China’s deepening partnership with Russia and its growing maritime capabilities have prompted Arctic governments to view Beijing not only as an economic actor or scientific stakeholder, but also as a potential strategic challenge. Despite political resistance from most Arctic states, China remains determined to expand its knowledge, presence and influence in the region.
Chinese policy documents and official commentary have long emphasised the goal of developing China into a ‘polar great power’. China’s 2018 Arctic Policy presented China as a ‘near-Arctic state’ with legitimate interests in Arctic shipping, resource development, scientific research and governance.
Since then, Chinese investments, scientific activities and diplomatic engagement have sought to establish China as a long-term stakeholder in the region. In addition to opening a weekly container route along the Northern Sea Route, China has become a major investor in Russia’s Arctic energy sector through its stake in the Yamal Liquefied Natural Gas project. It has also maintained a sustained scientific presence through the Yellow River research station in Svalbard and regular Arctic expeditions by its icebreakers Xue Long and Xue Long 2. Diplomatically, China has sought a larger role in Arctic governance since obtaining observer status in the Arctic Council in 2013. Together, these commercial, scientific and diplomatic activities demonstrate Beijing’s determination to remain a long-term Arctic stakeholder despite growing political headwinds.
China faces a more difficult Arctic environment than it did in the 2010s. Russia remains its principal partner, particularly following Moscow’s growing dependence on Chinese markets, technology and capital after the imposition of Western sanctions. Most of China’s economic involvement in the Russian Arctic is concentrated in energy, fisheries and shippingprojects, particularly liquefied natural gas production and exports to Asian markets. While important, this relationship remains relatively narrow and falls well short of the transformative economic partnership that some earlier forecastsanticipated.
Elsewhere, China has encountered growing suspicion. Several Arctic states have blocked or restricted proposed Chinese investments in strategically sensitive sectors, including infrastructure projects in Greenland. Canada has also become increasingly cautious about Chinese scientific activities in the Arctic, becoming one of many Arctic governments that view Chinese commercial and research activities through a security lens.
Despite these setbacks, China continues to expand its Arctic capabilities. Research expeditions, satellite systems, seabed mapping projects and polar infrastructure contribute to a steadily growing body of operational knowledge. Much of this activity serves legitimate scientific and commercial purposes, but many technologies involved possess dual-use potential. Data collected for climate research, navigation safety and oceanography can also improve maritime domain awareness and support future naval operations.
This dual-use dimension contributes to concerns about China’s longer-term strategic intentions. But there is also a risk of overstating what China can realistically achieve in the near future. Consider the oft-discussed possibility of Chinese submarine operations in Arctic waters. Arctic deployment could offer China significant strategic advantages, including a more survivable sea-based nuclear deterrent, enhanced second-strike capability and the ability to threaten North America from unexpected directions. It would also complicate US and allied maritime surveillance by creating new avenues of Chinese access through the Bering and Aleutian approaches, much as the Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom Gap shaped Cold War anti-submarine strategy.
While there is no public evidence that China routinely deploys submarines in Arctic waters, its expanding Arctic presence, ambitions to become a polar great power and growing operational experience in the region warrant closer attention to the prospect of future deployments. Rather than assuming that technical and environmental challenges will indefinitely constrain Chinese submarine activity, Western governments should monitor the gradual development of capabilities, infrastructure and operational knowledge that could eventually support a Chinese undersea presence in the Arctic.
Arctic shipping remains an important but often overstated element of China’s Arctic strategy. Early versions of a Polar Silk Road generated expectations that the Northern Sea Route would become a major artery of Eurasian trade and a cornerstone of China–Russia cooperation. In practice, commercial activity has fallen short of expectations due to challenging operating conditions, infrastructure constraints and geopolitical uncertainty.
Still, the Northern Sea Route retains strategic significance. The route offers a shorter connection between Asia and Europe and is becoming an increasingly important arena for geopolitical competition, with Russia seeking to tighten control while China continues to develop its commercial and operational experience in Arctic waters. Though Arctic shipping has yet to become transformative, it remains a long-term strategic asset for Beijing.
China–Russia military cooperation should likewise be assessed carefully. Military collaboration between the two countries has expanded with joint bomber patrols near Alaska, coast guard operations through the Bering Strait and naval exercises that demonstrate growing operational familiarity and strategic coordination.
But while Russia welcomes Chinese support in areas such as energy development, shipping and selected security activities, Moscow continues to regard much of the Arctic as a highly sensitive strategic domain in which it remains the dominant actor. This is why China–Russia Arctic cooperation is often characterised as pragmatic and project-based rather than as a fully integrated military partnership.
Even if China does not establish a military presence in the Arctic, its growing maritime capabilities, expanding Arctic expertise and closer ties with Russia make it a more consequential factor in Arctic security calculations. The significance of China’s Arctic engagement therefore lies less in immediate military deployment than in its adaptability. Policymakers should not underestimate Beijing’s determination to remain an Arctic stakeholder regardless of growing political headwinds.