In this week’s episode of China Insider, Miles Yu unpacks Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s remarks at the Shangri-La Dialogue on the United States’ strategic refocus to deter Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific. Second, Miles examines the establishment of an International Organization for Mediation in Hong Kong, and the potential consequences of China’s growing influence in global governance. Lastly, we observe the thirty-sixth anniversary of the Tiananmen Square Massacre, and revisit the many lessons and memories still relevant today.
China Insider is a weekly podcast project from Hudson Institute’s China Center, hosted by China Center Director and Senior Fellow, Dr. Miles Yu, who provides weekly news that mainstream American outlets often miss, as well as in-depth commentary and analysis on the China challenge and the free world’s future.
Episode Transcript
This transcription is automatically generated and edited lightly for accuracy. Please excuse any errors.
Miles Yu:
Welcome to China Insider, a podcast from the Hudson Institute’s China Center. I am Miles Yu, senior fellow and director of the China Center. Join me each week for our analysis of the major events concerning China, China threat and their implications to the US and beyond.
Colin Tessier-Kay:
It is Tuesday, June 3rd and we have three topics this week. First, we unpack defense secretary Pete Hegseth’s remarks at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore last weekend and the implications for refocusing efforts to deter China in the region. Second, we examine the establishment of an international organization for mediation in Hong Kong that Beijing intends to be commensurate with the International Court of Justice. Third, we observe the 36th anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre, and discuss the lessons we can apply to contemporary international affairs almost four decades later. Miles, great to be with you again this week.
Miles Yu:
Colin, nice to be with you again.
Colin Tessier-Kay:
Up first this week, defense secretary Hank Seth visited Singapore to attend the Shangri-La Dialogue where he delivered an address warning of China’s continued threat to the status quo in the Indo-Pacific and reaffirmed us strategy to refocus on deterrence efforts within a multilateral framework. Among many points, Secretary Hegseth further affirmed that in addition to a renewed focus on deterrence, the US does not intend to quote, “dominate or strangle China […] to encircle or provoke […] and does not seek regime change.” His remarks seem fairly consistent with prior addresses given in similar forums, but Miles, what are the key takeaways from Secretary’s latest address here?
Miles Yu:
Well, there are many key points before I dive into that aspect. Let me just say this speech actually has drawn extraordinary attention globally for many reasons. So one of the most important reasons because of the conspicuous absence of Chinese senior officials – normally, you’ve got a Chinese Defense Minister who shows up, but this time the Chinese Defense Minister is nowhere to be seen. And also it may have something to do with this intensifying purge that’s going on within the People’s Liberation Army by Xi Jinping. So that basically lacks an element of a dialogue between the US defense officials and Chinese defense officials. So basically, the United States goes to the podium and makes its announcement and policy announcements, which actually gain a lot of attention. Secondly, because the speech itself is very strong and robust in lay out, as you mentioned earlier, the key points are on American security commitment to Indo-Pacific. So that’s why this is a very important speech.
Most of the international reaction focuses on two things. One is the eminence of China’s attack on Taiwan, and secondly is about the American’s commitment to Indo-Pacific, so-called peace through strength. And that’s a very, very important message. Let me just say about this issue of secretary - the pronouncement that China’s attack on Taiwan could be imminent. I think that people are reading way too much into this. What the Secretary says is that, well, China had this plan to get ready to attack Taiwan before 2027, but in the meantime, that kind of military aggression against Taiwan could be imminent, could be any time, which is actually is a very different stress in Washington strategic circles in recent months since the inauguration of President Trump for the second term. That’s because we do not have any illusion about any timeline, and that’s the key point. So it could be imminent, could be tonight, could be tomorrow that’s imminent, and it could be 2027, you never know, or could be forever.
So that means that the United States has to be vigilant against Chinese aggression against Taiwan at any moment. So that’s basically that issue. Secondly, I think the speech is very comprehensive and it was very clear and I think it stressed several key points in addition to talking about China’s imminent threat. But mostly it’s a deterrence through strength. If there’s any hallmark of the geopolitical strategy, grand strategy of the United States under a second Donald Trump term, it will be deterrence. Deterrence through strength. And that means buildup of Americans defense capabilities and for the allies in the region to beef up their defense spending, which is also a very important part of the Secretary’s speech. So there’s several other points that we could discuss further
Colin Tessier-Kay:
From a regional perspective, given that, like you said, the current US strategy is to reorient toward deterring aggression by the CCP. One possible consequence of this might be a potential impact on a US force posture to maintain a strategic flexibility that might pull troops out of stations in South Korea and elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific, to respond to emerging needs and of course where the deterrence needs are the greatest. But Miles, I’d like to pick your brain here and ask, do you see any potential concerns with how the current force posture might be impacted by these strategic adjustments? And I’m thinking primarily of South Korea, Japan, perhaps even the Philippines and Australia - what exactly does a strategic refocus such as this require from our allies in the region?
Miles Yu:
Well, I’m not concerned at all. I mean this is all the whole package. I mean, we have what, 28,000 American troops on the ground in South Korea primarily to deter North Korea’s aggression. And that obviously is necessary, but do we need to put all 28,000 people there to deter North Korea while China poses a much bigger threat? So you have to really prioritize readjustment. So this is all very logical to me. Secondly, you’re right, deterrence through strength and you talk about commitment to the region, first of all, it has to really assure our friends and allies in the Pacific that America will be there. That’s a really important message of this Secretary’s speech that is America is unwaveringly committed to the security and peace in the Pacific, and he spent a huge portion of the speech talking about United States being an Indo-Pacific nation and we will be there when needed.
And our defense against the Chinese aggression in Taiwan and in South China Sea, the entire region is absolutely unshakable. So that’s a strong message - very, very strong. Secondly, he also talking about the idea of burden sharing, right? So that’s very important coalition building as well. So it is not really Americans defense alone, it’s a mutual multilateral defense, particularly in the South China Sea area. And they talk about our very fast buildup of our capabilities in conjunction with countries in the region, particularly in the Philippines. And the Philippines will play a very important role. China has been bullying Philippines like there’s no tomorrow. So that’s why United States is deeply committed to the Philippine defense because Philippines is a treaty ally of the United States, unlike in most countries in that region. So overall, I’m not concerned about this moving the test pieces here and there all for the much larger goal of deterring China. And I think that’s very, very important to me and I think the message should be very clear.
Colin Tessier-Kay:
For the last question on this topic, I’d like to kind of build upon the reactions from the regional actors themselves. I think the Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim commented that Malaysia would remain non-aligned and continue to work equally with both the US and China moving forward. And it seems like the perspective of other ASEAN and Pacific nations does skew towards similar approaches, albeit with heavily measured skepticism of increased economic ties with China. And I know Miles, given Secretary Hegseth even remarked on the inevitability of regional economic dependence on China. So I’m curious, what can the US focus on in this strategic readjustment to help fortify those existing alliances? I’m thinking about QUAD and other potential frameworks, but what do you likely see as the likely outcome here to be able to deter that economic dependence on China?
Miles Yu:
The forced stance of neutrality, in other words, do not take side between the US and China in its epic struggle is not really tenable. And I think many countries know that. And now for countries like in Malaysia and Singapore, even to say that we remain unaligned, I mean it doesn’t mean much right now because everybody knows that they’re on the side of the United States. As a matter of fact, it was during this trip to Asia, American’s key defense and military leaders also paid a visit to Malaysia, particularly Commander Paparo. That’s pretty much very telling. Don’t forget, Malaysia is one of the countries that has a maritime dispute with China in the South China Sea. So in the end it is in Malaysia’s national interest to ally with the United States because we’re going to defend them. So I think everybody knows that. I think that voice of do not force us to take a side is becoming weaker and weaker and weaker and partly because of the China’s economic sort of stronghold.
Many of the countries, Malaysia in particular, Malaysia is a dumping ground of Chinese chip electronics. And also Malaysia is one of the transport chip countries for Chinese chip electronics to come to the United States. So that’s one reason why during this tariff negotiation, Malaysia was hard hit by the United States tariff. So in all, I think US has leverage over countries like Malaysia, and you talk about even Singapore, I heard the Singapore Defense Minister saying some statements about, ‘hey listen, don’t be unnecessarily provocative.’ In the meantime, our defense arrangement with Singapore remains very, very strong and rock solid. So what I think is very important is the deeds and not necessarily words.
Colin Tessier-Kay:
Turning to our next topic this week, Beijing, through a convention signed last week, established the international organization for mediation headquarters in Hong Kong intended to resolve global disputes on par with the International Court of Justice and the permanent court of arbitration of the UN at the Hague. According to Reuters reporting, Indonesia, Pakistan, Laos, Cambodia and Serbia were among the countries attending the signing ceremony with representatives from 20 international bodies including the UN were also expected to join. Miles, can you walk us through this development? What’s the impetus behind establishing the arbitration center and why in Hong Kong?
Miles Yu:
This is absurd for the UN officials to attend such a ceremony. It’s really bizarre because China’s purpose is very simple - China set up this international organizational mediation basically to invalidate the UN sponsored International Court of Justice in the Hague because that Court can make a judgment on international matters of disputes between state and state. The judgment of that international court of justice will be binding - it’s legal. So China wants to set the court that - whose decisions will not be binding would be sort of flexible and will be completely controlled – is only interpreted by China as the leader of the opposition to that international system. So this is a blatant attempt to skew international justice because China basically knows that the law, international law is not on its side. You look at all this major judgment against China out of the Hague, I mean the 2016 judgment over the South China Sea against China, basically in favor of the Philippines, the plaintiff.
And even though it’s not from the same court, but it’s from the same kind of international system under UN, right? Secondly, if you look at the global reaction to that 2016 judgment against China in American matters, there’s not one country who has come up in favor of China’s position on that matter. And there’s not one country who is rising up saying the Filipinos are wrong. So this is why China knows that is a total isolation in international legal system. So that’s why they want to set up this international organization of mediation. They don’t call it court, they call it organization, and it’ll be totally under China’s control and China says other third countries sign up over there. If you look at the 30 countries, there are countries of far less significance. Many of the countries are actually a rogue state - they were the under sanctions by the international [organizations] - like Cuba, like Venezuela, Cambodia for example. So you mentioned, this is to me, this is just a very feeble attempt for China to regain some kind of legal dignity in the international arena. I think it is self-defeating. Why Hong Kong? Well, because Hong Kong has gone, has basically disappeared as the hub of judicial independence has basically lost its status as a free port because China basically penetrated control over Hong Kong a hundred percent. So this will be China’s opportunity to use Hong Kong as some kind of a bridgehead to blunt international system of law. So I don’t think this is going to work out.
Colin Tessier-Kay:
Yeah, I’m glad you brought that up because the principle concern here seems to be over the potential growth of China’s influence in global governance, which is not exactly a new concern, but it would seem a concerning development nonetheless, given China’s historical track record on international arbitration and dispute resolutions. I mean, you mentioned earlier the Unclosed maritime arbitration back in 2015/2016, as well as several others that China has just seemingly ignored our outright disregarded, citing that same report I mentioned earlier. There also seemed to be concerns with failures in China’s other mediation centers, principally in Xi’an and Shenzhen and the potential impact also on contracted borrowers within China’s Belt and Road. Miles, do you believe China’s influence in global governance will expand with this development? Or do you feel that they still face several challenges and limiting factors that might prevent their growth here?
Miles Yu:
I mean, China wants to be a global leader, particularly a leader of the global south. It is really, really a really absurd idea. First of all, if you want to be a mediator, arbitrator of some kind of internal dispute, you must have a reputation and credibility. China does not have to ask China to dispute, for example, between say all four or five countries in the South China Sea area and with China itself over the sovereignty and American waters of the South China Sea. I mean, who is going to trust China to be the leader? Another thing is China is the largest perpetrator of a lot of international injustice cases from IUU, the illegal under-reported unregulated fishing, to say fentanyl, to territorial expansion. I mean, you name it. Many major issues in today’s world involving unjust and unserved accident have China hands in it. So China has no credibility in mediated those terms.
Look at a China’s stance trying to mediate a settlement between Russia and Ukraine. Between Israel and Hamas. China has taken the side - on the wrong side of history repeatedly. So how can the international world trust China to have just and fair and impartial settlement play any role in that kind of settlement in those international system? So credibility is lacking. Secondly, even within the global South, China’s ambition will not go any further. Think about India, think about Russia. Would those countries relate China to be the leader of their pack? I don’t think so. So it is really, really a novel idea. It’s all imagination. China wants to regain international dignity. It must behave better and it must do it very soon. Otherwise China will be very quickly synced into further oblivion.
Colin Tessier-Kay:
Turning to our final topic this week, we observe the 36th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square Massacre. On June 4th, 1989, Chinese troops opened fire on students and workers who had been peacefully protesting for political reforms in and around Beijing’s Tiananmen Square. While never entirely confirmed, at least several hundred protesters were killed and tens of thousands more were arrested across China in the suppression campaigns that followed. Miles, perhaps let’s start here with any comments you would like to share on this anniversary and what are the lessons we should carry with us now 36 years later?
Miles Yu:
Well, for 36 years, we, the outside world has strived to basically preserve historical truth and to honor the victims and to defend universal rights. And all those things are basically for victims of China’s brutal attack in the early morning of June 4th, 1989. The world has not forgotten. So, however, in addition to that, there’s much, much more to this. Now, keep in mind the most salient lesson here is this. In 1989, before the massacre, the world, particularly the United States, harbored this naive idea that if China developed economically and the human rights will improve, China will become more and more open to market forces and China will even become democratic. So that was the fantasy.
The guns and tanks in Tiananmen Square should have crushed that fantasy cold turkey, but it didn’t. So the fantasy lived on for another three and a half decades. Today, there is a particularly important meaning for us to commemorate the Tiananmen Massacre. That is, it is time for us to end that fantasy once and for all. In other words, if China remains a communist country guided by Marxist-Leninist communist ideology, the more the economy develops, the more repressive the country will become. So that’s why it is time for us to ditch, jettison this fantasy of economic security is equal to national security. Economic progress is equal to progress in human rights and democracy. That is basically a fantasy. That’s why it’s very important for us to really commemorate the 36th anniversary of massacre because it’s carried a very poignant, cogent contemporary significance. And in addition to that, we don’t have to really forget this fact that 1989 Tiananmen Massacre was very significant, because it was the heroes at Tiananmen Square that triggered the massive protest movement in eastern block in Europe under Soviet control.
It was the inspiration provided by the heroes at Tiananmen Square that triggered the uprising in East Germany, in Czechoslovakia, in Hungary. And this is the aspect that is openly ignored. So in a way, it was actually the German movement that really facilitated the speedy downfall of the Soviet system because Gorbachev visited China days before the Massacre took place, and he witnessed the brutality of the Chinese Communist Party leadership, his own communists committed this heist crime, and he vowed to never to let this happen in the Soviet Union. As a matter of fact, it would be impossible for Gorbachev to conduct a 1956 Hungarian-style crackdown, a 1968 Czechoslovakian crackdown, and also 1989 Tiananmen crackdown. So it is the impossibility for another communist party leader like Gorbachev himself to continue to carry out the Chinese-style massacre, that really is a strong signal and the Soviet region must be changed. As a matter of fact, it did.
Colin Tessier-Kay:
Commemorating Tiananmen has since been forbidden in mainland China. However, Hong Kong historically has held commemoration vigils every year on June 4th in Victoria Park. And while the vigil was banned in 2020 and 21 under COVID-19 lockdown restrictions, the commemoration ceremony never really fully reopened [under the CCP’s national security regulations]. And since then, several arrests have been made in recent years under charges of “inciting subversion” under the National Security Law, I think it’s important however, to highlight that one group in particular, the Tiananmen Mothers, continues to write to Beijing each year requesting an impartial inquiry into the incident, mostly to publish the full list of those killed and compensate the victims and their families among other claims. Miles, kind of a two-parter here with a bit of a loaded question, but will the CCP likely ever respond to these requests? And in specific - does the CCP do anything differently on June 4th each year to enhance the repression of information or public mobilization?
Miles Yu:
Absolutely. I mean, every time on June 4th, they basically locked out the dissident and they enhanced the security. And this whole country is built upon this big lie that on June 4th, 1989, nothing happened. Tiananmen Square, just like nothing happened during the 10 years of the cultural revolution. Nothing happened in the 1950s when millions and millions of people perished under communist rule. And I think you mentioned a very important point that China, the Chinese Communist Party is very good at suppressing dissent within its sovereign domain. Hong Kong is now part of that. So what happened is normally you would drive this voice of dissidents, you would drive the forces of reform and progress either underground or overseas, in this case, mostly overseas. And then it is these forces driven out by China and those forces will flourish in the foreign country. And then it is normally these oppositions formed underground in China, driven out by the Chinese government to overseas that would force the force of reform and change, which would ultimately lay the foundation for the demise of that repressed regime.
Now, this is not just communism. You look at this, the last dynasty, the demise of the Manchu Dynasty was precisely this pattern that is the revolutionaries were driven out by the Chinese dictatorship, the autocrats of the imperial court. And they formed their international alliances in Brussels, in Tokyo and in San Francisco. And then they would change China from outside in. And I think right now, you see there’s a massive resistance movement formed overseas, not just the people which is very heroic and brave for decades, even under the most stringent and brutal repression by the Chinese government. You look at the following long today, right? They’re all over the place. They were one of the most potent forces against the Chinese communist regime. Now, the Tiananmen Massacre, the victims, the survivors of the Tiananmen movement have never died. And they actually flourish in Boston, in New York, and in Los Angeles and in London and many other cities. So eventually those small streams of resistance will form a gigantic force. And that will basically, eventually, hopefully, and I think if history is proven to be any light of enlightenment, basically devour the repressive regime. And I think if I were Xi Jinping, I would go back to read history very carefully.
Colin Tessier-Kay:
That’s unfortunately all the time we have for this week. Miles, thank you again for sharing your insight and we’ll check back with you again next week. Alright, looking forward to be with you again next week.