The war in Ukraine has become a central test of American power. Its outcome will determine NATO’s credibility, Europe’s security, and China’s calculations regarding Taiwan. President Trump, in a recent post on Truth Social, said, “We will continue to supply weapons to NATO for NATO to do what they want with them.” The phrasing was crude, but it carried an important admission: NATO remains an American-led alliance, and U.S. support for Ukraine is not peripheral to that system — it is central to its preservation.
The struggle in Ukraine does not end at Europe’s borders. Its outcome shapes the balance of power in the Middle East and Asia. A Russian breakthrough would sap Europe’s strength and give Beijing room to expand its influence. China is already exploiting the distraction to coordinate more closely with Moscow, deepen energy and defense ties with Iran, and press its advantage in Asia. The war also sustains Iran and North Korea, whose drones and artillery feed directly into Russia’s campaign. Shipments from Tehran, shells from Pyongyang, and oil revenues from Beijing all reinforce the anti-U.S. network, gaining momentum from Moscow’s defiance.
In fact, Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has given his partners new opportunities, with China benefiting the most. Cut off from Western markets, Moscow has turned to Beijing, which has quickly expanded its influence across trade, energy, and military cooperation. Chinese imports of Russian crude more than doubled, reaching $62.6 billion in 2024, while total trade surged to $245 billion. The yuan now accounts for nearly 40 percent of Russia’s international transactions, advancing Beijing’s push to internationalize its currency.
This realignment has created an interdependence that serves Beijing. With Western suppliers cut off, China has stepped in to provide automobiles, electronics, and semiconductor equipment, leaving Russia dependent on the Chinese industry. That dependence gives Beijing leverage over critical supply chains and makes it the main sponsor of Moscow’s war ambitions.
Semiconductor trade data show this dynamic most clearly. In 2023, about 90 percent of Russia’s microchip imports came from China, a crucial input for its weapons systems and military equipment. By sustaining this trade, Beijing has become indispensable to Moscow’s war machine. Political alignment reinforces the bond, and a Russian victory would only strengthen the arrangement by securing Moscow as China’s long-term supplier of energy and resources.
North Korea now supplies just under half of all artillery shells used by Russian forces and has even sent troops to the battle lines to gain combat experience and modernize their arsenal. Iran provides swarms of cheap and lethal drones that have reshaped the battlefield. These contributions keep Moscow fighting, but behind all of them is China. Beijing enables these regimes to bypass sanctions, props up their economies, and turns their involvement into a strategic gain. It studies how Western systems respond to these weapons, folds those lessons into its own planning, and factors them into its calculus concerning Taiwan.
In effect, for China, the benefits of the war extend beyond trade and energy. Ukraine has become a live-fire laboratory where Iranian drones and North Korean artillery are tested against NATO-standard defenses. Each strike gives Beijing a chance to study Western technology, vulnerabilities, and response times, offering a preview of how Western systems might perform in a Taiwan conflict. Furthermore, the war depletes Western stockpiles and exposes the limits of allied supply chains, providing China with a clearer understanding of how long Washington and its partners can sustain a high-intensity conflict. Finally, Ukraine has become a proving ground for hybrid warfare, propaganda, and disinformation campaigns aimed at dividing democratic publics and testing the cohesion of alliances. Xi Jinping will carefully weigh all these lessons as he plans for Taiwan.
While Ukraine teaches Beijing how the West fights, it also provides China with an opportunity to rally the Global South against U.S. leadership. Beijing and Moscow constantly cast themselves as champions of a multipolar order and present Western support for Ukraine as proof of hypocrisy and overreach. BRICS has become the institutional face of this strategy, bringing together countries that resent U.S. dominance of global finance. China presents itself as the economic alternative and Russia as the military counterweight, together claiming to defend sovereignty against Western interference. Moscow’s ability to wage war without serious consequences strengthens that message, feeding the perception that U.S. leadership is eroding and that its alliances cannot endure.
A Russian victory would give that perception real weight. A loss in Ukraine would trap Europe in a decade of instability and leave America without the allies it needs in Asia. European governments would be compelled to spend their political and financial resources on rebuilding defenses at home rather than collaborating with Washington in the Indo-Pacific. At the same time, U.S. partnerships in the Middle East would fragment. Allies already hedging between Washington and Beijing would come to see American guarantees as unreliable, creating hesitation and confusion just as China positions itself as an alternative partner. Across the Global South, the signal would be unmistakable: China stands as the rallying point for anti-U.S. sentiment. Most dangerous of all, deterrence would fail. Beijing would see in Ukraine the proof it needs that aggression pays and that America lacks the will to stop an invasion of Taiwan.
A Ukrainian victory would reshape the balance. First, it would restore deterrence by showing that aggression fails. Russia would be cut down as China’s principal partner, Iran and North Korea would lose their battlefield laboratory, and Beijing would think twice before testing America’s resolve in East Asia. Second, it would reinforce the cohesion of the U.S.-led alliance system. The broader network of states that sustains Moscow and amplifies China’s challenge would be weakened, proving that American partnerships remain the backbone of global stability.
Since the start of his administration, President Trump has stressed the need to bring the war to a close. He is right to highlight that goal, but the terms of any settlement matter. An end that leaves NATO stronger and Russia weaker would restore stability and credibility. An end that rewards aggression would invite more of it and deliver to Moscow, Beijing, and their partners everything they seek.