This translation was generated using AI and edited lightly. Read the original in French here.
According to the Spanish daily El Mundo, the CIA reportedly warned Paris, Madrid, and Rome of a possible Russian plan to launch drone attacks from ships in the Mediterranean. On Thursday evening, Emmanuel Macron denied that the CIA had issued any such warning to French intelligence services, as Italy’s defense minister had done before him.
What to Take Away
- Uncertain origin, but already having an effect: Macron denies any CIA warning, without ruling out the broader threat. The source of the information and whether an American document exists remain unclear.
- A technically plausible scenario, with real disruptive potential: The Gerbera drone has a limited payload and would not cause major destruction, but a single successful incident could have a significant psychological impact.
- Part of a broader Russian strategy below the threshold of war: A series of limited, difficult-to-attribute actions could aim to create anxiety, test European defenses, and weaken support for Ukraine.
- France has significant capabilities, but no absolute protection: France has maritime surveillance, frigates, signal stations, and expanding counter-drone capabilities, but cannot guarantee complete protection against small, low-flying drones launched close to shore.
- Early detection and cooperation are key: The article emphasizes maritime surveillance, protection of critical sites, intelligence-sharing, and coordination with European allies as the main elements of an effective response.
Emmanuel Macron says he did not receive the CIA warning mentioned by the Spanish press. Who might benefit from spreading this information, and why?
Tsiporah Fried: The first question is where this information came from. The French president’s denial contradicts a central element of the published account: the claim that Paris had received a specific CIA warning. It also means that we cannot present the meeting of political officials at the Élysée on September 18 as an established consequence of this alleged warning. At this stage, we know neither whether an American document exists in the form described nor who passed these elements to the press.
Several explanations remain possible: partially reported information that was misinterpreted, the informal circulation of a scenario being examined by intelligence services, or a disclosure intended to influence public debate. It would be imprudent to identify an author without evidence. Moscow can benefit from the result — public anxiety followed by suspicion among allies — without necessarily being behind the publication.
Conversely, there is nothing that allows us to accuse the United States of fabricating the story.
The immediate risk is that unverified information produces exactly the effect of a destabilization operation: making Europeans doubt their security and their partners. Emmanuel Macron’s denial should therefore lead us to correct the narrative, without concluding that the broader Russian threat has disappeared.
Regardless of this disputed warning, is the scenario of Russian drones launched from ships in the Mediterranean plausible?
Tsiporah Fried: Yes, the method of operation is technically plausible; that does not prove that an operation is being prepared. A commercial vessel could serve as a mobile platform for relatively small drones, bringing their launch point closer to the coast and reducing the time available to detect them. This is the mechanism described in the Defense News article, but applying it to an attack against France, Spain, or Italy remains a hypothesis, particularly since the claim that Paris received a warning has been denied.
The Gerbera, primarily used as a decoy, can also be adapted for reconnaissance or carry a limited payload. Such a device is not, by itself, a threat comparable to a missile. Launched close to a coastline, however, it could damage exposed equipment, disrupt an activity, or test the response of defenses.
In the scenario described, the decisive factor would be less the sophistication of the drone than its launch point. Launched from the sea, it would travel a shorter distance to the coast and potentially leave less time to identify the vessel, confirm the threat, and protect the target. Several devices could also tie up surveillance and defense resources disproportionate to their cost.
The psychological dimension is therefore significant, but it rests on a genuine capacity to cause disruption. Even a limited attack can be presented as proof that European infrastructure and populations are no longer safe. We must avoid both overestimating the damage a Gerbera can cause and underestimating the political impact of a successful incident.
That is why the response needs to be twofold: rigorously verify the information concerning the alleged plan while preparing maritime surveillance and protecting sensitive sites against a credible method of attack. Rejecting an unconfirmed warning does not remove the need to prepare for the risk it describes.
François Chauvancy: Technically speaking, it does not really hold up. Drones capable of flying across part of southern Europe, launched from ships that could move around the Mediterranean without being monitored, seems a bit far-fetched. That said, we are indeed in a period of destabilization. Why not? After all, some people have imagination.
As for the drone itself, everything depends on how it is used: reconnaissance or explosives?
An explosive drone seems unlikely to me. But we could replay the Leipzig incident: a drone arrives, an explosive device fails to detonate. That is a strong enough message to make everyone start worrying.
Whatever it carries, the drone is now a weapon that is difficult to defend against, in the sense of preventing it from carrying out its mission.
What does the manufacture of this drone tell us about China’s involvement in Russia’s war effort?
Tsiporah Fried: The Gerbera illustrates the role of Chinese supply chains in Russian drone production. According to Ukrainian military intelligence, the device is assembled in Russia from a prototype developed by the Chinese company Skywalker Technology and from kits supplied by that company. There is, however, one fact that should not be overlooked: Skywalker’s product catalog does not mention it.
It is therefore too simplistic to describe it as a drone entirely “made in China,” just as it would be incorrect to portray its production as exclusively Russian. In addition, some of its electronics come from Western suppliers.
This situation reveals a Russian industrial dependency: access to Chinese designs, components, and production capabilities facilitates the large-scale manufacture of inexpensive drones. But this alone does not demonstrate that the Chinese state approved any particular operation, still less a potential strike against a NATO country. We must distinguish the contribution of companies and commercial supply chains to Russia’s war effort from a Chinese political decision to participate in an attack.
Does the mention of France, Spain, and Italy indicate deliberate political targeting?
Tsiporah Fried: It is possible, but we cannot conclude this from the list of countries alone. First of all, they share a geographic characteristic: their Mediterranean coastlines would be accessible under the scenario described.
France and Italy have also, in different ways, taken part in actions against vessels linked to Russia’s shadow fleet. The French Navy notably boarded the Deyna in the Mediterranean; a European force led by Italy inspected an oil tanker linked to this fleet. I would be more cautious about the degree of Spain’s involvement. There is nothing to establish that the alleged warning was a response to these operations.
The 2027 electoral calendar could be another factor of interest to Moscow. Intimidation could fuel war fatigue, criticism of support for Kyiv, or distrust of governments. But the fact that these countries are mentioned does not prove either that an attack has been decided or that their elections would be its principal objective.
A hybrid operation can seek to create a perception of vulnerability even when defensive capabilities exist. Its impact then depends as much on political and media reactions as on physical damage.
François Chauvancy: This fits into a Russian “strategy of anxiety”: frightening public opinion by bringing the war, or the possibility of war, closer to their own territory. Whereas Eastern European countries are all convinced of the reality of the threat, southern European countries are much less so.
From a Western perspective, with this dramatization of the warning, the message to these countries is clear: wake up, there is not only an eastern front, there is also a Mediterranean front.
If the operation is Russian, it is also a way of dispersing the attention of intelligence services and European forces, which are relatively limited. This dispersal allows the Russians to weaken European support for Ukraine.
Do recent incidents reflect a Russian strategy aimed at remaining below the threshold of war?
Tsiporah Fried: They reflect a pattern we now recognize: multiplying limited actions that are difficult to attribute quickly in order to test defenses and allied cohesion. Taken individually, each incident may appear insufficient to justify a major response. Taken together, however, they can impose significant costs, sustain uncertainty, and force Europeans to question how NATO would respond.
However, we must not allow Moscow alone to define what falls “below the threshold.” NATO explicitly notes that a sufficiently serious hybrid campaign could lead the Allies to invoke Article 5. It has strengthened surveillance and coordination of its capabilities, notably through Baltic Sentry and Eastern Sentry. These are concrete responses to repeated incidents, even though their activation does not mean that every hybrid act automatically calls for a collective military response.
The difficulty is connecting intelligence to a political decision: detect, establish the facts, attribute responsibility when the evidence permits, and then choose a proportionate collective response. This is also a question of deterrence. If Russia believes it can accumulate hostile acts without identifiable costs, ambiguity works in its favor.
François Chauvancy: My hypothesis is that the scale reached by the conflict on Russian territory has led Vladimir Putin to go further. In my view, we are in the final stretch: the exhaustion of both belligerents is such that each is now seeking to gain an advantage in order to force the other into negotiations.
Even if the front shifts somewhat without actually changing the balance of power on the ground, the Russians must accompany their long-range strikes with the destabilization of states supporting Ukraine. However, hybrid attacks, sabotage of the enemy’s factories or those of its supporters, and interference in elections are part of all wars.
Can France protect its Mediterranean coastline?
Tsiporah Fried: Since the 2024 Paris Olympics, France has accelerated the development of its counter-drone capabilities, but a recent National Assembly report points out that this remains one of the major challenges, particularly when it comes to disruptions to air traffic.
Yes, France has serious capabilities, and the French Navy maintains a presence across the Mediterranean coastline, with frigates equipped with layered air-defense systems, as well as its 19 semaphore stations and naval bases.. No, it cannot promise absolute protection against small drones launched from the sea at short range as part of a saturation attack.
Effective defense requires the close integration of maritime and air surveillance, intelligence, continuous air-security measures, drone detection and counter-drone capabilities, as well as the close protection of sensitive sites. The French Ministry of the Armed Forces recently conducted Exercise XLAD 26, under the command of the Air Defense and Air Operations Command (CDAOA), at several sites across the country to test this response.
French forces are also training in counter-drone operations in the Mediterranean with their partners. But XLAD is a laboratory designed to test, under near-real conditions, the systems and joint-force coordination that are intended to equip France by 2030 under the VIGIDRONE program.
The specific difficulty in the scenario described would be identifying a suspicious vessel early enough among commercial shipping and then detecting small, low-flying devices. The time available to react would depend on their launch point and target.
Protecting a handful of priority facilities is one thing; providing continuous, comprehensive coverage of the entire coastline is another. The resources used must also be proportionate: we cannot permanently rely on expensive interceptors to defend against inexpensive drones.
The appropriate response is therefore to act as early as possible in the threat chain: intelligence-sharing with allies, monitoring vessels, coordination between maritime and air assets, and then layered defense of critical sites. France has the capability to do this, but the scenario illustrates why adapting counter-drone defenses and maintaining European cooperation must remain priorities.
François Chauvancy: What we have seen over the past two years, everywhere in Europe, is how difficult it is to determine where a drone comes from and what it is doing. We cannot even identify the operators, let alone the aircraft themselves, including over airports in northern Europe.
Yes, in my view, drones can get through. Our airspace has no difficulty intercepting aircraft, and probably missiles. A drone, by contrast, does not fly at the same altitude or in the same way, and we cannot defend thousands of kilometers of coastline.
And what does “defend” actually mean? First, identify the object, then decide to destroy it. And on national territory, we must be careful: debris falling onto a house can result in legal claims.
I therefore do not think we are capable of preventing a drone from entering our airspace. Across all the known examples in Western Europe, we have very rarely been able to intercept and shoot down a drone.