A recent U.S. intelligence assessment indicates that Russia could test NATO’s resolve over the next few years with a limited attack, possibly against a Baltic state or Poland. The warning follows others made over the summer. But there is another country that may be even more likely to find itself in Russia’s crosshairs, and it has gone largely unnoticed by policymakers: Moldova — a small country in the heart of eastern Europe nestled between Romania and Ukraine.
As Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine approaches the four-and-a-half-year mark, with no end in sight and little progress on the battlefield, the Kremlin may become increasingly desperate to seize the initiative.
Outside the Euro-Atlantic structures of NATO and the European Union, Moldova is particularly vulnerable. At a time when Russian President Vladimir Putin is facing considerable military difficulties in Ukraine, why provoke the might of the entire NATO alliance when Russia could escalate more safely and easily in Moldova?
For the Kremlin, this makes strategic sense. Moscow sees Moldova as part of the same geopolitical struggle as Ukraine. Had Ukraine fallen in 2022, there is little doubt that Moldova would also have been consumed. While Western policymakers view Ukraine and Moldova as two distinct countries presenting different geopolitical challenges, Moscow sees them as part of the same interconnected strategic space.
Russia also already has a military presence, albeit small, in Transnistria, the Russian-occupied breakaway region of Moldova that lies mostly on the eastern bank of the Dniester River. This gives the Kremlin options.
For the most part, the administrative boundary between Moldova and the de facto Transnistrian authorities remains calm. In fact, since Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the de facto authorities in Transnistria have, for the most part, behaved responsibly to avoid any local confrontations. But this does not mean that Russia could not use its vast influence there to provoke a crisis.
A localized clash involving Russian or Transnistrian forces would not be enough to overwhelm Moldova’s security forces. The Russian military presence in Transnistria is not sufficiently large to do so. But such a clash could provide Moscow with a pretext to intervene more directly using drones and missiles, with possibly devastating consequences for Moldova.
Russian missiles and drones have already repeatedly entered Moldovan airspace from Ukraine. This steady drumbeat of incursions risks desensitizing the West to violations of Moldovan sovereignty. What is initially dismissed as another case of spillover from the war in Ukraine could create an environment in which a more deliberate Russian attack on Moldova is not immediately recognized for what it is.
Any military escalation would almost certainly be accompanied by intensified hybrid warfare. Russia has repeatedly interfered in Moldovan elections, financed opposition political movements, and sought to influence politicians, and continues to meddle in Moldovan society when possible.
But any Russian escalation against Moldova would carry risks for the Kremlin. An attack on Moldova would not automatically trigger NATO intervention, yet it is difficult to imagine either Ukraine or Romania standing idly by as Moldova descended into chaos. Ukraine could face domestic pressure to intervene in Transnistria and remove the remaining Russian military presence there. Romania, with its exceptionally close cultural and political ties to Moldova, could face similar pressure to act.
The ultimate prize for the Kremlin would be to create enough instability to remove Moldova’s democratically elected pro-European government and replace it with a Kremlin puppet. This would give Moscow another way to pressure Ukraine’s western flank, particularly around Odesa. At a minimum, Russia could seek enough instability to derail Moldova’s path toward European Union membership. Brussels would be hesitant to admit a country descending into chaos.
Moldovan society has proven to be very resilient. Any military intervention would be limited to only airstrikes, as the small Russian force in Transnistria is geographically isolated. There is no guarantee for Moscow that the de facto authorities in Transnistria would play along with any Russian adventurism that could be hugely destabilizing for people living on both sides of the Dniester River. If it goes badly, Russia could lose Transnistria forever — and with it an important source of leverage and influence in Eastern Europe that the frozen conflict has provided for more than three decades.
Although Moldova is not a NATO member, it is exactly the sort of partner the United States should support. Chișinău has navigated an extraordinarily difficult geopolitical environment since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine while strengthening relations with Washington. Moldova has been one of the few European countries to answer the Trump administration’s call to reduce tariffs on American imports to 0%, for example, while simultaneously taking important steps to diversify its energy supplies.
It does not take much imagination to see how a localized confrontation over a Moldovan town or village along the Dniester could rapidly become a major geopolitical crisis in Europe.
While policymakers debate where Russia might test NATO, they should also think more creatively about where Moscow might escalate without directly confronting the alliance.
The warning signs are there. Now is not the time to look away.