This brief from Hudson’s Zineb Riboua examines Russia’s growing influence in the Middle East and Africa.
Executive Summary
- Moscow’s mercenary struggles: Wagner mercenary deployments in Africa have faced considerable issues. Yet Russia’s efforts to transition its Central African Republic operations to the Kremlin-controlled Africa Corps have sparked local resistance from both troops and political elites.
- Russia moves to formalize Sahel ties: Despite these struggles, juntas in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso agreed to expand state-to-state military relations with Moscow.
- The Kremlin eyes the Gulf of Guinea: Moscow is working to establish footholds in the coastal states of Togo and Benin to extend its maritime presence in the Atlantic.
- Rosatom expands in West Africa: Rosatom, Russia’s state-owned nuclear corporation, has signed a cooperation agreement with Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso.
- Moscow bets on Egypt: Russia seeks to embed itself in key regional hubs along the Red Sea, particularly by strengthening energy and economic ties with Cairo.
- UAE and Russia seal landmark trade pact: Moscow and Abu Dhabi signed a cooperation agreement that covers high-growth service sectors like financial technology, healthcare, logistics, professional services, and transportation.
1. Moscow’s Mercenary Struggles
Russia’s mercenary options in Africa face significant challenges. An on-the-ground report from Mali alleges that Wagner mercenaries frequently carried out unauthorized operations, costing the Malian forces critical vehicles and personnel and leaving local troops exposed to insurgent attacks. Malian soldiers reportedly resent the Russian mercenaries, who command key bases and enjoy privileges such as guaranteed medical evacuation. More than 30 Malian officers were arrested for allegedly plotting against the junta for its favorable treatment of the Russians.
Now, Moscow is pressing the government of the Central African Republic (CAR) to replace its remaining Wagner private military company units with the Kremlin-controlled Africa Corps. But CAR officials believe Wagner is more effective and prefer to pay for mercenaries through mineral concessions, rather than the direct payments Moscow is demanding in exchange for the Africa Corps’ services.
Why it matters
Wagner’s mercenaries have produced mixed results for African governments. But Russia’s push to institutionalize its mercenary operations has sparked further resistance among both troops and political elites, who are accustomed to Wagner’s political and financial flexibility. Instead of consolidating influence, Moscow risks alienating its clients, who see the Africa Corps as less useful and more extractive.
If the transition continues to falter, Russia faces a stark choice: (1) double down by coercing African regimes into compliance, or (2) quietly revert to Wagner-like arrangements to restore local buy-in. Either path exposes vulnerabilities that insurgents and rival powers could exploit. For Washington, this turmoil is an opportunity to present embattled African governments with an alternative.
2. Russia Formalizes Military Ties to Sahel Juntas
Despite the mounting problems surrounding Russia’s mercenary forces, the members of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES)—Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso—are entering a new phase of cooperation with Moscow. From July 28 to 30, a Russian delegation of government ministers and senior officials from state-owned energy, mining, and satellite technology companies visited all three nations. The sides agreed to expand joint training, logistical support, arms transfers, and intelligence coordination.
Why it matters
The agreement marks another step in Moscow’s effort to shift from improvised Wagner deployments toward more formal state-to-state defense partnerships. Moscow has sought to expand its influence by using mercenaries as an entry point then converting its footholds into official state ties. Additionally,by combining security, energy, and mining deals, Russia is offering the AES juntas a package of regime-survival tools that Western governments are either unwilling or unable to provide.
The US can still reestablish relations with AES states through partners like Morocco or Turkey, particularly because Moscow’s past efforts have failed to subdue jihadist groups in the region. Washington and its allies should seek to exploit these failures to regain influence. But if the West fails to offer credible alternatives—security assistance, investment, and sustained regional engagement—it risks surrendering a key strategic corridor to the Kremlin.
3. Russia Eyes the Gulf of Guinea
Moscow is accelerating its efforts to land security deals in coastal West Africa. On July 22, Russia’s legislative committee ratified a comprehensive military cooperation agreement with Togo that covers joint military exercises, training programs for Togolese soldiers, intelligence sharing, weapons and equipment, navigation rights, and counter-piracy cooperation. But Russia’s most important strategic objective is access to Togo’s deep-water port of Lomé. The Togolese capital hosts one of West Africa’s most strategic seaports, positioned on a critical shipping corridor for global energy and commodities.
The deal comes as jihadist attacks are increasing in northern Togo and the Togolese government seeks to bolster its overstretched security forces. The agreement is still pending approval in Togo’s parliament. But the urgency of the country’s security crisis suggests that ratification is likely.
Russia is pursuing a similar path in Benin. Russia’s ambassador in Cotonou, Igor Yevdokimov, announced that Moscow plans to sign a military cooperation agreement with Benin, adding that he hoped Russian warship visits to Benin and Togo would become “a good tradition.”
Why it matters
These new agreements are part of Russia’s campaign to entrench its naval presence along the Gulf of Guinea—a critical artery for global energy, commodity, and manufacturing flows. This is a calculated evolution from Moscow’s traditional focus on using Wagner-style mercenary operations to gain influence amid insurgencies and civil wars.
Access to Togo’s main port and Benin’s maritime infrastructure would grant Moscow:
- Naval power projection across West Africa. This will allow Russia to assert its global reach despite European isolation and mounting sanctions.
- Strategic oversight of the shipping corridors that facilitate Europe’s energy supplies. Moscow will therefore gain leverage over Western economic interests.
- A sustainable presence. Port agreements tend to be more durable than fraught military partnerships like those Wagner forged with embattled military governments.
- Integrated economic-military influence. Port access can serve as a gateway to broader infrastructure, mining, and energy ventures to solidify Russia’s presence.
To respond, the US needs to rapidly reinforce its maritime partnerships with Togo, Benin, and other members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Washington should begin by offering credible security assistance to countries like Senegal and Mauritania to blunt Russia’s diplomatic overtures and preserve the Atlantic coast as a secure, open corridor for global commerce.
4. Russia Goes Nuclear in the Sahel
AES members Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali have made clear their intention to achieve “energy sovereignty” from the West. Moscow is capitalizing on this initiative by using nuclear energy diplomacy to expand and entrench its influence in the region. Rosatom, Russia’s state-owned nuclear corporation, has signed a cooperation agreement with Niger that includes joint work on nuclear power plants, research reactors, and fuel supply chains. The memorandum also covers the training of specialists, giving Russia an expanded role in Niger’s scientific and medical development. Finally, it discusses the creation of a Russian-Nigerien intergovernmental commission on trade and economic cooperation. Rosatom concluded similar agreements with Mali and Burkina Faso in June.
Why it matters
For the military-led regimes of the AES, the possibility of nuclear power—however distant it may be—promises an escape from chronic electricity shortages and dependency on Western supplies. Russia, meanwhile, is making a long-term bet by entrenching itself in the Sahel’s energy infrastructure. Through reactors, fuel supply chains, maintenance, and training, Moscow is binding Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso to Rosatom for decades. Unlike short-term mercenary contracts, energy cooperation gives the Kremlin a durable instrument of nonmilitary influence.
Along with eroding Western strength, these energy agreements give Moscow added leverage in global nuclear governance. Washington and its allies should respond by (1) supporting the Nigeria–Morocco pipeline project, which would span 13 West African coastal states and (2) backing renewable and conventional energy cooperation programs with credible financing and necessary technology transfers. Without such efforts, Rosatom could entrench itself as the dominant energy partner for West Africa.
5. Russia’s Strategic Bet on Egypt
Russia-Egypt trade exceeded $9 billion in 2024, and Russia is opening a new consulate in Sharm El-Sheikh, signaling Moscow’s intent to embed itself in key regional hubs along the Red Sea.
Nuclear energy is central to the two nations’ partnership. Rosatom is constructing Egypt’s first nuclear power plant at El-Dabaa. Russia is also advancing the Russian Industrial Zone in the Suez Canal Economic Zone, aiming to make Egypt a production and logistics base for Russian industries targeting African and Middle Eastern markets.
Beyond infrastructure, Egypt’s highly influential Al-Azhar University has launched strategic partnerships with major Russian universities and research institutions. This academic relationship gives Moscow a soft power outlet, lending it legitimacy within Egypt’s educational and religious landscape.
Why it matters
For Washington, Russia’s growing footprint in Egypt is especially concerning for two reasons:
- Moscow is anchoring its influence in long-term strategic projects. The most notable are the El-Dabaa nuclear plant and the Russian Industrial Zone. Unlike military deployments or commodity trade, which can be scaled down or replaced, nuclear energy projects and industrial zones create structural dependencies that the West cannot easily dislodge.
- Egypt’s geographic and political centrality magnifies its importance. As the most populous Arab state, the guardian of the Suez Canal, and a key mediator in Middle Eastern conflicts, Egypt is indispensable to regional security and global trade. It also serves as a gateway into Africa, with growing influence on African Union deliberations and economic corridors linking North and sub-Saharan Africa.
6. UAE and Russia Seal Landmark Trade Pact
Last month, the United Arab Emirates and Russia signed a landmark trade in services and investment agreement (TISIA). Unlike the UAE’s existing economic partnership agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union, which focuses narrowly on goods, the new TISIA provides a comprehensive blueprint for investment and cooperation across high-growth service sectors like financial technology, healthcare, logistics, professional services, and transportation.
UAE-Russia economic ties were already on the rise. In 2024, trade excluding oil between the two countries grew 4.9 percent from 2023, reaching upwards of $11.5 billion.
Why it matters
The TISIA deepens Russia’s integration into Gulf financial and service networks as Western sanctions hammer Moscow’s economy. By pivoting to services and foreign direct investment, Russia may gain access to capital channels, technology, and logistics platforms otherwise cut off by sanctions.
While Washington threatens sanctions to isolate Moscow, Russia is turning to Abu Dhabi as an economic refuge, using the UAE to shield itself from Western pressure and maintain a presence in the Gulf. Without a strategy to counterbalance this, the US risks allowing a key partner to normalize and expand ties with Moscow and undermine sanctions’ effectiveness at slowing the Russian war machine.
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