Over three years have passed since Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered his forces to capture the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of eastern Ukraine. And 21 months have elapsed since Russia began its major assault on the city of Pokrovsk, a critical Ukrainian stronghold in Donetsk.
Battlefield geometry makes Pokrovsk uniquely consequential: reports of Russian advances in the city have produced international headlines for weeks. Should Russian combat formations take control of the city, they will be positioned to assault Ukraine’s principal fortifications along the Kostyantynivka-Sloviansk-Kramatorsk axis.
At least that was the assumption until now. Instead, a United States–led initiative under negotiation for the past several weeks is attempting to alter the dynamics of the conflict permanently. The initiative calls on Ukraine to withdraw from its fortifications in Donetsk—and would turn the region into a demilitarized zone that Russia insists should be recognized as its own territory. Reportedly, the US is asking Ukraine to decide on the proposal in a matter of days.
While this plan pursues the salutary aim of ending a bloody war, it is only palatable to Moscow if Russia is granted more territory at the negotiating table than what it has been able to seize on the battlefield in three years of grueling combat. Rather than entertain the dismantlement of key planks in Ukraine’s defenses, US and European policymakers would do well to refocus on supporting Ukraine as best they are able—and let Kyiv take its chances on the battlefield if it so chooses.
This year, at the cost of more than 350,000 casualties, Russia has conquered roughly 1 percent of Ukrainian territory. To take the rest of Donetsk in combat, Russia would likely need to sacrifice hundreds of thousands more soldiers. Even then, its preferred outcome would hardly be assured.
The initial US proposal, now under negotiation, rests on two assumptions: that handing Putin Donetsk will persuade him to honor a ceasefire, at least temporarily; and that Ukraine will be hard-pressed to stanch further Russian gains in the event of continued fighting. Given battlefield realities, so this thinking goes, it is better to take a bad deal now than face collapse later. To sugarcoat this bitter pill, the US is offering Ukraine a security guarantee in the event Russia breaks its commitment and resumes military operations.
That so many critics of US assistance to Ukraine are cheering this proposal underscores how its security guarantee deserves real scrutiny. After all, if the US is careful in how it calibrates its military assistance to Ukraine now, would it really be prepared to go to the mat with Russia to defend Kyiv later? In 2008, Putin invaded Georgia during the waning days of a Bush presidency that was managing conflicts elsewhere and preoccupied with a global financial crisis. It is not difficult to imagine Putin making a similar move at the end of the Trump presidency, especially if the US is buffeted by major headwinds like, say, a downturn in artificial intelligence market valuations or a military crisis in Latin America. Even at full strength, would any hypothetical American president be willing to combat deploy US troops to confront Russia in Ukraine?
These dynamics leave Ukraine with one true security guarantee: its own armed forces. Vice President JD Vance may be correct when he writes, “There is a fantasy that if we just give more money, more weapons, or more sanctions, victory is at hand.” But neither is Ukraine on the cusp of defeat. Only Kyiv should decide whether to abandon some of its best defensive positions in exchange for a ceasefire that the Kremlin could violate at any time.
The questions of territorial concessions and security guarantees being negotiated are exceptionally sensitive. There is no doubt that Washington possesses enormous leverage in these talks. When the US briefly paused intelligence sharing with Kyiv in early March, for example, Ukraine’s position in the Russian region of Kursk deteriorated rapidly and decisively. Europe, simply put, cannot compensate for America’s unrivaled space-based assets and high-end battle networks. Similarly, Zelenskyy never misses an opportunity to plead for more US-built Patriot missile defense systems.
But it would be a mistake if Washington used this advantage to insist on terms that Kyiv believes would imperil its defenses. The resulting collapse in Ukrainian morale could do greater damage to the country’s cohesion and fighting power than even today’s high desertion and casualty rates.
For the Kremlin, that may very well be the point. The Russian elite sees the war in Ukraine as a confrontation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and aims to destroy the Ukrainian armed forces and decapitate the country’s leadership. Moscow will only accept a political agreement to end the war that facilitates these goals.
Failing that, the Kremlin hopes the ongoing talks will sow division between Ukraine and its Western partners, as well as among NATO allies. But as Putin made clear at several points over the past week, what he will not do is compromise on key terms. Russia holds the same basic positions now that it has held since at least the Alaska summit this August. The US peace initiative, reinforced by a new National Security Strategy this week that criticizes Europe for its stance on the war, will only entrench Putin’s attitude.
As negotiations unfold, US and European leaders should put forward an honest and forthright assessment of what they can and cannot provide Ukraine in its fight for survival, from economic aid and military assistance to harsher sanctions and export controls. Forging such a common understanding upfront is the key to gaining a true picture of what is possible on the battlefield and to avoiding transatlantic divisions that Russia will seek to exploit. Whether to continue fighting—or agree to an ugly truce—should then fall to decision-makers in Kyiv.