Sophisticated non-kinetic threats, such as Chinese cognitive domain operations (CDO) and Russian active measures operations, define the contemporary global security landscape and pose significant challenges to national security policymakers in the United States. These adversarial capabilities transcend traditional military engagement, targeting the cognitive processes, beliefs, and unit cohesion of an opponent to achieve military objectives, often as a precursor to the onset of hostilities. By targeting the brain itself, adversaries can potentially alter US service members’ decision-making or behavior, having a detrimental impact on their will to fight. Current understanding of brain sciences, the ubiquity of surveillance technology and big data, and algorithm-based evolving business and marketing models that condition human behavior are converging to shape global power competition in ways that may undermine the efficacy of assumptions about American power. As a result, foreign adversaries could subject the American population to a persistent state of cognitive manipulation and control. To prepare service members for this rapidly evolving environment, the Department of Defense (DoD) needs to adopt strategies to build critical thinking and individual resistance to persuasive cognitive attacks. This paper proposes a military training program that begins in recruit training and continues as part of regular professional military education based on information inoculation theory, a critical-thinking strategy analogous to medical immunization.
Background
During the Korean War, American social psychologist William McGuire expressed concerns about reports that Communist forces were brainwashing American service members. He suggested that because Americans lacked mental defenses against sophisticated ideological attacks, they would be more susceptible to persuasion. To counter these psychological tactics, McGuire argued for a form of cognitive inoculation that would work much like a vaccine. Conceptually, one may trace information inoculation back to Aristotle’s refutational enthymemes, the idea of preempting an argument beforehand to make one’s case. Just as a body builds resistance to viruses through previous exposure, beliefs can be made resistant to persuasive threats through pre-exposure to weakened forms of persuasion. “Cognitive vaccines” expose individuals to weakened counterarguments or manipulation strategies, prompting them to generate their own supporting arguments. Psychological inoculation can offer broad protection, especially when supplemented with “booster shots” over time, to develop a form of herd immunity.
Today’s information environment provides nearly unlimited vectors for foreign malign entities to direct cognitive manipulation campaigns at the American population, and especially US military service members. Current understanding of brain functions and their relationship to behavior modification has advanced considerably since the early 2000s. Techno-authoritarian powers like China and Russia are devoting considerable resources to the development of neuroweapons and synthetic biology with the desired effect of manipulating cognitive and emotional states. They are leveraging these improved capabilities in support of intelligence collection and advanced cognitive influence operations. And they are combining them with strategic control over physical information architecture, online networks, and social media applications such as TikTok, WeChat, and Telegram (along with potential economic leverage over American social media and technology companies, such as X, Meta, and Alphabet).
Early scholarship on information inoculation focused on theoretical advancement. In the 1990s, organizations introduced practical applications related specifically to health promotion. Studies demonstrated success in campaigns to prevent smoking, reduce alcohol and marijuana use, and promote safe sex practices; some findings suggested “umbrella protection” for related health concerns.
Related experimental studies continue to support the efficacy of information inoculation, also known as pre-bunking. They emphasize that typical techniques, such as fact-checking and debunking, have a limited impact on the susceptibility of individuals to cognitive manipulation. Evidence has shown that various pre-bunking techniques are far more effective. One online experiment compared the effectiveness of psychological inoculation against the more traditional “false tag” interventions in protecting against misinformation on social media. The study used real-life misinformation posts in a social media simulation, measured engagement, and found that both interventions reduced engagement with misinformation, but inoculation proved more effective. It concluded that inoculation’s immunity was robust to variations in individuals’ cognitive reflection, suggesting it is generally more effective than false tags. However, a combination of interventions may be necessary due to heterogeneity in inoculation’s effect.
Another study explored how psychological inoculation can reduce susceptibility to misinformation in large rational-agent networks, moving beyond individual-level effects to consider dynamic online systems. Using an agent-based model, the study found that the efficacy of inoculation is time-sensitive. It emphasized the importance of front-loading interventions by targeting critical thresholds of network users before their beliefs solidify into echo chambers. It also suggested that harnessing tipping-point dynamics can lead to herd immunity effects and that inoculation processes do not necessarily increase false-positive rejections of truthful information. These findings validated inoculation’s robustness for countering misinformation in networked environments.
Finally, one social experiment used five short videos to expose people to common manipulation techniques (emotional language, incoherence, false dichotomies, scapegoating, and ad hominem attacks). Through seven preregistered studies, including a large-scale YouTube field experiment, they found that these videos significantly improved manipulation technique recognition, boosted confidence, enhanced discernment of trustworthy content, and improved sharing decisions. The results demonstrated the intervention’s robustness, scalability, and cost-effectiveness in real-world settings, although its limitations included the unassessed long-term efficacy.
Why Are Service Members Vulnerable to Cognitive Manipulation Campaigns?
Humans are susceptible to cognitive manipulation for a variety of reasons. The human brain is a complex organ that has contributed to the survival and development of our species. However, it is not structured to be completely rational or to thoroughly evaluate every piece of information in the environment. Instead, humans have evolved to rely on a complex interplay of heuristics, emotional responses, and social cues. This leaves us vulnerable to actors leveraging our cognitive biases, emotion-driven responses, and social influence. We receive no education or training on manipulation techniques such as gaslighting and logical fallacies. Studies also confirm that humans are generally poor at detecting lies, even blatant ones.
Military recruits can be particularly vulnerable to cognitive manipulation by foreign powers. The majority of recruits are still young adults, typically in a transition phase from late adolescence. During this growth period, they are subject to rapid psychological and social development. Initial military training is designed to be both physically and psychologically demanding while isolating recruits from their usual support networks. This creates a fertile ground for new narratives and ideologies to take root. Some recruits have preexisting vulnerabilities, such as anxiety, depression, or personality traits, that initial screening does not detect, making them even more vulnerable to manipulation.
Of course, most recruits (and young adults, for that matter) have grown up in an information environment that is rapidly evolving. They typically own or use information technology devices that are connected to the information environment, such as cars, watches, or even eyewear. They consume information from a wide variety of sources, including online networks and social media. This makes them ideal targets for exploitation and manipulation by foreign actors.
Improving Cognitive Resilience in Recruit Training
Modern war is taxing physically, emotionally, and cognitively. The DoD and all service components recognize that the ability to critically assess, interpret, and use information is a mission-essential skill that is central to victory and the lethality of all military service members regardless of job functions. The services have initiated some training programs in critical thinking, information literacy, psychological resilience, and counter-influence training. However, they have usually restricted this training to certain job roles or offered it as a train-the-trainer course rather than making it a part of general military education. Significant gaps remain, which leave uniformed service members especially vulnerable. Overall, there is a lack of universal, mandatory information literacy training. Although general military education highlights critical thinking, some educators may not have received sufficient training to teach it or to evaluate students’ progress. There is limited training for recruits on foreign influence operations, and no training on how to resist malign influence operations. Much of the current training is reactive instead of proactive. There is no comprehensive, preemptive inoculation approach for the general force.
This report proposes a model for an information inoculation training program for military recruits and recommends making it part of the subsequent annual required Professional Military Education (PME). Beginning in recruit training provides a foundational impact alongside physical readiness and psychological resilience. Recruits are a captive audience for two to three months of recruit training, depending on the service. Implementing information inoculation early in a service member’s career is critical to building long-term cognitive resilience. It aligns well with established programs like the US Navy’s Culture of Excellence and the US Army’s Master Resilience Training and Comprehensive Soldier and Family Fitness. This targeted approach addresses the gaps identified in universal information literacy and explicit counter-cognitive manipulation training for the Joint Force.
Introducing inoculation at the recruit training stage enhances cognitive resilience across the military, turning it into a strategic advantage. Training recruits this way creates a shared defense against cognitive warfare and boosts operational effectiveness. By addressing potential anchoring bias early, the approach helps prevent misinformation from taking root—a much tougher challenge once an enemy has established false narratives.
Design Principles
An information inoculation campaign that the DoD introduces into recruit training should adhere to a robust set of design principles, drawing from proven best practices in inoculation theory and grounding them in adult learning:
- Technique-based inoculation focuses on teaching recruits to identify common manipulation techniques rather than specific ones in narratives.
- Active engagement and gamified learning have consistently proven to be more effective in enhancing the ability to spot manipulation and conferring resistance.
- Threat and refutational preemption are core components of learning modules that introduce threats (forewarning of impending persuasive attacks) and refutational preemption (presenting weakened examples of manipulative arguments alongside clear refutations). The arguments will be designed to prompt recruits’ responses while remaining easily refutable.
- A focus on intellectual humility guides recruits to recognize the inherent fallibility of their own intuitions. This is central to promoting an open-minded approach to information consumption.
- Booster nudges and post-inoculation talks prolong protective effects and promote reinforcement mechanisms.
- Scenario-based learning is a proven, effective way to allow recruits to practice discernment skills in high-stakes, ambiguous contexts that mirror real-world operational challenges.
- Alignment with adult learning principles emphasizes the relevance of training and its application to military duties.
Integration into Recruit Training and Professional Military Education
The DoD will need to integrate the information inoculation curriculum into existing recruit training phases using current structures and schedules. This gradual approach enhances learning and retention, as cognitive defenses require ongoing development. Each service can adjust the proposed phases to meet its specific training needs.
Phase 1: Reception and Initial Awareness (Week 0–1)
Objective: To introduce the fundamental concept of cognitive warfare and highlight personal relevance and the threat that misinformation poses.
Content:
- This phase will start with a high-impact briefing on the modern information environment, explaining the nature of foreign influence operations (such as those from Russia, China, and Iran) and showing their common tactics, including social media, deepfakes, and generative artificial intelligence. It will explicitly warn recruits beforehand, serving as the threat component of inoculation, by indicating that opponents will likely challenge their beliefs and perceptions. It will also emphasize the importance of critical thinking for effective decision-making in a military context.
- Methodology: Short, engaging presentations, compelling video vignettes illustrating real-world examples of information attacks, and initial facilitated group discussions to foster immediate engagement and understanding.
Phase 2: Foundational Inoculation (Weeks 2–5, integrated into existing resilience / mental toughness modules)
Objective: To develop a core understanding of common manipulation techniques and cultivate basic refutational skills.
Content:
- Module 1—Understanding the Information Environment: A deeper examination of different kinds of misinformation and disinformation, the motivations behind foreign actors, and the overall idea of cognitive warfare.
- Module 2—Inoculation Fundamentals (Pre-bunking): A detailed explanation of the threat and refutational preemption mechanisms. This will involve exposure to weakened examples of manipulative arguments, followed by guided refutation exercises (passive refutation).
- Module 3—Technique-Based Resilience (DEPICT Framework): Focused training on identifying and analyzing common manipulation techniques (Discrediting opponents, Emotional language use, increasing intergroup Polarization, Impersonating people, Conspiracy promotion, and Trolling).
- Methodology: Interactive workshops, short gamified modules (e.g., adaptations of the Bad News game tailored for military scenarios), and facilitated small group discussions that integrate directly into existing modules focusing on building resilience and mental toughness.
Phase 3: Application and Reinforcement (Weeks 6–10 / Follow-On School Training)
Objective: To apply inoculation skills in simulated high-stress scenarios and reinforce learning through continuous boosters.
Content:
- Module 4—Critical Thinking and Media Literacy Application: Practical exercises centered on source evaluation, recognizing inherent biases, and verifying information from multiple perspectives. Training will also include cognitive reflection techniques and strategies to promote intellectual humility.
- Module 5—Reinforcement and Real-World Application: Integration of brief, personalized booster nudges into daily training routines (e.g., pause-before-sharing prompts). Recruits will have brief, structured post-inoculation talk sessions to debrief on information attacks they encountered. Scenario-based exercises simulating real information threats will be part of field training, including live-fire and force-on-force drills.
- Methodology: Ongoing gamified learning, small group problem-solving exercises, and realistic combat simulations with embedded information challenges. Certified trainers or designated instructors will facilitate regular debriefings, leveraging the military’s team-oriented and debriefing culture.
Phase 4: Sustainment and Advanced Training (Post-Recruit Training)
Objective: To ensure the long-term durability of inoculation effects and facilitate continuous adaptation to evolving threats.
Content:
- Integration of information inoculation principles into PME at all levels.
- Regular booster modules and refresher training, potentially via online platforms or unit-level sessions.
- Advanced training for noncommissioned officers and officers focusing on identifying and countering complex malign influence operations.
- Methodology: Online interactive modules, advanced simulations, and guided discussions to foster a continuous learning environment.
There are key ethical and policy considerations for an information inoculation training program, starting with the need to foster discernment rather than impose belief. The training should emphasize recognition of common manipulation techniques, such as the DEPICT framework. It should be educational, nonjudgmental, and non-accusatory while clearly stating its purpose and avoiding craftiness or fear tactics. Recruits and service members should remember that the First Amendment protects a significant amount of false speech and limits government control over social media and personal communication. Inoculation is a free-speech-compatible approach that emphasizes skill-building only.
The proposed integration into recruit training and military education aims to enhance learning and retention by advancing from basic awareness to more complex skills, similar to physical fitness. By incorporating post-inoculation talk and scenario-based learning within team settings, it strengthens cognitive defenses through existing military practices, making the training both effective and enduring.
Conclusion
The modern information environment presents evolving challenges to US national security as foreign adversaries use advanced cognitive strategies. Information inoculation theory, which is based on scientific research, provides a framework for building resistance to such mental tactics and for fighting misinformation and disinformation. Research shows that exposure to weakened counterarguments and their refutations beforehand can boost resistance to cognitive influence, and meta-analyses support the broader applicability of these findings across various contexts.
Within the US military, current programs in critical thinking, media literacy, and psychological resilience establish an initial but incomplete foundation. A specific vulnerability exists among recruits because foundational training does not consistently include comprehensive instruction in identifying and resisting foreign influence campaigns. The rapid development and spread of adversarial information techniques emphasize the need for more proactive measures.
This model incorporates an information inoculation approach into US military recruit training. By implementing this strategy at the entry level, it leverages the existing training environment to develop basic cognitive defenses. The core principles emphasize technique-based inoculation, interactive learning methods, continuous reinforcement, and peer-based debriefing. This approach aims to foster critical thinking skills that are durable and widely applicable. Integrating this curriculum into both initial and ongoing military education efforts will strengthen individual and collective cognitive resilience, ultimately enhancing the nation’s capacity to counter cognitive threats within the broader scope of national security.