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Iran and Its Houthi Proxies Target Saudi Airports and Gulf Shipping

Can Kasapoglu Hudson Institute
Can Kasapoglu Hudson Institute
Senior Fellow (Nonresident)
Can Kasapoğlu
Fighters loyal to the Houthi authorities take part in a rally in Sanaa on October 7, 2026. (Getty Images)
Caption
Fighters loyal to the Houthi authorities take part in a rally in Sanaa on October 7, 2026. (Getty Images)

Executive Summary
 

  • Saudi aviation under pressure. The Houthis launched systematic strikes against airports in Saudi Arabia, which disrupted connectivity and imposed mounting economic costs across the kingdom—and potentially gave Tehran additional leverage in negotiations.
  • Maritime threats widen. Iranian attacks hit anchored tankers beyond the Strait of Hormuz transit lanes and placed regional trade and energy flows at greater risk.
  • Iran signals missile resilience. Reports that Iran test-launched 30 ballistic missiles suggest that Tehran has replenished at least part of its prewar missile stockpile.

1. The “Glass Kingdom” Gambit: The Houthis Launch Systematic Strikes on Saudi Airports

The Houthis’ regional air campaign is now targeting Saudi commercial aviation, as the Iranian proxy in Yemen launched multiple ballistic missile and drone salvos against the kingdom’s principal airports. On October 10 and 11, Saudi authorities reported that hostile projectiles had struck King Fahd International Airport in Dammam and a terminal at Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport. October 12 brought another round of long-range Houthi attacks against airports in Saudi Arabia.

The attacks on October 10 killed 13 people and wounded more than 300, making it the kingdom’s deadliest day in over a decade. An additional strike on October 11 killed one person and injured nearly a dozen. King Khalid International Airport, Saudi Arabia’s second-busiest airport, has remained closed since the first attack.

The disruptions rank among the most serious to hit Saudi aviation in several years. Access to the capital city, Riyadh, has been severely curtailed, while the kingdom’s principal western aviation hub, Jeddah, remains only partially operational. On October 12, the aviation website Flightradar24 showed commercial aircraft avoiding the airspace around Riyadh, although flights continued to cross Saudi airspace and serve Jeddah on the country’s Red Sea coast.

The Houthis are likely targeting Saudi commercial aviation in response to Washington’s recent efforts to encourage Western airlines to suspend commercial flights to Iran. On September 8, the United States sanctioned 27 Iranian airlines and suspended authorizations for overflights and certain foreign-operated flights into Iran. By September 24, the United Arab Emirates had suspended all Iranian carrier services.

Other countries and airlines soon followed suit. Reuters, citing Iranian sources, reported that Iran’s air connections with Oman, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Iraq had been disrupted. Turkish Airlines suspended services to Iran through at least March 2027, while Lufthansa and Austrian Airlines did so through October 24.

Additionally, Qatar Airways indicated it would suspend air services to the Islamic Republic until at least November 29. On October 2, Iraqi authorities announced that Iranian airlines, excluding Mahan Air, were permitted to operate 40 daily flights to and from Najaf. A separate US license allows Iraqi Airways to carry Iranian religious pilgrims between Najaf and Iran until October 28.

Iran is also likely seeking to weaken Saudi Arabia’s links to international aviation networks, force Saudi air defenses to protect civilian targets, erode international confidence in the kingdom, and widen the economic and political costs of Riyadh’s intervention in Yemen.

Airports offer particular advantages for such a campaign. As nodes of civilian infrastructure, they are comparatively soft targets that depend as much on consumer confidence as on physical capacity to operate. A force that attacks an airport need not destroy the entire facility. Even one or two drone, ballistic-missile, or cruise-missile attacks can cause chaos as airlines and passengers reassess the risks of flying.

The political-warfare effects of such an operation can be equally consequential. Strikes on airports can draw sustained news coverage and social media attention, magnifying the attacks’ impact beyond the initial damage. The campaign could reinforce a perception of Saudi Arabia as a “glass kingdom”—wealthy and ambitious, yet vulnerable to disruption. This trope feeds a narrative that the Saudis’ operations against the Houthis in Yemen are an increasingly costly undertaking sliding into mission creep.

The attacks have also sharpened worldwide concerns that civilian aviation hubs could become targets in armed conflict. On October 11, the US Federal Aviation Administration urged American carriers to exercise caution when flying to or over Saudi Arabia. The European Union Aviation Safety Agency likewise broadened the scope of its airspace warnings for Saudi Arabia, citing missile and drone threats.

According to the US Embassy in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Interior continues to warn that filming or sharing information about missile and drone interceptions and impact sites in the country can carry legal penalties. US citizens have also been detained for photographing recent events in the country. These restrictions likely reflect concerns that the Houthis and their Iranian patrons could exploit open-source imagery to assess battle damage and refine their subsequent strikes, a practice that is already commonplace in Ukraine.

Global airlines’ decisions in the wake of the Houthis’ attacks are extending the commercial consequences of the strikes beyond the announced airport closures. Lufthansa Group canceled flights to Riyadh through October 16; Air France and KLM suspended services through the end of the month; and Etihad extended its already-announced cancellations. Delta postponed the planned launch of flights connecting Atlanta to Riyadh from October 23 to March 2027. Other carriers across Europe and Asia have suspended services to the kingdom, compounding the pressure Saudi Arabia faces from regional conflict and increased jet fuel costs.

The economic backdrop of the Houthis’ air campaign exacerbates these vulnerabilities. Saudi Arabia’s real gross domestic product is projected to contract by 3.6 percent this year, partly because of weaker oil activity. Meanwhile, the kingdom’s flagship investment conference and the WPC Energy Congress, both scheduled for October in Riyadh, face mounting pressure to cancel or modify events; several leading oil executives have already dropped out of the WPC event program. These overlapping disruptions illustrate the potential strategic payoff of limited attacks on aviation infrastructure in shaping perceptions of Saudi vulnerability.

2. Tehran’s Coercive Signals: Tanker Attacks in Hormuz and Ballistic Missile Drills

Iran continued to use attacks on commercial shipping in an attempt to assert control over the Strait of Hormuz. United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations reported that unidentified projectiles struck two outbound tankers on October 10 and 11, setting the first ablaze and damaging the second. On October 12, Sepah News, the official news outlet of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, published footage that purportedly showed another tanker on an “unauthorized” route striking a naval mine in the strait.

The October 11 drone strike on the Petro Dolphin tanker at Oman’s Sohar anchorage highlights how Tehran has shifted from targeting ships already underway to striking vessels moored at anchor. Lloyd’s List, citing the Joint Maritime Information Center, reported that Iran had attacked three tankers in 72 hours operating outside established transit lanes. With traffic through Hormuz still far below historical levels and efforts to restore passage through the maritime chokepoint stalled, regional anchorages are increasingly exposed.

Oil prices climbed almost $2 a barrel on October 12 as Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia overshadowed expectations of additional oil supplies for global markets. These price increases came despite President Trump’s announcement that Russia and Ukraine had agreed to stop targeting energy infrastructure and reports that the Trump administration had secured supplies of Russian diesel. Kyiv said it would adhere to such a ceasefire if Russia did, while Moscow has not publicly confirmed that it agreed. Brent crude, a major global benchmark for pricing unrefined petroleum, settled at $106.65 a barrel, gaining $1.93, or 1.8 percent, to reach its highest closing price since September 15.

Meanwhile, the Islamic Republic continued to conduct ballistic missile drills. Pro-regime Iranian media reported that the IRGC had launched 30 ballistic missiles, including the high-end Khorramshahr and Emad projectiles, during recent large-scale exercises. The Khorramshahr carries a dispersing, shotgun-type warhead and is built from North Korean blueprints and components. The reported tests of these higher-end systems may signal that Iran has replenished its once-depleted missile stocks, although the launches alone do not establish the pace or extent of that recovery.

Strategic Takeaways and What to Monitor

Iran and the Houthis are creating threats that extend well beyond the Middle East. Pressure on global commodity flows and international aviation spreads the costs of regional war across the world economy.

Saudi Arabia is increasingly central to this coercive campaign. For Riyadh, the stakes reach directly into Vision 2030, which seeks to turn the kingdom into a global logistics and aviation hub. Repeated attacks on airports threaten both immediate connectivity and the commercial confidence needed to sustain that transformation.

These global repercussions should not overshadow the Houthis’ continuing ground operations around Taiz, where the military situation remains critical. The next report will examine that campaign and its implications for Yemen’s military balance and Saudi Arabia’s security.