As the geopolitics of Eurasia shift, Central Asia faces a historic moment. No longer tethered to Moscow’s gravitational pull, the region is now navigating a new constellation of global powers. In the wake of the Russia-Ukraine War and the cascading effects of Western sanctions, the five Central Asian republics—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—are recalibrating their foreign policies, asserting their sovereignty, and embracing a multipolar future. This regional realignment is ending Russia’s centuries-old monopoly over Central Asia. Consequently, a New Great Game may be emerging in the region as major powers—including Russia, the United States, China, and the European Union—compete for influence and resources.1
The Twilight of Imperial Legacy
After Russia conquered Central Asia in the nineteenth century, the region has evolved within Moscow’s orbit—first under the Russian Empire, then the Soviet Union, and later the Russian Federation. In the immediate aftermath of the USSR’s collapse, Central Asian elites largely came from the Soviet nomenklatura and maintained close linguistic and cultural ties with Russia, and during these decades Moscow remained Central Asia’s gravitational center. Russia offered security guarantees, absorbed millions of migrant workers, and controlled the region’s key trade routes, pipelines, and banking systems. In return, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan offered political loyalty and access to energy and raw materials.
But that era is ending. Younger leaders and populations with no memory of Soviet rule increasingly favor their own national identities and want their countries to diversify their foreign and economic relations. Meanwhile, public opinion surveys in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan show that support for Russia is weakening, especially among younger and non-Russian respondents.2 And once-dominant Russian media is losing ground to local outlets, Turkish soft power, and global digital platforms.
War Leads to Realignment
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine exacerbated the collapse of Moscow’s imperial influence, and since 2022, the war has led to geopolitical realignments across Eurasia. Though Central Asia once appeared to be part of an unshakeable Russian sphere of influence, it is now fragmenting into a more complex and competitive multipolar landscape.
Having long seen Russia as a guarantor of stability, Central Asian leaders now see their neighbor as a source of uncertainty. In particular, Western sanctions have exposed the fragility of depending on Moscow economically. Trade routes, financial transfers, and energy exports—all historically mediated through Russia—suddenly became strategic vulnerabilities. The war has also disrupted trade and remittance flows, causing inflation and uncertainty. According to one group of academics based in Kazakhstan, “The imposition of Western sanctions on Russia has had a complex impact on trade relations and economic conditions in the region, prompting the Central Asian states to reconsider their ties with other global actors.”3
The Central Asian countries responded swiftly to the war and Western sanctions by diversifying their economies, seeking autonomy, and collectively determining to never again rely on a single external power. As part of this shift, they are developing new transport corridors, cross-Caspian energy routes, and regional supply chains. The reorientation, while economically costly in the short term, may yield strategic dividends—greater connectivity with Europe and the Indo-Pacific and reduced vulnerability to sanctions or political coercion.
Diverging National Paths Lead Away from Moscow
Central Asia now falls into two groups. The resource-rich states—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan—possess the means to assert strategic autonomy. The resource-poor states, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, remain dependent on remittances and Russian security protection. Yet all five share the same instinct: to develop relations with more countries and avoid entanglement in Moscow’s geopolitical decline.
Kazakhstan: Pragmatic and Multi-Vector Diplomacy
Under President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Kazakhstan has emerged as the most sophisticated practitioner of multi-vector diplomacy. While maintaining formal alliance structures with Moscow through the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), Astana has drawn clear red lines. Tokayev publicly refused to recognize the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk (Ukrainian oblasts Russia has partially occupied), hosted hundreds of thousands of Russians fleeing mobilization, and deepened ties with China, Türkiye, and the EU.
Kazakhstan is also spearheading the Middle Corridor,4 a multimodal trade route linking Asia to Europe via the Caspian Sea and the South Caucasus, bypassing both Russian and Iranian territory. The project reflects not only logistical pragmatism but also an intention to re-anchor the country within a wider Eurasian network less dependent on Moscow.
Uzbekistan: Assertive Sovereignty
In Uzbekistan, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev has positioned his country as an independent regional hub. Remaining outside both the CSTO and EAEU, Tashkent emphasizes sovereignty and economic openness. It cultivates parallel relationships with China, Europe, and the United States while preserving pragmatic relations with Russia. Mirziyoyev’s Uzbekistan symbolizes a new Central Asian confidence—assertive yet cautious, reformist yet nationalist.
Turkmenistan: Neutrality and the China Turn
Long defined by its self-proclaimed policy of neutrality, Turkmenistan has progressively shifted toward Beijing. China is now the main buyer of Turkmen gas and is a crucial infrastructure investor. Ashgabat’s orientation toward the East underlines a broader regional trend: Russia is no longer the uncontested energy gateway of Central Asia.
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan: Enduring Dependence
For the smaller economies of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Russia remains an indispensable partner. Millions of their citizens work in Russian cities, and remittances account for a large share of each country’s gross domestic product. Russian military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan still provide security against regional instability. Yet even here, quiet hedging is underway: Bishkek and Dushanbe are exploring Chinese investments, Gulf capital, and new diplomatic channels to dilute Moscow’s dominance.
New Actors Enter the Region
The balance of power in Central Asia is shifting toward a genuine multipolar order as countries in the region move away from Moscow and as the following powers engage them:
- China has become the region’s leading economic partner, investing heavily through the Belt and Road Initiative and dominating energy and infrastructure projects.
- Türkiye is expanding its influence through the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), blending cultural affinity with strategic ambition.
- European actors, including EU organizations and the French government, have stepped up their engagement, particularly in energy and rare-earth partnerships with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
- The United States has revitalized its diplomatic dialogue through the C5+1 format, seeking to anchor Central Asia in a broader network of cooperation independent of Russia.
For the first time since independence, Central Asia’s capitals are setting the terms of their foreign relations rather than reacting to external pressures. But the guiding principle is not alignment with any other power (e.g., China or the United States) but equilibrium.
The Turkic Nexus: Key Balancer in Great Power Competition
The OTS has gained visibility as Türkiye and its Central Asian members seek to balance ties between Russia, China, and the West, positioning the Turkic world as a bridge region. The emerging bloc is not anti-Russian, but is instead deliberately focused on Central Asia. Its members pragmatically seek to balance partners, pursue economic growth, and redefine sovereignty on their own terms.
The latest gathering of leaders at OTS’s summit in Azerbaijan in October further demonstrated that Russia’s dominance in its former imperial backyard is slowly and irreversibly eroding. The event also showed that its members seek to be their own force on the global stage. As Azeri President Ilham Aliyev said at the beginning of the summit, OTS “has evolved from merely a platform for cooperation into one of the significant geopolitical centers,” and he was pleased to see its “prestige grow on the international stage.”5
In the current context of great power competition, the states comprising the OTS have emerged as essential balancing actors: geographically between Russia and China, and politically between competing models of governance and connectivity. Their growing coordination through the organization enhances their collective agency, making them pivotal to the stability of Eurasia and the resilience of global supply routes.
An Opportunity for the US
For the United States, renewed engagement with Central Asia is a strategic and symbolic imperative, especially after the closure of a US base in Uzbekistan left a diplomatic gap in 2005. As a New Great Game unfolds in the region—which is defined less by territorial conquest than by competing economic corridors, energy routes, digital infrastructure, and influence networks—the US needs to engage the region more. For example, a higher-level political presence, including a presidential visit to Central Asia, would signal Washington’s commitment to regional sovereignty and economic diversification.