Moldova and Ukraine were granted candidate status to join the EU in 2022 and formal accession negotiations were launched in June 2024. But it was only last month that the first substantive negotiations opened. Despite optimistic rhetoric from some European capitals, it is likely that full membership will take a significant amount of time.
This is not necessarily a reflection of the potential or readiness of Moldova or Ukraine. It is more a reflection of the EU’s unpreparedness to absorb them, especially a country as large as Ukraine.
The question of EU enlargement has been contentious for years. Whether the bloc should widen its membership by adding new members or focus instead on deepening integration and consolidating its institutions remains a perennial debate. Adding Ukraine and Moldova, with their unique security challenges because of Russia, will make the process even more difficult.
In Moldova’s case, there is the matter of Transnistria, the Russian-occupied breakaway region that lies mostly on the eastern bank of the Dniester River and has been under Russian influence since the early 1990s. In Ukraine’s case, the challenge is even more obvious: bringing into the EU a country fighting a major war against Russia will be politically, financially and institutionally difficult.
In the technical sense, enlargement is fairly straightforward, although laborious in practice. Once a country begins accession talks, it must align with the acquis communautaire — the EU’s body of laws, regulations and standards, which runs to 35 chapters.
These chapters cover issues ranging from the rule of law, public procurement, statistics and financial control to economic policy, agriculture, transport, energy and the environment. Opening and then closing them is no easy task. For example, Turkiye has been a candidate country since 1999 and began accession negotiations in 2005, yet it has provisionally closed only one chapter.
Last month, the first set of substantive negotiations was formally opened for both Ukraine and Moldova. This stage focuses on the “fundamentals,” including the rule of law and fundamental rights, the functioning of democratic institutions, public administration reform and economic criteria. These issues are opened first and closed last because progress on them determines the overall pace of accession. For Ukraine, carrying out difficult reforms while fighting for national survival will be no easy task.
But it is not just Moldova and Ukraine that need to reform. The EU also has serious institutional questions to address.
First, Brussels will have to think about decision-making in the European Council and the European Parliament. The European Parliament currently has 720 seats. Absorbing Ukraine would therefore require existing member states to lose seats or the EU to expand the parliament.
Then there is the issue of voting in the European Council, where many decisions are taken by qualified majority. This system is based partly on population, requiring the support of member states representing at least 65 percent of the EU’s total population. If Ukraine joined, it would become the EU’s fifth-largest member in terms of population, followed by Poland and then Romania. This means the center of gravity in EU decision-making would shift further east, reducing some of the influence Western Europe has long enjoyed.
Second, there is the Common Agricultural Policy and how it would apply to a large agrarian country like Ukraine. Introduced in the 1960s, it remains a complex system of agricultural subsidies and rural development support that still accounts for roughly a third of the EU’s long-term budget.
The amount each country receives under the policy is heavily influenced by the size of its agricultural sector and farmland. Ukraine has about a quarter of Europe’s farmland. If it were to enter the EU under current Common Agricultural Policy rules, tens of billions of euros in subsidies could shift from west to east. The policy is already one of the most contentious issues inside the EU. Bringing in agricultural powerhouses like Ukraine and, to a lesser degree, Moldova would push this issue to the top of the agenda.
Finally, admitting Ukraine and Moldova would almost certainly require a new treaty, or at least treaty-level reforms, to address these issues. Considering the political dynamics across Europe, ratifying a detailed treaty might be too difficult right now.
The last major EU treaty was the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force in 2009. Ratifying it was not easy. Some member states have domestic requirements that can include national referendums. In Ireland’s case, voters initially rejected the Lisbon Treaty and had to vote a second time before it was approved. Other major EU treaties have faced similar challenges.
With euroskepticism and populism on the rise, the idea that all 27 member states could agree on and ratify a new treaty to make enlargement work seems politically unrealistic.
In the debate about Ukraine and Moldova joining the EU, most of the focus has been on their ability to reform their societies and economies to meet the high standards of membership. This is understandable but incomplete. More attention should be placed on European leaders doing the hard work now to prepare the EU itself.
Ukraine, in particular, is becoming a powerhouse in its own right. If a lasting settlement with Russia is ever agreed, Ukraine’s economic, industrial, agricultural and military potential will be enormous. This is why Europeans need to work just as hard as Ukrainians and Moldovans to ensure that future enlargement happens as smoothly as possible.