In this week’s episode of China Insider, Miles Yu reviews the latest report from Hudson Institute’s China Center, China after Communism: Preparing for a Post-CCP China, and highlights key findings and analysis regarding a potential collapse of centralized authority in China. Next, Miles unpacks the latest updates following Taiwan’s recall election, and explains what the results mean for the next round of elections in August and Taiwan’s democratic process. Lastly, Miles looks back at the protest movements across China since the beginning of this year and discusses the impact these movements have on China’s social stability and the Chinese Communist Party’s regime legitimacy.
China Insider is a weekly podcast project from Hudson Institute’s China Center, hosted by China Center Director and Senior Fellow, Dr. Miles Yu, who provides weekly news that mainstream American outlets often miss, as well as in-depth commentary and analysis on the China challenge and the free world’s future.
Episode Transcript
This transcription is automatically generated and edited lightly for accuracy. Please excuse any errors.
Miles Yu:
Welcome to China Insider, a podcast from the Hudson Institute’s China Center. I am Miles Yu, senior fellow and director of the China Center. Join me each week for our analysis of the major events concerning China, China threat, and their implications to the US and beyond.
Colin Tessier-Kay:
It is Tuesday, July 29th, and we have three topics this week. First, we recap the recent event hosted by the China Center in Hudson Institute to announce the center’s latest report, “China After Communism: Preparing for a Post-CCP China” and highlight some key takeaways from the conference. Second, we unpack the latest from Taiwan’s recall elections last Saturday and what this means going forward for Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan and recall movement. Lastly, we look back at the protest movements across China since the beginning of this year and aim to put into context the growing public descent across the country and the impact these movements have on China’s social stability and CCP regime legitimacy. Miles, great to be with you again this week.
Miles Yu:
Nice to be with you, Colin.
Colin Tessier-Kay:
Up first this week we cover the highlights from a recent event hosted at the China Center to announce the latest report “China After Communism: Preparing for a Post-CCP China”. The event convened policy experts and China scholars across two panels on a central theme and question of what preparations are necessary to adequately respond to a potential collapse of the CCP and centralized authority within China. Miles, would you like to start us off here with the recap of the event and key takeaways from the report?
Miles Yu:
Yeah, I mean, this is exercise impossibilities. The China Center, as you know, has been endeavoring on this project for over a year. What happened is we’re inspired by history. History tells us that it’s probably very daunting to bring down repressive regimes such as Nazi Germany, such as Imperial Japan, even the Soviet Union, as [one] might say. But as daunting [as] those tasks were, it probably [was] tougher to rebuild the society out of the ruins of repressed regime[s], out of collapse[s]. We have a lot of work plannings about how to defeat [and] how to destroy repressive bad regimes, but we probably haven’t thought enough about how to transition a collapse regime [and] how to stabilize the regime that has just collapsed. This is a very important historic task, and we’re thinking ahead. This is kind of the net assessment for the possibility after a collapsed communist regime.
Now, there are a couple of things we should know about China. China, China is the longest communist party ruling regime. Also, China is a big country, the largest economic entity in the world. Thirdly, the regime is built upon something that’s very fragile. History is not on the side of the Chinese Communist Party. Sooner or later, the regime will collapse. I think a sudden collapse is not only possible, [but] it become[s] increasingly likely. That’s why we have studied this matter for over a year. We have the companion publication. Nevertheless, this is not about how and why the regime will collapse, but [this is] about what if. That’s the purpose of this exercise. We had a very successful conference last week, and we have a very well received publication [to] go along with the conference. Those are the issues, and we can discuss a little later about this project. That’s basically the general background of this conference and also our publication.
Colin Tessier-Kay:
Turning to our next topic this week, on Saturday, Taiwanese voters rejected a bid to oust roughly one fifth of the legislature in the recall election, all of whom were members of the KMT (Kuomintang) party. While there are still further recall elections on the way in August, the latest round has tempered hopes for the DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) to obtain a legislative majority. We’ve been covering the recall movement on China Insider and we’re waiting for this, Miles, to see how things would go. And Miles, it seems like the KMT lives to fight another day. What exactly went on in this round of voting and how did these KMT legislators retain their seats?
Miles Yu:
I think this is a very surprising turnout [and] outcome. Actually, to think about it, it is not really that surprising because all politics are local. What the KMT did was to localize the main issue, which is Taiwanese identity and anti-communism. They tried to dilute that kind of a theme and thrust, and focused instead on the minor issues of personality, that kind of things. Also, the KMT control the legislative Yuan. Don’t forget that. They literally in the last days before the vote, they said, “we’re going to give every Taiwanese citizen voter 10,000 or a hundred thousand Taiwanese dollars”. I don’t know, you call it bribery or something. I don’t know how this is going to be possible, but it’s a local issue. They won. However, I will say also it didn’t really solve the problem of the major issue that is the Taiwanese Identity Communist Party infiltration to Taiwan society.
I must also say this though. The recall rules and regulations set the threshold for recalling a legislative member very, very high. So, it’s almost impossible. First of all, there are three stages, right? Three thresholds. Number one is 1% of registered voters sign up for yes recall, and then they got that one. Then, the next one is 10%. That’s all. Got it. But the final vote, which is last Saturday, requires 25% of all registered voters for a “yes” vote. And not only that, the “yes” vote must be bigger than the “no” vote. This is where the trick [was] played very brilliantly for the KMT. The threshold is simply too high.
Now, some of the key KMT members on the recall ballot, namely the majority leader Fu Kun-chi(傅崐萁), and also the strongest diehard KMT member in Taipei City, a lady by the name of Hsu Chiao-hsin (徐巧芯), the thresholds were passed. The “yes” vote were all 25% above. However, the “no” vote is bigger because to be recalled, members of the KMT legislative Yuan, we’re recalling people in their stronghold, in their hardcore district, which is explained to me the very odd and unfortunate phenomenon of voter turnout. Now, for issues like this, voter turnout should be much higher. The reality was that only about 50% to 60% of people showed up to vote, and that turnout was not sufficient enough because these were all KMT stronghold. The reason I think there is a relatively low turnout is because this is not really about [the] final recall, yes or no. This is about a vote for recalling the current members, and then after that, you’re going to have another new election of the next replacements. Now, these replacements, remember, are all in districts of the KMT strongholds. It’s almost unlikely that you will have the opposition leader to win the seat in the KMT strongholds. That’s one of the structural reasons over there. I also say, so if the voter turnout would be like 80% or 90%, I’m sure the yes side would have prevailed, but that didn’t happen. It’s only about 50% to 60% of the voter turnout, which is kind of relatively low, not high enough. In other words. I must also say though, the incumbent the political party, the DPP really did not do it wholeheartedly. They did not mobilize its whole base for this whole thing. When they did, it was too late and too little. I think this is the unfortunate result.
However, my view is for the “yes” campaign, this is a tactical defeat, but the strategic victory, that is, this recall campaign has redefined the discourse of the Taiwanese politics. The baseline right now is really about whether you’re anti-communist or your CCP-friendly. This is a very important thing. From now on, the narratives, the dialogue will be whether you’re a CCP-friendly or not. It’s not just about domestic issues. This is one of the reasons why almost all the KMT members on the record ballots are forced to defend themselves, saying that we’re not CCP friendly. We’re not going to overtly pro-China. This is very important to change the course of dialogue, content of dialogue. I think that’s a very important win strategically for the “yes” campaign. Another thing I might say also, is that there’s enough new participants in this great recall. By the way, this record is not really this DPP recall campaign. It’s basically the anti-KMT campaign. A lot of people in the middle. The new forces were joining in. We’re seeing the emergence of a new political force in Taiwanese politics that is neither KMT, mostly DPP, but definitely something in the middle and something that is [the] embodiment of the general discontent of the tenure and the lack of serious of Taiwanese politics. I think overall, this is a lesson for the “yes” campaign, but also, it’s [a] democratic process. It really shows the vibrancy of Taiwanese democracy overall. I think it’s a very good exercise.
Colin Tessier-Kay:
Quick numbers recap. The KMT currently holds 52 seats while the ruling DPP holds 51. The magic number here is still six for the DPP, and would need at least that many KMT lawmakers to lose their recall elections to achieve a governing majority across both the executive and legislature. While the DPP were hopeful, many of the recalled lawmakers were from well-organized, established KMT stronghold districts, like you mentioned, Miles, and this result will seemingly make things much more difficult for Lai (赖清德) and the DPP in next month’s recall election, but also in general for legislative hopes. As the KMT coalition has made for a significant roadblock to date, especially as it concerns the latest defense budget and DPP-led government reform efforts, Miles, what is the outlook remaining recall elections next month and what will this mean for Taiwan’s government if the KMT retains the coalition majority?
Miles Yu:
I will say this. I think this recall movement is such a momentous political landmark in Taiwanese politics. Even though the KMT didn’t lose anybody so far, there’s only 25 out of the 31. However, I would say this CCP-friendly Taiwanese legislator will be much, much more careful, much less blatant in their sort of CCP friendly politics. I think they have learned, actually, as a matter of fact, some of the people on the record ballot openly said, “We have made a mistake. I didn’t pay enough attention to the sentiment of the voters. From now on, I’ll be more careful, more responsible”. That’s a very good thing, right? There are remaining seven elections, seven votes in seven districts. As you say correctly, the DPP would have to win at least six of them. I think that election will be held on August 23rd. I doubt it is going to be very likely that will turn, you will have to win sixth of seven. The odds is very, very slim. However, there is a way of hope. Overall, this is very good exercise in democratic process. I mean, I have never seen anything that’s so orderly, so emotionally involved, and so it’s really participatory democracy at its best.
Colin Tessier-Kay:
And if nothing else, it’s a wonderful insight into Taiwanese democratic processes and politics like you mentioned. And so, to round out this topic, we have to ask from the foreign policy perspective here, what really is the impact of this latest recall election in the broader context of the US-Taiwan relationship?
Miles Yu:
I think it’ll not change that much because United States will defend Taiwan no matter how Taiwanese politics moves because this is not just Taiwanese issue, it’s a global issue as we have said repeatedly. The defense of Taiwan is also the defense of the United States. Many people have said that. You see that just in the aftermath of the recall movement, the votes on Saturday, the British Defense Minister said, “You know what? We are ready to fight to defend Taiwan against the communist invasion of China military.” There’s no clearer message than that. I mean, that ,of course, is a reflection of the collective resolve of the international community led by the United States and aided by countries like Japan, Australia, and definitely the UK. A lot of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) countries have said the same thing. I think the issue of Taiwan is no longer localized. No matter how politics in Taiwan’s plays out, I think ultimately it is a principle of sovereignty and independence at stake. United States has shown really strong resolve to just defend Taiwan’s status quo.
Colin Tessier-Kay:
We’ll look to circle back on this as August 23rd is the next date for the recall elections, for the remaining seats, and to see if they do pass that six seat threshold, but there’s much between now and then to monitor. Moving to our final topic today, we’ve covered several emerging and sustained protest movements across China in recent months, movements that have formed in response to declining economic growth rates, youth unemployment, unpaid wages, human rights abuses, and more. While we have covered the context and circumstances surrounding these protests and emerging movements, it’s equally important to look into the movements themselves and better understand the characteristics of each. Something of note on this thread of thought is the nature of each protest and the number that have escalated to levels of violence, either on behalf of the protesters or the armed police attempting to control public descent. Miles, maybe you can start us off here with an overview of the recent rise in public protests in China generally, and why we are seeing the number of sustained movements this year alone.
Miles Yu:
I think the western media, western politics overall, have really underestimated degree to which the Chinese population is angry at the ruling regime. I mean, we from the west look at China as a threat to global peace, and China is gaining strength. Yes, but that’s only the Chinese Communist Party. They’re gaining hard power. They are very advanced in artificial intelligence. They’re very advanced in their modern weapon development and the cyber offensive capabilities. They’re all there. Yes, that’s true, but that regime is fundamentally challenged by the momentous, I would say, volcanic disenchantment inside China. If you are Xi Jinping sitting in Zhongnanhai every night - I don’t think he really, really placed the threat of Western democracy against that regime at the top - on top of that is his worry, a paranoia of a popular uprising against the regime.
You can see this everywhere. Last week, I believe on July 23rd, the entire city of Hangzhou exploded. Hangzhou is no small city. It’s a big eastern Chinese city, a tech center. That’s where Jack Ma (马云)is from, right? It’s a very, very big deal. Well, the people took to the street by the tens of thousands. What caused the protest? Well, the city water has become terribly dirty, and you have the human feces in the water, according to local reports. The government denied this as a rumor, and they arrest bunch of people. That really make the citizens outraged. Tens of thousands of people took to the street to protest. You know what they were chanting? They’re chanting about down with the Communist Party of China. Xi Jinping stepped down, resigned. Those political slogans were unthinkable in today’s China. But then people say that. You’ve got tens of protests like this happening daily in China.
The only reason we don’t know about this is number one, China kicked out all the Western journalists, virtually every one of them. China basically is this very powerful and comprehensive censorship regime, so you don’t know much what’s going on in China. But if you pay attention, if you are a discerning China watcher, you’ll find out because China, even though is heavily censored, but again, there a lot of smart people who can send out the messages through social media, for example. Also, they have enormously powerful, oblique dissent. In other words, not directly challenging the regime, but very, very indirectly through channels. I think the regime is very, very fragile in that regard because the people have awakened. Now you are talking about the unemployment rate of unsustainable proportion, the youth employment age 16 to 24, the most productive age group is as high, could be as high as 50%. Think about that. By the end of this month, China will add about 20 million new college graduates. Most of them, I would say, most of them will not be able to find jobs. You can see the social tension are very, very high. That’s why Xi Jinping being constantly is worried and paranoid about Western influence, about Western leaders using their soft power to urge for the communist regime to give China the basic rights of free expression, free protest, and economic equality. Those things are at the top of the worried list of the Chinese Communist Party. I would say if we don’t recognize this powerful social tension, the forces unleashed by this social protest, China’s watching China’s study community as a whole is committing a terrible mistake and also the consequences of which will be enormous. We have to pay attention to this kind of stuff. That’s why we have podcast like this.
Colin Tessier-Kay:
And I’m really glad you brought up that point, and I’d like to kind of stick with it for a second, if you will, because with the expulsion of so many Western journalists from China and just the vast network of censorship that is set out both within and without of China, to truly track these developments and protest movements and public dissident movements, you really have to take the time and dig deep and through the research and find sources that are reporting on these issues. I’m thinking back to the beginning of this year in January with one of the first mass protests of the yearin Pucheng in Shaanxi Province, following the death of a high school student there and how the conflict between local police and militia and local civilians kicked off in that regard. While the CCP likes to advertise select channels for the public to express their discontent and criticism, obviously public protest and dissent is heavily, heavily monitored and controlled by the CCP state apparatus, both in digital and analog form. Miles, as we round out the topic for today, kind of a two-part question for you. As we consider the nature of these collective protests, what is the impact of them on Chinese social stability and perhaps CCP regime stability? For our listeners who are looking to get a little bit more into tracking these events, where can they go to look to find these sources or what should they be looking for in terms of news media outlets?
Miles Yu:
Well, let me answer your last question. First of all, they should listen to this podcast, number one. Number two, they should really look for this kind of off-the-mainstream media about China. You should really pay attention to what’s going on, what’s been reported by Taiwanese media, for example. They are the keen observers of movement and trends in China. And because stakes are very high and also Japanese reporting is pretty good, but it’s not as good as Taiwanese reporting, I would say. I also think that the reason I said that is not from the point of view of being arrogant. Just back to our first topic today, we talk about it, that is, our report on preparing for the post-CCP China, some of the people in the West, they don’t think it were being serious. Yet, in a Chinese speaking world, I’ve got a whole bunch of responses from China, from people who were overseas who were Chinese, and they were really, really interested in this, and they don’t think this is really remotely impossible. Many people have basically suddenly opened up their imagination and say, hey, this is something we’re going to do. This is all about a different perspective about what’s going on in China. A lot of stuff about China is not about what the information we could get [or] should get from Chinese government, but you have to really pay attention and go through the firewall to watch the social media trend. I think first of all, you really need bilingual capabilities. Number two is that you should have a healthy dose of skepticism about mainstream media, and also particularly, you should basically adopt the attitude of distrust or verify toward Chinese social media. That’s always the golden rule. You have to really start with the fact that there are the tools of CCP mendacity and lies, and then you go back to say, if [the] reality really matched that. Sometimes truth will not become truth in China until it’s officially denied, [and] that is also another golden rule.
Colin Tessier-Kay:
Well, that’s our time for this week. Thank you to our listeners for checking in again, and thank you to Miles as always for this week’s conversation. Always great to hear from you, and we’ll check back in with you next week.
Miles Yu:
Okay, looking forward to chatting with you next week.