] would have electricity, and this would enable them to feel and to be part of a modern society, not to just watch it from outside.

This is something that illustrates what I'm calling exclusion from the market. The exclusion from the political process is maybe something that is much more important. Even in countries which are not examples of democracy, such as Iraq—under Saddam, there was some form of political participation for those around the president of the [Ba'ath] party—[even though the majority] did not have the freedom to say what they wanted. But [some of the people] were enabled, to some degree or in some ways, to implement or to have some discussions and to participate in how to do this or how to do that, and so on.

But in these settings, along with the economic exclusion, there is also political exclusion [and even where] formal democracy is implemented. You'll find that in the rural areas, among the poor, it's—well, no one would pay the price of a ride to the city or to the neighboring village to vote or anything. Political participation sometimes seems even senseless—meaningless.

So, to summarize again, we find ourselves in a situation that is very paradoxical in many ways. Modernization has outstripped, in fact uprooted, operations from the old traditions—from the old ways of living and of doing everything and of looking at the world—but did not give people access to all the positive things that come, [the things] that should be expected from [modernization].

I come then to the third part of my presentation. It's about reactions to modernization. I would like to go back to the way Muslims have reacted to these processes, to these changes. I would begin by mentioning early reformism, which was evoked and mentioned all the time yesterday.

Well, the first reaction was that of [people like] Mohammed Abduh [? recording unclear] and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani [?], and so on. Early reformism—and I wonder, again, whether a semantic problem may [arise from] the choice that has been made [by using] the term "reformism." The Arabic word [for "reform" is] *Islāh*—and my friends can correct me here—means rather "remedy" or "redress," and the idea behind the concept of *Islāh*, is that something has gone wrong with Muslim societies, not with Islam, not with their religious views. Instead, [the view of *Islāh* holds that Muslim societies] have fallen too low in comparison with the norm [set by Islam], and that the [Islamic] norm was perfect and was still valid, and that Muslims have just needed to return to the norm in order to find solutions to everything.

And of course, within the *Islāh* norm it was accepted—and this can be acknowledged as a positive fact—that it included all what is linked to modernity, rationality, respect for science, tolerance. And so, for these thinkers, all this is already there. We do have it in our traditions and so on in this normative system, and all what was needed is to bring the fact to the level of the norm.

And here again, I have a quote from Wilfred Cantwell Smith: "The previous movements on which we have touched had assessed the internal decline of Muslim society only on a criterion of classical Islamic prescriptions, and had opposed its non-Muslim rulers or enemies only in immediate and local terms, more or less ad hoc." In Athrani (sp), both problems came to a more sophisticated self-consciousness. By this time, the internal inadequacies were no more pronounced than the inner penetration and outer pressure of Europe had both proceeded much further. It was his genius, the genius of Al-Athrani following Smith, to see the situation in comprehensive terms and in perspective. You realize that the entire Islam world—not just this or that part of it—was threatened by the West as a powerful dynamic entity.

And so, in comparison with that entity, that is on a European criterion, the entire Islamic world was weak. He realized that, in a sense, that world was threatened by its own weakness. The earlier reformers had preached that the Muslim social condition was wrong. Athrani insisted that it was evil. Moreover, he seems to have been the first Muslim revivalist to lose the concept of Islam and the West as commonality for relative and, of course, antagonistic historical phenomenon. This antinomy, as is well-known, has since become quite standard in virtually all Islamic thinking.

Well, here I would distance myself to some extent from this presentation by Wilfred Cantwell Smith since, in the history of Muslims, we have what is called the "Khaldunian cycle." Ibn Khaldun, the medieval Muslim thinker, had presented the political dynamic within the Muslim context as being a kind of cycle through which some forces who remained on the periphery [of Muslim society] combined the idea of return to the purity of principles with the idea of the need of reforming the state of society, the decay of society. And they organized themselves in a way that enabled them to take the power from the center.

It is in this way that new dynasties following Ibn Khaldun have emerged in history; [in this way] the rotation of the political elites had been achieved. It seems to me that Al-Afghani and Mohammed Abduh and all the earlier reformism was, in a way, trapped in this view which had prevailed during the history of Muslims—that, in order to achieve reform, in order to achieve redress of the ills of society, one needed to go back to the purity of [Islamic] principle, [and] also to try to ignite popular mobilization, and to go back and to take the state from those who happen to have it.

So, this has been the [intellectual] current that has attracted the greatest attention from scholars and from the media. There were other voices from the Muslim world, which were saying very different things. Most of these thinkers [were] rejected at that time as being more or less traitors, those who didn't accept that the Islamic heritage was perfect and had an answer to everything.

Now, we are rediscovering some of them. One [such person] in my own country is Al-Hashwe [sp?], and someone has had the idea of going back and [recovering what he has to say]. He was a [inaudible] secretary of the [inaudible] and to the king at some point early in the 20th century, and he simply said, at that time, when was is happening or what has happened recently in Europe is of such importance, the revolution, industrial, intellectual, well, what happened is so important, and it has torn apart all the concepts, all the views, all the schemes that we are using, that we were using to understand the world. And we need to go to—put into question our own instruments of understanding of the (inaudible) world, our own tools, our own concepts, and invite Muslims and his fellow [inaudible]. His writings were—well, now they are rediscovered—*are* very, very interesting. But in his time, he was labeled as someone who was sold to the enemy and who didn't deserve to be listened to.

There were other voices like this. I think that, in some aspects, Sayeed Ahmed Khan (sp?) in the sub-[continent] had said something like what al-Hawse [sp?] said, and [subsequently] suffered a similar kind of rejection. Ali Abderraziq— I have translated his book [on the political foundations of Islam], first published in 1925—didn't say anything else. He tried to ask the question that Muslims and non-Muslims were raising, and to use the techniques, the approaches, the methods of modern historiography. So, to the question whether Islam was a religion of politics, he said let's go back to the scriptures, and he quoted all the verses in which one may find some allusion to politics, and he went to the Hadith and tried to identify a good selection. The Hadth literature is immense, but he made a good selection.

And at the end, he began to comment on the [selected Hadith,] and he found that there was nothing, absolutely nothing in all this. And then he had to face the problem: Why do we consider that the prophet has created a politics? Was it really a politics? Was the Prophet Mohammed a king or did he want to be a king? or did he want that his successors would be kings? And questions like this, and—well, again, to go back to this, [it is important] to go back to the idea that there were other voices.

It seems to me that, after the era of early reformism with al-Afghani [ed.] with Mohammed Abduh [ed.]—and also with those who narrowed the perspectives, like Mohammed Alshid Ariba, and all the fundamentalists that built on [this] narrowing—now, we have another way of thinking about these issues. We have new voices, and we have now—well, the earlier reformism tried to

find ways which would enable [the adaptation] of the traditional framework to modern conditions and, in doing this, for him, the concept of *ijtihad* was capital, had a very important role.

Now, with the new generation, which is building its works on the most recent scholarship, on the new traditions, we've been able to put into new perspectives these very frameworks that were linked to Islam. And I can mention a few names, but the the list is much longer than [I can say now]—Mohammed Arkoun is one of them; Abdul Karim Soroush is another; Padlorech Man on the subcontinent, Abda Najich Sharchvi, Mohammed Avid Dejabe—the list is very long. And I think that there is very, very important and very refreshing news in these [new intellectual] currents, which really attempt to approach things in different ways.

So, we have what we can call the "rarification"—this is a word from Cantwell Smith—rarification of all the idealization processes, and I have another quote here from Schulze about the idealization of Islam: "A characteristic of the newest Islamic policy to emerge was the ideological instrumentalization of Islam. Unlike the ulema, who thought of themselves as the custodians of theological, legal or mystical doctrines, Islamic intellectuals had developed Islam into a many-sided ideology in the strict sense. As an ideology, Islam no longer competed with other religions, especially Christianity and Judaism, but with secular views of the world. From that point of view, the answering of theological questions was merely Islam's secondary function. Islam was to be primarily a Unitarian, compact system of explanations and norms for society or for the nation. Hence, it was to describe both the historical development of the human community or nation and the Utopian aims of the historical development of mankind."

I will stop here—I have more in the paper, but I think this is enough for us. So, we have a process which has solidified, has crystallized Islam as an ideology, and if I can say, I find in this even some relevance of the Platonism that prevailed in pre-modern societies. The idea that Islam offers or provides a kind of "archetype"—this is a word used by historians of Platonism—a kind of model which stands above history, which stands above society, above politics, and which contains an answer to each and every question that may come to the mind.

I mentioned in the beginning the fact that there are books about Islam and genetic engineering—and there are so many of these kinds of writings. These authors think that [they can deal with the questions raised by modernity] just by going back to the tradition. They are not thinking. They are not inventing anything. They are just reading. It's like Platonic contemplation—they [believe] they can find in these teachings the exact saying, and even sometimes a modern science, and that we need not go further than reading these sources. So, there is this Platonic idea of an archetype—of a God-given social and political order, or blueprint of the good or the perfect society.

Well, it seems to me that, at the same time this process was building up, [there was also the] fact that, in the discussions [on the matter], we opposed [Islam and modernity]—we put Islam together with categories which are changing all the time—such as, well, civilian society, human rights, Europe, and so on. This solidifies and gives weight to attitudes in this matter, and makes things appear as if they were something that is—that [withstands] change, that is stable, *above* everything. And that when there are changes, [then all these transformations] are fashions.

Every day they will come up with a new word: They would say "civilian society," and then they will try to attract us to discuss something that they have invented or that may be relevant to their own societies, and just try to take us out of our own identity, our own history, our own brand and superb perfection.

So—this is a fact that attracted my attention: We have the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Well, the only religious community which tried to write alternatives, or alternative declarations of human rights, was the Muslim [community]. I'm not aware of a Christian declaration of human rights, or of a Jewish or a Buddhist declaration of human rights. But, there are at least two alternatives which have been attempted by some Muslims here and there rejecting the universal [declaration], and trying to bring out something new.

This leads me to the final part of my presentation, which [involves] questions that should weigh on our consciousness. On this subject of Islam and modernity, I would again raise the question of the role of theology, or the need for going back to theology. Do we need to go back to theology in this debate?

We are—and it is a fact—looking at religious traditions from the outside whether we are Muslims or non-Muslims, and this reminds me of a remarkable work done by Cantwell Smith. He has two articles [on the subject.]. In one of them, he reviews the writings, the early writings in the Muslim communities about all the subjects linked to society, and he finds that the word "Islam" does not even exist in the titles of the early writings. People who are dealing with law, with theology, with truth, with ethics and so on—[they] thought of Islam as one source among others.

But gradually, [Cantwell Smith] finds that the word "Islam" comes up as being the main source—then, *the only* source—of tradition. This is for the classical period. He also takes the discourses that have been, well, in circulation throughout the 20th century, and he finds that Islam is becoming gradually, but very stead[ily], very surely, a kind of divinity. And [Cantwell Smith] asks the question: Muslims [have been], to his knowledge, adoring God for sometime, but are they now adoring something else that they call "Islam"? This is a question by a theologian, and we may continue along this route.

My other question here is whether Platonism should still be a way of approaching religion—whether we still should keep with the idea that religions are something which are given out of history, and which should remain as [they are now] being discussed and thought of as being systems that stand beyond and above history—above society, above social change.

I would come to another set of questions. Here I will just enumerate a number of questions. [What] I said in my paper and my presentation—I don't consider them as stabilized. I will need to work more on them. So, I would come to another set of questions about the impact of the media in our societies. And one of the things that I think has a great influence on our perceptions and our attitudes and our behaviors is the fact that the media are with us and that they shape our views. Mohammed Arkoun, the well-known contemporary scholar, has written an article which will appear in *Prologues* and will be published in our issue next July-June.

Well, [Arkoun's article] says that the influence of the media is such that all the benefits that we can have from a sound, good education in history are outweighed by this, [and] that the media [teaches] us to live in a series of [continuos] flashes. We are taken by atrocities, events that happen—one or two days—and then we have to forget. And then, there are new events, and we are just go from one item to the other. It [inaudible/atomizes?]—if I can say, this is what Arkoun has said—our view of history. And instead of looking at things and putting things in the larger picture—instead also trying to think out of the box—we are kept under emotional impressions.

[The influence of] these—this continuous series of flashes —leads me to the following question. It's about education. Now, the media are more or less having this influence on this debate intellectually, on Islam and modernity, and all subjects linked to Islam because of what seems to me to be a very big deficit in education and policies. And this deficit is something of a big, big problem within Western societies and within Muslim societies, but with different consequences in the two contexts.

Within Western societies, it leads to some very biased views about the world, about other civilizations—and Arkoun asks, for example, whether we should still teach the history of France—(in France the history of France, in America the history of America, and so on)—because we are no [longer] living within these national entities, and we have to understand that we are now only [living] in multi-religious, multi-cultural society settings.

So, there is this big deficit of information. No information is given within educational curricula to the public about Muslims in the West. And this makes things easier for the media to have its important role—and also, to some point, to drive scholarly work, to drive research on these subjects. So, the big questions are asked by the media, and most scholars find themselves more or less compelled to react to the questions which are raised like this.

In the Muslim context, the deficit has, as I said, different and maybe more dangerous consequences. One of the choices that was made in the policies devised by modern states was to devaluate, or to push aside, education in the humanities. It was thought that what these countries needed for their development was a good education in medicine, in engineering, in all technical fields and so on. What was done is quite impressive, because I think the basic skills in these things are very well, as much as they can be within many Muslim societies. But the elimination of education in the humanities and the fact that these societies have gone very far from the concept of liberal education—of education not to train people to have some knowledge or some expertise in this or that, but also to be able to face new ideas, to question one's own ideas and views, and to respect the multiplicity, the diversity of views. All this has not been, in my opinion, well kept within educational programs in Muslim countries.

I already have mentioned the idealization—and, well, the switch to national languages, and the fact that this prevents the new generations from accessing what seems to be like the air that we breathe in these countries, what seems to be some of the basic cultural goods.

My following question is about what I call the "exclusion of the majority." I think that we may, and probably should, begin to ask ourselves about this exclusion. What is called now "poverty" in the World Bank jargon and so on, is not, to my knowledge or to my understanding,

comparable to poverty within Western societies. It happens that there are some marginal individuals in Western societies, or even communities. Poverty exists even in this country. But this is what we learn in the Muslim world: That even in the richest country, they have some people who are excluded and who are living very, very badly. But, it seems to me that it's very different. What is happening within Muslim societies—and not only in Muslim societies, I would like to stress that: if we look at the map, [economic exclusion of the majority] is something that happens in areas in which modern states have no means to cope. I have given the example of access to electricity. A very basic commodity like this can change completely the lives of people. But the case is that this exclusion is now a world phenomenon. It's not something that is circumscribed to one or to a few countries, to Muslims or to non-Muslims or whatsoever. It's a world phenomenon, and it seems to me that maybe it is time to raise the question at a world level.

It seems to me that we should be aware also that, for Tocqueville—and I was very happy that he was mentioned in the opening session as being someone who really understood something about the American society, I hope I'm not quoting badly what was said— but Tocqueville considered the fact that Americans found themselves in an environment where there was hope for the future, where there were [new] perspectives, where there was an open horizon, where it was possible to hope that tomorrow would bring better, greater prosperity than today. [This] was a major factor, was a major component in changing the attitudes of the people. Well, I would say that [in majority-exclusion] contexts, we have exactly the opposite.

The third question that we may need to ask ourselves is about the build-up of modern nations, and I happen to—well, a friend of mine sent me just a few days ago the unpublished paper by Francis Fukuyama, which is entitled "The Imperative Of State Building." This I think will be published in the *Journal of Democracy* in the issue for next June.

MR. PLATTNER: No, April.

MR. FILALI-ANSARY: April, that's good. So, from this paper, I would like to read the following quote: Fukuyama says that, "In 1900, state sectors in Western Europe and the United States generally consumed no more than 10 percent of annual gross domestic product, GDP. By the 1980s, that figure approached 50 percent and, in the case of social democratic Sweden, 70 percent." Well, in this article there's an opposition between the scope and the strength of state institutions. Maybe in this sentence, Fukuyama is inviting us—and he will confirm this—to think of a third dimension of the temporal.

The fact that states in Western societies didn't fall from the sky, [but] was constructed throughout a long and painful and difficult process in which there were many crises, many serious problems, and so on—and the fact that the share of the GDP now has gone from 10 to 50 percent—I should think that we should be aware that the GDP in the 1900s was a fraction of what it is nowadays, and so it was not just multiplied by five. Maybe it was multiplied by 50, I don't know, or even more.

So, in these countries, the state had to build itself in order to manage services—new services to the population in order to take all this share from the GDP and redistribute it in the form of

educational, health services and other things. And, through this process, it had to build a very strong, very complex set of institutions.

Well, in Muslim countries, nationalism began as it began in other settings—by stressing cultural homogeneity: the idea that we were all Arabs, so we need to be together in one Arab state, for example. But in fact, modern nations are not made only by this cultural homogeneity. In fact, these states are built by economic infrastructures, by roads, by schools, hospitals—and also by, if I can say, informal or symbolic infrastructures, the institutions that make the nation. And I think that, in most Muslim countries, the state which has been created has not had to face the needs of these populations—[and so these states] didn't have the time or they didn't have the possibility of developing its institutions to the point of becoming effective.

So, I think that if we go back to Tocqueville and his explanation of how democracy emerged in America, we can understand that none of these basic conditions are available. Yet democracy has become in very big demand and is now one big Utopia, as one may say, within Muslim societies. Now, the populations have converted [to the idea of democracy]. And a colleague of mine, a Moroccan philosopher, has said that democracy and human rights are now the implicit religion of humanity, because, even within Muslim societies, now all the populations seem to have converted to the ideals of democracy and human rights. We find ourselves again in this kind of paradox—[a paradox] which again doesn't seem to have any theological dimension, but which is real and very real in each and in most Muslim societies.

Thank you very much.

MR. PLATTNER: Thank you, and now we'll hear from our commentators. First, Asma Afsaruddin.

MR. ASMA AFSARUDDIN: Thank you, Mark. I just wanted to say right at the beginning that I based my comments largely on the written version of your paper, so I am going to be referring to certain things that you didn't exactly elaborate upon in the course of your oral presentation but which I will refer to, and I'll try to find the exact reference to it in your paper.

I really did enjoy reading and listening to Professor Filali-Ansary's nuanced and thoughtful presentation. I think it is absolutely crucial that we problematize right off the bat the monochromatic usage of broad terms like "Islam" and "modernity" with their different historical and cultural inflections, as he has done. I would assert, as he has, that it is absolutely vital that we not objectify and essentialize Islam and the various phenomenon it represents.

In the introductory class on Islam that I teach, usually every year, I try to impress on my students the point that Professor Filali-Ansary made so forcefully: that the term "Islam," at the very least, refers to both a religion, a system of beliefs, as well as to a civilization and certain societal and cultural processes, all of which tends to be collapsed into this one term. Sometimes, a light seems to go one in their heads at this point and illuminates for them the basic terminological disadvantage that we have in clearly signifying in different contexts what exactly we mean by the term "Islam."

The historian Marshall Hodgson—and you've already actually referred to this—was fully aware of this problem and came up with the neologism "Islamicate" culture, or civilization, to be distinguished from Islam as a religious tradition, but it never caught on on a broad scale. And once in a while, you'll open up a scholarly journal that's disseminated among maybe a handful of scholars and find this term but, for some reason, it never really entered public, even academic discourse in a big way.

Our consequent discourse of impoverishment then reflects to a considerable degree the imprecision with which we use and misuse this term. As Professor Filali-Ansary rightly emphasizes that—and this was in his written version—that it produces deep misunderstandings between interlocutors, even those who use the same idioms.

Modernity is another term that also gives rise to different sets of assumptions on the part of different interlocutors. Some of the ambiguity inherent in the term is reflected even in the description of our panel, which appears to have conflated modern with modernist, unless I am misunderstanding the purpose of the description and, therefore, modernity with modernism.

The people we choose to call "fundamentalists" or "radicals" or "militants" from whatever religious tradition are often times moderns with a vengeance—and this actually was referred to by Marc—especially when it comes to using for their ideological ends, state-of-the-art technology of the modern media, communications systems and transportation. Radical resurgent religious ideologies are in fact a product of the modern age. Modernity is a precondition for them. Radical Muslims, Christians and Jews, however, are, for the most part, not modernists.

Marshall Berman in his work, *All That Is Solid Melts Into Air: Experience In Modernity*, provides us with a useful distinction between being modern and being a modernist. Berman says, "To be modern is to experience personal and social life as a maelstrom, define one's world and one's self in perpetual disintegration and renewal, trouble and anguish, ambiguity and contradiction." In contrast, Berman further states, "To be a modernist is to make one seem somehow at home in the maelstrom, to make its rhythm one's own, to move within its currents in search of the forms of reality, of beauty, of freedom, of justice, that its fervid and perilous flow allows." It's a bit of purple prose there, but I think you get the drift of his meaning.

According to this distinction, religious radicalism is a manifestation of the vulnerability and insecurity that modernity inflicts on the individual. This does not result, however, in a wholesale rejection of modernity itself, but rather in a selected acquiescence to certain aspects of it which enhance the agendas of radical groups. This may even lead to attempts to construct an alternative vision or configuration of modernity. The modernist, on the other hand, seeks accommodation with modernity as it is usually defined and wishes to hermeneutically adapt to the changed circumstances ushered in by modernity.

This modernist project is anathema to religious radical groups since, from their viewpoint, such an enterprise represents capitulation to inauthentic norms and an illegitimate watering down of their pristine ideologies, as Professor Filali-Ansary alluded to. This is particularly true for the radical Islamist when modernity is conflated with Westernization and modernism thus comes to signify for them rapprochement with alien Western values.

One such aspect of modernity and an example of a Western value associated with it is secularism—and I'm going to refer to something that's in your written paper because it really struck a chord in me—and I kind of went off at great length [in my written response] on the importance of honing in on the concept of "secularization" and the fact that you do have a precursor of this, the modern form of secularization, in early Islamic thought, as you pointed out. "To this"—and I'm quoting from professor Filali-Ansary's paper—"To this, one can accept that some form of secularization not related to the modern one"—although I may argue that it gives us a base to work with and could be then expanded to be conflated with some of the modern aspects or understandings of secularization—"some form of secularization not related to the modern one did take place in the early history of Islam when—early eastern Muslims, when neither the well-guided Caliphate nor the authentic Imamate considered respectably by Sunnis and Shi'is as the legitimate claimers of political authority with keeping power."

And I think that's a very important statement. I'm going to expand on this. And again, I think keeping in tandem with your treatment of the terms "Islam" and "Modernity," you very nicely problematize this term and concept, and I think that must be done. Professor Filali-Ansary rightly notes secularism's pre-modern antecedent in Islamic thought, and its existence from the very beginning of Islamic history. So, I'm going to kind of elaborate on this a little bit more because I think it does have important implications for modern political thinking.

Interestingly, the modern Arabic word for "secularism" implies having to do with this world, while the Latin etymon for the word "secularism" has to do with age or time. In either case, the word is generally understood to refer to the profane space or realm as opposed to the sacred or sacrilized realm. In this sense, there is a clear recognition of secular, of profane space within Islamic religious, intellectual and, particularly, within political thought.

Even during the period of the rightly-guided Caliphs, I would argue, there was no notion of sacred or sacrilized politics—and this is something you referred to already—according to the early sources, although some of the later sources tend to re-troject back into this period some such notion. Apart from the broad injunction to maintain law and order and contain chaos, there is the religious prescription in Islam's foundational texts for any particular kind or form of government.

The Arabic word "fitna" is generally, and particularly in the political realm, understood to connote disorder and chaos. Disorder is to be prevented at all costs, for it militates against the peaceful, just and law-abiding society which the Koran envisions for humankind. Apart from espousing that disorder be contained and that believers must be continuously engaged in promoting what is right and forbidding what is wrong with a variety of means, the Koran and the Sunna—the Sunna here referring to the practices, customs and sayings of the Prophet—the Koran or the Sumna does not prescribe the establishment of any formal mechanism or governing body to achieve this end. The Koranic principle of "shura," meaning "consultation," does, however, advocate that decision-making in various spheres be consultative and collective.

As most of the historical sources inform us, the earliest Muslims perceived the need for a ruler, or a ruling council, in view of the rather dire circumstances immediately following the Prophet's

death. It is on record that some of the Ansar, or the Medinan converts, suggested that the Muslims choose one ruler from among them and another ruler from among the Muhajiroun, or the Meccan immigrants to Median. That such a suggestion could even be made at this time is a strong indication that these early Muslims knew of no clear scriptural or prophetic prescription for a particular form or mode of government.

The process of negotiation and debate that ensued is further testimony to the absence of specific instructions regarding succession to the Prophet. In fact, a number of Muslims in the formative period remained unconvinced that they needed a ruler or any form of government at all to contain disorder.

Among the *Mu'tazila*—the Mu'tazila were an early group of scholars and theologians from the second century of the Islamic era, or the eighth century of the Common Era, who were known for their partiality for speculative theology, and you sometimes see them referred to as the rationalists. Among the Mu'tazila, there were several individuals who thought that a Caliph was unnecessary as long as the Muslims adhered to the Koran and followed the example of the Prophet. Others subscribed to the opinion that more than one ruler, or even a ruling body, could just as effectively maintain law and order.

The diversity of opinions in the first three centuries of Islam on this topic is attested to by the rationalist theologian Abd al-Jabbar, who died in 1095, and he identifies for us three broad trends of thought in his time on the issue of the Caliphate. The first, a minority, hailed that the Caliphate was not necessary. The second believed that it was required on the basis of reason. And the third maintained that it was necessary according to the religious law. This range of thought testifies to the active engagement of many thinkers, but the critical issues of sound governments and socio-political administration, unfettered by an assumed religious mandate for a specific political institution—so maybe I sound a lot like Ali Abderraziq on this, but he was on very firm historical ground when he was pointing to the diversity of views on this topic in the early period.

By the fourth century of Islam, 10th century of the Common Era, a broad consensus in Arabic Ishmea (sp??) had developed among the scholars about the necessity of a ruler for the polity. It is this consensus, which had evolved through natural and deliberative historical processes, that ultimately and, somewhat ironically, conferred on the office of the Caliph the imprimatur of a religiously ordained institution. By this time, Muslims—or, more accurately, Muslim scholars—had developed the conviction that their consensus was reflective of the divine will. In other words, it was the rational and utilitarian necessity of providing for law and order which, in turn, was held to ensure the moral and material welfare of the polity, to lecture a consensus on the necessity of the Caliphate.

Once this consensus developed, an alternate situation no longer seemed politically viable or morally desirable. Does—the scholar (al Igi sp.?) maintained that popular consensus from the time of Abu Bakr, the first Caliph onwards, and social utility had established the necessity of the Caliphate while the famous theologian Al-Ashadi??? formulated the doctrine that this institution was a requirement of the religious law.

Part of the Islamist discourse today on the so-called Islamic state or government is predicated on the attribution of highly politicized meanings to key Koranic terms. In a study I recently completed, I've shown that Koranic terms like Ahmud (sp) and Hukum, which later became infused with primarily political meanings, were devoid of such significations in their earliest use. The neologisms Al-Hakemea (?/??) , which refers to divine sovereignty, and Al-Houkumal Islamia (????) , which can be translated "Islamic Government," a real buzzword in especially Islamic literature, were coined only in the 20th century and cannot claim an older pedigree despite blanket statements to the contrary made in Islamist literature.

In the early medieval literature, political administration or statecraft is termed a "siesa (sp) ," a non-Koranic Arabic term that referred to the temporal and worldly realm only. That is to what we would call today the secular realm. A siesa was often held to be beyond the purview of Islamic jurisprudence, fiqh, down to rather by its own set, worldly and pragmatic concerns. Such a delimitation testifies to the recognition in the medieval period of the bifurcation of the religious and political spheres and challenges the truism that religion and politics are inseparable in Islam.

The Sharia, in fact, is largely apolitical. The Koran, to be sure, emphasizes God's suzerainty and lordship over all creation. As His created beings and vicigerants on earth, humans owe their obedience to Him. However, they have a choice, unlike other created beings. In the realm of earthly existence, the Koran accords much freedom to human beings in determining the course of socio-political affairs within the broad parameters of the moral and social objectives of the revealed law, and this principle was recognized in an important genre of legal works composed under the rubric of *Makaset A'Sharia (sp*) , translated as "the objectives of the religious law."

Freedom of determination contingent upon righteous conduct and safeguarding of the well-being of the polity is most apparent then in the political realm. Thus, each of the four immediate successors to the Prophet was selected in a different way, and each adopted a number of distinctive policies in response to their specific historical circumstances without invoking a supposedly revealed blueprint for political administration. Well, I'm going to have to skip over a few things. Let me see what I can give away.

Some of the later juries would, however, become quite concerned with the minutiae of political conduct and compose manuals detailing the rights and obligations of the ruler and the ruled. But many of these prescriptive manuals clearly draw on non-Islamic sources in propounding theories of statecraft, drawing, for example, on pre-Islamic era precedence and relying on secular administrative literature, such as the Persian Prince of Maris (sp) genre.

I also wholeheartedly agree with Professor Filali-Ansary that the origins of the opposition to modernization processes with this underpinning of secularism then should not be sought within the realm of religious doctrines, and this was a statement you made in your written version. It is more fruitful, as he shows, to focus on the specific historical processes that have abetted resistance to modernization in various ways, and to focus on the specific socio-political and economic contexts in which discontent with modernity has been, and continues to be, articulated.

In conclusion, I want to hone in on the perceptive remarks made by Professor Filali-Ansary concerning the importance of education for both Muslims and non-Muslims regarding the

trajectories of Islamic religious, political and intellectual thought through the ages, and which have a bearing now on our conversations about the present and future. Despite the vast explosion of information on our contemporary period, despite the most advanced technology that produces knowledge and makes it available to us at a moment's notice, there is very little genuine education going on, especially from a humanistic perspective, and I think this is a real problem in the Islamic world and the Third World, in general.

Most Muslims are out of touch with their intellectual and ideational heritage, and most non-Muslims have, at best, a superficial and skewed knowledge of it. In the West, as Professor Filali-Ansary points out, it is the media that determines to a considerable extent how Islam is to be produced and packaged in powerful sound bites.

On the other hand, most Muslims, as Professor Filali-Ansary points out, no longer have access to the written records of classic Islamic intellectual thought and tend to emotively relate to Islam as primarily a transcendent and basically closed religious system. The dissonance this has produced and continues to produce in a considerable number of Muslims is sharply evident today. But the eclectic nature of the pre-Islamic intellectual and political tradition, as I briefly indicated and as Professor Filali-Ansary pointed to, augers well for the present and future, pointing the way to a similar creative and innovative engagement on the part of Muslims with the challenges of modernity today. Thank you.

MR. PLATTNER: Thank you very much, Asma, and now we'll hear from Francis Fukuyama.

MR. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA: Okay, thank you very much. I also very much liked Professor Filali-Ansary's paper.

I could summarize it in a series of about six propositions quickly, [all of] which I think I agree with completely. First is that Islam is not one thing, as we've just heard. Second, modernity is not simply one thing, which we've also just heard elaborated. Three, there has been de facto modernization within Islamic societies that is ongoing and seems to be quite desired by people. I would add one gloss to this.

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) produced two reports on Arab human development in the past couple of years. One empirical fact that I drew from them that I think is actually pretty striking, they did a survey across all Arab countries in which they asked the question: "Would you want to immigrate to the United States if you had an opportunity?" And in every single Arab country there was a majority of respondents that said "yes," so that it does seem to me that, if you look at it from the broad mass of popular opinion in these countries, there cannot possibly be this deep-seated hostility or hatred of modernity if this kind of thing is, indeed, a fact.

Fourth proposition would be that there was an initial Muslim intellectual response from people like Afghani and Abduh that, in a sense, understood the challenge of modernity and sought an essentially conservative response. I'd say there's also a political response in the form of Attaturk and Reza Shah that tried to deal with it on a more practical level. But fifth, you had—and this

was something that Professor Ayoob and other people yesterday spoke of— an attempt to turn Islam into an ideology that would contest other ideologies like fascism and communism.

And I think, if you look at the way people like [Ladan and Roya] Bouroumand in a paper in the *Journal of Democracy* or Olivia Wang or other people that have written about Islamism have described it, they've actually borrowed a great deal from modern extremist movements of the right and the left to create a doctrine that is not Islam, it is basically an ideology—modern political ideology that uses Islamic terms but really has to be seen as primarily political rather than religious—and *that's* really what the fight today is over.

And then, the sixth proposition is that we've now gotten ourselves locked into a false understanding of a necessary conflict between Islam and modernity based on this misunderstanding, or this inappropriate identification, of this ideology as somehow of being representative of the essence of Islam. This was fed by media oversimplifications, it's fed by the lack of education and knowledge on the part of both western people and people in the Muslim world, and that's where we're stuck today. And so, I think that's all completely right.

Now, let me give you a little bit more of my take on this. I agree particularly with the point that was made on page six of Professor Filali-Ansary's paper where he says, "Opposition to modernization processes should not be sought within the realm of religious doctrine." Let me elaborate on this—and again, this is not, on my part, based on any deep knowledge of Islam. I regard myself primarily as a comparativist. But if you look comparatively at other large cultural systems, like Christianity or Confucianism or Islam or Hinduism, it does seem to me that there's some generalizations that you can make with them.

Speaking of this one question, I think Professor Filali-Ansary used the term "Platonism." I would perhaps use the word "essence." The question is: Doesn't religion have an essence that somehow remains constant and transmitted over generations and centuries that somehow remains inviolate? Well, I think, on one level, probably yes. There are certain core teachings that every religious doctrine has, but a lot of times its very hard to know what that is because many things that people take to be core doctrines in fact get modified and interpreted over time, and I think all of these cultural systems, therefore, over the centuries being extremely flexible.

I'll just give you several examples of this. Separation of religion and politics—we've heard from both of the prior speakers about how this is not clearly established in the Islamic tradition, but where we say in the West we think that's part of our tradition, that wasn't the case at the end of the Middle Ages. I mean, you had two centuries of religious warfare in which every prince in Europe tried to establish the religious confession of his people. And, in a sense, modern liberalism grew out of this huge fight between Protestants and Catholics and various sects of the two over the intermixing of religion and politics. Modern liberalism, in some sense, is simply saying, "Look, this is too dangerous to have this fight, and so let's establish politics on a different basis where we exclude religion." And so, even in the Western tradition, that separation was not a clear one.

[Take, for example] a doctrine like slavery. Christianity has been used both to justify slavery and to attack it. My favorite example is one that Marc Plattner will remember. In the early

1990s, Lee Kwan Yew in Singapore started talking all this nonsense about Confucianism and authoritarianism and how there's no support within the Confucian tradition for democracy. So—I guess it was about in 1996 or '97, after Lee Teng-Hui had been elected President in Taiwan—that he invited the National Endowment for Democracy to have a big kind of coming out party for Taiwanese democracy, and he went and talked to his Confucian experts at Princeton and Harvard and places like that and said, "You find me something in the Confucian tradition that supports democracy." And sure enough, they came up with analects in Confucius that said that you should consult the people and be respectful of them and so forth, and so he said, "Look, Lee Kwon Yew is wrong about this. In fact, there's plenty of support." So, these things do get interpreted.

Now, I would say that the real question is—the real comparative question is the speed and the dynamics of the confrontation with modernity, because I think that we can make the case that the Muslim world has been slower and more resistant to dealing with this, but that, essentially, the interaction has not been fundamentally different.

All traditional societies—and I would include European traditional society—have engaged in violent confrontations with this thing called modernity, and it's been a long struggle. What happens is that, when you see the power of modernity, you are both repelled but also attracted to it, and it produces a counter-reaction, often times highly ideological, often times very violent. In Western Europe, that was the Counter-Reformation, really.

And in fact, it's interesting: In the Weber debate, a lot of people have argued I think quite persuasively that all of the anti-modern things we associate with Catholicism in Europe actually are products of the Counter-Reformation. They're not deeply embedded in Catholic doctrine at the end of the Middle Ages. It was very latitudinarian and, in a certain way, pluralistic. But, this kind of hard opposition created a sort of ideology—an anti-modern ideology, which was really a reaction to the Protestant Reformation and which, in certain ways was a kind of precedent for this ideologization of Islam that we see on the part of the Islamists.

In Japan and China, other modernizing societies, you also had efforts to selectively appropriate some of modernity. So what happened if Commodore Perry shows up in Tokyo Bay with these black ships? The Japanese say, "Whoa, this is really powerful stuff. We'd better figure out what they've got that we don't have." But they tried to compromise. They tried to get the technology and some of the institutions, but they said, "Well, we want Western technology but [also] the Japanese spirit underneath this." But there's a fundamental rejection of certain key elements of that modern—that modern set of institutions. And it, again, leads to this very violent rejection in many ways of Western dominance and of certain kinds of Western cultural values—which ultimately, in Japan's case, culminated in the Pacific War.

So then, they get hit on the head again and they say, "Whoa, that really is powerful. We now realize after a century of modernization that we still haven't gotten it." And then, they go back to the drawing board and they say, "Well, what have they got that we don't have," and gradually there's this very grudging acceptance over time that it's not just the technology and it's not just centralized government and bureaucracy and educational system, but they have to have other

things, like personal freedom and so forth. And I would say in Japan that's still probably an ongoing struggle.

In other parts of East Asia that I think have modernized much more successfully than the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa and other parts of the world, you have the same struggle. The Chinese have had numerous backlash movements. In a way, Maoism could be seen as a certain kind of anti-Western backlash movement that was just as totalitarian and insane as anything that the Islamists had produced. In Cambodia under Pol Pot, you had this backlash movement—radicals would kill people simply for wearing eyeglasses because it was somehow a non-Cambodian, Western intrusion on their—whatever they believed to be their culture. And so, this kind of phenomenon I think really is quite common.

So, as I see it, the real difference has to do with the speed and the thoroughgoingness of the kinds of adaptations that these societies make in confronting this very powerful thing, and I think we could make the argument that east Asia did better because the adjustment was quicker. There wasn't this idea that their traditional culture was this perfect thing that—and so that the fundamental impulse was basically a kind of conservative or even reactionary one. I don't know. I mean, this is something I think we need to think further about because I'm not really sure what the origins of it was.

It could be that, in East Asia, because we did not have monotheism, it was really easier to accommodate different traditions and different aspects of culture than in a very all-embracing, monotheistic civilization like that of Islam. But, I do think that it's very important to keep in mind that there really are these diverse traditions in all of these civilizations, and it's an ongoing and dynamic process. And I suspect—[when], as I think everyone expects, the current regime in Iran falls—you're going to get probably a big explosion of thinking and practice of a much more liberal form of society in an Islamic country.

Now, the final thing I'd like to say has to do with the non-religious sources of opposition to modernity in Muslim countries. It's a little bit strange that we keep talking about Islam and modernization as if Islam is the only thing that slows down modernization in that part of the world, because we don't—well actually, there was a time when you'd have these conferences on Confucianism and modernization where people would say that it's this ethical doctrine that's really the big obstacle to modernization. Today, we realize that that's a bunch of baloney because, in fact, it was bad politics and the legacy of colonialism and a lot of other things that had nothing to do with the cultural characteristics of that part of the world.

And in particular, if you look at the Muslim world, it seems to me there are plenty of things that are obstacles to de facto modernization that had nothing to do with religion. Again, the *Journal of Democracy* a couple of issues ago published this really interesting article by Alfred Stepan on the supposed Muslim democracy deficit, and what he said basically was it's not a Muslim democracy deficit, it's an Arab democracy deficit. If you look around the Muslim world, there are actually quite a few examples of countries that are both economically modernizing and are democratizing politically: Mali, Senegal, Turkey, Malaysia, Indonesia, and so forth. The real deficit, the statistical deficit, really is in Arab countries, which makes one think that the real problem has to do something with Arab political culture and less of the religion Islam itself.

I'll give you one suggestion about what might be part of [these] non-religious sources of the difficulty in this transition to modernity, which has to do with kinship systems. And actually, Abdulwahab Alkebsi and I had a long talk about this, and I actually learned a lot at the dinner last night about the survival of tribalism in Arab countries.

But, there's a very interesting theory that has been out there for the last 10, 20 years about the role of kinship in the modernization of the West. It used to be that everybody believed—I mean, early modernization theory [proposed]—that everybody in some mythical time in the past lived in these big, extended kinship groups, and that the nuclear family was a byproduct of industrialization in the West. And as a result of people like Peter Haslett and John Hodgnall (sp) and the so-called "new family historians," it has been recognized now that the nuclear family actually predated the Industrial Revolution.

By their account it was by four or five centuries, and that the nuclear family, rather than being the result of modernization, actually was one of its at least contributing causes because the ability of people to free themselves from obligations through large, extended families, clans, tribes, other kinds of groups like that, permitted a kind of economic individualism in the delegation of family fortunes and the movement of property, personal property, and the like.

And in fact, Deepak Lall (sp) has this theory that it actually goes all the way back to Pope Gregory in the ninth century who issued an edict basically claiming on behalf of the Catholic Church the inheritances of girls that were either women that were widows or girls that died without ever being married. And, in fact, the Catholic Church increased its share of total wealth in France by about 15 percent over the generation after this edict, which meant the creation—actually, that was the money that eventually got into the public sector in western Europe. But, the point is that there was a basic change in the kinship systems that occurred in that part of the country that was very conducive to economic modernization, which then took off after the Reformation for a lot of other political and other kinds of reasons.

In many Muslim countries, that has not happened. And I would say that tribalism in the Arab world, or the existence of these very large, corporate entities in a—let's say in a country—well, a country like Pakistan has got tribes in the Northwest frontier. In Singh and Punjab, the problem is much more these very hierarchical kinds of clan systems where all of the wealth is locked up in these extended family systems. It's very hierarchical, quasi-feudal, and it is a real obstacle to both democracy and to the economic modernization, and these kinship systems are not religiously based. They don't really have anything to do with religion. They're just out there.

It's also going to be an interesting issue having to do with the assimilation of different immigrant communities in the West because one of the ways that these kinship systems reproduce themselves over generations is by their ability to control the sexuality of their female offspring. And so, I think that one of the things that's been very powerful in the cultural systems in Muslim countries has been the ability of these kinship systems to perpetuate themselves. I think the headscarf is—it's not intentional, but I think it has the effect of controlling the sexuality of daughters. And practices like cousin marriage, which again have nothing to do with Islam, are very much geared towards the transmission of certain kinds of cultural values across generations.

And so, I think, if there is a problem with the assimilation of Muslim immigrants in Western Europe or in other Western societies, it really has to do much more with the survival of those kinds of social practices rather than anything having to do with religion.

So, thank you.

MR. PLATTNER: Thank you.

MR. FILALI-ANSARY: Thank you, Marc.

Well, I think that I was right not to [finalize] my paper over here, as I said, because there's so much that has been added by my two friends that I would like to take account of in rewriting of the paper.

I would like to come back to just two issues that were raised and which, I think, may need some further consideration. One of them is the secularization in pre-modern Muslim societies, and I think it is important to take stock of the latest scholarship—the latest historical work, the latest works on the history of Muslims—and to look at it not in ideological terms—in what is imposed on us nowadays—but [rather], to look at the sources, at the writing and at how things happened.

And yes, one of the main things that was brought to our awareness by the recent scholarship is the fact that, immediately after the death of the Prophet, there were debates among Muslims. It was not necessarily—even the very idea of creating a Muslim polity was the subject of debate, and Shaykh Kabbani was mentioning yesterday that there were three parties immediately.

But I would—I have suggested that there were in fact four because, among those who had been rejected as apostates, there were some who were, if I can say, proto-secularists who said that they would prefer to remain Muslims without contributing to the buildup of the Muslim polity, and they were executed. And we now know that, among the closed inner circle of the companions of the Prophets, there were debates about whether it was legitimate to put to death these people as apostates, whether An-Omar in the second Caliph were, as we know, to have said no, it was a big mistake. We should have accepted that part of the Muslims could go away and not come with us. Indeed, in fact, that was an Arab, which was not Arab in later history. So, I think it is very important that, in all these discussions, we take account of what is brought to us by the latest in scholarship.

Well, I think that Professor Fukuyama has brought so much to this discussion, it's made—I won't react to each and everything, although there is a lot of matter for discussion. I would just go directly to something that seems to me needs to be questioned. It's what I would call the singling out of the Arab world.

There was a UNDP report on the Arab world. I'm not aware whether there were similar reports on other parts of the world, but only the Muslim world. I'm not aware whether there is a UNDP report about sub-Sahara Africa. I would understand that it is important at some point to focus on

some areas in which problems are more intense or more difficult than elsewhere and try to understand.

But it seems to me that it really [is] something that needs to be questioned: Why singling out in this continuum. What I see is that we may need to think more in terms of geography than in terms of history or culture. When we look at these issues, these problems of development, democratization and so on, I think looking at the map in different ways brings so much information and has to be taken into account again as a means [to achieve a] much more serious of understanding what happens in these parts of the world.

That's all for me.

MR. PLATTNER: Thank you.

Now, let's take questions. I had a couple of requests before, so we'll take Charles and Hillel and Mohammed, Bob Blake, and then I'll take more. So, let's start with Charles Fairbanks.

MR. CHARLES FAIRBANKS: This is for Mr. Filali-Ansary's argument—I thought the importance of exclusion from modernity was a very persuasive and nuanced argument. But I don't know whether, because of specific places that I'm familiar with, I would tend to lay more emphasis on particularly Wahhabi ideology as a means of being modern. [For example] if you join one of the Wahhabi groups of fighters in Chechnya, it's a way of not having to give flamboyant hospitality to people, not having to support your extended family, and so forth.

And it seems to me that that Salafism or Wahhabism today functions to a great degree as an ideology like early Protestantism that strips away cultural characteristics that make it difficult to participate in the modern society and economy while, at the same time, maintaining certain crucial markers of identity. And other people like Olivier Roy have argued this. I wonder, do you think that's wrong or just incomplete?

MR. FILALI-ANSARY: Yes. Well, what I tried to say was to stress not the exclusion from modernity, but rather the exclusion from the markets and the region. It's exclusion from the markets of material and symbolic goods, which is for me something so important that it bears on all the other aspects of political, cultural life in these countries.

Now, for the Wahhabi ideology: what I know about it is that it was born in early 18th century at a time and in a place which was, as you have written, very much isolated from the rest of the world, and it seems to me rather in its origins—not in the users that have been—that come—that came later, but at its origins to be rather liable to Khaldunian explanations. And the Khaldunian explanations bring some of the best insight into how the pre-modern Muslim societies—societies in this area of the world, I would prefer that, between some two parallels on the map—have been functioning, [including how] the political rotation, the rotation of the elites—has happened in these contexts.

And the main idea there is that all the wealth in this area was produced and accumulated in urban centers which were not able to defend themselves from the tribal environment. So, the

temptation was all the time very great for the tribes around the city to take the urban centers and to erect political powers, or political systems of power, which could take all the main resources that were brought by the activities within urban centers. And so—well, all the wealth was produced in the city. The military and political might was in the tribes, and so there was this cycle. And the tribes—in order to take the power or the competition between tribes—used religious language.

Yesterday, it was said again and again that there was probably no political theory in Muslim societies, to which I would simply say that we are maybe looking for political theory in a place where it doesn't exist—in the wrong place, if I can say. Maybe that— political theories flourished, but in a language, with a vocabulary which is not the vocabulary of contemporary politics. There is a book by Bernard Lewis entitled, *The Political Language of Islam.*

Jabri (sp.), the Moroccan philosopher that I was mentioning, stresses that the big fact about political thinking and acting in the history of Muslims was that it adopted the language and the symbols and vocabulary of religion. But it was understood as not being really a theological debate by the actors themselves: They were using a language. And knowing that they were using it in specific ways, we have a huge number of titles and words about politics within these societies, but in specific vocabulary.

So, to come back to the Wahhabi thing: I would say that Wahhabism is maybe liable to the Khaldunian cycle. The kind of thing that the Wahhabi's said at the beginning were [also] said by the Almohads in the Mahgreb centuries. It's always the idea of the purification, of the return to the norm—and that, in order to bring society back to the norm, one had to use the arm of the state. One had to take the Caliphate and the army and impose going back to the norm.

So, that was in the beginning. Now, in the latest decades with the income from oil and so on—and the fact that Saudis were the ones who could help build mosques and these religious centers— maybe, and of this I'm not sure, maybe [they] have helped to disseminate some views about Islam and contributed to the rarefication that we have been discussing. But, I would rather make a clear distinction between pre-modern societies, rather liable to the Khaldunian system, and modern societies which have broken this cycle, if I can say, and have been taken into other forms of systemic development.

MR. PLATTNER: Thank you.

Next, Hillel Fradkin?

MR. HILLEL FRADKIN: Hi, Hillel Fradkin of [the Center for Islam, Democracy, and the Future of the Muslim World]. I first want to say that I felt the discussions were extremely impressive and helpful.

I do have a question, but first I'll just make an observation, and invite a discussion from all three panelists. And that is: as [Abdou Filali-Ansary] pointed out there, the Wahhabi movement does resemble many earlier movements, and it can be understood in Khaldunian terms. There's the factor of urban wealth and tribal military power, which creates motive and opportunity.

But, [the Wahhabi movement is driven] mostly by the sense that urban life is decadent and corrupt. And so, all of these movements justify themselves not in terms of getting power or wealth, but in terms of some event of ethical purification. And I wonder whether—considering what you said about urbanization and what Frank said: to the degree to which that persists in the reaction to modernization or Westernization, how it might bear on the future struggle, especially in light of the point that Frank brought up about the degree to which sexual freedom is tremendously important in contemporary tensions [between] Muslim societies and modern societies.

The question I have goes like this: As you well know, Islamic civilization, if I may use that term, or civilizations, are typically praised for having recovered Greek antiquity and having transmitted it to the West where it is understood to have been some kind of blessing in it the Renaissance, where we've heard that it's with (inaudible) republican and democratic thought.

But, it sounds as if what you said this morning, and this is directed both to Abdou as well as to Asma, that the West got the blessing, and the Islamic world got the curse in the form of persistence of (inaudible) respect, and I was wondering whether that might be fair to say.

MR. FILALI-ANSARY: Yes. Well, about the indication of a moral order [concerning sexuality]—I think it is a very important remark, that it's a fact. There is a kind of moral attitude and a feeling of what is called the Western moral decay. It's something—it's an argument that keeps [being] brought by Islamists, and seems to have an impact.

And here—if I may return to the idea of the influence of the media—I would compare the effect to when someone looks at a movie but without listening to the sound. When someone just sees people gesturing and moving around, this is what seems to happen, the kind of misunderstanding with this spread of the television and mass media. This is something that may be troubling to us, and they need from us some further research or further consideration.

It seems that, in most Muslim societies, women oppose some forms of liberation much more than the men. It's not a fact of men opposing women. What happens—and I have witnessed this in many cases in the debates—it's not the men who are trying to keep authority. But it happens very, very frequently. In my country, it was very striking that, on the same day, there were two demonstrations—one in favor and one against the reform of family law.

The one in Rabat, which was in favor, had some 100,000 people in it. The one which was in Casablanca, which was against, had maybe between five to 10 times more people. Most of them were women. So there is, I think—here you have to come back to the idea of perception, of how people breed their perceptions of themselves and of the other—how they see the West.

And the idea of moral decay in the West has a great influence, has great grip. And just the fact [of bringing] everything European and American under one category—the West—well, it makes people, if I can say, blind to the diversity of culture in the West: the individual makes his or her choice, and that we have all kinds of behaviors and so on. Even our scales by which we measure

or we make judgments become a matter of choice for individuals. So, I think that there's here a matter for further research. .

About the transmission of the Greek heritage: well, the fact that the West would have taken the good parts of it… maybe I don't know what. For me, something that needs also to be taken into account is the kind of influence of Platonism and Aristotleism in Muslim thought, and their durable impact.

Let me just signal one example. I had once a few years ago an article by a Western philosopher about economics in Aristotelian thought, and it was clearly an article by someone who had absolutely no idea about Muslim perceptions or traditions, and so on. But, reading the article, I was very startled: It was exactly what the Islamists say [about] the Islamic theory of economics. So, in fact, what has been more or less the impact of Aristotelianism in [Muslim] society at some time in history has been, more or less, adopted within these intellectual circles, and has been transmitted and keeps being transmitted.

One needs to go out of this cultural arena to look at things from outside—to look at the sources, to look at how Aristotle has been received in different contexts, to understand that, well, it is some kind of Aristotelianism. And I insist Platonism is also somewhere part of these traditions.

Now, there is, what I attempted to describe as a new wave of scholarship, which happens not to be offered only by Muslims. It's Muslims and non-Muslims. Muslim traditions no more belong only to Muslims, and this is a fact of history. And this new knowledge gives us the means and the tools to put things in their right place—to understand that, for example, all this ideology of Islamic economics, Islamic banking and so on is built on assumptions that were adopted at some moment when Aristotelianism was the last word and understanding science and so on, and that Aristotelianism is no more the only possible foundation for understanding these matters.

MS. AFSARUDDIN: Well, I actually don't have that much to add, but just to emphasize what you just said in terms of the continuity of the influence of Greek antiquity in Islamic thought. Past the early Abassid period when it was in its full floret, I mean, even someone like al-Ashari, who had this really virulent reaction to especially Greek rationalist thought as evidenced in Mu'tazila thinking, even he continued to use the terminology that had been developed by them and that was predicated on the dialectical process and in Jedel (sp) and Samporit (sp), and continuous within the al-Ashari tradition.

It becomes Islamicized-icing to the point where it's no longer recognized necessarily as being of Greek providence, but it maintains its continuity, as you pointed out. It resurfaces in unusual places. And it is by careful scholarship, I think, that we can trace this continuity and attest to its vitality in some respect in current Islamic thinking as well.

MR. PLATTNER: Thank you.

Okay, look, our time is really running short. I have four other people on my list. I'll ask them each to quickly give a brief question or comment, and then we'll have the panel respond. So, it's Mohammed Ayoob, then Bob Blake and Timur Kocaoglu, and then Dick Zinman.

MR. MOHAMMED AYOOB: Couple of quick points, one about Professor Filali-Ansary's paper. It's an excellent paper. There's emphasis in one portion of the paper on the concept of exclusion really estimated a lot of thought (inaudible). And as you have described it, exclusion is not really exclusion from material goods but also from political participation. And I was wondering, continuing with some of the thoughts that I presented yesterday, if one can reverse this process and make political systems in the Muslim world much more inclusive, would that take much of the scheme out of the Islamist states? That's the one question.

The second and related one is that this exclusion at the political level takes place not only within polities but in the international political realm, as well, where Muslim elites in particular find themselves—those particularly with a degree of historical consciousness—find themselves politically impotent. And this they find very galling because, unlike other colonized peoples whose attraction with the West came only when the West was powerful—the attraction of Islamdom with Christendom—that attraction had a 1,000-year phase where, in Eastern and Muslim perceptions, Islamdom was superior both in terms of matters civil and military.

And then, one very quick point about Francis Fukuyama, which I've actually shared it with him: the reference to our political culture as an exploratory barrier, which I think Professor Filali-Ansary also mentioned, I just finished a paper [on that subject]. It's part of a project at CSIS on Muslim (inaudible) democracy, and I was looking particularly at the Middle East for democratic record. And it is true that, statistically, it is significant that it's the Arab world where this (inaudible) is concentrated. But, I just wanted to challenge the notion that it is the Arab political culture that's the (inaudible) care.

There are two or three other much more important variables, which I came up with because, if you look—again to put the Arab democratic record in proper historical perspective—during the first half of this century, at least not till the end of the Second World War, there was a brutal liberal democratic trend—maybe it was **Rey Kuhlani (sp)** who realized this—that was pretty strong, or becoming strong in the Arab, then that (inaudible) gets you (inaudible) .

And what happens there I think there are two or three very good variables. One, the golden (inaudible) . This is extremely important to the Arab world going up (inaudible) . The involvement of the external (inaudible) back in (inaudible) regimes that led to the asphyxiation of that liberal democratic trend. The other is the question of oil, which contributes to it. And finally, the Arab-Israeli conflict, which allowed to demagogic or (inaudible) the Arab world, so to take the public platform and hijack the (inaudible) source. And all that together really explains all that.

MR. PLATTNER: Thank you.

Bob Blake?

MR. BOB BLAKE: In the preface to this session, it says, "Does Islam need to undergo a reformation or enlightenment similar to that experienced by Christianity in the West?" I think that neither of those is very appropriate. The Reformation seems to be what the radical

Islamicists want—and enlightenment, at least something (inaudible) enlightenment early into the millennium.

But, the period between the Reformation and the Enlightenment that Frank Fukuyama described as a war in which the two parties got so exhausted—that period seems to me to be a more useful one not because they got exhausted, but because [the result was] a positive tradition of religious toleration. The world, the Dutch Republics, in parts of France, England, among thinkers like Castellio and Grotius and John Milton and John Locke and (inaudible) and leading to Voltaire—a lot of their thinking gave rise to secular or separation of religious and political regimes in England, eventually in France, in America.

And I'm wondering—well, and John's good will (inaudible) both talked about the creative and necessary thinker to democratization. I wondered whether what's going on in Iraq—with al-Sistani accepting a transitional law which allows Muslims to actually revert to Judaism and convert to Christianity—[whether] that may be one example. Are there other examples of the idea of religious toleration—not democracy (inaudible), which I think necessarily precedes it—religious toleration leading to freedom of [conscience] and leading maybe to a modern outlook on the world? Has anything like that developed in the Muslim world?

MR. PLATTNER: Thank you. Timur?

Mr. TIMUR KOCAOGLU: Timur Kocaoglu, [from the] University of Istanbul, and Professor of Political Science. Mr. Filali-Ansary, I do (inaudible) some of these concepts about being Islam. But, I was wondering (inaudible) one point, which is that (inaudible) and clear some of the—these concepts both Euro-centric and West-concentric point of view. You come up with an Arab-centric point of view.

This—your paper raises that because all the examples that you give about the modernization process is exclusively about the (inaudible) , and the truth, which will (inaudible) it was not intentionally about (inaudible) , but it excludes (inaudible) , which was much earlier than the Arabic (inaudible) and the earliest conflict in the mid-18th century, and all the Arabic (inaudible) in Istanbul, in Barta (sp) or Iran, Italy, (inaudible) . But only reference that you quote from the—your (inaudible) aren't exclusively Arabic, (inaudible) , and this exclude the (inaudible) who were much earlier, as (inaudible) some of that in Arabic, in the (inaudible) region in the (inaudible) central Asia (inaudible) like the Qatars or (inaudible) .

But you do exclude all the references to them, and especially those (inaudible) excuses that we know (inaudible) later in the (inaudible) , that we have a wide range, which (inaudible) . So, your (inaudible) your paper (inaudible) in Iraq, even that you will (inaudible) a British India for the Muslim renovations happening. So what I—maybe I brought that in your paper. In last paper, you won't bring (inaudible) an Arab-centric point of view, but it brought the Islamic-centered point of view.

MR. PLATTNER: Okay. I'm afraid now we really do have to give our speakers a chance to respond. I'm afraid we won't get more questions in this session, but perhaps some of them can carry over to the afternoon.

MR. FILALI-ANSARY: Yes, thank you.

Well, I'll begin with the latest remarks made by my friend from Turkey—and I agree with you 100 percent, it is true. And this leads me to come back to something (inaudible) said about (inaudible) in his paper, the idea that Muslims have become the object of history rather than being subject.

In fact, there were in the history of other lands than Arab, other types of interactions in the sub-continent and so on, which we don't know enough of. And [as to] the Arab centralism—it is, and as I said just before, even the World Bank is making this assumption. Marc had the interesting observation in the beginning about the emphasis we put on Muslim *civilizations* in the Institute [that I direct now]— It is intended to try to go beyond [the idea that Islam is just one monolithic culture]—and this is very, very important point. I fully agree with you, and thank you very much to have brought it.

[To] Professor Ayoob—you spoke about the possibilities of a further inclusion [in Muslim societies]. This is maybe something to work on for the future. One can begin from the basic [observation] maybe that Islamists have been much more aggressive and much stronger where the political system has been closed to participation for the longest periods. In Iran, the [Islamist] reaction was so strong under Khomeini because, of the [exclusion] under the Shah—and what is incredible now, as Professor Fukuyama was mentioning, the evolution of kingships in Iran.

That kingship had chosen to be one party, which is one of the most absurd, if I can say, forms [of political organization] that appeared in history: a king who chooses to have only one party in the country and to impose the totalitarian approach, even if it were liberal. So, we had, more or less, the reaction, and we have the proof, I think, in the cases that were mentioned—also in the article by Stepan—that I *wouldn't* say that it is because there is an Arab culture.

But in some contexts, it has been possible to have less exclusion—or probably a little more inclusion of different parts of the population. [As a result] it was possible then to move easier to some democratic forums. I don't know whether we should use this concept of exclusion to explain the fact that some elites in the Muslim world have been more or less either rejected by dominant forces within the Muslim world or been marginalized by the media coverage.

The coverage by the media, and especially in Western media, has been such that, in a way, the leaders have been appointed by television stations in the West. When I remember the discussions about the book by Salman Rushdie—those who were in the U.K., for example, they were—there are so many universities in which there are so many good scholars on Muslim traditions, but the television stations have chosen [instead] to appoint as the spokespeople for Islam some people who were the most ignorant, but they happen to be the ones who are the most excited, the most virulent and so on. And this way they were perceived within the British society as being the leaders. So, [this] is also a form of exclusion, but I think it is different from the other form.

Now, to the question whether Islam needs a reformation: I have, I think, an article on this, which has been published. I don't think that we should expect history to evolve in the same way or to have the same processes in different contexts. What I liked in the first session of this very conference is the idea of a quietist tradition within Shiism. I come from a Sunni background, and for Sunnis, Shi'is are perceived as the activists—as the ones who wanted to have the good, the legitimate political power, and the Sunnis are the quietists. This is how they perceive themselves.

As a quietist, I think there is—there are quietists forums and expressions within Muslim traditions that are available, that are already there, and with which Muslims have been happy for centuries in many [different] conditions. We probably don't need to wait for the coming of some Muslim Martin Luther or anything of the sort. I think that we have had some modern scholarship—and what it brings—this new awareness, gives great strength, great legitimacy and in academic terms, in scholarly forums, and in terms of ethics—to these quietist forums. Now, [as a result of this] scholarly [activity], [theses quietest traditions] are much more solid—what Arkoun says, [they are] built on knowledge of text—and so Arkoun and the others work is built on knowledge, and [this] is much closer to the efforts that is now the implicit religion of humanity, as Jabri has said.

Thank you again.

MR. PLATTNER: Thank you.

Asma, do you want to add a word?

MS. AFSARUDDIN: Maybe just about the Reformation, because we were just speaking about this at the breakfast, and we brought up the fact that you simply can't replicate the particularities of certain historical circumstances that took place several centuries ago.

And as the person who asked the question also rightly pointed out: it actually led to greater intolerance at the beginning, and really virulent infighting among Christians at that time in Europe. So, I'm not sure that's a useful way of pointing to some of the problems within Islamic societies today—what must happen to reform.

[In the Islamic world today] there is a recognition that reform must happen—but, I think it would be more along the lines of being re-engaged with the Islamic tradition, with classical thought, and of stripping away the cultural accretions that have occurred over the centuries and going back to the sources—I mean, sort of replicating what happened during the reformation, that doesn't go back to the sources. That must happen within Islamic thought, but I would stop short of calling it "reformation" just because it evokes the European experience.

MR. FUKUYAMA: Well, first to Professor Ayoob: I think I misspoke. I was simply trying to make the point that people tend to blame Islam for the failure of modernization. I was just trying to make the point that there are lots of other sources of this, and I actually didn't mean to single out Arab political culture. I mean, I think all of the factors that you mentioned feed into that.

Just on your third one, this question of the Islamic Luther: for 30 years [people] keep saying, "Well, we need this Islamic Luther," and so forth. I think this is just silly, and I think people should stop waiting for this particular Messiah to come about because it may be just the vanity of intellectuals that think that ideas by themselves are really so powerful.

I think it's a misreading of European history to think that Martin Luther was the one that brought about the modern world just by tacking these 95 Theses on the cathedral door. The hard work of creating a modern society was based partly on ideas, but it was also very heavily political and I think that, in the Muslim world, it's going to be a matter of politics. I mean, Turkey did not end up as a fairly successful modern society because there was a Turkish Luther. It happened because of Attaturk and use of political power and creation of political institutions and all these things.

And so, I just think people should stop waiting for this Luther to appear and start thinking more concretely about the way that you can change real political institutions to bring about more modern societies.

MR. PLATTNER: Thank you to all our panelists. My regrets to those whose questions we couldn't take, and we'll resume (inaudible) .