Sustaining the Fight: Munitions Acquisition, Industrial Capacity, and Integrated Air and Missile Defense for Japan

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Executive Summary

At the end of 2026, Japan will update its three security documents that provide guidance for its security and defense policy over the next five years. Though Japan has made progress since the last update in 2022, several persistent gaps in missile procurement, particularly of interceptors, remain. Because of the changing strategic environment—which consists of enduring conflicts, greater American emphasis on capable partners, and qualitative changes in regional missile threats—Tokyo should consider several policy changes. For example, Japan should adopt an integrated approach to missile defense that pairs layered interception with ground-based systems able to attrit strike platforms before they launch, invest in production of munitions such as Patriot Advanced Capability-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (PAC-3 MSE) interceptors, work closely with the United States on procurement and co-production, and inform the Japanese public about the need for such measures. Though no country should undertake these measures lightly, they are necessary given the increasingly challenging security environment in East Asia.

The Changing Strategic Environment

As Japan prepares the next iteration of its three security documents—the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the Defense Buildup Program (DBP)—it needs to consider current and potential future strategic environments. The following are the themes for which it should prepare.

Nature and Duration of Conflicts

The documents should first consider the likely duration and nature of conflicts that Japan may face. The wars in Ukraine and Iran suggest that future conflicts against determined opponents will be long rather than short. Both conflicts also have a stop-start, intermittent aspect to them—periods of alternating intensity paired with inconsistent truces and peace overtures—that help elongate them. In similar circumstances, Japan’s ability to develop resilient and sustainable warfighting capabilities on its own soil will be vital.

In addition, future conflicts will likely heavily feature long-range strike capabilities and gray-zone tactics that seek to minimize response times. These tactics can take many forms, such as electronic or information warfare, blurred legal and territorial boundaries, or normalization of provocative and rule-breaking behavior. China’s navy, coast guard, and maritime militia already engage in such actions in the South China Sea, around Taiwan, and in Japan’s exclusive economic zone. In comparable circumstances, the ability to secure persistent situational awareness and quick defensive responses to provocations will be necessary.

US Strategic Priorities and Implications for Japan

As Tokyo develops its own set of strategic documents for late 2026, America’s 2025 NSS and the 2026 NDS serve as natural points of reference given Japan’s role as Washington’s most important ally. For Japan, the two documents emphasize three important American strategic priorities that will have a bearing on the Indo-Pacific.

First, US allies need to do more to support global security. As the NSS declares, “We count among our many allies and partners dozens of wealthy, sophisticated nations that must assume primary responsibility for their regions and contribute far more to our collective defense.”^[1] The Trump administration has assertively pushed North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies to increase defense spending to 5 percent.^[2] Japan, in reaction to the challenging regional environment, has increased its defense spending to 2 percent two years early and will likely increase it further.^[3]

Second, Japan needs to deter China through strength. The NDS and President Donald Trump’s recent visit to Beijing indicate that the United States wants to engage with China to achieve short-term strategic stability between the two countries.^[4] Yet Washington will still seek to defend its interests and the First Island Chain in the Pacific from a position of strength. Meanwhile, tensions between Tokyo and Beijing have increased since October 2025, when Japan affirmed that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would constitute a “survival-threatening situation.”^[5] Beijing responded with export restrictions against Japan, and Chinese diplomatic officials made personal threats against Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi.^[6] Despite such provocations and Beijing’s claims that Tokyo is remilitarizing,^[7] Japan has neither retaliated nor escalated against China. Rather, like the United States, it has focused on building its defensive strength.

Third, the US requires allies like Japan to develop resilient supply chains and consistent access to critical materials. After China used its dominance in rare earths for economic coercion in 2025,^[8] the American NSS made secure supply chains a requisite for a secure Western Hemisphere and a free and open Indo-Pacific. Japan shares similar priorities, as secure and resilient energy and material supply chains are a central component of the updated Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept that Prime Minister Takaichi introduced in Vietnam on May 2.^[9]

Qualitative Changes in Regional Missile Threats

The threat environment facing Japan has transformed in both quality and scale. The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) has deployed an integrated theater strike posture spanning the entire First Island Chain, combining ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and hypersonic glide vehicles. According to the Department of War (DoW), the PLARF maintains approximately 550 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs, primarily DF-26) and 1,300 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs, including the DF-21 and DF-17), for a combined total of roughly 1,850 missiles capable of reaching the Japanese home islands.^[10] China has oriented an additional 900 short-range ballistic missiles primarily toward Taiwan, though some can reach Japan’s Southwest Islands.

However, the threat extends well beyond the PLARF’s ground-launched missiles. China would most likely employ highly responsive ballistic and hypersonic missiles at the outset of hostilities to strike air defense systems, radar sites, and command-and-control nodes, degrading Japan’s defensive posture. In parallel, H-6K/N bombers would conduct standoff attacks, launching cruise missiles from beyond the reach of Japan’s air defenses. Once China has achieved that degradation—as the United States demonstrated against Iran—tactical fighters such as the J-16 and future H-20 stealth bombers could conduct repeated stand-in attacks with cheaper munitions such as glide bombs. As the Hudson Institute report Strengthening the Front Line details, most of the PLA’s strike capacity against Japan resides in air-delivered munitions.^[11] The PLA can deploy thousands of weapons a day, mostly from bombers launching cruise missiles or guided glide bombs.

These threats will continue to grow. The PLARF’s DF-26 IRBM inventory grew from zero in 2016 to approximately 550 by 2025, and its MRBM holdings have expanded rapidly over the same period. The fielding of the H-20 stealth bomber will represent a qualitative and quantitative leap in PLA standoff strike capability. Moreover, the increasing range of PLA bombers and the expanding blue-water capability of PLA Navy carrier strike groups mean air threats to the Japanese archipelago will increasingly come not only from the west—across the Sea of Japan and East China Sea—but also from the Pacific side. The combined volume of ground-launched missiles and air-delivered munitions that China and its allies can direct against Japan could reach several times the current level by the late 2030s. North Korea is also fielding maneuverable hypersonic glide vehicles and pursuing saturation attack concepts.

This threat structure demands a truly nationwide integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) posture that balances the expansion of interceptor inventories (active defense) with resilience measures such as dispersal, hardened shelters, and deception (passive defense). Japan possesses indigenous and license-produced air defense missile development and production capabilities. But even if Tokyo combines domestically produced and foreign-procured interceptors, the overall interceptor stockpile, production capacity, and acquisition posture remain insufficient relative to the projected threat.

Japan’s Defense Buildup: Progress and Remaining Gaps

Achievements Since 2022

Since the adoption of Japan’s three strategic documents in December 2022, the country has significantly strengthened its defense capabilities. For example, it has accelerated fielding of the Type 25 surface-to-ship guided missile; acquired Tomahawk cruise missiles; constructed Aegis system-equipped vessels; expanded intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities; and forward deployed forces to the Southwest Islands. The establishment of the Joint Operations Command (Japan) and the elevation of US Forces Japan to a joint force headquarters have deepened bilateral command-and-control integration.

The current DBP also gave unprecedented emphasis to investments in sustainability and resiliency. It identified ammunition and munitions as one of seven priority areas and allocates approximately ¥2 trillion ($12.4 billion; approximately ¥5 trillion when related areas are included) over five years. This represents a historic shift compared with previous plans. The DBP set a two-phase target:

1. Resolve munitions shortfalls and establish the capacity to repel an invasion by FY2027.
2. Strengthen defense capabilities to intercept and defeat aggression at earlier stages and greater distances by approximately FY2032.

Persistent Gaps in Munitions Investment

Despite these improvements, Japan’s stockpiles of munitions and interceptors remain insufficient relative to the evolving threat environment. The tendency to prioritize high-cost platforms—F-35s, F-15 Japan Super Interceptor upgrades, Aegis system-equipped vessels—over munitions procurement is not unique to Japan. But the effect is amplified for items procured through foreign military sales (FMS). The US determines production schedules and allocation priorities, and any interruption in procurement makes regaining a production slot difficult. No matter how many platforms Japan fields, it cannot maintain combat sustainability without adequate munitions—a lesson the war in Ukraine has made unmistakably clear.

The clearest illustration of this problem is the zero-new-procurement request for PAC-3 MSE interceptors in Japan’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2026 budget request. The PAC-3 MSE serves as the terminal defense layer of Japan’s multilayered IAMD architecture. Although Mitsubishi Heavy Industries produces the missile airframe domestically under license from Lockheed Martin, the seeker—a critical guidance component—depends on Boeing providing supplies, constraining domestic production capacity. In practice, even the license-produced PAC-3 MSE faces supply bottlenecks similar to those of pure FMS items.

Concerning the supply of components, there are some encouraging and less-encouraging developments. On the encouraging side, Lockheed Martin is working to increase PAC-3 MSE annual production from approximately 600 to 2,000 interceptors by around 2032 under a seven-year framework agreement it signed with the Pentagon in January 2026. Boeing has also begun expanding its Huntsville, Alabama, seeker production facility to increase output by 30 percent. It expects the additional production line to become operational around 2027. On the less-encouraging side, these ramp-ups are gradual, and near-term supply relief will take time. Beyond the war in Ukraine, the US and its Gulf allies consumed a massive amount of Patriot interceptors during Operation Epic Fury against Iran, with reports of up to 1,000 rounds fired in less than a month. Until production increases take full effect, the US and its allies worldwide will compete for limited stocks, and the allocation environment is likely to tighten further. This supply pressure is not limited to the PAC-3 MSE; other air defense missiles procured through FMS, including the Standard Missile (SM) 3 and 6, face similar structural constraints.

Any interruption in procurement risks lowering Japan’s priority in the production line and may place it at a disadvantage in an increasingly competitive allocation process. The strategic cost of pausing procurement at this juncture is significant; Japan should instead maintain procurement continuity while pursuing an expanded supply of key components, such as seekers, through cooperative frameworks.

Wargame Evidence on Required Stockpiles

Hudson Institute conducted multiple wargames that confirmed these operational challenges. Each wargame simulated a Taiwan contingency in the 2035–40 time frame, in which China conducts simultaneous, multi-axis strikes against the Japanese homeland with hypersonic and ballistic missiles to prevent US and Japanese intervention. By the late 2030s, analysts expect the primary missile threats that Japan faces to shift toward Dongfeng-17 (DF-17) series hypersonic glide vehicles and Chang Jian 1000 (CJ-1000) hypersonic cruise missiles. These threats are far more difficult to intercept than legacy ballistic missiles, demanding substantially more advanced sensor, command-and-control, and interceptor capabilities than those available in 2026.

While these simulations occurred under specific conditions, in one wargame, over a combat period extending up to roughly one week, China launched 364 DF-17 hypersonic glide missiles and 144 CJ-1000 hypersonic cruise missiles—a total of 508 missiles—against Japan. Defending teams consumed an average of approximately 318 PAC-3 MSE interceptors.

In another wargame, under different scenario conditions, China launched an average of approximately 426 missiles over approximately three days of combat. They included CJ-1000 hypersonic cruise missiles, KD-21 air-launched ballistic missiles, and DF-27 ballistic missiles. Japanese forces consumed an average of approximately 105 PAC-3 MSE interceptors, and the broader multilayered air defense system, including future long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs)—Chu-SAM, SM-6, SM-3, and Evolved SeaSparrow Missile—also expended large quantities of interceptors.

These wargames yielded two key findings.

First, PAC-3 MSE interceptor consumption was substantial in both wargames—at levels that would exhaust current inventories within days of sustained high-intensity combat. Forces employed the PAC-3 MSE not only for conventional ballistic missile defense but also for intercepting hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles in the wargames. At the same time, the multilayered air defense system as a whole consumed large quantities of interceptors across all tiers. Efforts to deepen stockpile depth throughout the entire interceptor architecture should therefore accompany expansion of PAC-3 MSE procurement. At the very least, this Japanese stockpile should include sufficient PAC-3 MSE interceptors to ensure sustainable expenditures in numerous high-intensity scenarios.

Second, as described earlier, the initial barrage of ballistic and hypersonic missiles poses a serious threat in its own right. However, even if Japan can defend against these opening strikes, it also needs to be able to stop the bombers, tactical fighters, and one-way attack drones that follow—otherwise, the defense cannot be sustained. In the wargames, destroying strike platforms before they could launch (shoot the archer), not merely intercepting incoming missiles (shoot the arrow), proved critical to sustaining overall operational effectiveness. The wargames tested a long-range kill chain concept that combined ground-based SAMs with uncrewed sensors and uncrewed targeting aircraft to engage PLA bombers and airborne early-warning aircraft at ranges exceeding 300 nautical miles. Destroying bombers not only halted their current attacks but also prevented future sorties by those aircraft. Moreover, the persistent threat forced surviving bombers to launch from longer ranges, which gave air defenses more opportunities to intercept cruise missiles, reduced damage to airfields, and in turn preserved more aircraft on the ground—enabling additional fighter sorties. These compounding benefits were essential to sustaining the fight.

Policy Considerations for Future National Security Documents

The Need for an Integrated Approach

These findings underscore the necessity of an IAMD posture that balances three elements:

1. Prelaunch attrition of strike platforms including bombers (shoot the archer)
2. Layered interception of ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missiles (shoot the arrow)
3. Dispersal, hardened shelters, and deception to sustain operations after absorbing attacks (passive defense)

Expanding PAC-3 MSE procurement is essential as the terminal defense layer, but it alone cannot address all phases of the threat. With regard to shooting the archer in particular, Japan’s defensive counter-air (DCA) capability has traditionally centered on fighter aircraft whose operations depend on runways. However, as described earlier, if the opening missile barrage neutralizes air bases, it will severely constrain fighter-based DCA. Runway-independent, ground-based DCA capabilities are therefore essential. These include very-long-range surface-to-air missiles (VLR-SAMs), which are systems that have an effective engagement range of 500 nautical miles and can engage high-value airborne assets such as bombers, airborne early-warning and control aircraft, and tankers from ground-based launchers. Japan will also need the ground-launched LongShot. Developed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, these one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicles would be launched by dispersed ground launchers and be equipped with air-to-air missiles to destroy enemy fighter-bombers at the merge. Together with the PAC-3 MSE and long-range SAMs (which would engage tactical fighters and establish defensive sanctuary around Japan Air Self-Defense Force basing), these systems should form the backbone of a ground-based IAMD architecture.

Why Munitions Investment Matters to Japan’s Defense Resilience

Operational Value. The PAC-3 MSE serves as the terminal defense layer engaging threats that have penetrated upper-tier interceptors (SM-3, SM-6, Chu-SAM, and others)—the indispensable foundation on which the entire multilayered air defense architecture depends. Moreover, as its extensive combat use in Ukraine and Operation Epic Fury demonstrates, the PAC-3 is the most battle-proven terminal defense system in existence, with its operational effectiveness being demonstrated in multiple conflicts. Sustaining the entire interceptor architecture requires expanding this terminal defense layer alongside investment in VLR-SAMs, LongShot, and other tiers.

Industrial Base Sustainability. Interrupting procurement risks damaging highly specialized supply chains through supplier withdrawal, skilled workforce attrition, and production line shutdowns—damage that takes years to reverse and weakens the foundation of co-production efforts. Continuous, efficient, bulk-buy procurement predictably provides many benefits. It helps maintain industrial base stability by driving costs down and cutting down production lead time, and coinciding with US procurement of similar missiles. Such procurement also aligns the US and other like-minded nations operationally. Ensuring steady and stable procurement of vital munitions such as PAC-3 MSE interceptors is vital for Japan’s readiness to respond to future contingencies that may suddenly arise.

In addition, a steady and significant procurement schedule makes certain that, as the US and most of its allies and partners are increasing their PAC-3 MSE acquisitions, Japan’s contracts for the interceptor receive priority and improved volume pricing.

US-Japan Joint Operations and the Importance of Stockpiling. Ukraine has been able to sustain wartime logistics and receive continuous ammunition resupply from allies through its relatively secure western regions. Japan’s situation would be fundamentally different: in a contingency, the entire archipelago would likely be under persistent attack, making it far more difficult to transport and resupply interceptors safely once a conflict has begun. Peacetime stockpiling is therefore more important for Japan than it has been for Ukraine. If Japan’s air defense posture is inadequate, the risks and costs of conducting operations from Japan—whether defensive or offensive—rise substantially. A Japan that remains defensively vulnerable would make the defense of Taiwan and the First Island Chain untenable and could render US defense commitments in the Western Pacific unsustainable. For the United States to maintain forward defense in this region, Japan should strengthen its own defense posture—including interceptor stockpiles—and underpin its geopolitical indispensability with substantive defense capability.

Industrial Cooperation: Procurement and Production

In addition, the recent Iran conflict showcases the need for increased procurement of munitions through both foreign purchases and domestic production. In 2023, then-Minister of Defense Minoru Kihara announced that Japan would increase and speed up its purchase of American Tomahawk missiles, affirming the two nations’ close cooperation.^[12] In the two months since the Iran War began, the DoW has used up significant stockpiles of its long-range strike and interceptor missiles.^[13] To replenish these stocks, the US will delay its shipment of similar weapons to its allies, such as the 400 Tomahawk missiles Japan agreed to buy.^[14] Though the United States has made increased defense industrial production a priority, capacity remains a major constraint; Tomahawks take 47 months to build and deliver. Given the risk of potential contingencies, Japan should balance external purchases with domestic sourcing and co-production.

Japan-US co-production through mechanisms such as the Defense Industrial Cooperation, Acquisition, and Sustainment Plenary offers a great deal of promise. In April 2026, officials from the DoW and Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Agency met and pledged to deepen defense industrial cooperation.^[15] The Missile Co-production Working Group received updates on programs such as the AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile and SM-3 Block IIA missiles. Though defense officials in Washington and Tokyo have not yet made any decisions about the PAC-3 MSE, both sides agreed to accelerate the development of concrete measures that would improve production efficiency. Given the importance of the PAC-3 MSE to the current conflict in Iran, this should be a priority.

Public Policy Information for Munitions Investment

Finally, the three new national security documents and the Japanese government should convey to the Japanese people how the regional and global environment poses challenges and why Japan’s security and defense industrial base efforts are vital to protecting Japan and its interests. The Japanese public is largely already aware of these considerations. For instance, in a 2025 Cabinet Office survey on the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) and Japanese security, 92 percent responded that the US-Japan alliance contributes to Japan’s security, and 90.9 percent responded that Japan should retain the bilateral alliance and rely on the JSDF for its security.^[16] In the aftermath of Prime Minister Takaichi’s October 2025 comments about a Taiwan contingency, a Kyodo poll found that 48.8 percent of the Japanese population supported the right to collective self-defense in a Chinese attack on Taiwan, while 44.2 percent opposed. However, a robust 60.4 percent of those surveyed backed the prime minister’s plan to increase the country’s defense spending.^[17]

These figures demonstrate that Japanese voters are aware of the security challenges their country faces in increasingly adverse regional and global environments. Yet the Japanese government’s ambitious plans to increase Japanese defense spending, overseas military exports, and other aspects of the three security documents will require significant resources and create new responsibilities for the JSDF. To make its defense policies successful, the Japanese government needs to expand its efforts to inform and engage with the Japanese public about the necessity and purpose of an increased security footprint.

Conclusion

The Takaichi government faces numerous policy questions on multiple fronts: energy security, industrial investments, the US-Japan alliance, Chinese economic coercion, and more. Yet the release of the three security documents in late 2026 will have a significant impact on Japan’s future security trajectory in an increasingly insecure East Asia. The strategic environment has changed significantly since the last security document release in 2022. An analysis of recent policies and wargaming results suggests that to protect Japan’s interests, the next set of security documents should emphasize an integrated approach to missile defense, invest in production of munitions such as PAC-3 MSE interceptors, work closely with the US on procurement and production, and inform the Japanese public about the need for such measures. These efforts will inevitably create even more work for Japanese government and security officials, yet they are necessary to enhance Japan’s security in the medium term and beyond.

The authors thank their colleagues at Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts and Technology (CDCT) for their contributions to the wargames underpinning this analysis. We are especially grateful to Shane Dennin for his work analyzing the engagement data. We also thank CDCT Director Bryan Clark, Timothy A. Walton, David Byrd, Dan Patt, and Zane Rivers, among other colleagues, for their insights and advice. Any remaining errors are our own.

Endotes

1. National Security Strategy of the United States of America (White House, November 2025), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf. ↑
2. “Defence Expenditures and NATO’s 5% Commitment,” NATO, April 10, 2026, https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/introduction-to-nato/defence-expenditures-and-natos-5-commitment. ↑
3. Dzirhan Mahadzir, “Japan Poised to Increase Defense Spending to $70 Billion, 2% of its GDP,” USNI News, December 3, 2025, https://news.usni.org/2025/12/03/japan-poised-to-increase-defense-spending-to-70-billion-2-of-its-gdp. ↑
4. “Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Secures Historic Deals with China, Delivering for American Workers, Farmers, and Industry,” White House, May 17, 2026, https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2026/05/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-secures-historic-deals-with-china-delivering-for-american-workers-farmers-and-industry. ↑
5. John Geddie, Tim Kelly, and Mariko Katsumura, “Why Japan PM’s Taiwan Remarks Escalated Tensions with China,” Reuters, November 20, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/why-did-japan-pms-taiwan-remarks-cause-such-stir-2025-11-11. ↑
6. Colleen Howe, Liz Lee, Rocky Swift, Kentaro Okasaka, and Anton Bridge, “China Imposes Export Controls on 20 Japanese Entities to Curb ‘Remilitarisation,’” Reuters, February 24, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-adds-20-japanese-entities-export-control-list-2026-02-24; “Japan Protests Chinese Envoy’s Beheading Post Tied to Takaichi,” The Asahi Shimbun, November 10, 2025, https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/16147746. ↑
7. Leo Lewis, Joe Leahy, and Demetri Sevastopulo, “Xi Jinping Railed Against Japan’s ‘Remilitarisation’ at Donald Trump Summit,” Financial Times, May 24, 2026, https://www.ft.com/content/70e922b3-c423-40f2-9c9d-1c64a38e026b. ↑
8. William Chou, China’s Bureaucratic Playbook for Critical Minerals (Hudson Institute, 2025), https://www.hudson.org/supply-chains/chinas-bureaucratic-playbook-critical-minerals-control-technology-transfer-william-chou. ↑
9. Sanae Takaichi, foreign policy speech at Vietnam National University (provisional English translation), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, May 2, 2026, https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/101022881.pdf. ↑
10. Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (Department of War, 2025), https://media.defense.gov/2025/Dec/23/2003849070/-1/-1/1/ANNUAL-REPORT-TO-CONGRESS-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2025.PDF. ↑
11. Bryan Clark, David Byrd, Masashi Murano, Timothy A. Walton, and Shane Dennin, Strengthening the Front Line: Transforming the Japan Self-Defense Force for Twenty-First-Century Deterrence (Hudson Institute, 2026), https://www.hudson.org/defense-strategy/strengthening-front-line-transforming-japan-self-defense-force-twenty-first-bryan-clark-david-byrd-masashi-murano-tim-walton-shane-dennin. ↑
12. Minoru Kihara, “Japanese Security in an Uncertain Indo-Pacific,” remarks and interview by Kenneth R. Weinstein, Hudson Institute, October 4, 2023, https://www.hudson.org/events/japanese-security-uncertain-indo-pacific-minoru-kihara. ↑
13. Rebecca Schneid, “The US Is Facing an Ammunition Shortage Due to the Iran War. Here’s What That Means,” Time, May 12, 2026, https://time.com/article/2026/05/12/US-ammunition-shortage-iran-war. ↑
14. Demetri Sevastopulo, “US Warns Japan of Severe Delays in Tomahawk Deliveries Due to Iran War,” Financial Times, May 23, 2026, https://www.ft.com/content/406bc3bb-068b-4f4c-b064-23082e8a9f70. ↑
15. Ministry of Defense (Japan), “The 4th Japan-US Defense Industrial Cooperation, Acquisition, and Sustainment (DICAS 2.0),” news release, April 2026, https://www.mod.go.jp/en/article/2026/04/119520c9725a022e137f982c87f919e8b7d95cb4.html. ↑
16. “自衛隊・防衛問題に関する世論調査” [Public opinion survey report summary version (preliminary),” Government of Japan, January 9, 2026, https://survey.gov-online.go.jp/diplomacy_defense/202601/r07/r07-bouei. ↑
17. Satoshi Sugiyama, “Japanese Divided on Military Response to China over Taiwan, Kyodo Poll Shows,” Reuters, November 16, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/japanese-divided-military-response-china-over-taiwan-kyodo-poll-shows-2025-11-16. ↑