New Initiatives at the DoW’s Office of Industrial Base Growth

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The authors would like to thank Matthew Florance, Thianna Chisholm, Philip Dackiw, and Naveen Wineland for their excellent research support.

Introduction

Revitalizing and expanding the United States defense industrial base (DIB) is a top priority for the second Trump administration, which recognizes that “American national power depends on a strong industrial sector capable of meeting both peacetime and wartime production demands.”^[1] In line with this assessment, the 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS) set the goal of making the United States “the world’s premier arsenal, one that can produce not only for ourselves but also for our allies and partners at scale, rapidly, and at the highest levels of quality.”^[2] The Department of War (DoW) has been driving this effort by implementing long-overdue reforms across the national security ecosystem.

Yet much of this important work is happening out of the public eye. As a result, interested individuals often have difficulty understanding the purpose of key reforms and cannot appreciate the progress taking place.

The Arsenal Papers seek to highlight these key policy developments and reforms in the defense industrial sector and explain their significance. The objective is to foster a better understanding of how DoW is working to increase warfighting readiness, supply chain resilience, and the nation’s ability to rapidly scale defense production in response to emerging global threats. The reports will not cover all of the DoW’s efforts, which would be unrealistic. Rather, they will be episodic explainers drawn from Hudson Institute’s conversations with key policy officials.

The first in this series focuses on initiatives underway at the Office of Industrial Base Growth (IBG). The office’s inaugural head is Deputy Assistant Secretary of War (DASW) for Industrial Base Growth James Mismash, who is also the director of the DoW Office of Small Business Programs. DASW Mismash and his team are pursuing multiple initiatives to foster greater participation in the US defense marketplace. IBG is involved in several interrelated initiatives. It operates the LYNX platform, which supports the burgeoning Civil Reserve Manufacturing Network (CRMN); these initiatives assist new entrants into the DIB. The office is also leading efforts to put the long-running 1260H List into practice by implementing Section 805 of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and Section 851 of the FY 2025 NDAA; these efforts are focused on reducing reliance on China.

This report examines the purpose of these tools and how IBG uses them to advance the pool of new entrants into the DIB and the administration’s goals for American industry. Specifically, it explores how LYNX and CRMN can be used cooperatively to expand the US DIB by raising the visibility of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), giving them direct paths into the defense marketplace, and enabling them to make their extensive industrial capacity available to the DoW. It also explores how the 1260H List is increasing the transparency of US critical supply chains and how Section 805 and Section 851 aim to gradually eliminate the United States’ material dependence on China by improving cooperation with domestic manufacturers.

Background: The Office of Industrial Base Growth

DoW established IBG in January 2026 as part of a growing push within the federal government over the last several years to revitalize and restructure the US DIB. This was a priority for the first Trump administration, which issued Executive Order (EO) 13806, “Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States.” This order mandated an in-depth review of US manufacturing capacity and supply chain resiliency.^[3] The report resulting from this EO, published in 2018, identified a wide array of weaknesses across the American defense industrial sector, which successive administrations have sought to remedy.

The second Trump administration is working to revitalize production capabilities, partly by encouraging the entry of new participants into the defense sector through both new and existing mechanisms, including Defense Production Act Title III and the financial incentives it provides, as well as authorities such as loans and purchase-offtake agreements, in addition to newly developed platforms such as LYNX that aim to simplify the acquisition process.

The administration has also signaled this intention through national strategy documents. The 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) noted the need to “innovate powerful defenses at low cost” and “re-shore our defense industrial supply chains.”^[4] Similarly, the 2026 NDS called for a “national mobilization” to “bolster our organic sustainment capabilities, grow nontraditional vendors, and partner with traditional DIB vendors.”^[5]

The prime contractors that have come to dominate the DIB cannot completely meet these objectives. While established defense companies remain crucial to US national security, their organizational complexity and incentive structures often make them far less effective at rapidly innovating, producing, and surging production.

To promote these outcomes at scale, it is essential to create pathways for emerging firms with novel technologies to enter the defense marketplace. Reshoring the American defense industrial supply chain will require a broader ecosystem of domestic producers comprising a range of companies with different areas of expertise—including highly specialized entities and larger and smaller commercial enterprises. Commercial entities of all sizes and specialties, working together across the DIB, could comprise a diverse defense manufacturing ecosystem to fulfill US production needs in peace or in war.

This view motivated the DoW to create IBG.^[6] Previously, the DoW Office of Small Business Programs (OSBP), established in 1978, sought to increase small enterprises’ participation in defense programs,^[7] and its mandates and programs were separate from the Pentagon’s interactions with larger, established manufacturers. This segregated approach led to a systemic disconnect in the department’s engagement with industry, limiting its ability to implement a national industrial strategy that would truly revitalize the DIB. The 2025 NSS, however, made clear that expanding the DIB required cultivating new entrants of all sizes, including larger commercial firms that could contribute to national reindustrialization efforts.^[8] The creation of the new office and its subsumption of OSBP constitute DoW’s first steps toward putting this understanding into practice.

IBG: Expanding and Strengthening the Defense Industrial Base

As DoW has officially explained, IBG is the umbrella organization for efforts focused on “expanding and strengthening the defense industrial base through vendor growth and supplier maturity.”^[9] In addition to broadening recruitment efforts beyond small businesses, IBG is focused on actively helping new entrants, mid-tier firms, and non-traditional contractors succeed in the defense ecosystem. By helping firms secure their first government contract—an objective OSBP has historically undertaken—the office hopes to further identify and secure long-term industrial capacity to meet pressing US defense needs.

These changes position IBG at the intersection of four important questions:

1. How can the federal government help more firms enter, compete, and succeed in the defense marketplace? 

2. How can the federal government transform participating firms into technically qualified, financially sustainable, and production-capable suppliers in a sector that is necessarily complex due to its connection to US national security?

3. How can the federal government connect and work with civilian commercial enterprises to secure additional industrial capacity for use during an emergency?

4. How can the federal government remove hostile actors from its critical supply chains while preventing gaps or immediately filling gaps in procurement of defense-related resources, inputs, and products?

The recently launched LYNX platform, discussed below, represents the most significant change to the existing system, providing a simplified entry point into the defense sector by redesigning the means by which firms engage with the DoW.^[10] CRMN, though not an IBG-directed initiative, is a complementary effort designed to bring in commercial manufacturers of all sizes that would be willing and interested in transitioning and leveraging their commercial manufacturing capacity to support the warfighter in the event of a national mobilization. LYNX allows companies to register interest in participating in CRMN. It also helps introduce defense business to non-defense manufacturers across the country.^[11]

These initiatives illustrate IBG’s dual emphasis on vendor growth and supplier maturity and underscore the importance of distinguishing between the two. A larger vendor pool does not necessarily correspond to a stronger industrial base.

Conversely, cultivating capable suppliers provides little benefit if new firms struggle to enter the defense market. Strengthening the DIB, therefore, requires initiatives that broaden participation and ensure that firms succeed in the market over the long term. DASW Mismash and his staff recognize this dynamic and are using it to determine the office’s goals and metrics for success.

IBG’s Short-Term, Medium-Term, and Long-Term Goals

While the small business office at the Pentagon has previously relied heavily on volume metrics, specifically the number of companies introduced to the defense market, IBG is transitioning toward a stronger focus on outcome metrics, including contract quality and growth sustainability, to assess whether its efforts are producing a stronger and more resilient DIB.^[12] It has set the following goals:

• In the short term, identify companies that have left, been unable to enter, or previously not had a place in the defense ecosystem.
• In the medium term, help American companies remove Chinese suppliers from their production chains and minimize risk to the broader US DIB.
• In the long term, cultivate a self-sustaining pipeline of domestic companies capable of competing at the prime level, reducing reliance on a small number of large primes.

IBG Initiatives

LYNX

LYNX is a platform with a streamlined website that enables new contractors to discover DoW contract opportunities, gain visibility across the defense industrial sector, understand the requirements their companies must meet, and receive individualized support for regulatory compliance.

For new or civilian suppliers, there is a high barrier to entering the DIB. In a 2026 survey by the National Defense Industrial Association, small business respondents highlighted their top challenges, which included finding contracting opportunities and points of contact.^[13] Companies can spend months attending meetings across relevant DoW offices and still fail to secure contracts.^[14] Even when appropriate contracts are available, they are published as a “jargon-and buzzword-filled multipage document posted on sites only the defense industrial base knows how to navigate,”^[15] as one writer noted. Complicated regulations impose additional informational and financial burdens on small businesses that already struggle to prove their readiness and can hardly afford to make significant investments in navigating bureaucracy.^[16]

IBG launched LYNX to reduce these barriers by unifying a fragmented process into a single pipeline for readiness and acquisition.^[17] It provides businesses with personalized information to help them navigate the complex compliance and contracting processes.^[18] It also enables DoW small-business advisers to connect with new entrants who hope to contribute to defense production. At a more strategic level, it helps the department better understand the composition of US critical supply chains and identify suppliers to fill capability gaps.

LYNX is divided into sub-platforms for industry, small-business advisers, and government, called LYNX Expanse, LYNX Allyance, and LYNX Launchpoint.

• LYNX Expanse is the industry-facing platform. As DASW Mismash has explained, its goal is to guide companies through the compliance and contracting discovery process so they are not “just spending 40 million hours applying for contracts [that they are] probably never going to get as a new entrant or somebody that doesn’t have all the requirements.”^[19] Expanse is built for ease of use and integrates artificial intelligence to analyze a company’s strengths and understand its goals. It helps companies develop personalized roadmaps, highlights new contract opportunities, facilitates networking connections, and sends updates on industry news.^[20] Expanse does not replace SAM.gov, the US government system that enables contractors to find and bid on government contracts. Nor does it replace other contracting pathways. Rather, it is a platform for discovering hard-to-find contracts, tailored to companies’ capabilities and experience.
• LYNX Allyance is the adviser-facing platform. Allyance is designed for DoW organizations that support small businesses, such as APEX Accelerators, which are compliance and contracting advisers, and Project Spectrum, a cybersecurity compliance adviser. Allyance provides them with tools to connect with companies, tailor advice based on advisees’ LYNX Expanse profiles, and recommend suitable contracts. Allyance anticipates the need to incorporate advisers’ expertise into the LYNX system and offers a way for liaison organizations to monitor their advisees.
• LYNX Launchpoint, which is still in development, will be the government-facing platform. It will serve as a market research and risk assessment tool and give government officials and policymakers a clearer view of their supply chains.^[21] If DoW officials identify a capability gap, Launchpoint will allow them to ask, “Does that capability really exist in the way that we’re describing it?” It will also connect them with relevant suppliers if it does.^[22] If department officials need to assess FOCI (foreign ownership, control, or influence) risks within their supply chain, Launchpoint will offer insights based on information from companies listed on LYNX Expanse.^[23] Launchpoint will enable policy officials to discover existing manufacturers and understand the successes, failures, and risks associated with specific suppliers and the supply chain overall, providing the DoW with better supply chain clarity.^[24]

Each sub-platform has distinct features tailored to its user base, whether a manufacturer, an APEX adviser, or a policymaker. Although each version has tailored tools, they all connect to form a unified hub for company information, advisory resources, and contract discovery. For example, a new manufacturer can list its capabilities through LYNX Expanse; an adviser can provide certification guidance through LYNX Allyance; and a contracting officer can identify a potential supplier to fill an urgent gap through LYNX Launchpoint.

What’s Next for LYNX

LYNX serves as both a supply chain transparency tool and a resource for small, growing, and nontraditional businesses entering the DoW contracting scene. IBG recognizes that companies will increasingly be required to onshore key components and that contractors are prohibited from using China-sourced components. LYNX can help the DoW and primes identify American alternatives to banned suppliers.

The department also views LYNX as a source of metrics on small-business growth—its data can offer insights into whether small companies are staying small or truly growing.^[25] LYNX also addresses problems the IBG faces, such as, How do I transition technology effectively?^[26] For example, the Air Force may need a certain capability, completely unaware that the Navy already has a provider for it.^[27]

Future updates to LYNX will likely include features that allow manufacturers on LYNX Expanse to discover each other if they want to start a subcontracting relationship.^[28] IBG anticipates ongoing improvements to LYNX, including the impending release of LYNX Launchpoint. The platform is continually offering new contracting opportunities, industry engagement pathways, and regulatory compliance guides. As DASW Mismash has noted, LYNX is not static; it has new opportunities for companies every day.^[29]

The Civil Reserve Manufacturing Network

CRMN enables commercial manufacturers to voluntarily enter into agreements with the DoW. These agreements would require a company, during a national emergency or significant supply chain disruption, to shift a portion of its production capacity from commercial to defense manufacturing to produce military equipment and other critical defense materials.

The network’s creation was driven by growing bipartisan concerns that the United States lacks sufficient surge capacity. Congress established the program through the 2026 NDAA and authorized $131 million to implement a pilot model.^[30] Under the FY 2026 NDAA, the DoW is required to establish a National Manufacturing Registry to identify and inventory domestic production capabilities. Currently, the federal government lacks a comprehensive inventory of domestic manufacturing capabilities that could be mobilized during emergencies.

Once operational, CRMN should help to address multiple pressing problems. It could provide a pathway for commercial firms to engage with the DoW and increase the department’s awareness of their manufacturing capabilities—as well as open DoW opportunities for non-traditional firms. It could increase competition in the defense marketplace by raising the visibility of smaller shops and specialized firms.^[31] This network could also reduce US dependence on a small number of defense primes.

Private manufacturers will retain primary responsibility for ensuring workforce, facility, and cybersecurity readiness and compliance.^[32] Participating companies will maintain their normal commercial operations during peacetime but should be prepared to shift production as requested by the DoW during a crisis.

Through this partnership, the United States can increase its surge capacity without incurring the costs of maintaining overcapacity in the US DIB that would go unused during peacetime. Ultimately, CRMN is a public and private sector partnership that strengthens US national security by preserving essential production capabilities, reducing dependence on foreign producers, maintaining a workforce with technical knowledge, and enabling quick scaling of production capacity.

CRMN’s Utility for SMEs

Russell Winter is a third-generation tool and die maker who bought his family’s small machine shop in 2019. When he took over Center Tool Co. from his father, Winter learned firsthand how much SMEs struggle to sustain themselves in the defense marketplace because of complex compliance requirements, onerous regulations, and low visibility in a market dominated by a few large manufacturers.

These hurdles can easily drive shops like Winter’s out of business, depriving rural American communities of jobs and the DIB of valuable industrial capacity. Russell subsequently founded US MFG to keep smaller shops in business by building a real-time, verified capacity infrastructure platform that matches them to contracts and gives government an active digital twin of prequalified, available capacity.

While building this network, Winter discovered CRMN. He was immediately drawn to the initiative because he believed it would align with one of his ongoing efforts: helping SMEs become more visible and, therefore, more competitive in the defense marketplace. By volunteering their shops for surge production during a crisis, SMEs could make the DoW aware of their existence, capabilities, and willingness to contribute to American reindustrialization. Such awareness could even help these smaller shops secure government contracts before a surge event occurs. As a result, participation in CRMN could not only provide SMEs with another pathway to enter the US defense manufacturing ecosystem but also offer them immediate opportunities to sustain and grow their operations.

Winter believes such developments would also benefit the DoW. Specifically, he sees smaller shops like his as prime candidates to help the government further onshore and diversify the DIB in the short term, while also providing excess capacity for potential use in the long term. Since SMEs typically operate at 20–30 percent utilization—unlike their larger counterparts, which generally operate near 80 percent—smaller businesses can provide the DoW with the additional surge and industrial capacity it seeks. By connecting the department with these SMEs, Winter believes, CRMN can contribute to peacetime policy efforts as well as wartime crises.

The 1260H List, Section 805, and Section 851

A fourth aspect of IBG’s mandate is to reduce US reliance on Chinese inputs by working with other DoW organizations to identify domestic suppliers to replace inputs sourced from Chinese military-affiliated companies. IBG’s sister component, the Office of Global Investment and Economic Security, oversees the identification of Chinese companies of concern and publishes a list of Chinese military-affiliated companies in accordance with Section 1260H of the FY 2021 NDAA. Prior to 2024, this list was just that—a list. The FY 2024 NDAA provided teeth and force to the list. Section 805 of this law prohibits, starting this year, the DoW from procuring any item from any company on the 1260H list.

Starting next year, the law goes further and prohibits DoW contractors from selling to the department anything sourced from a company on the 1260H list. Together, Section 1260H of the FY 2021 NDAA, Section 805 of the FY 2024 NDAA, and Section 851 of the FY 2025 NDAA establish a framework for identifying Chinese military-linked entities within the United States so that the DoW can restrict their access to US defense supply chains. IBG’s platform and programs will be critical to identifying domestic small and mid-tier companies to replace these Chinese military-affiliated suppliers.

The 1260H List

Section 1260H of the FY 2021 NDAA directed the secretary of defense to identify “Chinese military companies” with a commercial presence in the United States, revise the list on an ongoing basis, and publish it annually through December 31, 2030. The section defines a “Chinese military company” in two ways: (1) an entity directly or indirectly owned by, controlled by, or acting on behalf of the People’s Liberation Army or an organization subordinate to the Central Military Commission; or (2) an entity identified as a “military-civil fusion contributor,” meaning any entity that receives assistance, funding, direction, or licensing from China’s military-industrial apparatus.^[33] The most recent 1260H list, published on June 8, 2026, identifies 188 companies, 55 more than on the 2025 list.^[34]

The 1260H list has continued to expand in scope over successive iterations. Initially concentrating on Chinese state-owned defense and aerospace conglomerates, the list now includes companies in cybersecurity, telecommunications, biotechnology, battery manufacturing, solar energy, and civil engineering. Beyond its regulatory function, the list retains effectiveness as a reputational tool. Companies doing business with an entity on the 1260H list treat the designation as a serious warning and preemptively minimize exposure and seek alternative providers, even when continued cooperation may remain legally permissible.^[35] The 1260H architecture is a linchpin of a growing set of federal restrictions, including investment prohibitions under EO 14032, Commerce Department Entity List designations, and Section 889 telecommunications bans.^[36]

The Office of Global Investment and Economic Security manages the designation process, working closely with the intelligence community, which compiles data and corporate registry filings to build a record for each company being considered for inclusion on the list.^[37] Companies that are designated can submit a formal administrative petition for reconsideration. The secretary of war also has the power to waive Section 1260H designations if the DoW has a compelling national security justification and phase-out plan to eliminate the listed company from the supply chain. However, Section 1260H lacked real enforcement power until Section 805 was enacted.

Section 805

Section 805 of the FY 2024 NDAA serves as an enforcement mechanism that prohibits the Pentagon from contracting with or procuring goods or services from entities on the Section 1260H list after June 30, 2026. It also bans indirect procurement, such as contracts with entities that incorporate components or services from 1260H-designated entities, starting on June 30, 2027.^[38]

The statute also directs the DoW to provide technical support to affected businesses to ensure compliance. The secretary of war maintains the authority to grant case-by-case waivers if a contractor provides a strong justification and a clear phase-out plan to remove Chinese suppliers. This indirect procurement ban contains a dedicated exception for “components,” defined as items “supplied to the Federal Government as part of an end item or of another component.”^[39] This carve-out is ambiguous. Until the DoW issues implementing guidance through the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, the scope of the indirect ban remains uncertain.^[40]

Section 851

Section 851 of the FY 2025 NDAA establishes new contracting restrictions to strengthen the integrity of America’s DIB by addressing certain lobbying relationships involving companies designated as a “Chinese military company,” as defined in Section 1260H in the FY 2021 NDAA. Section 851 prohibits the Department of War from entering into, renewing, or extending certain contracts when a contractor, its parent company, or a subsidiary has a relationship with a covered lobbyist. A covered lobbyist is a lobbying firm that represents both a DoW contractor (or its parent or subsidiary) and a company identified on the department’s 1260H List. To operationalize this requirement, IBG recently initiated Project CLEAR to help organizations understand Section 851, evaluate lobbying relationships, and make informed decisions before they affect department contracting opportunities.

Implications for Companies

An October 2025 analysis by the supply chain intelligence firm Altana, which analyzed 6.6 million multi-tier transactions across 609 defense contractors, found 267,338 import transactions in 2024 in which 1260H-listed entities appeared at Tier 3 (three or more layers removed from the prime contractor) or deeper in contractor supply chains.^[41] A 2021 survey by Deloitte found that only 15 percent of chief procurement officers have visibility into suppliers past Tier 1. This suggests that the vast majority of defense contractors cannot account for the full extent of their 1260H exposure.^[42]

With the indirect procurement ban approaching, contractors that have not begun mapping their sub-tier supply chains face a narrowing compliance window. As these contractors work to identify and remove designated suppliers, IBG’s tools can help fill the resulting gaps.

As Section 805’s procurement bans take effect, prime contractors face the problem of removing 1260H-linked suppliers from their supply chains and finding replacements that are verified, compliant, and production-ready. The challenge is particularly acute for contractors that rely on Chinese suppliers for specialized components in areas like critical minerals, electronics, and precision manufacturing, where domestic alternatives may be limited or immature. Last December, Assistant Secretary of War for Industrial Base Policy Michael Cadenazzi acknowledged that many firms are working with 1260H-connected entities “knowingly or unknowingly” and warned that contractors who wait until 2027 to begin requesting waivers will face “a painful process for everyone.”^[43]

Section 851’s implementation also makes clear that companies need to be cognizant that their lobbying relationships may affect their ability to contract with the Department of War. If an organization retains a lobbying firm that also represents a company identified on the 1260H List, it may not be eligible to enter into a new DoW contract, renew an existing contract, or extend a current contract.

IBG’s LYNX, by helping to identify small businesses and nontraditional suppliers, can help the DoW find potential alternative suppliers aligned with prime contractor needs.^[44] By expanding supplier participation and improving industrial base visibility, LYNX aims to help relieve some of the problems the procurement bans will create. As Cadenazzi framed it, the Section 805 bans represent “a great opportunity for us to shift investment into domestic firms and increase the amount of demand.”^[45]

Conclusion

After being shaped by the unprecedented military mobilization of World War II and the strategic competition of the early Cold War, the modern US DIB has undergone drastic changes while experiencing cycles of expansion and contraction. The industry has seen decades of contracting demand, large government-backed mergers and acquisitions, and the offshoring of manufacturing and processing capabilities, primarily to China, as the government supported globalization.^[46] As a result, today the defense sector is hyper-consolidated and relatively undiversified.

With his so-called Last Supper in 1993, then-Deputy Defense Secretary William Perry gave major defense executives the “green light” to pursue mergers with other contractors due to large, Pentagon-led funding cuts. Consequently, the number of primes fell from approximately 51 to five within a decade.^[47] In tandem, the number of mid-tier and small suppliers dropped precipitously as companies fought for fewer and smaller contracts.

This period of rapid consolidation—which was one of the fastest transformations of any modern US industry—now poses a serious challenge as adversaries, particularly China, ramp up military capabilities. While the Chinese threat is not new, in recent years the DIB’s vulnerabilities have become impossible to ignore. Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine and the current US-Iran war have demonstrated that the defense sector cannot mobilize quickly enough. So the Pentagon remains severely compromised in terms of surge capacity.^[48]

The Trump administration is responding to this crisis by trying to revitalize the defense industrial base. IBG-support initiatives represent just a few instruments in the government’s arsenal for strengthening supply chains and restoring America’s industrial capacity.

Abbreviations
CRMN:    Civil Reserve Manufacturing Network
DASW:    deputy assistant secretary of war
DIB:    defense industrial base
DoW:    Department of War
EO:    executive order
FY:    fiscal year
IBG:    Office of Industrial Base Growth
NDAA:    National Defense Authorization Act
NDS:    National Defense Strategy
NSS:    National Security Strategy
OSBP:    Office of Small Business Programs
SMEs:    small and medium-sized enterprises

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2. 2026 National Defense Strategy (US Department of War, January 2026), 5, https://media.defense.gov/2026/Jan/23/2003864773/-1/-1/0/2026-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY.PDF. ↑
3. “Presidential Executive Order on Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States,” White House, July 21, 2017, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-executive-order-assessing-strengthening-manufacturing-defense-industrial-base-supply-chain-resiliency-united-states/. ↑
4. National Security Strategy, 14. ↑
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13. Vital Signs 2026: The Health and Readiness of the Defense Industrial Base (National Defense Industrial Association, April 2026), https://www.ndia.org/-/media/sites/ndia/policy/vital-signs/2026/ndia_vitalsigns_2026.pdf. ↑
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22. Schadlow and Mismash, “Growing the DIB.” ↑
23. Shaw, “From Capability to Contract.” ↑
24. Schadlow and Mismash, “Growing the DIB.” ↑
25. Schadlow and Mismash, “Growing the DIB.” ↑
26. Shaw, “From Capability to Contract.” ↑
27. Porteous, “The Front Door”; Shaw, “From Capability to Contract.” ↑
28. Schadlow and Mismash, “Growing the DIB.” ↑
29. Schadlow and Mismash, “Growing the DIB.” ↑
30. “The Civil Reserve Manufacturing Network: What State and Local Officials Need to Know About the Pentagon’s Plan to Mobilize Commercial Factories,” Defense Manufacturing Brief 1 (March 2026), Manufacturing Momentum, Center for Regional Economic Competitiveness, 2, https://www.manufacturingmomentum.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Issue-Brief_Civil-Reserve.pdf. ↑
31. “Defense Primes (Subcontracting Basics),” Defense Market, accessed July 20, 2026, https://www.defensemarket.org/defenseprimes/. ↑
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33. William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-283, § 1260H, 134 Stat. 3388, 3965–66 (2021), https://www.congress.gov/116/plaws/publ283/PLAW-116publ283.pdf. ↑
34. Entities Identified as Chinese Military Companies Operating in the United States in Accordance with Section 1260H of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (US Department of War, Office of the Under Secretary of War for Acquisition and Sustainment), June 8, 2026, https://media.defense.gov/2026/Jun/08/2003945537/-1/-1/1/ENTITIES-IDENTIFIED-AS-CHINESE-MILITARY-COMPANIES-OPERATING-IN-THE-UNITED-STATES-IN-ACCORDANCE-WITH-SECTION-1260H.PDF. ↑
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36. John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232, § 889, 132 Stat. 1636, 1917–18 (2018), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/COMPS-15483/pdf/COMPS-15483.pdf. ↑
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38. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, Pub. L. No. 118-31, § 805, 137 Stat. 136, 315–16 (2023), https://www.congress.gov/118/plaws/publ31/PLAW-118publ31.pdf. ↑
39. 41 U.S.C. § 105 (2011), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/41/105. ↑
40. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, Pub. L. No. 118-31, § 805. ↑
41. “Compliance Analysis: Defense Prime Supply Chains Riddled with NDAA Section 1260H Violations,” Altana, accessed July 20, 2026, https://altana.ai/resources/ndaa-dib-violations. ↑
42. PR Newswire, “Deloitte’s 10th Annual Global Chief Procurement Officer Survey 2021: CPOs Harness Agility to Deliver and Protect Value Despite Uncertainty in the Wake of COVID-19,” press release, April 27, 2021, https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/deloittes-10th-annual-global-chief-procurement-officer-survey-2021-cpos-harness-agility-to-deliver-and-protect-value-despite-uncertainty-in-the-wake-of-covid-19-301276794.html. ↑
43. Lauren C. Williams, “Pentagon Preps to Enforce Ban on Companies with ‘Indirect’ Ties to China,” Defense One, December 19, 2025, https://www.defenseone.com/business/2025/12/pentagon-preps-enforce-ban-companies-indirect-ties-china/410316/. ↑
44. US Department of War, Office of Small Business Programs, “Department of War Launches LYNX to Help Businesses Enter and Compete in Defense Markets,” news release, January 30, 2026, https://www.war.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4394333/department-of-war-launches-lynx-to-help-businesses-enter-and-compete-in-defense/. ↑
45. Williams, “Pentagon Preps to Enforce Ban.” ↑
46. Jon Harper, “Defense Industry Could See Another Wave of Mergers Acquisitions,” National Defense Magazine, February 2, 2021, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2021/2/2/defense-industry-could-see-another-wave-of-mergers-acquisitions . ↑
47. Noah Robertson, “The Pentagon Wants Industry to Transform Again to Meet Demand. Can It?,” Defense News, February 20, 2024, https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2024/02/20/the-pentagon-wants-industry-to-transform-again-to-meet-demand-can-it/. ↑
48. Robertson, “The Pentagon Wants Industry to Transform Again to Meet Demand.” ↑