In this special report, Hudson Senior Fellow Can Kasapoglu examines how China is bolstering Iran’s long-range strike deterrent by providing the Islamic Republic with satellite-based targeting data. He then analyzes the policy implications of this development.
Introduction
During Operation Epic Fury, Iran pursued a deliberate strategy against United States forces arrayed in the Middle East. Facing US air superiority, the regime’s praetorian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) adopted an asymmetric counter-air approach that targeted high-value US military assets across the region, from strategic-enabler aircraft to expensive radar sites.
While Iran’s wartime strikes initially appeared to be lucky shots, they were likely cued by foreign space-based targeting data. Open-source indicators suggest that satellite imagery and geospatial-intelligence support from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) helped Tehran identify and prioritize critical American capabilities in the Middle East, allowing Iran to launch a selective campaign even under pressure.
This development highlights a problem that is not unique to the Gulf: China’s commercial satellite sector supported entities hostile to the West in different parts of the world—including the former Russian shadow-army Wagner in the invasion of Ukraine, as well as the Iran-backed Houthi militia group in Yemen.
In May 2026, the Trump administration sanctioned several China-based firms for providing satellite imagery that enabled Iranian strikes against US forces. According to the administration’s official explanations, MizarVision, a China-based company, published open-source imagery of US activity during Operation Epic Fury, while Earth Eye, a Chinese remote-sensing entity, provided satellite imagery directly to Tehran. Chang Guang Satellite Technology, a commercial firm linked to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), collected and supplied Iran with imagery of US and allied military facilities.
China’s Commercial Satellites Support Iran’s Target-Acquisition Efforts
China’s efforts to boost Iran’s long-range strike deterrent have been years in the making. In 2024, the IRGC reportedly established ties with both Chang Guang and MinoSpace Technology, another Chinese firm, to secure space-based intelligence support. Both companies operate in China’s state-linked commercial ecosystem, and both firms assemble advanced remote-sensing satellites aligned with Beijing’s strategic priorities.
Chang Guang produces small cube-sats—or miniature, modular nanosatellites—equipped with high-resolution imaging. The Beijing-based MinoSpace manufactures the Taijing-series Earth observation satellites. Cooperation with these two firms could enhance Tehran’s ability to monitor US military facilities and accelerate Iran’s efforts at target development.
Then, in April 2025, the US Department of State announced that Chang Guang had supported the Houthis, Iran’s Yemen-based proxy militia, in targeting maritime activity in Bab al-Mandab, a critical maritime strait linking the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the wider Indian Ocean. As the operator of Jilin-1, the largest Chinese commercial satellite constellation, Chang Guang allegedly provided the Houthis with imagery intelligence for operations against commercial shipping and US naval forces. Chang Guang reportedly continued its support for this effort despite Washington engaging Beijing on the issue.
Open-source defense intelligence reveals that Chang Guang Satellite Technology is not just another commercial satellite firm. Though not very old, the company has become a leading example of China’s new commercial space sector: innovative, similar to a startup, and nominally private, yet heavily dependent on state support. Chang Guang’s high-end satellite imaging, sensing, laser communications, and intelligent remote-sensing capabilities place the company near the forefront of China’s space ambitions. Despite a more cautious public posture today, Chang Guang has longstanding ties to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and apparent support from the PLA, lending its technologies clear military relevance, including in the area of maritime surveillance.
Embedded within the Chinese Academy of Sciences and backed by the provincial government of Jilin Province, Chang Guang exemplifies the CCP’s common strategy of fusing military and civil institutions. The firm is much more an extension of China’s defense apparatus than an independent commercial entity, and the company has repeatedly operated as a de facto intelligence asset in support of Beijing’s allies. Accordingly, in 2023 the United States sanctioned Chang Guang for supplying imagery to Russia’s Wagner group in occupied Ukraine.
Beijing’s Intelligence Dividend in the Middle East
Beijing’s investment in the Middle East first paid off with the Houthis. In February 2024 the Iranian proxy militia conducted the first known successful anti-ship ballistic missile strike in military history.
The Houthi anti-ship ballistic missile program is a product of the IRGC’s missile ecosystem. Available writings assess that the 280-miles-effective Asef appears to be a rebranded anti-ship variant of Iran’s Fateh-313, while the Tankil is likely a previously unseen anti-ship version of the IRGC-developed Zohayr. Both are Iranian-origin systems and represent the Houthis’ heaviest anti-ship missiles, with large warheads. The smaller Faleq, Mayun, and Bahr al-Ahmar also reflect Iranian design philosophy and seeker technology, though they do not precisely match known Iranian systems. They may be previously unseen Iranian missiles smuggled into Yemen, or Houthi-assembled rockets fitted with Iranian guidance kits, similar to Hezbollah’s precision-guided missile program.
More importantly, in this effort the Houthis employed a weapon that—given Beijing’s proliferation of DF-26B anti-ship ballistic missiles, DF-21 variants, and others in the segment—is theoretically central to China’s military planning against US carrier strike groups.
For the PLA, the Red Sea is more than a proxy battlefield; it is a testing ground for studying how US naval forces detect, track, intercept, and respond to missile and drone attacks under real combat conditions. Furthermore, Beijing’s support for the Houthis appears to have benefited China operationally. The militia has often spared Chinese vessels in attacks throughout the region, while the Houthis’ campaign against US naval forces likely yielded valuable data on American defenses. The PLA may use some of this data for its Indo-Pacific planning, though that operational environment no doubt differs from the Middle East.
In 2026, moreover, China likely expanded its Houthi-assistance model during Operation Epic Fury. By March, Iranian launch volumes had dropped. But Tehran’s targeting had become more selective, focusing on radar systems, aerial refueling, satellite communications (SATCOM), and command and control assets. The maturation of Iran’s targeting efforts suggests that the Islamic Republic benefited from external satellite imagery, geospatial intelligence, and artificial intelligence–enabled support.
Rather than relying on large-scale strikes designed to cause mass casualties, during Operation Epic Fury Iran targeted US strategic enablers—vital military support systems—across the Middle East. Satellite imagery confirms that Tehran struck high-value infrastructure, including the AN/FPS-132 early-warning radar in Qatar, where at least one array was damaged in March 2026. Similar strikes reportedly hit radar facilities at Al Ruwais and Al Sader in the United Arab Emirates during the same period.
The cost differential in these attacks was stark. Qatar purchased the AN/FPS-132 from the United States for $1.1 billion in 2013, while Iran used drones costing $20,000–$60,000 each to damage the radar. That asymmetry only amplified Tehran’s campaign.
Iran also targeted high-value aviation assets during Operation Epic Fury. Tehran reportedly damaged a US Air Force E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) in a March 27 strike on Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, and likely also damaged five KC-135 Stratotankers at the same facility on March 13. On February 28, additionally, an Iranian drone struck Naval Support Activity Bahrain, the headquarters of the US Fifth Fleet. Satellite imagery of the location later confirmed damage to large SATCOM terminals used for satellite communications.
Policy Implications
Despite Beijing’s public posture of neutrality in the conflict between the United States and Iran, China has become increasingly involved by providing Tehran with military, technological, and dual-use support. China’s commercial space sector is likely to play a strategically important for future conflicts in the Middle East. Nominally private Chinese firms closely tied to the CCP continue to supply Iran with imagery and intelligence support.
This arrangement affords Beijing deniability while providing Tehran with improved targeting intelligence. Furthermore, China’s modus operandi allows it to avoid open intervention by enabling Iran and its proxies through commercial channels while imposing costs on the US from a diplomatic distance.
America and its allies should expand efforts that addresses the de facto military assistance that Beijing is providing to the IRGC. To counter China’s activities, Washington and its allies should broaden sanctions targeting Beijing’s full enabling network, from its satellite manufacturers, brokers, artificial-intelligence firms, and banks to its insurers, cloud-computing providers, and logistics and procurement intermediaries.
Alongside sanctions, force-protection efforts by Washington and its allies should prioritize strategic enablers, including tankers, AWACS, early-warning radars, SATCOM terminals, fuel farms, air-defense nodes, command posts, munitions depots, and runway-repair assets. Improving force protection for these strategic enablers requires hardening military sites and air bases, as well as enhancing dispersion, deception, and redundancy for effectiveness.
Last, recent experience in the Middle East has provided the United States with a potential preview of Indo-Pacific contingencies that the future may bring. Iran’s Chinese-enabled strikes in the Gulf illustrate Beijing’s ability to study and target the United States’ operational architecture, and can inform Washington’s planning for future scenarios involving Taiwan.