On August 5, 2025, the Australian government announced its decision to procure Mogami-class frigates from Japan’s Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI), with the first three costing roughly A$10 billion each (about US$6.5 billion). This is the first time that Japan has contracted the export of a major lethal weapon system. Australia’s decision to upgrade its surface combatant fleet followed a recommendation in the 2023 Australian Defence Strategic Review, which stated that Australia’s strategic circumstances require “an enhanced lethality surface combatant fleet that complements a conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine fleet.” The report recommended an independent analysis of the Royal Australian Navy’s (RAN) surface combatant fleet capability, and on the basis of this analysis, the government decided to double the fleet’s size. As part of the plan, Canberra committed to replacing its aging Anzac-class frigates with 11 new general-purpose frigates in order to improve the aging and fragile surface combatant fleet sooner.
The Capabilities of Mogami Frigates
The Australian Department of Defence initially identified four types of vessels as candidates for purchase: the German MEKO A-200, the Spanish ALFA 3000, the Korean Daegu-class FFX Batch II and III, and the Japanese Mogami 30FFM. The latter vessel is a cutting-edge surface combatant used by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) that has a projected 40-year service life. Measuring 142 meters long with a standard displacement of approximately 4,880 tons, this multi-role platform features excellent anti-air warfare (AAW), anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and anti-surface warfare capabilities, as well as sea-mine countermeasures. The Upgraded Mogami has several additional unique warfighting capabilities suited to Australia’s needs.
The vessel has a robust and diverse armament package, including a 32-cell vertical launching system (VLS) for both surface-to-air and anti-ship missiles. It offers an enhanced air-defense capability compared to the Anzac-class frigate, enabling more effective layered protection. The 32-cell VLS can also deploy Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles and interceptors, and its strong capabilities are interoperable with American forces.
In addition, the Upgraded Mogami is one of the longest-range frigates in the world, with an exceptional operational range of 10,000 nautical miles (nm), in contrast to the Anzac-class frigate’s range of about 6,000 nm. The Mogami’s extended operational range provides unparalleled coverage capabilities for Australia’s navy, which patrols the country’s 3.86 million square mile exclusive economic zone. The frigate’s ability to transport equipment and personnel across vast distances enables it to deliver the essential firepower, fuel, food, and other supplies necessary for sustaining long-range combat operations, significantly expanding operational flexibility.
The Australian Defence Force suffers from serious personnel shortages, and the Mogami requires a significantly smaller crew than other ships. Australian Chief of Navy Vice Adm. Mark Hammond, commenting on the four candidates to replace the Anzac-class frigates, noted that the Japanese have “done an exceptional job of leveraging emerging technology to reduce the crew size of their frigates.” The Mogami is designed to be operated with a crew of about 90 because of personnel shortages in the JMSDF. Japan’s older Asagiri-class destroyer—which is similar in hull size and displacement—requires a crew of about 220, while the Anzac-class frigate requires 163 and the German MEKO A-200 requires 120.
To achieve this reduction, the Mogami adopts commercial maritime technologies such as the integrated bridge system, which enables one-man bridge operations, thereby reducing the required number of bridge crew from around ten to just four. The Mogami class also includes labor-saving technologies in its damage control and engineering systems, which minimize manpower requirements throughout the ship. These features are beneficial for Australia, which suffers from military recruitment and retention problems.
How Australia Could Use the Upgraded Mogami in a Taiwan Conflict
Japan and Australia have rapidly deepened their defense cooperation in recent years because of common interests. Australia sees Japan as an “indispensable partner,” and Japan is committed to building “the closest cooperative relationship second only to the Japan-US defense cooperation.” Australia’s decision to move forward with the Upgraded Mogami–class frigate shows Canberra’s interest in strengthening security relations with Tokyo and becoming more involved in Indo-Pacific security—a decision driven by the changing security situation, particularly concerning Taiwan.
Mogami-class frigates could be helpful during a Taiwan contingency in several ways. Given the distance between Australia and Taiwan, the vessels would play less of a direct frontline role and would instead support, interdict, and extend the RAN’s operational range. In particular, the United States and Japan hope that the Australian navy would use the Mogami to escort ships carrying fuel or ammunition and to reinforce other convoys heading north, protecting them against submarines and providing air defense. The allies will need such escorts to protect refueling convoys because People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces will likely attack refueling stations near Taiwan in a conflict’s early stages.
In addition to protecting military assets, the RAN’s Upgraded Mogami–class frigates can protect civilian and commercial vessels around Australia and prevent the PLA Navy from blocking shipping lanes. China would likely send submarines into the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the South Pacific to harass shipping, and the Mogami could effectively patrol choke points like the Lombok, Sundra, and Torres Straits, as well as the waters between the Coral Sea and Guam. A Chinese blockade of any of these waters would significantly affect the conflict, as many cargo ships and other civilian vessels pass through them.
Additionally, the RAN often conducts joint operations with US forces, and the Upgraded Mogami with its AAW capabilities could support other navies’ surface vessels that are vulnerable to long-range strikes. During a conflict, the US Navy and the JMSDF will employ their Aegis destroyers to defend critical assets—such as operational bases in Japan and Guam or large surface platforms like aircraft carriers—against the threat of Chinese anti-ship ballistic missiles and anti-ship cruise missiles. As a result, smaller amphibious units, logistics elements, and commercial shipping in other areas with insufficient air defense coverage would be vulnerable. In such a case, Australian Mogamis could protect these isolated assets.
Challenges Moving Forward
While Australia’s decision to purchase 11 Upgraded Mogami–class frigates is historic for Japan’s defense industry and Indo-Pacific security, Japan and Australia need to overcome multiple hurdles to make this successful.
First, the Japanese government, which is also seeking to purchase Upgraded Mogami–class frigates for the JMSDF, needs to address problems with Japan’s shipbuilding capacity. Japanese shipbuilders, including MHI, are suffering from reduced production capacity due to Japan’s work-style labor reforms, labor shortages, and lengthy construction periods for new ships. MHI now has a four-year order backlog, and it has not yet built the Upgraded Mogami that Australia would purchase. The Japanese Defense Ministry is planning to purchase 12 Upgraded Mogami–class frigates over the next five years, and for Japan fiscal year (JFY) 2025, it has planned to purchase five hulls, an average of two to three ships per year. However, in the JFY2026 defense budget request, released at the end of August, the ministry reduced this order to just one hull per year. This may indicate that Japan is prioritizing stronger relations with Australia and is allocating MHI’s shipbuilding capacity for the RAN, even if this means slower deliveries to the JMSDF.
Second, the first three Upgraded Mogamis will be built in Japan, and the rest will be built in Australia. But Australia’s shipbuilding industry suffers from problems similar to those in Japan. Not only does Australia have labor shortages, but its shipbuilders also have a history of failing to meet production deadlines. These issues, together with MHI’s lack of experience in building ships abroad, may further complicate the production process.
Working with the United States
Besides the shipbuilding challenges Japan and Australia face, they both ought to address a few other concerns. In particular, while focusing on the Japan-Australia relationship is the key to success, working and collaborating with the United States is still necessary.
First, Tokyo and Canberra need to have regular dialogues with the US so that Washington can understand how the program supports US interests. Just as the current US administration has scrutinized the deal to export Virginia-class submarines under the AUKUS (Australia–United Kingdom–United States) framework, it may also dislike efforts to prioritize the Australia-Japan alliance through defense exports. So Japan should consider how Washington views this contract.
Moreover, while the Australian Mogami program is a bilateral Japan-Australia initiative, in practice it inevitably requires coordination with the United States. Japanese and Australian yards will share shipbuilding responsibilities, but the nature of the combat systems demands a careful balance among all three partners. In particular, combat-system integration will likely involve Lockheed Martin Australia, and because the vessels will carry US-made weapons—such as the RIM-162 Evolved SeaSparrow Missile, the SM-2 and SM-6, and Tomahawk cruise missile—US participation is unavoidable.
Against this backdrop, the sourcing of the Mark 41 VLS becomes a practical focal point. For the first three Japanese-built ships, adopting an MHI-licensed VLS is the most efficient option in terms of cost and schedule, while the Australian-built hulls could potentially switch to a US-made VLS. However, Japan and Australia should continue to lead the framework as they engage the US when necessary to guarantee interoperability. By doing so, they balance efficiency, alliance cohesion, and operational credibility.
Conclusion
Successful production of the Upgraded Mogami–class frigates depends on many variables, including capacity, labor force size, and coordination between MHI and the Australian government. But if Japan wishes to promote its defense industry and defense exports, it will need to make this project work. Success here will further invigorate cooperation between Japan and other Indo-Pacific players as they seek to stabilize Indo-Pacific security.