Just ahead of the Aug. 23 elections, Kazakhstan's President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev spoke to the nation on television and asked citizens to take the long view.
"We face complex tasks as we strive to join the ranks of the world's leading nations," he said. "Often, the value of the most important decisions is only fully realized by people years later."
Tokayev's message can be boiled down to three words: trust the process.
It was a highly choreographed election. The pro-presidential Adilet party won 71.17% of the vote, according to preliminary results, an overwhelming majority as expected. All seven parties on the ballot were pro-government, while opposition parties were excluded and critical journalists faced increased pressure. Critics emphasized that this was a consolidation of power, not a step toward democracy.
Yet, viewing Kazakhstan's political changes solely through the prism of democratic advance or retreat misses the bigger context.
The world's most important geopolitical hedger is preparing for a much rougher world.
Kazakhstan shares a 7,600-kilometer border with Russia and a 1,780-km border with China. In the neighborhood, missiles and drones wreak havoc from Iran and the Persian Gulf to Ukraine.
Political stability is a fundamental necessity to maintain Kazakhstan's multi-vector foreign policy. The January 2022 anti-government riots, reflecting a power struggle, showed how quickly an elite rupture can translate into foreign dependence. To stabilize the situation, Tokayev had to request assistance from the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), giving Russia tremendous, albeit temporary, military leverage.
These concerns were the driving force behind Kazakhstan's constitutional reforms that took effect July 1. The bicameral parliament has been replaced by a 145-member Kurultai -- named after the assemblies where Turkic and Mongol peoples deliberated over major decisions, including the selection of khans (rulers).
The constitution creates the office of vice president for the first time. Shortly after the new Kurultai convenes, Tokayev will nominate a vice president and seek the legislature's consent.
The vice president is not necessarily Tokayev's designated successor, but presidential powers will immediately pass to the officeholder if Tokayev dies, becomes unable to perform his duties or leaves office -- perhaps to run for United Nations secretary general, as is often rumored.
Tokayev was handpicked to succeed longtime President Nursultan Nazarbayev in 2019, but Nazarbayev and his family retained enormous influence. That tension was thought to be behind the 2022 unrest, which Tokayev later described as an attempted coup. Tokayev emerged victorious, and Kazakhstan's political system has been reorganized ever since.
Shortly before the election, the Constitutional Court ruled that the new constitution reset Tokayev's presidential clock, theoretically allowing him to run again after his current term ends in 2029.
However, a source close to the government told this author on condition of anonymity that the court ruling should not be seen as evidence Tokayev intends to remain beyond 2029. It is, rather, a way to avoid becoming a lame duck by keeping that option open, the source said.
Taken together -- the Kurultai, the vice presidency and the ambiguity surrounding 2029 -- the reforms point toward an attempt to engineer an orderly political transition.
Such a transition is essential to preserving Kazakhstan's multi-vector foreign policy: maintaining relationships with China, Russia and the U.S. without becoming subordinate to any of them.
"Today the international system is becoming more complex and less predictable," Deputy Foreign Minister Arman Issetov told foreign reporters and analysts. With geopolitical tensions rising and competition for investment, technology and transport intensifying, he said, "stability remains one of Kazakhstan's main priorities."
Andrei Kazantsev, a scholar of Central Asian politics, sees a difficult balancing act between political opening and building functioning economies. China prioritized economic development while remaining politically closed, he said, while rushed political opening brought catastrophic consequences in Russia and Kyrgyzstan. "Kazakhstan is the only post-Soviet state that has managed to open up to society without experiencing a broader political and institutional regression," he said.
Maintaining that balance will become harder as Central Asia emerges as an arena of great-power competition.
For China, railways, highways and pipelines across Eurasia provide alternative connections to markets and resources should maritime chokepoints become vulnerable. Kazakhstan's enormous, mostly flat territory makes it a natural east-west corridor.
Washington sees Central Asia as a source of critical minerals that can reduce U.S. dependence on Chinese supply chains. Russia remains the region's traditional power.
That competition will soon be visible just across Kazakhstan's border in Kyrgyzstan. Chinese President Xi Jinping is due in Bishkek at the end of August for a state visit and Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit, alongside Russian President Vladimir Putin. U.S. Special Envoy for South and Central Asian Affairs Sergio Gor will be there at the same time to celebrate Kyrgyzstan's Independence Day, with meetings planned with Tokayev, Uzbekistan's President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and host Sadyr Japarov.
Kazakhstan's task is to ensure all three powers feel appreciated, without drifting too far toward any one camp.
The rationale for the Aug. 23 election becomes clearer in this context. Kazakhstan's leaders worry about a fragmented political system becoming vulnerable to domestic factionalism or outside pressure just as competition among the great powers intensifies.
Tokayev's wager is that Kazakhstan can consolidate the state without closing society, arrange a succession without triggering a succession struggle, and maintain a multi-vector foreign policy whichever way the winds blow.
As Tokayev suggested, whether the process worked may only become apparent years from now.