Political Islam, also known as Islamism, is both a reality of this century and a catch-all label often deployed to delegitimize various forms of Muslim political expression. It has the potency to mobilize supporters and critics alike. In this paper, we explore different shades of political Islam, arguing that it is not a monolithic phenomenon and that it is vital to properly explicate its different shades. We argue for a more nuanced understanding of political Islam by categorizing its varied manifestations. Furthermore, we argue for tailoring policy responses specifically toward each category of political Islam. While states may view political Islam as a security issue, in many cases, such a perception is inappropriate.
This paper contributes to the broader literature on Islamist movements, state-Islam relations, Islam’s role in politics, the role of secularism in Muslim societies, and the compatibility of political Islam with modern governance and democracy. Our intended audience includes scholars, policymakers, and religious leaders, particularly those navigating questions of pluralism, stability, and religious authority. We pay close attention to the complex political considerations that drive state responses to Islamism.
While many studies employ various typologies to categorize Islamists, we reject the dominant characterization of Islamists as necessarily power-seeking actors. Oliver Roy, for instance, claims that “Islamists intervene directly in political life and since the 1960s have attempted to gain power.”1 We align more with the nuanced analysis of Mohammed Ayoob and Danielle Lussier, who dispute the “inactive” nature of Islamists, i.e., the treatment of Islamists as ideologically committed to core Islamist beliefs rather than to political activity. Ayoob and Lussier identify four dynamic categories: vanguard revolutionaries, nonviolent political parties, national resistance organizations, and violent transnational actors.2 While they define political Islam as the instrumentalization of Islam for political gain, we use the term to refer to individuals and movements committed to belief in the establishment of the Islamic state, broadly defined. Furthermore, we challenge the idea that only Islamists believe in the normative appropriateness of Islamic concepts to solve contemporary problems.3 In fact, we assert that this belief is widespread among Muslims and is not a unique or distinguishing facet of an Islamist.
We begin by offering a definition of political Islam and the historical context in which Islamism developed. We then consider broader Muslim attitudes toward politics—both secularists and those committed to some form of Islamic state—before narrowing in on a subset of the latter, Islamists, and proposing our novel typology of Islamist actors. We offer these categories as ideal types and recognize that such identities are more fluid and often multifaceted in practice. This is an intellectual exercise in which we reference specific individuals, movements, or groups that embody key aspects of each ideal type category.
However, in doing so, we do not intend this study as a definitive or comprehensive effort to “map” all Muslim political actors in the world, nor do we deny the multidimensional nature of some movements. For example, analysts often treat the Muslim Brotherhood as a monolith, but if one considers the broad array of individuals and political movements this group has inspired and the way many of them have evolved over time, it becomes clear that identity categories such as the ones we propose are neither absolute nor static. Nonetheless, we suggest that this intellectual exercise can inform policy and advocate differentiated approaches toward different categories of Islamism, rejecting a one-size-fits-all solution and noting that not all types of Islamism require a security-driven response.
Political Islam: Understanding the Concept
Political Islam is a contentious concept subject to varying interpretations among scholars and observers. Here, we define political Islam as an ideology that holds that religion and politics are inseparable and that establishment of an Islamic state is a religious obligation of Muslims.4 Many debate even this definition, particularly the nature and form of any Islamic state, including what it entails and how it should be realized. These debates form the basis of many conceptual disagreements and will be revisited in due course. For adherents, the aspiration to establish an Islamic state lies at the heart of political Islam.
The Qur’anic concept of al-Din underpins this aspiration. It makes clear that Islam is a comprehensive way of life and more than just a religion that tells people about the hereafter.5 The term Muslim—one who submits (to the will of God)—implies a rejection of manmade ideologies. Proponents of political Islam would assert that secularism is a Western concept that arose out of specific historical circumstances.6 Superimposing secularism on the Muslim way of life would be taking an idea out of context and ignoring the clear Quranic injunctions of the completeness of Islam. This Islamic legal maxim informs the champions of political Islam that “when an obligation cannot be fulfilled without a means, then the means itself becomes obligatory.”7
Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun), one of the original movements of political Islam, emphasized Islam as a holistic way of life encompassing all dimensions of human existence, including domains typically under the ambit of government. In his understanding, it is not possible to relegate religion to the private sphere as secularism demands, as Islam is not something adherents can practice merely in the confines of their homes and leave out of life-changing realms such as public policy and governance.8
The sociopolitical context in which political Islam emerged is also essential in understanding its development. Until 1924, the Caliphate—despite its internal fractures—functioned as one of the last widely recognized symbols of Islamic political authority. The fall of the Ottoman empire, the advent of the modern nation-state in Muslim lands, and colonialism by Western powers introduced unprecedented ruptures. For the first time in Islamic history, there was no unified political authority nominally governing Muslims. More profoundly, colonialism did not merely alter political control. It was also a totalizing endeavor that brought with it a set of beliefs and worldviews, the most central of which was the ideology of secularism that most Western nations had already accepted as the ultimate political ideal.9 These ruptures catalyzed new existential concerns among Muslims and shaped the emerging discourse on political Islam.
The political and intellectual crisis that colonialism precipitated elicited a range of reactions from Muslim thinkers. Some argued that the abandonment of the Islamic ethos led to the regression of the ummah (community of believers). Within this line of thought, several ideologies emerged. The Salafi-Wahhabi strand advocated a return to the literal meanings, rites, and rituals of Islam as the Prophet and his companions had practiced.10 Modernist reformers argued that the neglect of independent reasoning, known as ijtihad in Islamic jurisprudence, led to the retrograde situation of Muslims.11 Some of those who emphasized the importance of ijtihad also contended that the failure to keep pace with Western technological advancements left Muslims societies in a vulnerable predicament.12 The combined effects of colonialism, material decline (relative to the West), and the fall of the Caliphate created the intellectual and political conditions under which political Islam emerged.
As mentioned earlier, the notion of a separation between religion and politics was foreign to the Islamic tradition, and indeed to much of Europe prior to the Enlightenment. In contemporary discourse, the question of whether Islam is compatible with secularism is ubiquitous in intellectual and political circles as Muslims try to reconcile political realities with theological predispositions. Many authors have argued that political Islam is an extremely modern phenomenon.13 For example, Talal Asad and Humeira Iqtidar argue that Islamist groups such as Jama`at-e-Islami and Jama`at-ud-Dawa in Pakistan are modern responses to state-led secularization efforts.14
What Is an Islamic State?
A note is warranted on what constitutes an “Islamic state” given the definition of political Islam employed in this paper. The necessity and feasibility of such a state remain debatable. Wael Hallaq argues that an Islamic state is “impossible” to realize in the modern era as the nation-state’s foundations, centered on politics and power, are incompatible with the precepts of Islamic governance, which pertain to morality and divine ordinance.15 On the other end of the spectrum, groups such as Hizbut Tahrir (discussed later in this study) state that it is incumbent upon every Muslim to work toward reestablishing the Caliphate.16
Malaysia represents a fascinating case in this regard. While most ulama (Islamic religious scholars) in the nation believe Malaysia is an Islamic state, they disagree on what aspects of the state constitute its Islamic nature. Malaysia practices a dual legal system: A modified version of the inherited British secular constitution is the primary legal framework, while a Sharia court exists for matters relating to marriage, divorce, and inheritance.17 There are growing calls by various factions to expand Sharia provisions, as most laws remain secular. Yet the claim by many ulama that Malaysia is already an Islamic state persists.18
Muslim Views of Politics
Before explicating political Islam, it is helpful to briefly discuss the broader spectrum of Muslim attitudes toward the relationship between Islam and politics, as illustrated in the figure below.
Figure 1. The Spectrum of Muslim Attitudes Toward Islam and Politics
It is possible to broadly categorize Muslim attitudes toward the relationship between Islam and politics into two main camps: those who believe the two are inseparable and those who adopt a more secular stance. While this paper does not focus on secular Muslims, a brief explanation is warranted. Within this category, we may identify two subtypes: hardliners and moderates.
The hardline secularists believe in a version of secularism that is “assertive.”19 Hardline secularists are those who openly and actively restrict the practice of Islam in the public sphere. They advocate for complete privatization of religion and are wary of religious symbols in the public sphere. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s brand of Turkish secularism was a prominent example. Ataturk had a deep disdain for Islam and conventional Islamic symbols. Turkish secularism was famously so militant that it prohibited Muslim women from donning the hijab and replaced the Arabic call to prayer with its Turkish-language equivalent—an act that most ulama widely considered a severe innovation (bid`ah).20
However, this assertive model of secularism seems to represent a minority view. Most secular-leaning Muslims are moderate and do not display contempt for Islamic beliefs. They believe secularism is more suited for the modern age and Islam should not play a leading role in public policy, especially considering the opportunities that pluralist politics provide for religious minorities. That is to say, many Muslims might wish to avoid living under a strict Islamic state because the Muslim world is itself divided into different sects and movements. For example, non-Salafi Muslims might not wish to live in a truly Islamic state if they feared the Salafists would take control of it and restrict the freedoms of non-Salafists.
Examples of such moderate secular groups in Southeast Asia include groups such as Jaringan Islam Liberal(Liberal Islam Network) in Indonesia, Sisters in Islam (SIS) in Malaysia, and progressive activists in Singapore.21 What unites them is a commitment to universal human rights, religious freedom, and equality between the various faith groups, including atheists. They argue that a neutral secular state is compatible with Islam and may provide Muslims with greater autonomy, as it guarantees freedom of religion for all faiths. They highlight historical precedents, such as the Charter of Medina—an agreement between the Prophet and his followers on the one hand and various non-Muslim communities upon the arrival of the former in Medina after their migration from Mecca. In their view, even in a predominantly Muslim land, Muslims would be better off under a secular state because they could choose their preferred version of Islam without state interference. Some proponents further assert that no explicit and definitive Quranic or Prophetic injunctions mandate the establishment of a religious state and therefore there is no prohibition against adopting secularism or a neutral secular state to manage Muslim affairs. These secularists regard Islam as compatible with the contemporary Westphalian state with its foundation of democracy, the rule of law, social justice, equality, freedom, and security for all citizens.22
There are also moderate secularists within Muslim scholarly circles. Some are skeptical of political Islam and argue for the acceptance of a secular state. Abdullahi An-Na’im contends that, to be faithful to their tradition in the modern era, Muslims would need to live in secular states that protect freedom of conscience, and only under such conditions can religious choices or practices be meaningful.23 The influential scholar Bassam Tibi, meanwhile, has been critical of various features that he sees as characteristic of Islamists, including virulent antisemitism.24 Both An-Na’im and Tibi are moderate secularists, as they do not seek to impose their views on others. They champion their views instead through intellectual platforms and policy advocacy.
We contend that many Muslims fall into another category that is not secular in its ideology per se but is, in effect, accommodating of secularism. Those in the “inseparable non-Islamist” category of Muslims hold that Islam and politics are inseparable, although their views of what this means in practice vary significantly from those of Islamists. We thus treat them as a separate group in our typology (see figure 1 above). These Muslims believe that Islam permeates all aspects of life, but they also do not regard the establishment of an Islamic state as a religious obligation in the way that Islamists do. In this line of thought, Islam can play a role in the public sphere through various forms of nonpolitical da`wah (proselytization). Three prominent figures in the modern era that we would categorize in this group are Javed Ahmad Ghamidi (b. 1952), a Pakistani thinker known for his rationalist and modernist interpretation of Islam with significant following among the Pakistani diaspora;25 Bediuzzaman Sa`id Nursi (1877–1960), a Kurdish-Turkish Islamic scholar and author of Risala-i Nur, which guides the Nur movement for spiritual renewal and moral reform;26 and Fethullah Gulen (1941–2024), a Turkish thinker who was inspired by Nursi and founded his own global Gulen movement.27
On balance, one may view Muslim secularists and inseparable non-Islamists as allies and pragmatically aligned in many ways. Muslim secularists categorically reject the idea of an Islamic state entirely, considering it an aberration and harmful to Muslims and Islam, while those in the inseparable grouping do not consider the establishment of an Islamic state obligatory in any way. While both camps may collaborate in advancing Muslim interests within the social and political domains, they ultimately differ in this ideological regard.
Variations of Political Islam
Our essay principally focuses on Islamist actors rather than the non-Islamists whom we have briefly attempted to categorize. We propose framing political Islam as a spectrum with five categories:
- deferential passive
- deferential active
- Islamist democrat
- Islamist non-democrat
- jihadist
The thread that binds all these Islamist groups is their shared belief in the establishment of an Islamic state and the rejection of secularism as a governing philosophy in principle. Our spectrum aims to capture a range of views on the immediacy of establishing an Islamic state and the methods that Muslims should deploy in doing so, ranging from the most passive or quietist to the most activist, intolerant, and indeed violent.
However, in practice, some individuals and movements that fall under the first two groups may adapt to living in secular societies without explicitly challenging the overarching political frameworks of these societies, meaning our conceptualization focuses on ideal types and what these individuals and movements see as the ideal political order rather than what sort of changes they are agitating for immediately. Moreover, while these categories offer a helpful analytical structure, in reality, individuals and movements often exhibit traits from multiple categories or shift between them as changing contexts and ideological trajectories shape their perspectives.
Beyond this core belief in the benefit of having an Islamic state, Islamists diverge on many issues, including the ideal extent of Muslim engagement with existing political systems, the nature of democracy, and the relationship with non-Muslims. Importantly, Islamists may belong to any sect, e.g., Sunni or Shia, and may draw from diverse theological orientations, including Salafi, Sufi, or traditionalist strands. This typology focuses narrowly on their orientation toward political order and statehood, particularly the Islamic state ideal. Furthermore, the typology explored in this paper does not attempt to capture other elements of religious belief. As such, it should not be conflated with other descriptive framings, such as “conservative” or “fundamentalist.”
1. Deferential Passive
This first category represents the mildest form of political Islam in terms of activism and efforts to transform society along Islamic lines. Notably, many of these actors already operate in Muslim states and societies, which makes it easier for them to justify their passive ideological stance. Others live among Muslim minorities in non-Muslim countries, where their passivity stems from various considerations, such as a fear of generating societal and political backlash (including losing political freedoms and opportunities for immigration). Some live in isolation from the larger Muslim communities in their country and lack access and proximity to power and political influence.
In contrast to other Muslims who may believe in the connection between Islam and politics but reject the necessity of a Caliphate (e.g., Javed, Nursi, and Gulen), these Islamists believe that Islam commands the creation of an Islamic state. Yet, while affirming the infallibility of Islam and its comprehensive applicability, including in politics, they refrain from promoting these beliefs in an activist or aggressive manner for practical reasons. Instead, they prioritize personal piety. In their view, if most Muslims are practicing, the establishment of an Islamic state will occur naturally. They therefore emphasize encouraging Muslims to adhere to Islamic law in the personal realm, especially emulating the minutiae of the Prophet’s practices. In doing so, in their view, Muslims should realize the ultimate goal of the Islamic state, which is to protect and enhance the religious lives and morality of humankind. As a result, such groups become either politically quietist or even apologists for certain regimes. Two significant examples of deferential passive Islamists, although they are quite different in many regards, are the Jemaat Tabligh and some Saudi Salafi-Wahhabis.
The Jemaat Tabligh, established in India in 1927, is a significant global Islamic group. Its mission centers on promoting individual piety while eschewing politics at the party and governmental levels.28 Its adherents typically remain apolitical and thus have been given latitude by many governments to continue their activities. In southern Thailand, where many other Muslim groups have to operate with caution, the state supports the Tabligh as it poses no threat to the status quo.29 Many Muslims throughout the world have had encounters with the Tabligh, either in mosques or in their own homes. The Tabligh sends da`wah missions abroad, encouraging local Muslims to perfect their religious observance by following the sunnah (Prophetic example). Interestingly, unlike in traditional da`wah efforts, the Tabligh does not proselytize to non-Muslims and shuns political engagement entirely, which has led to its acceptance in secular countries such as Thailand and Singapore. However, there are notable exceptions to this generally apolitical Tabligh character. In parts of Africa, segments within the Tabligh have transitioned into overt political activism and even militancy.30 While such cases remain rare within the larger Tabligh movement, they underscore the fluidity of Islamist categories that defy neat classifications.
The other example of deferential passive Islamists are Saudi Salafi-Wahhabis. Contrary to common depictions that tend to conflate Wahhabism with Muslim terrorism, many Salafi-Wahhabis adopt a stance marked by political reclusiveness. Founded by Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab (1703–92), the Salafi-Wahhabi movement was puritanical and attempted to eliminate alleged ritualistic and theological innovations (bidʿah) among the Muslim communities of Arabia. Abdul Wahhab claimed such innovations were not in line with what God and His Prophet had ordained.31 His legacy was extremely checkered since he issued fatwas (religious edicts) that justified violence against fellow Muslims whom he deemed innovators.32 The Salafi-Wahhabis have a longstanding alliance with the Saudi monarchy, pledging loyalty in exchange for Wahhabism’s status as something akin to a state religion.33 While this royal patronage endures, it does not constitute blanket support. The Saudi state has shunned or even punished Wahhabis who promote political activism.34
Nevertheless, for many Salafi-Wahhabis, quietism under a Muslim ruler is not only the judicious choice but the normative Islamic position.35 The Salafi-Wahhabis draw on various hadiths (Islamic oral traditions) to justify their obedience to a Muslim ruler, insisting that Muslims should be obedient so long as that ruler allows them to practice their faith, regardless of any other shortcomings of the ruler. This stance is not unique to Salafi-Wahhabis and has historical precedent. Among the Prophet’s companions, disagreements emerged about how they should react to the tyrannical rule of Umayyad leaders such as Yazid ibn Muawiyah. Abdullah ibn Umar adopted a quietist life, while Abdullah ibn Al-Zubayr and Husayn ibn Ali, the latter a grandson of the Prophet, believed it was their religious duty to resist Muawiyah’s rule. Over time, Muslim scholars have generally developed a pragmatic stand, typically choosing stability over rebellion and coalescing around the maxim “Sixty years of tyranny is better than a day of anarchy.”36 This quietist position most likely emerged in response to the trauma that the civil wars induced among early Muslims such as Ali ibn Abi Talib (the son-in-law of the Prophet), and Aisha bint Abu Bakr (the Prophet’s wife).37
In modern times, groups like the Tabligh and Salafi-Wahhabis have extended this quietist position to an extreme by disavowing political involvement or any attempts to challenge state authority. Yet, it is important to recognize that Saudi Salafi-Wahhabis in particular operate within a unique sociopolitical context, one in which the state already embodies many key features of an Islamic polity. Because of this, their relative political quiescence may reflect not only theological conviction but also satisfaction with the existing religious order as they perceive it. In contrast, Salafists operating in more secular or non-Islamic societies may feel greater impetus to engage politically, precisely because the society in which they live is not structured around Islamic norms. This highlights how sociopolitical environments significantly shape the political behavior of these groups.
We also note the dichotomy between Saudi Salafi-Wahhabi postures on domestic and foreign policy. While they maintain a quietist attitude on the domestic front, they have sometimes held an activist stance with regard to foreign affairs, condoning or endorsing jihadist activities overseas. For instance, Saudi Arabia’s Grand Mufti Ibn Baz (1912–99) issued a fatwa endorsing the jihad against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, thus legitimizing armed resistance as a religious duty for Muslims. His fatwa played a key role in mobilizing support and funding for the mujahideen in the 1980s.38 The recent social reforms in Saudi Arabia under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman raise further questions as to how the Salafi-Wahhabi movement will adapt in the long term given the likely tensions between new Saudi state policy and traditional Wahhabi political positions.
2. Deferential Active
Deferential active Islamists are primarily within Muslim minority communities in non-Muslim countries. They maintain the theological legitimacy of establishing an Islamic state as a religious obligation. However, they refrain from pursuing it in their immediate, non-Muslim context. They argue that as a minority, it is not obligatory or realistic to achieve Islamic statehood in the immediacy, and many argue that attempting to do so could prove detrimental to the welfare and interests of Muslims and Islam. In this regard, they are not so different from non-Islamists in terms of their willingness to live in a non-Islamic society and respect its laws so long as it protects their religious freedoms. Nevertheless, these individuals can still be considered Islamists insofar as they continue to believe in the superiority of an Islamic state as an ideal.39 They reject secularism as inherently superior to Islamic rule and, unlike deferential passive Islamists, they actively advocate for policies that they believe will help the Muslim community in their own countries. Moreover, while they reject the more radical Islamist activism of groups such as Hizbut Tahrir that seek to Islamize non-Muslim countries (see section 4, Islamist non-democrats), they support Islamist rule in the Muslim world (e.g., support for the brief Muslim Brotherhood government of Mohammed Morsi in Egypt), viewing the latter as part of a religious duty.
It is sometimes easy to misinterpret these nuances as contradictory, but they actually reveal crucial ideological differences that are shaped by the political and religious conditions in which different communities operate. We contend that deferential active Islamists genuinely believe both that an Islamic state is unnecessary for a Muslim minority in a non-Muslim land and that achieving such a state is a theological obligation in Muslim-majority contexts. The difference is thus contextual, shaped by distinct views of the role and obligations of Islamic governance in different environments.
Deferential active Islamists actively engage in social and political activism to protect both universal human rights and the rights of Muslim communities within existing secular and democratic frameworks. They differ from “deferential passive” Islamists in this activism. A relevant example of such Islamists is in the Singapore Islamic Scholars and Religious Teachers Association, known as Pergas.40 The group seeks to develop a resilient, integrated Muslim minority community within a secular, multicultural society through credible leadership of religious scholars. In its 2004 book Moderation in Islam in the Context of Muslim Community in Singapore, Pergas explicitly states that although the idea of an Islamic state is a valid theological position, it is neither obligatory nor realistic for Muslims in Singapore due to their minority status. The organization argues that the focus of da`wah should be preserving and advancing Muslim interests, moral integrity, and active participation within secular and democratic institutions. While Pergas disagrees with secularism ideologically, it accepts Singapore’s secular context as necessary for multi-ethnic coexistence and religious freedom. Pergas thus encourages the Muslim community to adapt to modern lifestyles and embrace a moderate Islamic identity that aligns with Singapore’s national harmony.41
3. Islamist Democrat
The third category is perhaps the most frequently discussed in political science literature. Islamist democrats promote Islam through nonviolent means (with some notable caveats, discussed below) and embrace democracy as a means to this end. They view the pursuit of an Islamic state as a religious duty, especially in Muslim majority countries. Some Muslims may fluctuate between Islamist democrat and deferential active stances if they live in non-Muslim countries. Indeed, both categories are politically engaged. Deferential active Islamists participate in social and political advocacy as civil society actors to strengthen democratic and secular institutions without the intention of pursuing political office, while Islamist democrats actively contest elections, form or join political parties, and present their agendas to the electorate with the long-term goal of establishing an Islamic state.
Islamist democrats operate primarily in Muslim-majority countries, where their prospects of electoral success are more feasible. Prominent examples include the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (Parti Islam Se-Malaysia, or PAS), and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.42 This category of Islamists justifies political participation by highlighting Islamic sources, such as the Quranic example of Prophet Yusuf asking the king of Egypt for a position in government. By drawing on such precedents, Islamist democrats argue that democratic participation is permissible in Islam.43 Many such political parties exist in the Middle East, and some of these have won power democratically. Tunisia’s Ennahda won power after the 2011 revolution, as did the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, although President Morsi’s stint was short-lived due to a 2013 coup.44
PAS is emblematic of this ideal type, maintaining a consistent commitment to participate in electoral politics since its inception.45 Even though PAS has generally advocated for the establishment of an Islamic state, it has shown enough malleability in its ideological predispositions that it has, at multiple times, entered into formal political alliances with secular and even non-Muslim parties.46 Since 2018, PAS has doubled down on its Islamic state rhetoric and has adopted an increasingly conservative stance while establishing local electoral strongholds and enjoying some success at the ballot box.47 Crucially, despite its ideological opposition to the secular government, PAS does not promote overthrowing the government through undemocratic or unconstitutional means.
The example of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and indeed the broader Middle East, is more complex. While many of the movement’s advocates focus on securing power through elections, some members of the group have engaged in political violence, and the tendency of authoritarian states in the Middle East to crack down on Islamists has arguably compounded this trend.
The late Egyptian cleric Yusuf al-Qaradawi (1926–2022)—often referred to as the “Global Mufti”—embodies these apparent contradictions. On the one hand, he championed a form of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) for Muslim minorities that emphasized integration and contextual judgment, recognizing that Muslim minorities face unique circumstances that require adaptive religious rulings. Hence, he argued it was not obligatory for Muslims in the West to form an Islamic state based on sharia. With regard to political order within the Muslim world, al-Qaradawi was an adherent to the ideas of Hassan al-Banna (1906–49), the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Qaradawi believed Islamist parties should take power through elections. The authoritarian regimes of Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt strongly opposed the Muslim Brotherhood as it presented a threat to the non-Islamist (though hardly secular) system of military rule.48 Consequently, al-Qaradawi spent much of his life in exile from Egypt. While he never called for jihad against Mubarak’s regime, some Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood members shifted into militancy in response to the government’s crackdown, while others went into exile but remained committed to advocating for Islamists to seize power peacefully.49
Moreover, it is important to again note that Islamist movements and figures can have very different views in the domestic and international arenas. Al-Qaradawi advocated peaceful political participation among Muslims in the Middle East, yet he explicitly supported violent jihad against U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and sanctioned attacks and suicide bombings during the Second Intifada. This reflects a broader pattern among some Islamists who advocate peaceful domestic politics at home while supporting militancy in response to perceived threats from non-Muslims in other countries.50
Critics of the Muslim Brotherhood have questioned whether their commitment to elections is principled or merely a means of seizing power that they would then refuse to relinquish. The 2013 coup by members of the Egyptian military cut short Morsi’s tenure and thus leaves us only to consider counterfactuals. However, it is probably most accurate to say that the Muslim Brotherhood has been inconsistent in its democratic stance, acting as an Islamist democratic movement at some points while embracing political violence in other instances, thus making them more like the subsequent category of Islamists (non-democrats). This is yet another example of the fluidity among Islamist groups, which defy neat categorizations.
4. Islamist Non-Democrat
For Islamist non-democrats, democracy is anathema to Islam. They regard it as a flawed concept that entrusts governance to the fallible wisdom of the masses and allows easy manipulation by the media, corporate interests, and powerful elites. More saliently, they reject the concept of elections, which the Prophet and his immediate successors did not practice, and forbid partaking in the electoral process. While they typically do not explicitly advocate specific acts of violence in the manner of Salafi-jihadists (discussed further below), Islamist non-democrats seek to achieve their goals through mass mobilization, popular revolution, or even coups d’etat, which are implicitly violent actions that fall outside the norms of electoral processes.
Hizbut Tahrir, founded in Jerusalem in 1953, is perhaps the most prominent example of Islamist non-democrats. The group is committed to the reestablishment of the Caliphate, which it regards as a religious obligation for every Muslim. Its members attribute much of the modern malaise among the ummah to the absence of a central Islamic political authority. Today, Hizbut Tahrir operates in many countries, including Western ones, but with limited popular support among Muslims.
Importantly, Islamist Non-Democrats are distinct from jihadists since they do not directly engage in violence and their speech often falls under the umbrella of protected speech in liberal democracies.51 However, there is a need to distinguish between the group’s formal stance and the real-world behavior of its adherents. While Hizbut Tahrir typifies nonviolence for the purposes of the categories in this paper, its position along the broader spectrum remains fluid, as members of Hizbut Tahrir or individuals it has radicalized have gone on to commit acts of terrorism or participate in attempted coups. Moreover, several countries have begun banning the group. Indonesia banned it in 2017 due to its opposition to the state ideology known as Pancasila (which the Indonesian constitution mandates that all organizations uphold).52 The Indonesian government determined that Hizbut Tahrir’s advocacy for establishing an Islamic caliphate and sharia-based governance directly conflicted with the Pancasila.53 More recently, the United Kingdom banned Hizbut Tahrir in 2024 for its endorsement of and incitement to terrorism.54
5. Jihadists
Much ink has been spilled on jihadists, and analysts often mistakenly equate the group with Islamists as a whole. The literature on modern jihadism and violent extremism is vast, and entire subfields of security studies and research centers have dedicated themselves to examining its causes and implications. This brief section does not intend to rehash the voluminous literature on this subject but to highlight a few points.55 First, jihadists believe establishing an Islamic state is necessary and obligatory and consider violent means legitimate and indeed imperative in pursuit of that goal. Second, they represent an overwhelming minority among Islamists. Third, jihadist groups differ significantly in scope and ambition. While al-Qaeda and the Islamic State are pursuing the ambitious—indeed, unrealistic—goal of establishing a global Caliphate, some jihadist groups, such as Hamas, have more limited territorial ambitions. And many groups, such as some in Africa, that emerged as independent insurgencies and later affiliated with al-Qaeda or the Islamic State navigate a complex relationship between global and local dynamics.56
Implications of the Analysis
The above categorization of Islamists can help inform suitable policy responses toward the different variations of Islamism. First, as this analysis makes clear, it is neither realistic nor democratic to expect all Muslims to adopt a secular worldview. Political Islam is an enduring reality and is likely to remain so, particularly as secular ideologies such as liberalism continue to reveal serious shortcomings and receive criticism from across the political spectrum, even in the non-Muslim world.57 The rise of populist movements and figures around the globe reflects a broader skepticism toward liberalism, and Muslims are no exception.58 Furthermore, a significant portion of the ummah deeply believes Islam can and should play a positive role in politics, though not all Muslims globally share this view.
Second, Islamism is not simply a conveyor belt toward jihadism. Empirical realities contradict this erroneous assumption. Many Islamists have remained nonviolent and ideologically consistent over decades, thus debunking the jihadist conveyor belt theory.59 In fact, many jihadists have animosity toward nonviolent Islamists.60 The mutual enmity between the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qaeda, for example, is well documented.61
Third, the idea that all Islamists are hardcore fanatics resistant to change is also unfounded. Many Islamists are political realists who adapt their strategies to the prevailing political context. Malaysia’s PAS abandoned its Islamic state aspirations when it allied with the secular parties Parti Keadilan Rakyat (People’s Justice Party) and Chinese-dominated Democratic Action Party (DAP).62
Finally, and most importantly, not all shades of Islamism warrant a security-led response. Each category of Islamism entails different immediate political aims and methods and therefore calls for a differentiated policy approach, as outlined in the following table.
Figure 2. Proposed Policy Responses to the Different Categories of Islamism
|
Political Islam Type |
Issue |
Policy Response |
|
Deferential passive |
Theological |
No policy response for secular state |
|
Deferential active |
Social |
Social response |
|
Islamist democrat |
Social/political |
Social/political response |
|
Islamist non-democrat |
Social/political |
Social/political response |
|
Jihadist |
Security |
Security response |
For deferential passive and deferential active Islamists, state intervention is unnecessary. Penalizing these groups would amount to policing thought rather than addressing any illegal conduct. For deferential active Islamists, a social response would be most appropriate to continue engaging with them as civil society actors who accept the political legitimacy and sovereignty of the nation-state.
Islamist democrats should be treated like any other political party. As long as they operate within constitutional norms and legal frameworks, their participation in democratic elections should be permitted. Banning Islamist parties should not be the first policy option. Excluding them solely on the basis of their Islamist orientation would undermine the principles of pluralism and democratic legitimacy. Furthermore, such social exclusion, ostracism, and marginalization can backfire insofar as such approaches can contribute to individuals’ radicalization into violent extremism.63 At the same time, winning elections does not grant any party, Islamist or otherwise, a blank check. We should judge Islamist parties, like their secular counterparts, not only by how they campaign and mobilize support but also by how they govern, particularly in upholding democratic procedures, respecting the rights of minorities, and protecting the rule of law. Political transitions bring about inevitable new variables, but political leaders and parties are obligated to earn and sustain the electorate’s trust after elections. There remains the worrying possibility of Islamist electoral success leading to anti-democratic behavior or authoritarian theocratic rule. Such an outcome is not unique to Islamist parties given other precedents of such takeovers by far-right parties, communist parties, etc. The point here is that, whether in the Muslim world or elsewhere, there is a need for strong institutional safeguards and a vigilant civil society to ensure that political leaders and parties do not subvert democratic processes from within.
To confront jihadists, this paper proposes a triple-pronged strategy. First, prevention ensures removal or mitigation of structural and ideological conditions conducive to radicalization. Second, there should be rehabilitation through deradicalization programs for jihadists in custody.64 Third, those convicted of violent acts or incitement to terrorism should face legal punishment. This is necessary because terrorism is a serious crime that “carrots” alone cannot address. Military measures may be necessary, as demonstrated in Iraq and Syria, when an international military coalition successfully degraded the Islamic State from a militant group that controlled vast territories to a series of less effective clandestine cells. Similarly, in the years following the September 11 attacks, U.S., NATO, and Afghan military operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan helped prevent al-Qaeda from launching any jihadist terror attack of comparable scale.
The case of Islamist non-democrats, such as Hizbut Tahrir, presents a trickier challenge. Although they do not explicitly advocate violence, their open rejection of democratic norms and the Westphalian nation-state means their ideology seeks to subvert the existing political order, and associates of these groups have transitioned into jihadism. States must therefore find a nuanced balance between defending free expression and upholding security underpinned by constitutional law and order.
In practice, states can adopt varied approaches. Authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and Central Asia tend to resort to draconian measures against Islamists, such as denying them political space, arbitrarily detaining their members, seizing assets, and even collectively punishing their family members. In contrast, democratic states seem to distinguish between individuals and movements. These governments generally afford individuals their civil liberties while varying their policy responses to Islamist organizations, from proscription (e.g., the banning of Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia, Germany, and the United Kingdom) to restricted activism with close monitoring (e.g., Australia), to full freedoms (e.g., the United States). Ultimately, the ideational character of these movements should guide appropriate policy responses. These responses should be systematic and community-based, incorporating partnerships with civil society actors across all levels to ensure legitimacy, efficacy, and sustainability.
Conclusion
The categories of Islamism explored in this paper should be understood as “ideal” types, constructs that can help delineate distinct trends within political Islam. In practice, however, specific groups or individuals often do not fit neatly into a single category. Their orientations may overlap, shift, or evolve in response to internal dynamics, political context, leadership changes, or ideological reevaluation. Over time, movements may transition across the spectrum, reflecting the fluid and contextual nature of Islamic activism. This paper has outlined different shades of Islamism and called for a more nuanced and realistic understanding of Muslim political activism.
Governments—particularly those upholding freedom of expression—should not reflexively suppress Islamist participation in public life. Such a response would risk violating the foundational principles of liberal democracy and alienate Muslims while undermining potential allies in the fight against true extremism. Many Islamists operate peacefully within the framework of existing political systems, and their ideological commitments are not inherently at odds with democratic norms. Furthermore, given the variety of worldviews within the Muslim world, there is a pressing challenge to understand these complex paradigms.65 Muslims generally have different worldviews from non-Muslims. However, governments should not see this as a precursor to Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis66 but as a pluralism of political thought that liberal democratic societies should be able to accommodate. The challenge for policymakers is to respond proportionately and wisely to different orientations of Islamism, recognizing the ideational, behavioral, and motivational differences between groups.