Frequent meetings between Pakistan’s chief of army staff Field Marshal Asim Munir and United States (US) President Donald Trump have generated a narrative that US Pakistan relations will return to an earlier golden era. Yet the relationship between the two has always been a tale of exaggerated expectations, unfulfilled promises from both sides, and grievous misunderstandings. It is unlikely that things will be different this time around.
Since Pakistan’s founding in 1947, its leaders have sought external economic and military assistance as a means of maintaining national security and mitigating the country’s weak finances. The US, as a superpower with plenty of disposable cash, was an early target of Pakistani policymakers’ messaging that, for the right price, they could be its partner in South Asia. Pakistan’s view of itself as a ‘warrior nation’ led to the belief that its military was a coveted potential partner for other countries.
The current Pakistani leaders, civilian as well as military, are selling President Trump the same argument that the country’s founding father, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, made to US diplomats soon after Pakistan’s founding: The US needs Pakistan because of Pakistan’s location and large military.[1] After each transactional embrace of the preferred geopolitical plans of various US administrations, Pakistan has found that the partnership was tactical on the US’s part and never resulted in a strategic convergence of interests.
It is true that, over the years, Pakistan has repeatedly secured US military equipment, some investment, and considerable economic assistance, as well as support at multilateral financial institutions. However, Pakistan’s desire for US support in securing advantage against India has always remained unfulfilled. The US has never stepped up to ‘resolve’ the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan’s advantage or satisfaction either.
Having dealt with US administrations for almost eight decades, Pakistan has developed a playbook that works with most of them. This includes strong personal relations and public praise of American leaders and generals. President Trump is especially vulnerable to this playbook, which is why US-Pakistan relations seem to be on the upswing at present. Given the rollercoaster history of the relationship, however, it will likely not sustain its current high.
The US’s military withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 resulted in acrimony over Pakistan’s role in the Taliban’s return to power. Keen to move beyond then President Joe Biden administration’s policy of benign neglect of Pakistan, Islamabad worked hard to woo the incoming second Trump administration. In addition to lobbying Trump’s inner circle, Pakistan has also enhanced engagement with the US military and intelligence establishments to get back into America’s good books.
Gaming the US president’s personality, Pakistan offered Trump an early win after his second inauguration. In March 2025, Pakistani authorities arrested and extradited Mohammad Sharifullah, charged in the US for his role in the 26 August 2021 Kabul airport bombing that killed 13 US service members and more than 160 civilians.[2] This led to Trump naming and thanking Pakistan in his State of the Union address.[3]
Similarly, knowing well that Trump is fixated on countering China by ensuring that the US has exclusive access to critical minerals and energy resources, Islamabad has offered support. In early April 2025, it hosted a Minerals Investment Forum attended by an interagency US delegation. Discussions have focused on advancing US interests in Pakistan’s mining and energy sectors and on jointly exploring critical minerals.[4] It helped that some of those offered mining deals in Pakistan are close friends or business allies of the Trump family.[5]
Although initially, on 1 April 2025, Pakistan was slammed with a 39 percent tariff rate, Trump’s team lowered it to 19 percent after Pakistan committed to importing more US products, including crude oil, and to opening investment opportunities for US firms in energy, mining, and information technology.[6] Pakistan’s public praise of the US President’s role in the May 2025 India Pakistan ceasefire, and its nomination of Trump for the Nobel Prize, resulted in invitations to the White House for Field Marshal Munir and Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif.
Currently, Pakistan is positioning itself as a partner in President Trump’s focus on the Middle East. It is an intermediary for the US with Iran, as it was when the US first sought to establish relations with China in 1970. As one of the top contributors to United Nations-mandated peacekeeping missions, Pakistan is one of eight Muslim-majority countries that have offered to contribute to the proposed International Stabilization Force for Gaza. All of this has resulted in Pakistan gaining a seat at Trump’s high table and words of praise from the US President for Pakistan’s current leaders.[7]
The American military continues to see Pakistan as a source of manpower for its area of command. One week before the first White House meeting between President Trump and Field Marshal Munir on 18 June 2025, at a House Armed Services Committee hearing, then US Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander Gen. Michael Kurilla praised Pakistan’s role in capturing Mohammad Sharifullah and in countering the terrorist group Islamic State–Khorasan, calling it a “phenomenal partner.”[8] A month later, Kurilla received the Nishan-e-Imtiaz (Military), one of Pakistan’s highest military honours, becoming one of the few senior US officers to be so recognised.[9]
Pakistan has yet to benefit from the current round of bonhomie with the US in terms of investment or expanded trade. That is because, unlike with China’s strategic public sector investments in Pakistan, private sector investors need the country to implement economic reforms before they consider investing. There have been, however, gains for Pakistan on the security side (albeit limited). All three Pakistani service chiefs visited the US in 2025, reflecting the Pakistani desire to return to a broader security cooperation beyond just counterterrorism.
It is true that no new US military equipment has yet been approved for sale to Pakistan, while the Trump administration has globally discontinued the US’s past practice of providing foreign military funding (FMF) loans. However, in October 2025, Pakistan was included in a contract—along with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries and some Middle Eastern countries— under which US defence contractor Raytheon will provide sustainment and spare parts for its Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) to them.[10]
Again, in December 2025, the US approved a US$686-million technical support and upgrade package for Pakistan's F-16 fighter jet fleet. This is designed to modernise the Block-52 and Mid Life Update (MLU) F-16s, ensuring they remain operational until at least 2040. Still, this is routine for countries that fly American military aircraft and does not add to Pakistan’s existing military capabilities. For additional firepower, Pakistan still continues to look to China.
For decades, the US has sought to change Pakistan's strategic focus from competing with India and seeking more influence in Afghanistan, to enhancing internal stability and economic development. But its military and economic support did not change Pakistan’s priorities.
Since the time Pakistan was formed, four American presidents—Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Donald J. Trump (in his first term)—have asked the question: what do we get from aiding Pakistan? Five—Jimmy Carter, George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama— have wondered aloud whether Pakistan’s leaders could be trusted to keep their word. For example, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Pakistani leader Musharraf pledged to assist the United States, but Bush noted in his book Decision Points that “over time, it became clear that Musharraf either would not or could not fulfil all of his promises.”[11] Obama, in proceeding with the raid to kill Osama Bin Laden, chose not to consult the Pakistani government because he claimed it was an “open secret” that elements of the Pakistani military and intelligence had ties to the Taliban, and potentially, al-Qaeda.[12]
Even so, geopolitical considerations have led the US to enlist Pakistan as an ally on three occasions: during the Cold War (1954–1972), the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan (1979 1989), and the war against terrorism (2001–2021). In each instance, the US reason for pursuing its alliance with Pakistan differed widely from Pakistan’s motives in partnering with the US. For instance, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, US National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, saw an opportunity to avenge the Vietnam War and bleed the Soviet Red army with the help of militant Islamist radicals. But for Pakistan, American equipment and training for jihad in Afghanistan were to become a launching pad for asymmetric warfare that would increase its regional influence against India.
This time, too, the US-Pakistan partnership is not an alliance based on shared global goals and interests. It remains a transactional arrangement between two partners with different enemies and different worldviews. Pakistani leaders are once again assuring an American President that they share his global security concerns, hoping to win his support for Pakistan’s regional aims. In the past, Pakistan was disappointed because the US did not share its view of India. This time, it has to also contend with the unpredictability and fickleness of an unconventional American President.
Read the full collection of reports in Pakistan in Perspective: A Post-Operation Sindoor Analysis.
Endnotes
- Shahid Javed Burki, “Pakistan and the United States,” The Express Tribune, March 2, 2014, https://tribune.com. pk/story/678047/pakistan-and-the-united-states. ↑
- U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, “United States Arrests ISIS-K Attack Planner for Role in Killing of U.S. Military Service Members at Abbey Gate, Afghanistan,” March 5, 2025, https://www.justice.gov/ opa/pr/united-states-arrests-isis-k-attack-planner-role killing-us-military-service-members-abbey. ↑
- Donald J. Trump, Speech: Donald Trump Addresses a Joint Session of Congress at the U.S. Capitol, March 4, 2025, Roll Call, https://rollcall.com/factbase/trump/transcript/ donald-trump-speech-joint-session-congress-2025 march-4-2025/. ↑
- U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, “Senior Bureau Official Meyer’s Travel to Pakistan: Media Note,” April 5, 2025, https://www.state.gov/senior bureau-official-meyers-travel-to-pakistan/. ↑
- Humza Jilani, John Reed and James Politi, “How Pakistan Wooed Trump and Rattled India,” Financial Times, August 11, 2025, https://www.ft.com/content/990b41df a22a-4075-826b-f5601be85d8a?syn-25a6b1a6=1; Faseeh Mangi, “A 35-Year-Old Crypto Bro Helped Pakistan Win Over Trump World,” March 29, 2026, Bloomberg, https:// www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2026-03-29/how-a 35-year-old-crypto-bro-from-pakistan-won-over-trump. ↑
- Asif Shahzad, “Pakistan Says It Held Productive Trade Talks in Washington,” Reuters, July 18, 2025, https://www. reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-says-it-held productive-trade-talks-washington-2025-07-18/ ↑
- Reuters, “Sharif Calls for American Investment in Pakistan in Trump Meet,” September 26, 2025, https://www. reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/sharif-calls-american investment-pakistan-trump-meet-2025-09-26/ ↑
- Hindustan Times, “On Cam: Top US General Shocks World, Says Pakistan ‘Phenomenal Partner’ in War on Terror | Kurilla,” YouTube video, June 12, 2025, https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=QJAhHznEi54 ↑
- “Pakistan Awards CENTCOM Chief General Kurilla amid High-Stakes US-China Strategic Balancing Act,” Defence Security Asia, July 27, 2025, https://defencesecurityasia. com/en/pakistan-awards-centcom-chief-general-kurilla us-china-strategic-balance/. ↑
- “US Firm to Supply Pakistan with Advanced Air-to-Air Missiles,” Dawn, October 8, 2025, https://www.dawn.com/ news/1947347. ↑
- AFP, “Bush Was Convinced Pakistan Would Not Act Against Militancy,” The Express Tribune, November 10, 2010, https://tribune.com.pk/story/74941/bush convinced-pakistan-would-not-act-against-militancy. ↑
- PTI, “Certain Elements Inside Pak Military Had Links To Al-Qaeda: Obama On Raid That Killed Osama,” The Indian Express, November 17, 2020, https://indianexpress. com/article/world/certain-elements-pak-military-links-al qaeda-obama-raid-killed-osama-7054572/. ↑