Shane Leary joins Miles Yu to discuss the forthy-fifth anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act. They then turn to Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s state visit to Washington, and the resulting developments in the relationships among the United States, Japan, and the Philippines. Finally, they discuss why the Biden administration’s attempts at reconciliation and cooperation with China have failed, and where US strategy vis-à-vis China is heading.
China Insider is a weekly podcast project from Hudson Institute's China Center, hosted by Miles Yu, who provides weekly news that mainstream American outlets often miss, as well as in-depth commentary and analysis on the China challenge and the free world’s future.
Episode Transcript
This transcription is automatically generated and edited lightly for accuracy. Please excuse any errors.
Miles Yu:
Welcome to China Insider, a podcast from the Hudson Institute's China Center. I am Miles Yu, senior fellow and director of the China Center. Join me each week along with my colleague, Shane Leary, for our analysis of the major events concerning China, China threat and their implications to the US and beyond.
Shane Leary:
It's Tuesday, April 16th and we have three topics this week. First Miles offers his thoughts on the 45th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act, following up on his recent op-Ed co-authored with former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. Second, we discussed Japanese Prime Minister Kashida’s state visit to Washington and developments in the relationships between the US, Japan and the Philippines. And lastly, we reflect on the United States China strategy over the past few years and whether the Biden administration might be changing course. Miles, how are you?
Miles Yu:
Very good, Shane. Nice to be with you again.
Shane Leary:
Yes, always a pleasure. So this past weekend we released a conversation between you and I as an event on the China Center webpage on hudson.org titled the Taiwan Relations Act at 45. And you also coauthored an OP-ed that same week with 70th Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in the Washington Times titled “After 45 years, the Taiwan Relations Act is no longer enough.” So for our listeners who may have missed either of these, and I would recommend them both, what can you tell us about the Taiwan Relations Act today? Its virtues and its faults in particular.
Miles Yu:
Well, Taiwan Relations Act is actually the landmark piece of legislation in US history. It defines the framework within which the US should interact with Taiwan. Not only that, it actually set the example. It covers much larger range, that is, it checked on the excess of the executive branch in defining a key foreign policy issues. That is the Congress interjected its own role to stop in the 1970s the secret diplomacy. Secret diplomacy is maybe necessary at the time, but it could be like an out of control train wreck if the executive secret diplomacy also involves some of the congressional prerogatives, for example, treaty right in this case, there was a very powerful mutual defense treaty with Taiwan then was known as the Republic of China, and that's why it was very significant. Not only that, it also sort of stopped the, I will say what I call the transactionalism, which is basically a bureaucratic approach to all things related to foreign relations.
That is they really do not consider a much larger geopolitical consequences or framework of the US policy, a national interest. To them everything is about how to do things smoothly without any sort of major crisis. For example, transactionalism’s specific manifestation in the US-China relationship is they do not consider about whether we should conduct business with China according to America’s national interest or international standard. As long as the US-China relationship is smooth, there will be no sort of trouble going smoothly. And that's basically why we check on that. But most importantly, the Taiwan Relationship, the Act of 1979 sort codifies America’s legal protection within the American domestic jurisprudence of Taiwan's interest in the United States. Now, Taiwan Relations Act first and foremost is an American domestic law. So it basically defines Taiwan as an ally, a country diplomatically recognized by the United States, no different from any other country with such a legal protection and particularly its property is a legal status in the United States, but perhaps the most importantly. Most importantly, it deals. It has something with Taiwan's security.
Taiwan Relations Act commits United States to Taiwan's defense capabilities. So that is probably the essence of this Taiwan Relations Act. Last but not least, actually, Taiwan Relations Act promotes the idea of human rights. It emphasizes the factor, the elements of human rights in US-Taiwan relationship. This was necessary because this was 1979. Taiwan at that time was still an authoritarian regime. The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 was the most important inspiration for Taiwan's pro-democracy elements and they were encouraged by the Americans stand. We wrote that into this landmark piece of legislation and it was a very important, I might even say instrumental in what Taiwan has become today that is a full-blown democracy with freedoms that not enjoyed by China at all.
So that's a very good side. There are some other sort of the bad side of this Taiwan Relations Act, and mostly as a result of the limitations imposed by history by the historical context, that is it did not really challenge the legality of a Carter administrations unilateral diplomatic switch from Taiwan to Beijing. Yes, the diplomatic recognition thatP resident Carter insisted it was right. It was the executive prerogative. The president can do that. But it neglected congressional proactive too, as I said earlier, because the US Taiwan relationship at the time involves a lot of treaties. Treaties has to be ratified or nullified by the US Senate. So in this case, particularly nullification who has the right congressional right now, there was a lawsuit launched by a senator from Arizona, Barry Goldwater accused Carter administration, the unilateral illegal nullification of this mutual defense treaty with Taiwan.
The Supreme Court shall back saying, no, we're not going to take this case. Because in order to procedurally, in order to, for Supreme Court to rule on this, Senate must reject, must send dissent to the White House's decision to nullify this mutual defense treaty. But the Senate failed to take action. And that's why procedurally this case didn't go anywhere. I think if the Senate did take up the case, I think the result might have been different at the Supreme Court. Now finally, there is also the ugly side of this Taiwan Relations Act. It basically remained acquiescent and silent on Taiwan's sovereignty and international representation issue. To recognize China's international status at the UN is one thing, but to abandon Taiwan's international representation, that's another. And I think the Nixon administration, as well as Carter administration had the instinct of keeping PRC and Taiwan both at international organizations. That would've been the right thing to do. But the Taiwan relations Act basically acquiesced that kind of arrangement, that is, abandoned Taiwan and give China a hundred percent international recognition. So Congress and the law, the Taiwan Relations Act itself codify the taboo of considering Taiwan's sovereignty recognition. Nowadays, you don't even want to talk about Taiwan sovereignty because this is so sensitive. China might get really mad about that.
So that's basically one thing and now 45 years later we have to reconsider this issue, which is very, very difficult. The issue of course at the time was who actually has the legitimate right to represent China is a PRC or ROC, which Taiwan was known for at the time? The question is What if Taiwan did not want to be recognized as China anymore? In words, what if Taiwan withdrew from this kind of a competition for the representation of China? So would Taiwan be recognized as a sovereign country after that? Taiwan relations act has a vision for what Taiwan might be decades down the road, but not on sovereign issues. It is mostly about the arms race, it's about human rights, those sort of things. Another really inadequate part of the Taiwan relations Act was the exclusion, I must a dangerous exclusion, of Taiwan's offshore islands from US protection and defense assistance.
Those were mostly Kimoi and Matsu. This is a very dangerous because it makes them vulnerable to Chinese military adventures. And from the point of view of Taipei, the Taiwan government, those offshore islands have always been part of a Taiwanese territory, sovereign territory. So this may create some kind of problems right now. There are some concepts and the language in this act that were heavily influenced by the Chinese insistence and the State Department transactionalist bureaucrats. For example, the White House insisted in this tense negotiation with the US Congress about the wording of this act that it must use the phrase “the people on Taiwan.” “The people on Taiwan” is very inaccurate. It does not really imply a sort of people's intrinsic cultural, political economic connection with Taiwan, just the people that exist on the island of Taiwan geographically at the moment, that would include some tourists from England, from Thailand, from Indonesia for example. So that's not very scientific definition. The correct phrase should be people of Taiwan or the Taiwanese people. So those are basically the good, bad and ugly side of this Taiwan relation act. And nevertheless, overall I say its an overwhelmingly positive, very good legislative action. And that has been guiding the US Taiwan relationship for the better for the last 45 years.
Shane Leary:
And as I said, if you want to hear more about this or read about it, I'd encourage you to check out the China Center's website where you can also see the rest of miles' work for our next topic. Miles, this past week, Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida met with President Biden for a high profile state visit in Washington. Among several statements made by President Biden, he said that the alliance is “closer, stronger and more effective than ever before in history.” How significant was this visit and what sort of agreements and actions have we seen come out of it?
Miles Yu:
US-Japan relationship has been the cornerstone, the bedrock of the US-Asia relationship, in a way. You couldn't find a better ally than Japan. Most importantly because of the shared value, Japan has been completely transformed since the end of World War II into a full blown mature, powerful democracy. We have some issues here and there just like a normal countries, just like relatives in the same family. But fundamentally we share the same blood and same gene of a democratic country. So we're free nations. Now, every time there's a Japanese prime minister, Japanese leaders who came to Washington, DC is going to be very important for that point of view. This visit by Prime Minister Kishida is particularly poignant and particularly important because the timing is very different. The timing is that Japan under leadership of Prime Minister Kishida went through another revolution in security in his military defense posture because Prime Minister Kishida completed the revolution that was started by Prime Minister Abe, but then he basically sailed it and make it a reality last year when he announced a whole bunch of very profound and change in Japan's national security and its capability building.
Number one is Japan is going to spend much more on its own defense to the point of 2% of its GDP. And that's pretty significant. Number two, Japan changed completely its defense posture that has been going on since 1950s from purely a hundred percent defense orientation to one that focusing on development of counterstrike capabilities, even preemptive strike capabilities. This is very really amazing. And number three, I think most importantly, Japan has positioned itself under Prime Minister Kishida not just the leader of peace and security in the region, but also in the world. Japan actively seeking membership or representation or connection with NATO for example. So that's actually is very, very important. So that's why his visit is very important to deal with the United States.
Secondly, this is a time of leadership transition. This is a presidential election year. Lot of foreign policies America’s security commitment to the trouble spots of the world are pretty much like heated debates. So he came over to support US global leadership amidst the election isolationism and Americans hesitation and the dismay and the lack of progress in Ukraine, for example, and the increased trouble in Gaza. So there is kind of Ukraine and Gaza fatigue if you will. So he came over here to basically to keep up confidence and to really applaud American's leadership and Japan is going to come here to help. So it's a very successful visit. He gave a amazing speech to the joint session of Congress and I have seen many speeches by foreign leaders, but I think Kishida speech is one of the most inspirational and most substantive I would say.
Shane Leary:
This visit was followed by a summit between US Japan and the Philippines. We spoke a bit about this relationship last week when there were indications that Japan would be establishing an agreement to deploy troops to the Philippines. Have there been developments on this front or were there significant security agreements that came out of this meeting or summit?
Miles Yu:
Yeah, well before I address that issue, that's a very good question. I think Prime Minister Kishida through a visit is also wanted to show to the American people the Japanese concern about what might happen after the election. They fear that there might be some kind of isolationist call for withdrawal from cooperation with Japan and withdrawal from US-Japan security arrangement. And to be honest with you, and also the election year can be very nasty. So he came here just to try to avoid the Japan bashing, if you will, to put it very bluntly during the election year. That's why in his speech to the Congress he mentioned that Japan has invested Japan's foreign direct investment in the United States has reached the point of astonishing $800 billion. So that will mean over a million American jobs working in the Japanese investment in the United States. That's pretty amazing accomplishment.
And also Prime Minister Kishida himself is a pretty charming diplomat. He talked about his childhood growing up in Queens, watching Yankees and the Mets, and I'm sure people live in that area in New York area. You cannot be fans of both. You have to choose. But he said, I'm a fan of both. So that's why he's a diplomat. And he gave Americans additional cherry blossom trees and he enjoyed reminiscent about his joy over Flintstones. For example. He liked the cartoon. He spoke very good English, unlike some of his predecessors I have personally encountered when I was in the government during the Trump administration, I remember there was one of his predecessors, I shall not name his name, he was a Japanese foreign minister. This guy was Harvard trained. He went to Harvard to get a degree, and his English is terrible. He needed an interpreter whenever he came to the State Department.
So that's kind of a little bit awkward. So Kishida is totally different. I think he's very much of a cosmopolitan individual there in the Japanese leadership. What has achieved during his visit in Washington? First of all, he and President Biden announced a joint development of counter hypersonic weapons, mostly in China. He said Japan is going to buy more tomahawks cruise missiles, which is very good. They also announced that US Japan will jointly develop missiles. Those are very, very good development. But also I think one of the most important issue that has been resolved during this visit was the US and Japan have agreed to joint command and control of two militaries. Japan and United States have a very deep military cooperation. You go to Japan, US troops have many stations in Okinawa, in Sasebo, Yokosuka, and in Tokyo area, US seventh Fleet, the largest overseas forward deployed fleet is based in Japan, Yokosuka Japan.
But there's always two headquarters. The command control is more or less not joint. So now they have agreed to put the joint command together just like a US and South Korean military. So interoperability, that's a very good progress. US Japan, they also agree to have a joint space program. It's also very important and US Japan have also agreed to jointly train AI-led next generation of pilots. Those are very important thing. All in all I think this is very successful visit. It is very refreshing. He should be happy when he goes back. You mentioned about the Philippines. The Filipino visit is also very important because during the visit by Minister Kishida, Filipino President Marcos Jr. also came to join the two leaders, prime Minister Kishida and President Biden in Washington dc. This is a powerful symbol of unity among two of America’s most important mutual defense allies, Japan and the Philippines.
They are here to talk about one thing, one thing only. That is how to cooperate act together like allies with mutual defense obligations to face off China's provocations. China has picked on the Philippines, single handedly sort of pretty enormous pressure to bully the Philippines. And I think United States has reacted very strongly, so has Japan. So that's why a Philippines problem is not just a Philippines problem. Philippines problem is America's problem. Philippines problem is also Japanese problem as well. So the three leaders came together, showed up in Washington DC and shows once again the resolve of all the friends and allies in the Indo-Pacific region, their resolve to fight aggression and to basically jointly defend their own interest and freedom of obligation to say the least.
Shane Leary:
And following these meetings, we saw a response from the PRC. The Chinese Coast Guard sent a flotilla of ships into the territorial waters of the disputed Senkaku islands. What can you tell us about this event and just the Chinese reaction generally to these multilateral developments?
Miles Yu:
Well, I think China once again seems to have miscalculated their reaction. They're increased, enhanced the bullying actions of late in the last month or two. It has been just unrelenting. Their bullying of the Filipinos is pretty bad. And Japan, when Prime Minister Kishida came to Washington, China basically send these warships around the dispute of Senkaku Island to have this very dangerous and military provocation. So you can see there seems to have a dramatic new course correction in the White House's approach to China, to all the escalations there too in the last couple of weeks. Number one, the Biden administration seems to have abandoned the non involvement in sovereignty disputes because it was over the issue of sovereignty that China picked fights with pretty much everybody's a neighbor, India, Vietnam, Philippines, and Japan. So United States traditionally say we don't really want to make any comment, any commitment, any involvement in the sovereignty disputes.
But now the White House has changed that tone. First of all, the White House announced openly that in the Chinese-Indian dispute about this piece of land, that China called the South Tibet and the White House said, “Hey listen, we are on the side of the India.” That disputed area is Indian sovereign territory. It's Indian land. This is extraordinary. This is pretty, pretty amazing. So openly resuscitated the Trumpian approach that is the denial PRC’s South China Sea claim. We declare for the first time in the history of US-China relationship, that China's claim in the South China Sea was, I believe the phrase we actually used was “completely unlawful.” That kind of announcement is in line with international ruling, the court of arbitration rule in 2016 that China's claim in South China Sea is unlawful. Basically there's no legal basis and also was reaffirmed by State department spokesperson.
So I think this is very important. There's a completely abandonment of non involvement in sovereignty dispute. I say that it's not really fully explained, fully articulated policy yet by say this beginning of a new trend. Secondly, and I think the Biden team has sort of tough enough is warning China on US defense commitment to the Philippines, to Japan. US will join the fight with the Philippines supply flotilla if attacked. US will join the fight if Senkaku were under attack by China. So those were two very specific reaffirmation during President Marcos’ during Prime Minister Kishida’s visit in the White House. And so this is basically, it's a warning to China. In the last week or so, the White House suddenly toughened up it's a policy on China. It's been known for months and months that China has been aiding Russia economically, materially and financially. But there's no little action taken.
So America's credibility is at stake. So this time the Biden demonstration issued direct warning. First is through Ambassador Nick Burns speech in Beijing condemning China's assistant to Russia, Russia's war economy. And then grandma Janet visited Beijing. People thought, oh gee, she's going to go ball again to have some magic mushroom of no consequence over there. But this time actually, her message was pretty tough. Secretary Janet visited China and she directly warned China the severe consequences if China would not stop financial assistance to Russia, she warned specifically China's bank's role in this illicit action. So this is a very interesting thing because China's behavior in the region and beyond poses a threat not only to one particular country, to a lot of countries. So that's why this backfired. Again, it's not just the United States suddenly decided to take a tough stand. The tough stand is a hundred percent dependent on China's own behavior and its own action.
Shane Leary:
So I want to key in on this toughening up of the US' stance. I think it's fair to say throughout the Biden administration's tenure thus far we've seen in some ways a continuation of Trump administration's policies towards China. But we've also seen continued attempts at cooperation and reconciliation with China. So where does the Biden administration's strategy vis-a-vis China today stand, would you say the approach of reconciliation and cooperation has failed?
Miles Yu:
It was doomed to fail because China traditionally takes any American appeal for cooperation as a sign of weakness, as a bargaining chip. China never meant to fulfill American's request. So that's why they use this opportunity. They use this as a sign of United States has something to beg China to cooperate. They just, number one, they delay. Number two, they say if you want the cooperation on fentanyl, on South China Sea, you have to really do something in return. That is you have to completely change your policy approach to China. That was set up during the Trump administration. And also you have to really show respect to me, which by respect China basically means if I kill a lot of Uyghurs, if I basically bankroll the bad guys in Pyongyang, in Teran or in Moscow, you really cannot really show any sign of a protest. You cannot really sanction me.
That's basically what China means, that my bad days would not be sanctioned or criticized otherwise you are disrespecting me. That's basically what I mean when I say it's doomed to fail. This is not just a rhetorical reputation of something that's just in a thin air. This has been proven again and again and again. You have to lay out your card, your principle with China a hundred percent clear, yes or no. And would you behave like a responsible big country following international law? Yes or no? If the international says that in the South China Sea does not belong to you, would you agree to that? If not, we're going to treat South China Sea as if it is international water. Everybody has right to do, otherwise you have to bear consequences from the group of nations, the Coalition of Free Nations.
So those were the way to do it. That's what the Trump administration did. And then that's why China really, really were not very happy with what the Trump administration did. China also mistook the Americans China policies revolutionary change during the Trump administration as a partisan, as the emotional reaction to China's behavior. Yes, that's emotional, but also it's principled. It's a principled approach to set the course right. And US-China relationship is very important. The potential for US-China relationship is unlimited, particularly the potential between Chinese people and American people. Interaction engagement is unlimited. Chinese government is in the middle and to basically solve this relationship to hijack the goodwill of the American people and American government and the Chinese people's interest as well. So that's why it's very unfortunate. But the stake is very high. We must persist. We must insist and we must overcome.
Shane Leary:
And so given the sort of toughening up in certain areas, whether it's border disputes or some of the other things we've discussed today, do you think we might be seeing a sort of course correction in the Biden administration's approach? And if so, where do you think that might be heading?
Miles Yu:
I think the Biden administration is already realizing it's lack of strength and the lack of progress in dealing with China. And during the election year, this kind of lack of efficacy of China's US-China relationship improvement, particularly when China received repeated Americans on treaties, all request people, nothing happened. So I think Biden administration is facing these voters’ judgment. So they're taking this action to change its course. I think that's already happening. I don't know whether this is kind of awakening or this is just the election expediency. I cannot say about that. But I do think that through constant practice, the right approach in our China policy will emerge. Hopefully the Biden Administration has learned lessons. If you recall at the beginning of the Biden administration on this very show, you and I talk about this issue that they want to cooperate with China. They also want to compete with China rigorously. And I remember what we said. I said, well, good luck. And I think that's exactly what has happened.
Shane Leary:
Well said. Well, Miles, I think that's all the time we have this week. Once again, thanks so much and look forward to next week.
Miles Yu:
Thank you very much and I'll see you next week. Thank you for listening to this episode of China Insider. I'd like to thank my colleague Shane Leary, for taking part in this undertaking every week. I'd also like to thank our executive producer, Philip Hegseth, who works tirelessly and professionally behind the scenes for every episode to make sure we deliver the best quality podcast to you, the listeners. If you enjoy the show, please spread the words. For Chinese listeners, please check our monthly review and analysis episode in Chinese. We'll see you next time.