During a NATO defense ministerial meeting last week, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth called for the creation of a “NATO 3.0.” This would see European members of the alliance take greater responsibility for the defense of the continent. But he also used the meeting to issue a stark warning to America’s European partners.
As a sign of the Trump administration’s dissatisfaction with Europe’s perceived lack of support for the recent war with Iran, Hegseth announced that a review would be carried out, lasting no more than six months, to determine the appropriate level of US military commitment to Europe.
The timing of Hegseth’s comments was no coincidence. The Trump administration has made burden-sharing and increased European defense spending a core part of its transatlantic strategy. President Donald Trump led efforts during last year’s NATO summit in The Hague to get alliance members to commit to spending 5 percent of gross domestic product on defense and defense-related issues by 2035. But even with these pledges, too few NATO members have shown a concrete plan for how they will achieve these spending targets. This has irked the administration.
However, the perception in the Trump administration that Europe did not do enough to support recent military actions against Iran is unfair. A small handful of countries, such as Spain, were overly restrictive when it came to allowing America to use bases and airspace in support of military operations against Iran. But most of America’s key partners in Europe allowed the US to use airbases and facilities, even if they did not broadcast it publicly.
More than 500 air sorties were launched from Italy and many more from the UK. Germany also allowed the use of American bases on its soil. Bulgaria played a role, too. At one point, Sofia International Airport temporarily suspended civilian flights during overnight windows to allow US military aircraft, including refueling tankers, to operate from the airport. Yet because some European countries were vocally opposed to US military action, NATO as a whole has been tarred with the same brush.
Perhaps, viewed most optimistically, Hegseth’s stern remarks to his fellow NATO defense ministers could pave the way for a smoother summit in Ankara next month, which Trump will lead. Delivering a tough message to Europeans ahead of the summit may make it possible for next month’s gathering to be better choreographed, smoother and more diplomatic for the US president. This is exactly what the alliance needs.
But Hegseth’s announcement of a six-month review of the presence of US military forces in Europe comes at a puzzling time. Soon after Trump returned to the White House in January 2025, his administration announced a full global force posture review that would be made public by the end of that summer. This review was meant to determine where US forces should be based globally to ensure that their presence aligned with America’s foreign policy goals under the new administration. Yet more than a year later, there is no review in sight.
In recent months, vague announcements have also been made by the Pentagon about the removal of some US forces from Europe, only for those decisions to be reversed after the White House intervened. Considering the circumstances leading up to this point, it seems unrealistic that a meaningful review focused solely on the US force presence in Europe can be completed in six months.
Even if such a review could be carried out properly, the timing, in the context of Trump’s ongoing peace efforts between Ukraine and Russia, seems ill-advised. At a time when America wants to show strength in Europe and demonstrate that it remains an actor on the continent with leverage against Russia, why conduct a review that could lead to a reduction of US power and influence in the region, arguably when it is needed most?
In truth, this debate about America’s conventional military role in Europe is part of a larger debate inside the administration about what America’s role in the world should be. Different groups are competing for influence.
The so-called prioritizers want almost all US focus to be on East Asia to counter China. The isolationists want American forces around the world brought home, with the primary focus on homeland defense. A third, smaller group takes a more traditional Republican foreign policy approach, seeing America as a global power with global interests and viewing its forward-deployed presence, alongside its role in alliance structures, as vital to US national security.
In many ways, the outcome of this review on US forces in Europe will determine which of these competing groups will have the biggest sway in foreign policymaking.
The decision about whether to base US forces in Europe should be based solely on America’s national security interests. It should not be based on whether some European countries supported the recent war against Iran or whether others are spending enough on defense or doing so quickly enough.
America’s military presence in Europe is first and foremost there to defend America’s national interests, not to defend Europeans. Defending Europe is perhaps a consequence of the US military presence in Europe, but it is not the reason for it. This is why any hardheaded assessment of America’s national security interests should lead to the conclusion that the US benefits from its military presence in Europe and its membership in NATO.
Hopefully, if the review is conducted based on America’s interests, it is unlikely there will be any meaningful reduction of US forces in Europe. That outcome would not only benefit America’s national security interests, but also those of its partners and allies in Europe and beyond.