Daniel Kochis originally prepared this analysis for NATO Allied Command Transformation in July 2025, and Hudson Institute has edited it lightly.
Since the end of World War II, the United States has maintained a robust troop presence in Europe. Facilitated by a network of bases, these forces help stabilize historical divisions on the continent, have undergirded the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since its inception in 1949, and afford the US outsized influence in a key region. While this presence today is a mere fraction of its former mass, it remains vital to the solidity of NATO’s mutual defense guarantee and the United States’ ability to effectively project power across the horizon in other theaters. Furthermore, a physical presence in Europe aids the United States in maintaining and deepening ties with its closest partners. The depth of the US alliance structure, principally its friendships in Europe, is one of the key assets in the nation’s favor as it faces momentous threats from authoritarian actors.
The United States and its European partners share deep historical, cultural, political, and familial ties. In a world where autocratic regimes in Beijing, Caracas, Moscow, Pyongyang, and Tehran are working ever more closely together, the necessity of standing shoulder to shoulder with democratic allies is likely existential.
Thankfully, the United States remains well positioned in Europe to maintain close alliances with its European partners, principally via the NATO conduit. There is little appetite in Europe to see America scale down its presence. In fact, those nations with permanent US deployments or facilities are eager to see the United States remain, while nations with a more ephemeral US presence are eager to attract a longer-lasting and more solid commitment. Conversely, the American public consistently places a positive value on a robust global posture.
It may be tempting to view the US force posture in Europe as expansive. However, in reality, it has already been trimmed down to such a degree that further reductions, especially in the near future, could undermine NATO’s ability to provide credible deterrence.
The Cornerstone of US Engagement in Europe is NATO
From a security standpoint, it is ideal to view Europe not as a distant theater with little bearing on US security but as the front line of North America’s shores. In some instances, quite literally, radar hosted at Royal Air Force Fylingdales in the United Kingdom and at Pituffik Space Base in Greenland (Denmark) are crucial early-warning radars for tracking incoming ballistic missiles. History has proven repeatedly that what happens in Europe will not stay in Europe. This remains true in the twenty-first century as revisionist powers increasingly view Europe as a zone of contestation.
The cornerstone of US engagement in Europe is NATO, the hugely successful multilateral organization that is still vital to transatlantic security. The return of salient threats to the North Atlantic region, principally the reanimation of Russian revanchism, underscores the continued need for a well-resourced alliance. The United States remains the undisputed leader of NATO, and its continued robust presence on European soil clarifies its rock-solid commitment to mutual defense for both allies and adversaries. This US presence helps to deter adversaries and provides policymakers with “flexibility, resilience, and options in a dangerous multipolar world.”
From an economic vantage, the United States has a stake in transatlantic security and stability. As I recently testified before Congress:
The US-European economic partnership is the engine of our mutual prosperity. The $8.7 trillion transatlantic economy supports a combined 16 million jobs in Europe, and the 48 contiguous US states export more to Europe than to China, with Oregon and Washington the only two exceptions. Over half of cumulative inward foreign direct investment to the US comes from Europe. This trade, investment, and intellectual exchange is the foundation upon which our way of life is built.
The Evolution of US Presence in Europe
The permanent American presence in Europe was born out of its historical role during and after World War II, when the US liberated large swathes of Europe from Nazi occupation and then blocked the Soviet Union from overrunning an exhausted Western Europe. The United States operated bases in Europe during World War I—for instance, at the time of the armistice, US naval aviation alone either operated or was actively constructing 15 bases in France, two in England, five in Ireland, and three in Italy. But the US did not retain permanent basing in the region following the conflict; it either returned sites to the host nations or closed them.
The Second World War brought the United States back to Europe. The United Kingdom invaded and occupied Iceland in May 1940 to preempt an expected German invasion of the strategically vital island. In July 1941, US troops arrived on the island and took over for the roughly 25,000 British forces then stationed there, freeing them for duty elsewhere. During the war, the United States built a naval air station at Keflavik, a base whose location astride critical sea lanes ensures its continued importance today. America’s permanent presence in Europe still bears the distinct imprint of World War II, with the US retaining key air bases in the United Kingdom as well as a cluster of facilities in regions of southwestern Germany that were part of the US and French occupation zones. Furthermore, none of the US bases in Germany are located in the former Soviet occupation zone or in former East Germany (German Democratic Republic). During the Cold War, the United States retained significant basing facilities in Europe, and its bases in Western Europe served as the front lines of freedom. As a recent report noted, “In 1991, the year of the Soviet Union’s collapse, the US Army in Germany operated from about 500 different sites scattered across the country. The amount of land occupied by the Army alone added up to 232,151 acres.” That Army basing in Germany alone amounted to more land than 15 Manhattan islands.
Today, that footprint is drastically smaller. As of July 2024, the United States maintained “31 persistent bases and 19 other military sites to which DOD has access in the region.” In all, nine US Army garrisons are based in Europe: one each in Belgium, Italy, Poland, and the Black Sea region (Bulgaria and Romania), and five in Germany. While the United States has hesitantly expanded its presence in nations that joined NATO after 1999 (an expansion year that saw the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland join the alliance), it had no permanent bases there until it stationed a V Corps forward command post in Poznań, Poland, in 2023. Despite this important first, the US presence in Eastern Europe remains minuscule and relies almost entirely on rotational troops. (Map 1 shows further details about US bases in Europe.)
To support its rotational presence, the United States has invested in key hubs, including Mihail Kogălniceanu (MK) Air Base in Romania. The value of this important Black Sea base, especially in consideration of the likely continued Russian occupation of Crimea, makes it a wise addition. The proximity to a key zone of contestation helps in part to explain US interest. For comparison’s sake, consider that the MK base is roughly the same distance to Sevastopol on the occupied Crimean Peninsula as Washington, DC, is to Charleston, West Virginia. The Biden administration increased US use of MK. In July 2024, a temporary deployment of B-52Hs to the base marked the first time US strategic bombers had operated out of Romania. The Trump administration has sustained the enhanced usage of the base. In February, Assistant to the President and Special Presidential Envoy for Ukraine Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Keith Kellogg noted that US bases in Romania “are maintained and will even increase in importance.”
The United States has expanded its presence at sites across Greece as well—including at the port of Alexandroupolis, a critical transport node, and Larissa Air Base, which hosts MQ-9s—and has started major upgrades to Naval Support Activity (NSA) Souda Bay. While Greece joined the alliance three years after its founding, US interest in growing its physical presence there stems from Greece’s geographic position astride the Black Sea and the active eastern Mediterranean.
Beyond these two bodies of water, the recent accession of strategically located Finland and Sweden to the alliance has opened a panoply of potential sites for the United States to expand its presence farther east and north. The United States signed a defense cooperation agreement with Sweden that entered into force on August 15, 2024, and one with Finland that entered into force on September 1, 2024. These agreements grant it “unrestricted access to the military infrastructure (air, sea and land bases) of these countries: 17 locations in Sweden, 15 in Finland.”
In Western European nations where its bases have had a longer-term presence, the American military has built rapport with the local communities and their leaders. Transport links tend to be well developed, and the United States enjoys access to key facilities in many of these nations.
Two examples include the Grafenwoehr Training Area in Germany, which the Army describes as its “largest and most sophisticated permanent training area in Europe.” Another is Landstuhl Regional Medical Center (LRMC), also in Germany. In September, the American College of Surgeons Committee on Trauma reverified LRMC as a US Level II Trauma Center, the only facility overseas with the designation. The facilities’ location far closer to combat zones and the expertise of its personnel have undoubtedly helped save many American lives. Consider that in the two decades of combat from 2001–21 in Afghanistan and Iraq, LRMC cared for over 95,000 wounded soldiers.
US Presence in Europe Is Historically Small
As of March 2025, the United States currently has 65,471active-duty forces permanently stationed in Europe. That is a modest enough footprint to fit into all but two professional football stadiums in the United States.
While the United States has centered the bulk of its permanent presence in nations with long-standing American bases (see chart 1 and map 2), it also rotates troops through NATO allies farther east. For example, it currently deploys 1,700 troops to Romania, 10,000 rotationally to Poland, 1,000 rotationally to Lithuania, and additional forces rotationally to Estonia. US rotations comprise both troops permanently based in Western Europe and troops from the homeland. Whether they are permanent or rotational, there is no doubt that this presence allows the United States to become more interoperable with allies, train more effectively, and become familiar with the terrain. Additionally, it gains political and social benefits from this presence, including an outsized influence in European affairs.
The Value of a Permanent Presence
While in recent years the United States has increasingly relied on rotational forces to bulk up its troop strength in Europe, there is simply no substitute for a permanent on-the-ground presence. In 2022, following his nomination as commander, US European Command (EUCOM) and as NATO supreme allied commander, Europe (SACEUR), Gen. Christopher Cavoli wrote, “From my perspective as the Commander of US Army Europe and Africa, permanently assigned forces are more operationally effective, as they remain fully oriented to the operational environment and can become interoperable with our Allies and Partners.”
While it may be tempting to view the recent reliance on rotational forces as a prudent answer to fiscal constraints, there is evidence that this is a mistaken assumption. One recent analysis compared the annual costs of continuously deploying a rotational armored brigade combat team (ABCT) to Europe to stationing an ABCT in a country such as Germany or Poland and found that the rotational deployment cost is nearly $70 million more per year. Similarly, with a flight-hour cost of around $33,000, F-35s based at Lakenheath, United Kingdom, would offer a more cost-effective response to threats emanating from the Middle East, North Africa, or Russia than flying the platform from bases in the United States.
The local knowledge that the United States gains and retains through permanently stationed troops is an underappreciated asset. In one example, a May rotational deployment of the 3rd Infantry Division to Estonia uncovered unforeseen obstacles unique to the terrain, in terms of both scouting and vehicle maintenance. As one report noted, the deployment “discovered upon arriving here that keeping military vehicles ready for combat is very different in below-freezing temperatures than it is at their Fort Stewart, Ga., headquarters.” Basing troops permanently in a nation allows for long-term linkages to grow organically with the host nation, and the knowledge troops accrue does not atrophy upon the end of the rotation.
Also note that in the event of a Russian conventional attack on a NATO ally, the United States cannot assume it would be able to successfully move a large presence back to Europe. These deployments would be heavily contested. In 2022, Adm. Sir Antony David Radakin, UK chief of defense staff, stated he had seen a “phenomenal increase in Russian submarine and underwater activity.” The Greenland–Iceland–UK (GIUK) gap has regained strategic currency in light of this threat. In the first two decades of the Cold War, the limited capabilities of Soviet ballistic missile submarines “allowed only a strike range that demanded Soviet submarines to break into the Atlantic through the GIUK gap to be able to threaten American targets.” While technological improvements in the latter half of the Cold War allowed the Soviet Union to plan to operate its nuclear-armed submarines from the relative safety of the Barents Sea, the GIUK gap retained critical importance. As one analysis noted:
While the GIUK Gap no longer was important in the context of the nuclear counterforce mission, the Soviet Navy maintained a core of SSNs (including the Project 945 Sierra, Project 971 Akula, and Project 671 Victor classes) equipped to attack NATO naval forces in the wider Atlantic. In addition, it deployed the Project 949 Oscar- and Project 949A Oscar II–class guided-missile submarines (SSGNs) specifically designed to kill US carrier battle groups. The clear desire of the Soviet Navy to deny NATO use of the seas meant the GIUK Gap, and the associated barrier defense concept, retained a degree of importance even after the Soviet SSBNs retreated to bastions in the far north.
The lesson to be drawn from the GIUK gap’s return to critical relevance is that it is far easier to have troops and equipment already in theater when the fighting starts than to have to transport personnel and equipment from overseas. Additionally, moving US forces over the Atlantic is not the only potential problem in the event of a future hot war. Russia would also use every means at its disposal to complicate and contest the overland transit of US and Western European forces toward battlefields further east. Russia is aware of and planning to exacerbate these vulnerabilities. A recent spate of sabotage against railways in Germany underscores the continued exposure of critical overland transport nodes in Europe. For all these reasons, retaining a robust US presence in Europe has a crucial deterrent value, lessening the potential of a conventional Russian assault against a NATO member state.
Magnified Value for Projecting Power Farther Afield
Beyond the defense of Europe itself, basing and troop presence in the region allows the United States to project power into Central Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa more quickly and efficiently.
Consider the terror attack against the US embassy in Benghazi, Libya, in September 2012, which saw four Americans murdered, including the US ambassador. Following that attack, a Marine response strike team was based in Morón, Spain, from 2013 to 2022 to quickly react to any future attacks in the region.
In a recent testimony, Gen. Cavoli addressed the value of US heavy ground forces based in Europe for action in theaters farther afield. He testified that pre-deployments are “fundamental” due to “three principal components: access, basing, and overflight.” He continued:
So, [these are] our ability to base our forces someplace, and to have the ability to access those forces to deploy them, and then to have the agreements to overfly nations. All of those things happen. They’re usually based on pretty deep relationships. If you want it to be there when you need it, you have to have prepared for that moment.
In June 2025, escalating hostilities with Iran underscored the value of US basing in Europe and assets prepositioned in the region. Mid-month, the United States deployed approximately 30 aerial refuelers based in the continental United States to “Ramstein Air Base in Germany, Morón Air Base and [Naval Station] Rota in Spain, Aviano Air Base in Italy, Prestwick International Airport in the U.K., and Souda Bay in Greece.” It sent a further 12 aerial refuelers to Lajes Field in the Portuguese Azores, which boasts the longest runway in Europe and the second-largest Air Force fuel depot overseas and in Europe. The United States used European basing to send additional fighter jets and transport aircraft to the Middle East. One analysis found that 63 US military aircraft landed at bases in the UK in one three-day span in June alone. In addition to air assets, US basing in Europe was an asset for American families departing the Middle East due to an increased threat. NSA Naples served as a waystation for military families returning to the United States.
Increasing Threats
Russia’s threat to the transatlantic community is only metastasizing. It presents a vastly different environment from the post–Cold War 1990s, when the United States began withdrawing forces as payment of a supposed peace dividend. European intelligence assessments all agree on a real likelihood of more widespread war in Europe in the next five to ten years. In June, Maj. Gen. Christian Freuding of Germany stated that a ceasefire in Ukraine could allow Russia to boost its rearmament and military recruitment efforts more quickly against NATO. “They are recruiting significantly more personnel than they need as replacements for the war in Ukraine. They are producing surplus stocks of ammunition, in particular, which they are putting on store.” In April 2024, German Chief of Defence Gen. Carsten Breuer stated, “Russia (will have) reconstituted its own forces to a degree that an attack against NATO soil could be possible” in five to eight years. He reiterated the timeline of 2029 or earlier in June 2025, noting of Russian military production, “Not every single tank is going to [the war in] Ukraine, but it’s also going in stocks and into new military structures always facing the West.” The Danish Defense Intelligence Service gave a similar timeline of five years in their February 2025 assessment. In December, Kaupo Rosin, director general of the Välisluureamet (Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service), warned bluntly that “the task for NATO in the coming 10–20 years will be to contain or deter Russia so it doesn’t get any stupid ideas to push towards the West militarily.”
Impact on NATO Deterrence
US forces based in Europe are the steel that gives NATO defense plans strength in the eyes of Russia. Former SACEUR Gen. Cavoli in April testified to the crucial importance of ground forces for deterring further Russian aggression:
The alliance, we collectively require a heavy ground presence. That is specifically to be able to overcome that singular Russian advantage of being able to put its forces on our borders as an alliance before the initiation of hostilities. That causes a time–space problem for us in terms of reinforcing, so the positioning of this large force has to be appropriate to the situation, right, to the level of threat. Whether that ground force comes from America or someplace else is really—SACEUR doesn’t care as long as it functions. There are some capabilities that the US is very careful to make sure we continue to contribute because they’re exquisite and in some cases unique, and we understand that those will have to be there all the time otherwise.
Gen. Cavoli stressed that the mix of heavy ground force contributions between the United States and Europe will recalibrate as European nations continue to fulfill their NATO capability targets through acquisition programs and increased armed force sizes. While it is not wise to overlook the recruitment problems of many European nations, assuming they address and overcome these problems, Gen. Cavoli’s testimony highlights the importance of timing for any potential future withdrawal of US forces. Any drawdown is inadvisable, but a haphazard one that pulls the rug out from under European NATO members before they can stand up replacement formations to backfill any resulting gaps would be the most damaging scenario.
Speaking about the potential for removing 10,000 US forces from Europe, Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto stated in April that he anticipates European forces can backfill the gap without much trouble: “It is not unexpected. It is something we have been preparing for a long time; now we will need to understand with what timing it will be made.” A recently published analysis, however, noted:
In a worst-case scenario, a hasty, large-scale US withdrawal from NATO could send the wrong signal to Russia, which might interpret it as the US abandoning its defense of Europe. The next three to five years could be the most dangerous for Europe, as it will be in the process of increasing its defense capabilities, but not yet able to fully deter Russian aggression.
A May report from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) found “the cost to replace the estimated 128,000 US personnel that we assess could be earmarked for a NATO contingency in Europe would, the IISS evaluates, come to an additional USD 12.3 bn annually.” Beyond a massive financial hole that it would need to plug quickly, Europe would be unable to produce the capabilities it loses in the short-to-medium term. In its report, IISS starkly warns:
If the US were to completely remove itself from NATO, European states would face a wide range of capability gaps and stark choices as to how to fill these gaps. . . . Even if governments placed armed forces and defence industries on a “war footing”, funding, industrial capacity and recruiting and training pipeline constraints would limit the speed at which military capability could be increased. In particular, developing the required defence-industrial capacity in a relatively short time frame would be very difficult. Not only would Europe’s current defence-industrial capacity struggle to ramp up production to meet these additional requirements quickly, but so too would defence suppliers outside Europe.
While the complete withdrawal of US forces from Europe is an extremely unlikely scenario, even a partial withdrawal would leave European NATO allies facing vulnerabilities at a precarious time. Indeed, the US presence is a shadow of what it once was, and after whittling it away across the past three-plus decades, the United States could approach the point of fatally undermining deterrence with further reductions. Europe remains heavily reliant on US strategic enablers, airlift and refueling, command and control, intelligence, and “long-range strike systems and battlefield logistics.” (See chart 3 for details on some key capabilities.)
In April, Gen. Ben Hodges, former commanding general of US Army Europe, stated, “The biggest gap would be US Air Force, early warning, intelligence . . . and then the US contribution at NATO’s air command at Ramstein.” NATO maritime electronic warfare (EW) Syndicate Chair Bas Nieuwenhuijse noted in May that the alliance is playing catch-up: It “hasn’t developed and fielded EW capabilities in the same amount of quality as some potential adversaries,” and within those it has, “NATO relies heavily on US EW capabilities.”
In the aerial and space domain, a recent analysis noted NATO reliance on the United States for electronic intelligence “collection, distribution and analytical capacity, and resulting threat library data.” Additionally, “dependency on the US is in airborne [electronic attack], or support jamming.” The report goes on to note:
Almost all the Alliance’s capability resides in the EA-18G Growler squadrons of the US Navy, and to some degree (with a focus on disrupting hostile communications rather than radars) in the US Air Force’s EC-130H Compass Call and new EA-37B Compass Call aircraft. There are no comparable capabilities elsewhere in NATO air forces—although the Italian air force has ordered two EA-37B aircraft that should be in service by the late 2020s.
The June confirmation hearing of Lt. Gen. Alexus G. Grynkewich as general and commander of EUCOM and as SACEUR underscored Europe’s inability to replace US nuclear deterrence. In the hearing, he testified to the importance of US nuclear capabilities and the forward positioning of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe:
The US strategic nuclear forces under the Command of General Cotton at US strategic command are really foundational to the security of all of Europe and foundational to the security of the alliance. It also underpins global security in many ways, and they are absolutely essential. I also would note the forward positioning of certain nuclear capabilities on the continent and those provide a very important backstop to any potential threat coming from the east.
In addition to capability within NATO, American skin in the game via boots on European soil makes US leadership real and helps hold together an alliance that is often fractious under the surface. The enervation of the US footprint would most likely lead to a scramble among larger European NATO members to replace Washington as the key member, resulting in further division.
Today, a sizable portion of the artillery, missile systems, armored vehicles, and fighter jets in service by European NATO members are American-made. A considerable lure of US-made equipment is not only the capabilities themselves but also access to “closer integration into wider US military systems,” which often accompanies such deals. US basing aids in maintaining those systems, training end users, and building interoperability between American and allied forces.
Public Opinion
Despite the general perception in Europe that the American public supports significant troop drawdowns in Europe, polling does not support this view. In fact, there is no widespread clamor among the US public for a withdrawal from basing overseas. A poll last year found majority support for long-term US military bases overseas in all three European locations for which it queried respondents: the Baltic States (54 percent), Germany (64 percent), and Poland (53 percent). Support for US basing in the Baltics and Poland was nearly identical among Democrats, Independents, and Republicans. However, Republicans showed greater support for US bases in Germany (71 percent) than either Democrats (62 percent) or Independents (59 percent). While US public support has remained favorable for long-term US basing in Germany across the past decade, support for US basing in Poland has increased from 37 percent overall in 2014 to 53 percent overall in 2024. A May–June 2025 poll found similar support (59 percent) for increasing the US military footprint in Eastern Europe.
Polling has found staunch support not only for American global leadership but also for committing US troops to the defense of allies. A 2024 survey found that nearly two-thirds of Americans (65 percent overall) would support the use of US troops “if Russia invaded a NATO ally like Germany”; a majority supports the use of US forces “if Russia invaded a NATO ally like Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia.” A 2024 report found that 63 percent of Americans surveyed would support the use of US ground forces to expel Russian troops if they attacked the newest NATO member, Finland. This same report found a majority (62 percent) of Americans wanted the United States to maintain or increase its troop presence in Europe.
A June 2025 survey of self-identified “Trump voters” found similar strong support for US global engagement: 92 percent believed “a strong American presence in global affairs contributes to a safer world,” and 70 percent believed “it is vital to prevent Russia from invading other European nations.”
While the American public continues to appreciate the value of US leadership and presence overseas in serving US interests, there is evidence of a secondary benefit of improving foreign attitudes toward the United States. A 2020 paper looking at the impact of US deployments on public opinion in host nations stated, “Our results suggest that contact with members of the US military may reduce prejudice against US actors and build more positive perceptions of them.”
NATO Allies Help Offset US Costs
The United States does not bear the cost of basing forces in Europe alone. As a recent Congressional Research Service report noted, identifying a conclusive amount of financial support that host nations provide for basing is extremely difficult. What is clear is that allies do contribute to offset the costs of US basing in their nations via in-kind contributions. A 2017 article estimated that NATO allies covered $2.5 billion annually, or 34 percent of basing costs in the theater.
Germany provides some of the largest financial support from a host nation. A 2013 RAND study estimated that Germany contributed $830 million in direct and indirect support in 2009:
Germany’s indirect support includes forgone customs duties, forgone income taxes, personnel benefits (such as accepting US Drivers Licenses without fees), and forgone rent on facilities provided by Germany for use by the United States. Additionally, direct support takes the form of land, infrastructure, construction, damage claim offsets, and compensation to local communities.
The report further notes that the total does not capture all the host-nation support Germany provides. For instance, it fails to capture the value of land that the Federal Republic provided years earlier for US basing and facilities.
Similar dynamics are in play in Italy. In 2019, Finabel estimated that the Italian government contributed “€500 million in indirect costs for US bases in Italy.” A 2013 report on the expansion of the US base at Vicenza in the early 2000s noted that, of the $610 million spent on upgrades to that date, “Washington convinced NATO to provide more than half these funds, and Italy ceded 210 acres of land for free.”
The 1973 cost-sharing arrangement (CSA) covers the financial aspects of US basing in the UK. A recent analysis summarizes the CSA as “the US funds most base developments, the UK contributes by providing land and facilities, often rent-free, and waiving certain taxes and duties.”
NATO allies farther east, such as Poland, are also investing heavily to support a US presence. In 2020, the two nations signed the US–Poland Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, which details a host of infrastructure projects the Polish government committed to fund and complete at 11 bases and training ranges across the nation. An October 2024 report noted that Poland had invested $300 million over the prior year on base improvements across the country, including “$93 million for ongoing work to build a new Army barracks and a dining facility in Powidz.” One US soldier praised Poland’s investment in new barracks at the Drawsko Training Center: “It’s awesome that [the Polish Armed Forces] have invested facilities and infrastructure in a long-term relationship with the US Army.” Infrastructure investments have continued in 2025, totaling $200 million and including “$56 million on force protection and communications” at Wroclaw and “$132 million to support drone and surveillance operations, as well as corresponding taxiway, hangar and communications upgrades” at Lask Air Base. Poland plans to continue spending $250 million a year to support a US presence through 2035, and could increase this figure should the US presence expand.
Furthermore, Polish forces will largely man, maintain, and pay for the Powidz Army Prepositioned Stocks-2 (Powidz APS-2) with a minimal US contribution. The site “houses and maintains a modernized Armored Brigade Combat Team’s worth of APS-2 equipment to include several dozen M1A2 Abrams main battle tanks and nearly 200 other armored combat vehicles, plus more.” The US expects its share of maintenance costs for Powidz APS-2 to drop by 90 percent by 2026 as Poland takes on the lion’s share of funding for the site.
In 2024, Romania began a $2.7 billion project to expand and modernize the MK base, including building “a new runway, a guard tower, and additional hangars to protect existing and forthcoming military assets purchased by the Eastern European country.”
Norway, too, helps offset the cost of the Marine Corps Prepositioning Program–Norway (MCPP-N). According to an updated memorandum of understanding that the United States and Norway signed in 2005, the two countries split operations and maintenance costs. The Norwegian contribution is “limited to half of the total costs incurred or the ceiling set in US dollars to be negotiated by the Parties, whichever is less.” The United States provides the equipment in the MCPP-N, while Norway “shall make available adequate means to load, transport, and protect equipment of the MCPP-N.” As an example of Norway’s investment in infrastructure surrounding the stockpiles, a pier at Hammernesodden meant to ease the ability of large vessels to dock and offload combat vehicles, completed in 2014, cost $22.5 million, but Norway paid for it entirely.
Also note that removing US troops from Europe or redistributing troops within Europe is not a costless exercise. Inchoate plans at the end of the first Trump administration to remove 11,900 troops from Germany, returning 6,400 to the US and redistributing 5,600 within Europe, were stunted in part over costs. Former Secretary of Defense Mark Esper stated at the time, “It’ll take several billion dollars, I’d say single digits, but that’ll be spread out over time, obviously.”
Some EUCOM officials dubbed one of the units that the United States scheduled to remove from Germany, the 2nd Cavalry Regiment, as a “go-to brigade for quick response.” It has been a frequent mainstay of the US component of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence in Poland, where the United States serves as the framework nation. The political reality is that future potential drawdowns of American forces are most likely to return stateside rather than redeploy to other theaters. Whether they redeployed or returned stateside, unless the Department of Defense (DoD) decommissioned them, sustaining them would not be free.
Chinese and Russian Threats: Two Sides of the Same Coin
Within policy circles, some of the discourse surrounding troop withdrawals from Europe rests on concerns about the need to fight a future war against China in the Indo-Pacific. The DoD’s recent short-lived pause on weapons deliveries to Ukraine originated from a contested belief that rebuilding US stockpiles for a future war against China necessitated the stoppage. Should similar Pacific prioritization policy preferences lead to recommendations to decrease the US presence in Europe, decision-makers should recognize the unified threat that China and Russia pose. The May 2025 agreement that Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping signed to deepen their existing comprehensive strategic partnership is indicative of this new reality.
Would withdrawing the US presence in the European theater weaken deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region? Adversaries and allies alike will watch any perceived ambiguity of US commitment to European security. Recent reporting indicates that many Taiwanese are nervous about their defense strategy of holding out for US assistance in the event of war. This development is a warning signal that what happens in Europe has meaningful implications for alliances across the globe.
Should the United States scale back its commitments in Europe because a future war in the Pacific is possible? The Pacific is primarily a naval theater: “The US Pacific Fleet fields around 200 vessels, about two-thirds of the Navy’s 296 ships.” Today, less than 13 percent of permanently stationed forces in Europe are from the Navy, while the Air Force, which constitutes around 45 percent of US permanently stationed forces in Europe, currently deploys just three permanent fighter wings there (one each in Germany, Italy, and the UK). While the United States regularly deploys strategic bombers to Europe, it does not have any permanently based there. It bases only four Patriot missile batteries in all of Europe.
It is also not an entirely remote possibility that Chinese success in establishing a military presence on the Atlantic Ocean could shake up the strategic map. In March 2022, a former commander of US Africa Command (USAFRICOM), Gen. Stephen J. Townsend, discussed the potential threat of Chinese relations with African nations:
The thing I think I’m most worried about is this military base on the Atlantic coast, and where they have the most traction for that today is in Equatorial Guinea.
Indeed, a 2023 study from researchers at William and Mary found that Bata, Equatorial Guinea, was the second most likely location for a future Chinese naval base overseas. The eighth most likely location was found to be Nouakchott, Mauritania. If a Chinese naval presence ever came to fruition in Nouakchott, it would alter NATO’s threat perceptions. For example, Nouakchott is closer to Madrid than Stockholm. US basing in Portugal and Spain would take on an outsized value in this scenario compared to its basing today.
Conclusion
The US presence in Europe bolsters NATO deterrence, allows the United States to more quickly and effectively project power in multiple theaters, and builds ties with its closest allies. Withdrawal of US forces—particularly one that is steep, swift, and uncoordinated—would have global implications.
When asked about the US presence in Europe in April, Gen. Cavoli testified, “It’s my advice to maintain that force posture as it is now.” He also stated, “I have consistently recommended throughout that period to maintain the forces we surged forward, and I would continue to do so if asked.”