For the United States, the lesson has been immediate and powerful. Over the course of the war, U.S. installations across the Persian Gulf have proved highly vulnerable, as Iranian drone attacks have damaged critical assets in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and elsewhere.
These strikes have not been limited to military bases and airfields. Ports, airports, refineries and energy terminals have also been targeted. Many of these sites were effectively defenseless. The attacks have caused tens of billions of dollars in damage and significantly affected the global economy. The attack on the Ras Laffan liquefied natural gas plant in Qatar, the largest in the world, reduced Qatar’s LNG export capacity by 17 percent. Repairs could take up to five years.
In the U.S., recent incidents have made this issue more urgent. In March, sophisticated drones appeared over military bases in Louisiana and D.C., raising concerns that hostile forces are already unafraid to breach American borders. They may have even positioned capabilities within the U.S.
The Pentagon has moved to install more robust defenses on its bases, but the harder question is what to do about everything else. The age of drone warfare means that the universe of targets vulnerable to attacks has expanded far beyond what government alone can reasonably protect. The government cannot station military-grade air defenses at every refinery, power plant or industrial facility.
That’s why private operators need the authority to adopt basic defenses to protect their own assets. This may sound radical, but it shouldn’t.
Owners of sensitive facilities already secure their perimeters on land. They erect fences, control access points and even employ armed guards. The same goes for cybersecurity, with companies that operate important infrastructure deploying their own systems to guard against attacks. In a crisis, companies still rely on public authorities — the police, the military, the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security — but in-house security measures deter intrusion and buy time.
Airspace requires the same attention. The first step to securing the sky is establishing a defensible perimeter above critical sites — a virtual fence. The Federal Aviation Administration already restricts airspace around major events and sensitive government locations. It needs to develop a mechanism to do the same for critical infrastructure.
But what happens when a drone crosses that boundary?
That’s when the second layer of security kicks in: electronic defenses. Directed-energy tools such as high-powered microwaves and electronic jamming can neutralize threats without the need to fire a projectile into crowded airspace.
However, even these countermeasures pose risks. Anti-drone systems can interfere with civilian aviation and must therefore operate within strict limits. To ensure defensive effects remain contained, these systems will require range constraints, geofenced boundaries and automatic shutoffs.
These capabilities already exist. Modern systems can define precise technical boundaries, ensuring they do not impact aircraft above a set altitude. They can also automatically cease operation if manned aircraft are detected within range. The missing link is policy. The government must establish a regulatory framework that allows for private sales of this technology but also includes a rigorous testing and certification process to ensure that only systems that meet strict containment standards are available for private use.
This availability must also extend to key locations overseas. This includes vital business facilities in foreign countries that are critical to the U.S. economy, but also dual-use infrastructure that serves a national security purpose. Across the Pacific and elsewhere, U.S. forces increasingly depend on privately owned assets — commercial ports, private airstrips, fuel depots and maintenance facilities — to sustain operations. These assets are exposed, and without enabling the same elements of self-defense that are required for critical infrastructure within U.S. borders, they will remain soft targets.
The Iran conflict has made clear that the drone threat is only going to grow, and major civilian infrastructures are at a heightened risk as a result. The government and the private sector must work together to establish a strategy and regulatory framework to build a shield and protect the infrastructure facing new danger from the sky.