SVG
Commentary
The Hill

Why Penalizing Partners Like Germany Would Weaken US Power

Daniel Kochis
Daniel Kochis
Senior Fellow, Center on Europe and Eurasia
Daniel Kochis
A US Army M1A2 Abrams tank prepares to engage simulated targets during exercise Combined Resolve 26-07 at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center’s Hohenfels Training Area in Germany on April 28, 2026. (US Army)

Until recently, U.S.-German ties were a bright spot in the transatlantic alliance. That changed abruptly after Chancellor Friedrich Merz publicly accused the Trump administration of being “humiliated” by Iran and lacking a convincing strategy for the war. Days later, Germany — recently praised as a “model ally” — was hit with news of a planned withdrawal of 5,000 U.S. troops.

This was not an isolated move. Reports suggest President Trump is informally sorting allies into tiers — rewarding some while publicly punishing others. Troop withdrawals may be just the start; even longstanding diplomatic positions, like U.S. support for British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, could be on the table.

It is an approach that may feel like leverage, but it will backfire. 

Germany shows why. U.S. forces there underpin American power projection across Europe, the Middle East and North Africa. In the current war against Iran, German territory has been indispensable for command and control, logistics and strike operations — especially as other European countries have restricted access.

At the same time, Berlin is finally doing what Washington has long demanded: rearming at a breakneck pace.

Germany has signed 47,000 defense procurement contracts since 2022 and is swiftly emerging as a future bedrock of transatlantic security, both capability and defense industrial capacity. This year alone, it will spend $127 billion on defense, far outpacing France. Pulling troops now does not just send a political message; it undercuts a partner that is actively becoming more capable and more useful.

It also is not cost-free. Germany helps offset the burden of hosting U.S. forces — costs that do not disappear if troops move elsewhere. And there is a hard reality: The U.S. presence in Europe is already a shadow of its former self. There is little left to cut without weakening coverage across multiple theaters.

The unit slated for removal is a permanently stationed brigade combat team, the 2nd Cavalry Regiment. Based in Vilseck, Germany, it is crucial for signaling deterrence, deploying regularly near the borders of Belarus and Russia to take part in exercises with allies or to showcase American presence on NATO’s eastward flank.

While preferable to complete removal, even reshuffling forces within Europe based on political favor would create headaches. Alternatives are limited. Moving major systems is not simple and shifting presence eastward while hollowing out established bases in the west risks new political frictions among allies. 

Even Poland, thought to be a potential future recipient of additional U.S. troops removed from longstanding U.S. bases in Western Europe, is treading carefully. Last week, Prime Minister Donald Tusk cautioned that while Warsaw is eager for additional U.S. forces, it did not want to “poach” them from other NATO nations.

Meanwhile, across Europe, public opinion of Washington is already souring. A U.S. seen as punitive or transactional will only deepen that trend, making it harder — even for friendly governments — to align openly with Washington. For some leaders, such as Spain’s Pedro Sanchez, confrontation with the U.S. could become a domestic political asset. 

The likely result is not compliance; it is backlash. European governments will not assume they are exempt. The lesson will be obvious: Germany today, someone else tomorrow. And with defense budgets rising, Europe will have options — whether in arms procurement or broader economic ties. 

None of this is to say U.S. grievances are unfounded. But there is a difference between managing disagreements and weaponizing them. The former strengthens alliances; the latter corrodes them. 

Today, some European governments may be willing to defy Washington. Tomorrow, different leaders in those same nations may swing back — if the political space to move closer in alignment remains open to them.  

The message sent by withdrawing troops from Germany will not land as intended. If anything, it would accelerate the very drift Washington should be trying to prevent. 

Punishing allies may feel decisive. If carried out, it would ultimately prove self-defeating. 

Read in The Hill.