Below, Hudson Senior Fellow Can Kasapoğlu offers an assessment of the growing defense ties between China and Iran.
Executive Summary
- China and Iran might be on the brink of a new era of defense ties, threatening Middle Eastern stability and the United States’ interests in the region.
- There is no confirmation of a major Chinese arms transfer to Tehran. But Beijing could replace Russia as Iran’s principal defense partner in the wake of the 12-day war between Israel and Iran.
- Should Beijing decide to expand its support of Iran’s military, Tehran would have a long and comprehensive shopping list. Iran would likely seek to acquire (1) J-10C combat aircraft, (2) HQ-9 strategic air defense systems and anti-stealth radars, (3) YJ-12 anti-ship missiles, and (4) ballistic missile components to augment the partially depleted deep-strike capabilities of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
- The possibility of snapback sanctions on Iran might also influence China’s stance. Beijing may not want to side too strongly with Iran after Tehran’s nuclear program precipitated its formal diplomatic rupture with the West and eventual US-Israeli military strikes on Iranian territory.
- Any weapons system China sells Iran would likely soon reach Tehran’s proxies, including the Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon.
- China risks heightening tensions with Israel and upsetting its carefully cultivated ties with the Gulf Arab nations.
Could China Emerge as a Major Defense Partner for Iran?
Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, has long used social media to antagonize the United States and its allies. But he has recently expanded the scope of his attempt to control the online narrative.
A recent post from Khamenei’s X account, written in Chinese, describes Tehran and Beijing as “ancient civilizations on Asia’s eastern and western wings,” and highlights their joint potential to “reshape the regional and even global landscape.” In the aftermath of the 12-day war between Israel and Iran, Khamenei’s post is a clear signal that Iran desires stronger bilateral ties with China.
Recent reports, allegedly drawing on leaked Western intelligence assessments, suggest the two nations will soon increase their defense cooperation. This makes the supreme leader’s rhetoric particularly threatening for the US and its allies. These reports assess that Iran is in talks to receive warfighting equipment to replenish the IRGC’s recently depleted ballistic missile arsenal, high-end combat aircraft, and strategic air defense systems.
China, for its part, is interested in expanding its historically minor defense export portfolio. Between 2020 and 2024, more than 60 percent of China’s arms exports went to Pakistan. Beijing accounted for less than 6 percent of total global arms exports, trailing the United States (43 percent), France (9.6 percent), and Russia (7.8 percent). Over that same period, US arms manufacturers supplied over 50 percent of weapons imports to the Middle East, with other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members all but crowding out the remaining regional market share.
China’s opportunity to expand its portfolio has arisen in large part due to the faltering of its most prominent ally. Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale campaign in Ukraine, Moscow’s arms sales have plummeted, including in the Middle East. Moscow’s failure to follow through on its commitments to provide Tehran with Su-35 combat aircraft and S-400 strategic air defense systems has also diminished the Kremlin’s credibility. By stepping in to fill this vacuum, China can widen its footprint across international weapons markets and give Iran the arms it needs to reconstitute its forces.
Iran’s leaders have long viewed China as a potential alternative that can lessen the impact of US sanctions and other efforts to isolate their regime. For Beijing, Tehran is a key energy provider. China purchases a significant amount of Iranian crude with help from Iran’s shadow fleet of tankers.
And while the Islamic Republic has never been a critical weapons market for the Chinese military industrial complex, Beijing has done numerous favors for the IRGC. In 2015, when Washington inked the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Tehran, China granted Iran access to satellite positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) equipment using the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System, a Chinese equivalent to the US-operated Global Positioning System (GPS). In 2021, Iran’s military apparatus received complete access to the BeiDou system. That same year, Tehran and Beijing signed a 25-year, $400 billion comprehensive strategic partnership agreement.
China and Iran have for years laid the groundwork to take their bilateral defense ties to the next level. But impending snapback sanctions are an important factor. In late August, France, Germany, and Britain declared that they will reinstate sanctions on the Islamic Republic due to its noncompliance with the nuclear deal. Beijing may not want to expand its military cooperation with Iran at the height of Tehran’s nuclear tensions with the West.
The assessments below list an array of options now at the two countries’ disposal. These are not done deals. But these systems reflect the mutual priorities of China and Iran.
Fighter Aircraft: The J-10C
Israel attained full air superiority during its 12-day war with Iran, and Russia has not delivered on its commitment to provide the Islamic Republic with Su-35 fighter jets. So Tehran has an understandable interest in securing a combat aircraft deal with China.
The most likely system is the J-10C, a 4.5-generation combat aircraft. This Chinese airframe is equipped with an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar and is certified with beyond-visual-range PL-15 air-to-air missiles that are effective up to 190 miles.
The J-10C made headlines during the May 2025 skirmish between India and Pakistan. Unverified reports have alleged that the Chinese aircraft scored its first aerial kills against the Indian Air Force, possibly downing French-supplied Dassault Rafale multirole combat aircraft or Russian-made MiG-29 or Su-30MKI fighters.
Regardless of the truth of these reports, Chinese defense stocks received a significant boost. The J-10C cannot match the fifth-generation tactical capabilities of Israel’s F-35I Adir. But a sufficient fleet of J-10Cs could put Tehran on a par with some NATO nations, many of which rely on other 4.5-generation aircraft like the US-made F-16V Viper and the French Rafale.
Air Defense: The HQ-9 and HQ-16
Tehran also may seek to procure Chinese surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems to rebuild its air defenses.
Israel’s aerial capabilities humiliated Iran’s long-range and high-altitude air defense architecture, which was centered on Soviet-vintage S-200 and S-300 variants and the indigenous Bavar-373. The Israel Defense Forces have systematically dismantled these assets, establishing a permissive airspaceover Iran. As with the Su-35 aircraft, Moscow has not yet provided Iran with a lifeline for its air defenses.
As a result, some reports suggest that Iran has already acquired Chinese SAMs—most likely the HQ-9 and possibly the HQ-16 variants. The HQ-9 is a hybrid that marries the Russian SA-20 (specifically, the S-300 PMU-1 and S-300 PMU-2 variants) with higher-end command and control, radar, and seeker technologies. These higher-end technologies bear similarities to US and even Israeli assets, which Beijing has likely learned about through espionage.
Because China has a more advanced microelectronics industry than Russia, the HQ-9 baseline likely boasts better sensors than its Russian counterpart. So while the Chinese SAM system is no silver bullet—especially against Israel’s F-35I Adir—a dense HQ-9 network could make Iran’s airspace much more dangerous for enemy combatants.
Iran may also seek to acquire high-end Chinese radars with anti-stealth sensor capabilities, such as the YLC-8B and the JY-27A. The US and its allies should be vigilant of Tehran’s attempts to acquire these systems, as Beijing might see the conflict between Iran and Israel as an opportunity to test its anti-stealth radars against Western aerial assets.
Anti-ship Missiles: The YJ-12
Chinese YJ-12 anti-ship cruise missiles could soon augment the IRGC’s disruptive military arsenal. Equipped with a ramjet engine that enables it to fly at high speeds, the YJ-12 is often described as a “carrier-killer” that could threaten the US Navy. The YJ-12 (or the CM-302, one of the missile’s principal export variants) would give Tehran a critical maritime area denial capability.
Tehran could also reverse-engineer many of the advanced munitions it cannot acquire outright, as it did in the case of the Chinese C-802 anti-ship missile. The Islamic Republic then transferred the missile system, rebranded as the Noor, to its Hezbollah proxy in Lebanon. The terror group used the missile to target the Israeli corvette INS Hanit in 2006. The Houthis, Tehran’s proxy in Yemen, have deployed the same missile, dubbed the al-Mandeb 2, against commercial vessels in the Red Sea.
The YJ-12 would offer the Islamic Republic—and its proxies—an even more capable asset than the C-802.
Ballistic Missiles: Components and Intelligence
Recently leaked intelligence reports indicate that China has agreed to help Iran rebuild its depleted missile deterrent. China was heavily involved in Iran’s ballistic missile program even before the 12-day war. In February 2025 Beijing sold the Islamic Republic 1,000 tons of sodium perchlorate, a solid rocket fuel component. This transfer is sufficient to power between 200 and 300 Haj Qasem and Kheibar Shekan missiles, which Tehran has previously used to hit Israel. In April 2025 the US Treasury Department designated six Chinese companies and six Chinese citizens for their roles in providing the IRGC with “propellant ingredients” for its missiles.
Beijing may also provide Tehran with guidance systems and microprocessors. Israel has sought for years to destroy Tehran’s solid-propellant ballistic missiles; accordingly, Israel targeted Iran’s missile production sites in both 2024 and 2025 and its transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) during the 12-day war. Israeli defense planners would no doubt take issue were China to help Iran rebuild these capabilities.
Proxy Networks: Chinese Intelligence Support for the Houthis
In April 2025 the US Department of State announced that a Chinese satellite company, Chang Guang Satellite Technology, had been directly assisting the Iran-backed Houthi paramilitary. Chang Guang, which owns the largest Chinese commercial constellation in orbit, Jilin-1, has been providing the Yemeni terror network with imagery intelligence to assist the group’s operations against commercial shipping and the US Navy.
Despite US engagement with Beijing on the matter, the satellite firm has continued to support the Houthis. According to a 2024 report in The Washington Post, the IRGC has also developed ties with Chang Guang—and with MinoSpace Technology, another Chinese firm—to secure support for space-based intelligence and surveillance operations. Both companies have close ties to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Chinese Communist Party. In 2023 the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Chang Guang for providing imagery intelligence support to Russia’s Wagner private military company in occupied Ukraine.
In return for Beijing’s support, the Houthis exempted Chinese vessels from their attacks on the region’s maritime traffic. The Iran-backed paramilitary has also provided the CCP with real-time data on the US Navy’s operational performance against missiles and drones—data that the PLA is no doubt incorporating into its preparations for a potential showdown in the Indo-Pacific.
China’s support for the Houthis reminds the West that when Beijing supports the Islamic Republic, it supports its proxies, too—and could continue to do so.
Conclusion: Preventing China from Bolstering the Iranian Threat
The People’s Republic of China has long walked a tightrope in the Middle East, looking to enhance trade with its local partners while avoiding entanglement in long-standing conflicts. In 2023 China even mediated a detente between Saudi Arabia and Iran, a high-water mark for Beijing’s regional influence.
But the ongoing conflict between Israel and Iran complicates China’s efforts. Beijing lacks the diplomatic gravitas to be the region’s main security guarantor. Moreover, China’s relations with Israel have been deteriorating since 2023. While the two countries continue to trade, the era of deep Sino-Israeli collaboration seems to have ended as Iran, left in the cold by the Kremlin, eyes a closer defense partnership with Beijing.
Despite numerous setbacks, the Islamic Republic has seen some successes. The Iranian regime partially penetrated Israel’s air defenses, attacked an important US base in the Gulf, and sustained its rule at home—at least for now. Iran has also become the primary drone supplier and a major supplier of ballistic missiles for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Iran is even arming North Korea with Shahed drones.
Iran therefore remains a potent regional threat and a key part of the hostile, authoritarian axis that also includes China, Russia, and North Korea. As NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte recently emphasized, collaboration among the West’s enemies means that the threat remains interconnected.
For this reason, Washington and its allies should closely monitor ties between Beijing and Tehran. If Iran uses its relationship with China to bolster its disruptive military capabilities, the 12-day war could be a mere speedbump for the Iranian regime, rather than a decisive defeat.