In promoting the deal to end the Iran war, Vice President JD Vance’s key argument is that Iran would not be rewarded unless it complies with the deal’s provisions. As Vance put it on Fox News on Monday night, the deal provides that “if the Iranians behave, and if there are sanctions relief, and if the Iranians are integrated into the world economy, we would invite other countries, not us, but other countries, to invest in their country. That’s fine. But only if they comply with the terms of the agreement.”
That is the standard reassurance Western leaders over the past century have offered when they make deals of this kind with bad actors — but it has generally proved hollow.
The pattern is well established: A democracy concludes a peace or arms control deal with a nondemocratic adversary. On the democratic side, political leaders win valuable credit with the public. They explain to skeptics that compliance will be verified and enforced, and violations will end the deal. The adversary then breaks its word, but the politicians on the democratic side do not want to discredit the deal they made. They do not drop it, let alone claw back benefits from the other side. The adversary learns — or knew all along — that it can violate the deal without significant penalty.
Consider the Treaty of Versailles. The World War I Allies imposed restrictions on Germany, limiting its army, navy and armaments production. Germany violated these provisions for years, rearming covertly through the 1920s and openly after 1933. The Allies who had pledged to enforce the treaty either turned a blind eye or watched with war-weary acquiescence.
Consider the Cold War. U.S. administrations of both parties signed arms control agreements with the Soviets, promising that violations would have consequences. The Soviets often broke their word, but there was virtually no enforcement.
An especially instructive case relates to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the centerpiece of Nixon-era détente. The Soviets built a massive phased-array radar at Krasnoyarsk, deep in Siberia, oriented in a way the treaty plainly prohibited. U.S. satellites discovered the facility under construction in 1983. The White House at the time was hardly in the hands of fainthearted doves. The president was Ronald Reagan, a hardheaded leader and an arms control skeptic.
Reagan called for strict compliance with such agreements and said he would “not accept anything less.” The House (by 418-0) and the Senate (by 92-3) called the radar a clear violation of the treaty. Senators urged Reagan in 1988 to declare the violation a “material breach,” but State Department officials opposed the idea. Reagan complained to the Soviets but ultimately did not abrogate the treaty. It appears that even he was unwilling to buck the popularity of agreements of that kind. The Krasnoyarsk violation was never punished.
Consider the 1993 Oslo Accords. In signing the agreement with the Palestine Liberation Organization, Israeli leaders said that if the PLO’s peace promises were violated, the accords would be terminated and Israel’s concessions reversed. The Palestinian leadership failed to fulfill key commitments relating to terrorism and to inciting hatred and violence. It gave financial benefits to imprisoned terrorists and their families. Yet, Israel has never been able to compel the PLO’s compliance. Israel did not withdraw from the accords, let alone reverse its concessions.
What explains this pattern? It is structural, not merely naive. Leaders of democracies who sign such agreements make a political investment in them that becomes more important than taking enforcement action when the other side fails to comply.
If a violation is reported, democratic leadership’s initial reaction typically is to say it’s unclear whether a violation has occurred. If it becomes undeniable, the second response is that the violation is not serious — which is what happened when a congressional delegation, after inspecting Krasnoyarsk in 1987, called the radar a violation of the treaty’s letter but not its “spirit.” And when the violation’s seriousness cannot be denied, the third response is that there is no good option for enforcing compliance. That is where the Reagan administration stood in 1988.
Vance’s defense of the Iran deal contradicts itself. Asked whether Iran would gain access to a $300 billion reconstruction fund, he did not say no. Instead, he laid out the points about Iran’s cooperation and its integration into the “world economy” and the United States inviting other countries to invest. But, once the funds were invested, they would not evaporate because Iran violated the agreement. If a capital infusion were made before a violation came to light, Iran would almost certainly keep the money as U.S. leaders debated whether the evidence of the violation was clear, whether it was significant and whether there was a good option for remedying it.
This is why the deal should produce no financial benefit for Iran until after Iranian leaders allow the U.S. or a reliable third party to dismantle and carry away its nuclear and missile facilities. Vance’s point would be valid if Iran made its key concessions irreversible before it received any sanctions relief or frozen assets.
The Islamic Republic of Iran has a long record of violating promises. History tells us to expect that, after benefiting financially, it will violate the deal and there will be no enforcement.