In his recent confirmation hearing, Gen. Chris Mahoney, the nominee for vice chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, set electronic warfare as one of his top priorities if he is approved by the Senate. This was welcome news after more than a decade of dire assessments regarding the US military’s eroding proficiency and capacity for fighting in the spectrum.
But to turn bold statements into operational impact, the Pentagon will need to update its approach for the information age. Electronic warfare is no longer just jammers and decoys. It is a battle for sense making itself.
For Mahoney to make good on this opportunity will require more than replacing or updating aging EW aircraft like the EC-130 Compass Call, EA-18G Growler, or RC-135 Rivet Joint. Those are tactical improvements that might help once combat begins. The more important investments will be those that set the battlefield before the first shot — or prevent any shooting at all.
In 2025, intelligence sources are highly distributed, span military and commercial systems, and are of widely varying quality. Enemy forces can use publicly available data to target US troops, ships, or aircraft and exploit social media to gather intelligence on US servicemembers and operations. Paradoxically, disrupting, overwhelming, or deceiving this flood of information may be getting easier. Today nearly all information at some point moves through the airwaves, including to and from space. Electronic warfare and cyber operations are merging as the fastest way to get into an opponent’s network becomes an antenna.
With military and commercial sensors ubiquitous, an opponent like China can build a comprehensive picture during peacetime of US forces’ positions, identity, and habits, building a “pattern of life” akin to the approach used during counter insurgency operations. When combat begins, People’s Liberation Army targeteers can quickly implement fire plans against US bases, ships, and ground units.
But this cuts both ways. US forces could mount a multi-dimensional campaign to undermine the confidence of Chinese planners and commanders. Jamming and decoys are just the start. The campaign should also include elements like radiofrequency-enabled cyber operations against PLA networks, deception operations using new force compositions and tactics, and false communications and messages.
If this sounds like events leading up to D-Day in 1945, that’s because it is. The difference today is US and allied forces will need to keep up the deception effort for months or years without a clear end state in mind. Otherwise, leaders in Beijing will assume they can target US forces at will and feel emboldened.
And the Department of War cannot sustain a campaign against China’s sensing and sensemaking apparatus with tactical EW systems and a few exquisite cyber attacks. These capabilities are best reserved for combat when they can defeat weapons or take out enemy networks.
To win the counter-sensemaking campaign the US military needs a deep magazine of “good enough” cyber and EW effects. Since each specific zero-day exploit, decoy, or back-door attack will likely be burned after use, they should not be exquisite game-changers. They just need to be good enough to make the opponent doubt its sensors or decision-support systems and force it to pursue a countermeasure.
But because they are perishable, the DoW will need a supply chain that creates new cyber and EW effects at a high tempo and integrates them into delivery systems like EW drones, radars, or other emitters. The US military is making progress on accelerating EW reprogramming, but still develops new cyber tools or EW techniques one at a time, using acquisition and contracting approaches the Pentagon is abandoning in its other programs.
The US military needs a new way to build and field cyber and EW effects.
During World War II the US military established a whole ecosystem to make decoys, posture and move them, and transmit signals simulating their invasion preparations. Today US forces cannot mount this kind of preparation out in the open where space-based sensors can quickly enlighten an adversary.
Luckily, 21st century counter-sensing and sensemaking capabilities and operations can be developed and planned entirely in a virtual space. The DoW can build digital emulations of potential targets, virtual models of EW and cyber effects, and assess various schemes for getting the effect into the target.
The US military and its industry partners already operate environments that could be used for developing some effects, but they are often dedicated to a specific delivery platform or mission and are rarely made available to new entrants like startups with creative ideas on how to disrupt enemy decision-making.
As one of his first actions, Mahoney should mobilize the department’s and industry’s existing resources to establish a federated environment for developing and testing new EW and cyber effects. This virtual sandbox could become the digital arsenal the Pentagon needs to fill its non-kinetic magazine and force Chinese planners and commanders to remain unsure of their prospects against Taiwan or other US allies.
The alternative, and the default approach of US services, is to continue building tactical systems and cyber silver bullets for the fight. Instead, they should be building the tools to ensure the fight never comes.